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A HISTORY OP THE ANTI-AVOIDANCE LEGISLATION APPLYING TO SETTLEMENTS
FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES 
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this study is to examine the growth and spread of 
income tax avoidance through the use of settlements and to analyse the 
background to the introduction of appropriate anti-avoidance 
legislation. Though there is much material available to explain the 
meaning of this legislation there is little to explain why it was 
introduced, what it was aimed at and why it took the form it did.
This research fills that gap and in the process throws light on the 
nature of the relationships between the Inland Revenue, Parliamentary 
Counsel, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Parliament. It also 
shows the influences each have in the policy-making and legislative 
processes. Although the focus is on settlements, some of the 
observations apply to avoidance generally and explain the development 
of the Revenue's attitude to it.
The research shows that the use of settlements for income tax 
avoidance was taking place at least as early as 1851 and became more 
worthwhile once graduation and super-tax were introduced. The real 
attraction to such avoidance came with the large and rapid increases 
in tax rates during the First World War. Anti-avoidance legislation, 
broadly in line with the recommendations of the 1920 Royal Commission, 
was introduced in 1922 but soon proved almost worthless. In 1927
(vi)
a clause to prevent all tax relief for charitable covenants was, under 
pressure, ’ withdrawn. Avoidance spread from the wealthy to the less 
wealthy until in 1936 its cost, in terms of revenue lost, had become 
unacceptably high, and legislation to prevent its most common form, 
(children's settlements) was brought in. Taxpayers adopted 
variations on a similar theme and following a threat of retrospective 
legislation most of the blatant forms of avoidance were blocked in 
1938. This new legislation was a great success, though there were a 
few problem areas for the Revenue which were highlighted by cases 
coming before the courts. Any loopholes so discovered were quickly 
closed off. Restrictions on other classes of settlement were put 
forward by the Revenue to the new Labour Governments elected in 1945 
and 1964, and many of their suggestions were taken up. Some of the 
changes to the legislation since 1977 have been relaxations to the 
provisions to alleviate their harsh manner of operation in certain 
restricted circumstances.
The main source materials for the research were the voluminous records 
of the Inland Revenue and the Treasury available in the Public Records 
Office,together with the files concerning the drafting of the 
* legislation held in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.
Subsidiary sources were parliamentary debates and papers and 
contemporary journal articles, books and press comment.
The analysis has been taken up to April 5, 1988.
(vii)
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The sections which make up Part XVI of the income and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1970, (ICTA 1970), and those other sections of that Act 
which operate by reference to it, are a set of anti-avoidance 
provisions introduced piecemeal from 1922 onwards in response to the 
development of specific methods of avoidance involving settlements. 
They do not have relevance only to trusts, because in most cases they 
are drawn widely enough to encompass dispositions, covenants, 
agreements and arrangements in which a trust is merely incidental, and 
even cases in which there is no trust at all. The provisions also 
extend to settlements made abroad and to sources of income not 
situated in the UK.
Some indication of the importance of Part XVI could be obtained if the 
number of new settlements coning under review by the Revenue each year 
and the number of technical challenges made under those provisions 
were known. Unfortunately, the inland Revenue were unable to produce 
such statistics without very considerable cost, but they were able to 
provide the following figures relating to non-charitable covenants.
2New Deeds Of covenant*
Year To 30 September Deeds To Minors Deeds To Adults
1981 16,000 60,000
1982 21,000 84,000
1983 36,000 85,000
1984 37,000 87,000
1985 46,000 90,000
1986 53,000 100,000
1987 49,000 100,000
♦Estimated to the nearest 1000
Source: Extracted from letter to the writer from Inland Revenue
Claims Branch dated July 28, 1988.
The number of technical challenges made against these covenants in the 
year ended September 30, 1986, was just over 6,000 with an estimated 
tax saving of £4.7m. The equivalent figures for the following year 
were 5000 and £2.6m.l The only year for which an analysis of these 
technical challenges to covenants could be provided by the Revenue was 
for the year ended September 30, 1983, in which 64.45% related to 
section 434, 10.68% to section 437, 0.42% to sections 445 and 450, and 
24.45% related to other causes, (mainly failure to seal).2
Incomplete though the above information is, it does show how 
attractive this form of avoidance seems to be, and how dangerous Part
3XVI still is for those who are reckless enough to ignore its terms, or 
so badly advised that they fail to manoeuvre round the obstacles it 
creates to the successful use of settlements for income tax avoidance.
The purpose of the research is to examine the historical development 
of this form of avoidance and of the corresponding anti-avoidance 
provisions in order to determine the aims of the legislation and to 
explain the circumstances which led to the introduction and refinement 
of each of its parts. It attempts to show why the provisions took 
the form they did and to give an insight into the attitudes, thought 
processes and events which shaped them. Through the fairly narrow 
perspective of the income tax settlement provisions will be seen the 
factors which stimulated avoidance, its spread amongst taxpayers, and 
the Revenue and Government reaction to it.
The development of an institutional structure by the Revenue to detect 
avoidance will be shown, as will the active role they played in 
bringing forward proposals for anti-avoidance legislation and in 
influencing its underlying policy, form and detail. There has been 
no coherent policy governing the nature of the legislation but rather 
the policies and principles have been developed by the inland Revenue 
as new problems have arisen. The inland Revenue have sometimes, 
(particularly in the earlier years), had to wait a long time for the 
opportune moment to put forward their suggestions, and although they 
seem to have a keen sense of knowing minister's minds, public 
attitudes and the political acceptability of their proposals, it is 
often the cost to the Exchequer of the particular form of avoidance 
which has been the major spur to legislation. In more recent years
4the Revenue seem to have met no resistance to their suggestions for 
almost immediate action to deal with any flaws discovered in the 
existing legislation.
The passivity of most chancellors might cause surprise as many give 
the impression of mere "rubber stamping" of detailed and persuasive 
arguments put forward by the inland Revenue whose considerable power 
is based upon their technical and tactical expertise. There have 
howeverfbeen rare but important occasions when Chancellors have 
prevented the Revenue from getting what they wanted. Furthermore, 
although the influence of Parliament on the anti-avoidance legislation 
has been minimal, some non-government amendments have resulted in 
changes to the proposals and an indirect influence has always been 
exerted through the restraint and moderation caused by fears of 
excessive parliamentary criticism. Even when the eventual 
legislation has been satisfactory to the inland Revenue it has often, 
particularly in the case of the earlier provisions, failed to achieve 
its objective, and such failures have been reflected in the increased 
sophistication of later legislation. The inland Revenue has been 
characterised in the thesis as an entity which displays such human 
characteristics as learning from its mistakes, having a memory and its 
own culture and values. It has matured as its experience of tax 
avoidance methods has increased.
Analysis of the "travaux preparatories", though not permitted as an 
aid to the interpretation of the statute, gives a useful but limited 
view into the minds of those who created the legislative text. This 
can give reassurance as to its meaning, but unfortunately although
5"the assiduous academic commentator can act in this way^  (subject to 
the problem of access to confidential official records)t the practical 
lawyer cannot".3 The emphasis has therefore not been upon using 
background materials as aids to interpretation, but more as aids to 
understanding the legislative process, the influences upon it and the 
relationships between those involved in formulating the legislation.
By so doing, a more rounded explanation of the objectives of the 
provisions can be given.
CONTRIBUTION
The thesis contributes to knowledge in a variety of ways. It shows
the aims of the settlement legislation and the reasons for the
refinements which have been made over the years, it accounts for the
development of the Inland Revenuefs attitude to avoidance in general
through the microcosm of its experience of the settlement
anti-avoidance provisions. It shows what great power the Revenue can
have in the policy-making and legislative process and the factors
conducive to their obtaining that power. The insights given into the
workings of the "corporate mind" of the inland Revenue are important
«
in helping to judge the way it will react in future situations, and 
given its influence on tax legislation, provide considerable 
explanation for the eventual shape of that legislation. Sane aspects 
of the detailed account of the process of producing tax legislation 
and of the behaviour and tactics of the administration may prove 
useful to those who wish to influence that legislation.
METHOD OF APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS
The main approach used was to analyse archival data, particularly that
6available in the Public Record Office and the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel, together with reports of parliamentary debates 
and papers presented to Parliament. These primary sources were used 
in combination with reports of tax cases and with journal articles and 
press commentary to gain a full picture of the state of the relevant 
income tax law immediately before the introduction of each new 
anti-avoidance provision, the nature and extent of the avoidance being 
used, public and professional awareness of it, and the reaction of the 
administration to its discovery. By bringing these materials together 
in one place the thesis presents a systematic study of the process by 
which one part of the anti-avoidance legislation has evolved from the 
time the various "abuses" and faults of the existing system were 
detected by the inland Revenue and examines how well that legislation 
has met its objectives. The legislation and case law is only 
explained as part of the process of achieving the main purpose of the 
research and a familiarity with the relevant law is assumed.
A major limitation of the research is that the thirty year closure 
rule prevented the examination of files in the Public Record Office 
after 1957, and that the department’s discretionary power to impose a 
50 year, 75 year and even 100 year closure has been frequently used by 
the Inland Revenue.4 It seems likely however, that in general,
extended closures have been used mainly for files involving personal 
details rather than for those relating to policy matters, and that 
therefore possibly little of major importance has been missed, but 
some of the class descriptions of closed files did indicate that they 
might have been relevant.
7Fortunately, and rather surprisingly, it was found that the Office of 
the Parlimamentary Counsel was prepared to grant access to their files 
right up to May 1979. The writer's experience of earlier years shows 
that much of the material on the closed post-1957 inland Revenue and 
Treasury files will be on the Parliamentary Counsel files, and that 
the latter files will thus give sufficient details to be able to deal 
with later years adequately. However, it is probable that there is 
considerable preparatory material on the closed files concerning the 
need for legislation, statistics and options considered, and it must 
therefore be borne in mind that all analysis and commentary relating 
to 1958 onwards (chapters 9 to 11) has been subject to this constraint.
REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH
There are four main classes of research related to the subject matter 
of this thesis; that which deals with the history of income tax; that 
which deals with tax avoidance generally; that which specifically 
deals with the settlement provisions; and that which deals with the 
formulation of tax policy. Although all four have in varying degrees 
been useful, their approach can be distinguished from that used in 
this study.
The general works on the history of income tax5 concentrate on the 
overall development of the income tax system through an analysis of 
the strategy of the various Budgets, the reaction to them, and the 
political and economic climate in which they were introduced, in 
doing so they, and the more specific papers which focus on one Budget 
or one Chancellor,5 make more than passing comment about the 
development of anti-avoidance legislation, but can hardly go into the
8details of any specific provision. They are essentially dealing with 
matters on a "macro" level, and because of this they rarely refer to 
those detailed papers in the Public Record Office or the Office of 
parliamentary Counsel which had to be examined in order to carry out 
research at the "micro" level required for this thesis. Nevertheless, 
they provide an essential background and context within which this 
study is set, and are based upon some of the same source materials.
Research concerning tax avoidance as a whole is of two types, 
historical and legalistic. To provide a detailed history of income 
tax avoidance would be a gargantuan task, and although nobody has yet 
undertaken it, a valiant attempt to give a popularised account of the 
subject was made by Oliver Stanley.? Settlements were, however, 
largely dealt with by giving brief accounts of the major (and simpler) 
tax cases.8 The legalistic research considers the merits of the 
different approaches available for dealing with tax avoidance and 
often proceeds on the basis of a comparison between countries.9 It 
also concerns itself with judicial attitudes to avoidance.10 Neither 
of these aspects of legalistic research has been examined in this 
thesis.
The third class of research is that which provides an analysis of the 
statute and case law concerning settlements, and in some cases goes on 
to provide advice on how to skirt round these provisions and gives 
appropriate wording for the drafting of deeds.H Such an approach 
does not involve an attempt to explain why the provisions were brought 
into effect and as this thesis does not provide a detailed account of 
the operation of the sections or an analysis of the case law, (except
9where it explains some later anti-avoidance provision), the two 
approaches are fundamentally different.
Perhaps the most relevant class of research to that in this study 
deals with the tax policy-making environment and the way in which tax 
policy is formed.^2 as Robinson and Sandford1  ^point out "we have 
little idea how our tax system came to be as it is - whether as a 
result of economic forces, political ideology, bureaucratic power, or 
other influences". Their analysis attempts to deal with this through 
an examination of the introduction of new taxes and shows that 
politicians set the goals for these taxes and that the civil servant's 
role was largely to flesh out their proposals and in doing so they did 
not perform "innovative and imaginative functions".14
This study shows an entirely different aspect of policy-making. It 
does not deal with new taxes but with specific anti-avoidance 
provisions, and shows the inland Revenue not only taking the initiative 
for introducing the legislation but also proposing the policy and 
working out the detailed procedural rules. It indicates that at the 
more "micro" and less political level, the policy-making process is 
quite unlike that found for the introduction of new taxes. The 
methodology used by Robinson and Sandford was to analyse a wide 
variety of documentary evidence relating to new taxes introduced 
between 1964 and 1976 and to interview many of those who were directly 
involved, but they could not examine the inland Revenue or Treasury 
files due to the thirty year closure rule.
The primary materials upon which this study is based have not been
10
used for this purpose before, and therefore there is no directly 
relevant prior research literature to review.
ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
Chapters 2 to 11 present an analysis of the subject matter over almost 
190 years in broadly chronological order with each chapter focusing on 
a period whose length has been determined according to the 
introduction of some important aspect of the legislation. The 
analysis stops at April 5, 1988 and references to the current 
legislation are therefore to the income and corporation Taxes Act 1970 
(ICTA 1970). Copies of the relevant clauses and schedules of the 
Finance Bills prior to 1970 are provided in the appendices in volume 2 
together with copies of the sections eventually enacted.
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the introduction in 1922 of the first 
efforts at the anti-avoidance provisions, by analysing the early
evidence of the use of settlements and the changes in the tax system
' • <•
which may have encouraged their spread. It gives some indication of 
how the Inland Revenue's attitude towards avoidance changed between 
the time income tax was introduced and the time they gave evidence to 
the 1920 Royal Commission on Taxation. It shows how the introduction 
of graduation and super-tax followed by the rapid rise in tax rates 
during the First World War and a hardening attitude to evaders caused 
a major stimulus to widespread avoidance.
The following chapter shows how, after a curious delay, a slightly 
modified version of the Royal commission's proposals regarding 
settlements were put to the Chancellor, agreed to, clothed in
11
statutory language and put before MP's, many of whom clearly had 
little understanding of the complex and detailed provisions they were 
being asked to consider.
Chapter 4 examines the way in which the 1922 provisions were within a 
few years easily circumvented and how a Cabinet Committee was formed 
to consider the whole problem of tax avoidance. The implementation 
of the Committee's recommendation to remove all tax relief for 
payments under charitable covenant proved to be so contentious that 
the proposed legislation was withdrawn. Nothing further was done to 
modify the 1922 provisions and the professional journals and 
eventually the newspapers spread detailed information on how to get 
round them so that by 1936 this form of avoidance was widespread and 
costly to the Excheq&er.
The process by which the inland Revenue built up statistics of the 
extent of the problem, (at least in respect of settlements on 
children), and persuaded the Chancellor of the need for action and 
battled unsuccessfully to get their own way is the subject of chapter 
5.
Chapter 6 shows how despite the Chancellor's threat of introducing 
retrospective legislation to block such schemes, avoidance methods 
hardly used in 1936 spread rapidly through the medium of journals and 
newspapers so that by 1938 further legislation became necessary. New 
provisions were introduced to deal with revocable settlements, (now 
5445-446 icta 1970), settlements in which the settlor retained an 
interest, (now S447 ICTA 1970), annual payments to trustees which were
12
not distributed by them, (now S450 ICTA 1970), and capital sums paid 
to the settlor in cases where income had been accumulated in the 
settlement, (now S451 ICTA 1970) and these, together with their 
supplementary provisions, make up a major and important part of the 
whole code. The process leading to this legislation contained some 
extraordinary elements, with the chancellor receiving advice from a 
barrister concerning how this form of avoidance could be stopped once 
and for all, the draft Budget statement being circulated amongst some 
of the Chancellor's trusted friends, various individuals attempting to 
draft appropriate legislation, and the parliamentary draftsman having 
great difficulties in producing a satisfactory form of words for 
section 451.
The following chapter demonstrates how the rather unsophisticated 
level of professional advice and the changed public attitudes to 
avoidance contributed towards the success of the 1936 and 1938 
legislation in preventing the avoidance at which it was aimed.
However, a potentially dangerous loophole in connection with 
settlements involving joint settlors was discovered as a result of the 
case of Herbert v. CIR^ but it was closed with retrospective effect 
on rather flimsy grounds of principle by means of declaratory 
provisions which are now in sections 436, 442 and 452 of ICTA 1970.
The eighth chapter shows that despite the continuing success of the 
original provisions, the Inland Revenue were quick to put forward two 
further radical restrictions relating to certain classes of settlement 
when the new Labour Government was elected in 1945. Though the 
Government accepted both proposals without resistance, and the attack
13
on the Duke of Westminster class of avoidance received no direct 
criticism, the removal of surtax relief for payments under charitable 
covenants was of an altogether different character. Even though it 
could hardly be classed as tax avoidance it was presented as such, and 
this caused considerable resentment and contentious argument in 
Parliament. The proposal emerged unscathed and obtained statutory 
effect in what is now section 458 ICTA 1970.
Although the period 1946 to 1958 involved a much reduced level of 
legislative and case law activity relating to settlements, chapter 9 
indicates that there were nevertheless two highly significant 
events. Firstly, the consolidation in 1952 created a defect which 
was not discovered until five years later, and secondly, the Revenue's 
loss of the case of Saunders v. CIR in 195716 was the first major 
failure of the 1938 provisions. The Revenue reacted to these dangers 
with great speed, and though they had some difficulty in obtaining 
exactly what they wanted, their perseverance resulted in than not only 
getting their own way, but also in the'introduction of further 
anti-avoidance legislation, (now section 448 ICTA 1970), before any 
known cases of avoidance had arisen. The chapter also illustrates 
how it can be politically acceptable to make minor changes to related 
legislation at the same time as major changes elsewhere, even though 
there is no direct interdependence between them and the minor 
alterations would not otherwise have obtained parliamentary time.
Chapter 10 deals with the eight years to 1966, a period in which a 
recurrent theme was the changes to the settlement provisions 
consequent upon alteration to the tax legislation in other areas and
14
in which the settlements legislation was first applied to another tax 
by being forced in an unsatisfactory manner to encompass short term 
gains. Even with a Labour Government committed to attacking 
"notorious avoidance and evasion devices",the inland Revenue*s 
major review of tax avoidance through settlements in late 1964, merely 
resulted in the removal of surtax relief for virtually all covenants 
and incane transfers the following year, leaving their other 
suggestions to be introduced in modified form a few years later, or to 
be ignored. The harsh provisions dealing with covenants and income 
transfers created anomalies and difficulties which were serious enough 
to result in retrospective relaxations being introduced in 1966.
One of the salient features of the penultimate chapter is the 
continuation of the process of making adjustments to the settlement 
provisions and applying them to other areas whenever new legislation, 
like restrictions on relief for interest paid, was introduced.
However, the short-lived aggregation of children's income with that of 
its parent introduced by the Finance Act 1968, and the permanent 
repeal of relief under section 228 of the income Tax Act 1952, were 
responses to arguments put forward by the Revenue in the 1964 review 
mentioned above. The Labour Government's weakness in 1977 led them 
to be persuaded by the Liberals to introduce relaxations to the 
settlement provisions in their application to maintenance funds for 
historic buildings and these relaxations were later extended by the 
Conservatives. A loophole pointed out by the draftsman in 1965 was 
eventually exploited in the early 1970's by the reverse annuity 
scheme, which, once discovered by the inland Revenue, was quickly 
stopped by the Finance Act 1977. It was not until 1980, when a flaw
15
was found in section 451 ICTA. 1970, that the Revenue came forward with 
a consultative paper concerning its modification, despite the 
considerable judicial criticism of the section*s draconian manner of 
operation many years earlier,18
The final chapter draws conclusions from the detailed research and 
attempts to analyse and explain trends, to draw together the 
connecting factors and to make explicit the patterns which have 
emerged fran the study. An indication of the usefulness of what has 
been done is given, and finally some brief suggestions for further 
related research are provided.
16
CHAPTER 2
1799-1920: FACTORS LEADING TO THE USE OF SETTLEMENTS FOR AVOIDANCE
AND TO EVENTUAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE MEASURES
INTRODUCTION
The potential for tax avoidance using settlements has been available 
right frcm the very introduction of income tax and the evidence shows 
that it was not long before the loophole was exploited. The inland 
Revenue initially had a very relaxed attitude to such avoidance and 
were far more concerned about the fact that evasion was widespread and 
difficult to detect. Avoidance was probably thought of by many 
taxpayers as being unnecessary when evasion was simple, relatively 
risk-free and achieved their aims.
A major stimulus to tax avoidance came in the early part of this 
century when the Revenue obtained greater powers to assist them to 
detect evasion and the penalties imposed became more severe. When 
this was combined with the imposition of graduation, super-tax, and 
sudden and very large increases in tax rates, many taxpayers appear to 
have been drawn into tax avoidance, and professional expertise began 
to develop to assist them.
By the end of the First World War, the Revenue's attitude to avoidance 
had hardened considerably and the damning evidence on the use of 
settlements which they presented to the 1920 Royal commission resulted 
in recommendations for anti-avoidance legislation.
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EARLY EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF SETTLEMENTS FOR AVOIDANCE: 1799-1903 
The Potential Attraction
Although the incane tax introduced in 1799 was charged at the rate of 
10%, various outgoings, like annual interest and annuities, were 
deducted in computing the total income upon which that charge was 
made. These deductions in combination with the fact that incomes 
under £60 where exempt, and graduated rates of tax were applied up to 
£200 before the full 10% was charged, meant that the system contained 
a defect because it would have been possible to avoid tax by creating 
settlements. These could take such simple forms as the transfer of 
assets to others within the family or the granting of annuities to 
them.l The ease with which the tax was evaded^ would possibly have 
led many people to merely evade rather than avoid it, but nevertheless 
the fundamental flaw upon which much tax avoidance was later based was 
inherent in the income tax system right from the start.
The greatly modified income tax introduced in 1803 was much more 
difficult to evade because it was based on the principle of taxation 
at source. This may have led taxpayers to actively seek out means of 
avoidance, and settlements would certainly have been very effective 
for this purpose, due to the exemption of incomes under £60 and the 
abatements applying up to £150. Initially the full rate of tax was 
only 5%, but with avoidance being so easily achieved it was probably 
still considered worthwhile, in 1805/06 the full tax rate was 
increased to 6-jj;% and in the following year to 10%; a rate which 
applied until the abolition of the tax in 1815.
Evasion had apparently becone so widespread, and so many persons had
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been declaring their income to be just under the £60 exemption limit, 
that it was decided, in 1806/07 to reduce that limit to £50 so that 
those who had made returns at just under the £60 limit in the previous 
year would find difficulty in showing a sufficient reduction in their 
income to obtain exemption.3 The total income tax yield for 1806/07 
was double that for the previous year, and even after allowing for the 
increased rate of tax and reduced exemption limit, it is clear that a 
considerable number of evaders had effectively been caught, it is very 
likely that these new payers of income tax, finding evasion a little 
more difficult, became all the more attracted to avoidance.4
In 1842 income tax was reimposed by an Act which was largely a reprint 
of the Act of 1806,5 but with the limit of exemption for individuals 
raised to £150 and the tax rate fixed at seven pence in the pound.5 
By present day standards one might think that with such a low rate of 
tax avoidance might not have been considered worthwhile, but it must 
be taken into account that once total income reached £150 the whole of 
it became liable to tax, and therefore at the margin avoidance had a 
considerable attraction.
Evidence Put to the Select Committees of 1851 and 1852 
Evidence taken before the Select committee on Income and Property Tax 
in June and July 1851*7 indicates that there was indeed a considerable 
amount of avoidance taking place.8 Although the committee spent more 
time discussing evasion, (in the strict sense), than avoidance the few 
references there are to methods of avoidance often relate to 
settlements. The creation of a charge on income by means of an annuity 
was apparently very common, as was the transfer of property to
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children and relatives, other than the wife,9 as can be seen from the 
following exchanges in the in the Minutes of Evidence to the Select 
Committee.
Question 226 Mr. Henley.(A member of the committee)
"How do you distinguish between what you have termed an evasion 
and a fraud?"
Charles Pressly.(A Commissioner of inland Reveue)
"I made use of the word avoidance? a man having £160 a year may 
charge his estate with an annuity of £20 a year to his child? I 
do not call that an evasion of the duty at all? I think it is 
perfectly legitimate? I think he avoids the payment of the 
duty."
Question 2387 Mr. Henley
"Have you any other cases about Schedule A?"
Mr. J. Hyde.(A Surveyor of Taxes)
"I have only ways and manners in which parties get off? some in 
one way and sane in another by contrivances, what we call 
avoidance? these two cases are under Schedule D? one is that of 
a clerk to rather an important gentleman, whose salary was £150 
a year, and he publicly asked his master to reduce it below, to 
get off the list? that is a common case now."
Question 2388. Mr. Henley.
"What is the other case?
Mr. J. Hyde.
Another is a case of an annuitant selling a sixpence out of the 
£150 to get it off."
One of the special Commissioners (Mr. Hyde) gave a good example of the 
kind of avoidance which was taking place:-
"... a farmer who is the owner and occupier of a farm at £140 
per annum ... would be assessed at £4/l/8d under Schedule A 
for the value and at £2/-/10d for the occupation, under 
Schedule D. His son, ... was employed upon the farm? he 
ostensibly makes the son his tenant, by which means the 
father can claim the £140 for the value of the farm, and the 
son can claim under Schedule D as the occupier at £140. The 
exemption runs up to £300 a year .... I believe that was 
done in Derbyshire to a great extent, and in other parts of 
the country, after the first year. This is what I would 
describe perhaps as a legal avoidance? it is not a fraud? it 
is merely the management."10
Hyde told the Committee that this kind of avoidance occurred quite
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frequently, and argued that taxpayers freely admitted to doing so 
because they thought such avoidance to be fair and reasonable.^ The 
Committee explored the possibility that such transactions were not 
bona fide because they were fraudulent, but the Revenue explained that 
there were no means of disproving that such transactions were bona
fide.12
The Revenue officials thought that avoidance by bringing income under 
the £150 exemption limit had increased considerably since income tax 
was first imposed.13 when asked whether taxpayers had begun to look 
upon the tax as permanent rather than temporary and therefore 
considered it more worth their while to make avoidance arrangements!^ 
the Revenue did not directly reply, but merely drew attention to the 
fact that more people were making small repayment claims than had 
previously done so because they had not taken the trouble of making a 
claim when they thought that the tax was only temporary.15 This 
reflects a change in the behaviour of taxpayers which is likely to 
have been more fundamental than a changed attitude to repayment 
claims. Once they considered income tax as a permanent feature of 
their financial affairs many more taxpayers probably began to create 
settlements to avoid it and it is possible that this was partly 
responsible for the increase in repayment claims.
The 1851 Select committee merely made a one page holding report and 
suggested that a further committee should be appointed. The following 
year their suggestion was taken up, but the 1852 committee spent most 
of its time considering alternative forms of taxation rather than the 
detailed operation of the existing system, and there is no mention of 
income tax avoidance in the Minutes of Evidence.15 However, the 
Comptroller of Legacy Duties did indicate that there had been a
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considerable increase in the number of deeds of gift of personal property, 
and particularly stock, Which was often put into joint names.^ By this 
means not only was legacy duty being avoided, but in many cases probably 
income tax as well.
Although there is little direct evidence of avoidance besides that 
provided by the Revenue, there were certainly many people whose 
circumstances would have made avoidance very attractive. The Head of the 
Statistical Branch of the General Register Office advised the committee 
that there were 341,000 individuals with incomes of £150 per annum or more 
in 1848. Of these, 105,000 had incomes in the range £150-£200 per annum^^ 
and the temptation for them to use avoidance to bring their income below 
the £150 exemption limit must have been quite strong.
The Effects of Permanancy And Rate Fluctuations
The income Tax Act of 1853 made major changes to the system but made it 
clear that the tax was intended to expire on April 5, 1860. It is 
suggested that this was a long enough period to cause individuals to go to 
the trouble of taking avoidance measures; especially when it is considered 
that there was a reduction in the exemption limit from £150 to £100. 
Reduced rates of tax were applied where the income fell between £100 and 
£150 and for 1853/54 the lower rate was five pence while the higher rate 
was seven pence, it was intended that these rates would be reduced over 
the seven year period for which the tax was imposed but on the declaration 
of war with Russia it became necessary to double than with effect from 
1854/55. A further increase took place in 1855/56 taking the lower rate 
to eleven and one half pence and the upper rate to one shilling and four 
pence; rates which also applied in the following year. One shilling and
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four pence was the highest incane tax rate ever reached until the outbreak 
of war in 1914.
The doubling of the rate of tax in 1854/55 and the further increase in 
1855/56 may well have been the stimulus for a considerable extension in 
the use of simple avoidance techniques but there is no direct evidence of 
t h i s . T h e  relatively high tax rates were, however, short-lived, and 
by 1857/58 they were reduced again to their pre-war levels.
Although another Select Committee on income and Property Tax was appointed 
in 186120 with the same terms of reference as the previous two, it 
concentrated its attention on some fairly radical proposals for 
modifications to income tax put forward by the Committee chairman and did 
not consider avoidance. However, inland Revenue officials did indicate 
that they believed that evasion of income tax was rife, but because of 
lack of information powers, extremely difficult to prevent.21 once again, 
the Committee made no proposals for amendment of income tax22 and a long 
period of stability in the incane tax system was to follow.
In the fifty years from 1859 to 1909 tax rates varied between two pence 
and one shilling and three pence in the pound "as poverty or plethora 
dictated"23 so that until the Finance Act of 1909-10 introduced super-tax 
together with a slight element of progression in the tax rates, the 
pay-off from avoidance would have been very small. Additionally, in 1863, 
the lower rate of tax on small incomes was replaced by a system of 
abatements where incomes exceeded the limit for exemption and this would 
have further decreased the attraction of avoiding tax where the exempt 
limit was marginally exceeded. However, evasion continued, according to
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the inland Revenue, to be "very considerable".24
Although there had been expectations of the abolition of income tax (and 
in fact a promise of its abolition to the Electorate of 1874) by 1876 
"even that modest ambition was abandoned"25 and with income tax looking 
like a permanent tax, many individuals probably began to consider taking 
permanent measures to avoid it.
Evidence Fran The Revenue's internal Files
In the period from 1851 to 1904 there is a dearth of internal inland
Revenue documents concerning tax avoidance,26 though fragmentary evidence
of the use of settlements is available in some of the Public Record Office
files. This lack of materials may indicate the relative rareness of such
forms of avoidance and some support for this is given in a memorandum by
the Board of inland Revenue to the cabinet Tax Evasion Committee in 1926
when the. Cabinet was informed that,
"the incentive to legal avoidance may almost be said to have 
begun with the high rate of taxation imposed during the war. It 
has been practiced since that time probably to a steadily 
increasing extent."27
Despite what the Board reported there is sane evidence concerning the 
use of settlements prior to the 1914 War in the Revenue's "Precedent 
Books" which set out brief details of certain technical cases which 
had been considered by specialists at Head Office. The book for the 
period 1892-191028 contains the following separate entries
"Minors - claim made by father, no trust and no absolutely 
definite statement as to nature of interest or amount expended.
Mr. Stoodley [Secretary for Stamps and Taxes to the Board of 
Inland Revenue] considered that there was no doubt as to money 
being minor's own and accepted the view that all the income was 
expended. The claim ultimately passed."
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"Minor children - income arising frcm shares transferred to 
their names and shares purchased in their names (Scotland). The 
solicitor's opinion on the facts of this case is that delivery 
of the property to the children has been proved, claim 
accordingly admitted under Board's Order 3rd October 1886."
The decision in the latter case was taken in 189629 but it is clear 
that questions had arisen in the past concerning the effectiveness or 
otherwise of transfers of income to children and that the Board had 
laid down guidelines in 1886 as to how such cases were to be treated.
The other evidence is all rather negative.30 Although a file giving 
details of precedents and practice notes for 19033-1- contains no 
references to any relevant matters and neither do the files containing 
the Solicitor's opinions and reports for the years 1906-1908 
. inclusive,33 at least this is sane evidence of the relative lack of 
importance of settlements at that time.
Miscellaneous Evidence
The relatively unsophisticated nature of the tax advice given by 
professionals can be seen from the correspondence and articles in 
their journals for the latter part of the nineteenth century.33 No 
doubt this ensured the restrained nature of avoidance in this period 
and that information concerning successful avoidance schemes spread 
only very slowly through the professions.
The Revenue estimated that the number of UK taxpayers was fairly 
steady at between one million and 1.3 million between 1840 and 
1882.3^ By 1883 the number had reached 1.5 million, but by 1901 five 
million people were estimated to be liable to income tax.33 This 
dramatic increase in the
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number of taxpayers over a very short period of time may well have 
stimulated an interest in tax avoidance for those who came within the tax 
net for the first time.
Transfers of income to charities in order that they could reclaim the tax 
deducted eventually came to be considered as a major problem by the 
Revenue, but there is little evidence of such transfers prior to the First 
World War. Even if such transfers did take place their effect must have 
been rather insignificant because according to a Special Commissioner who 
gave evidence to the Hume committee in 1851, only £24,960 was repaid in 
total to the 3,334 charities making claims.36 Evidence from after the 
First World War refers back to the pre war period and gives support for 
the view that transfers of income to charities was not common.37
Any loss of tax arising through settlements was apparently not of major 
concern to the Inland Revenue, because if it had been, they would almost 
certainly have found some cases worthy of fighting in the courts on the 
grounds that the income transfer was ineffective. The Tax Cases contain 
no evidence of such an attitude being taken until the case of CIR v 
Wilson38 in 1927, and although reported cases may only represent the tip 
of an iceberg, the scarcity of references to such avoidance devices in the 
files at the Public Record Office does seem to indicate that the number of 
cases in which the Revenue considered litigation but decided not to go 
ahead was probably negligible.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM AND IN THE TAX RATES
Although there was little to provoke widespread income tax avoidance in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the end of the First World
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War changes had taken place which produced a major stimulus for taxpayers 
to find ways to reduce their liability. These changes took place in two 
stages; firstly, by structural alterations in the ten years before the 
war, and secondly by major increases in tax rates during the war.
Re-appraisals Lead To important changes To The Tax System 
The first important step towards change was the appointment in 1904 of the 
Departmental Committee on Income Tax^9 which enquired into the 
desirability of alterations in the income tax system under various 
headings, including the prevention of fraud and evasion.40 Although the 
terms of reference refer to fraud and evasion the Minutes of Evidence^! 
show that the committee treated avoidance as a form of evasion.42
Detailed examples of classes of avoidance were provided in a memorandum 
submitted by Sir Thomas Hewitt, a King's counsel43 who had been Clerk and 
Counsel to the Commissioners of Taxes for the City of London for a period
of over 22 years. He described the methods used to avoid tax as forms of
legal evasion.
"Other numerous cases of evasion are those effected with the 
assistance given by the decided cases under the income Tax Acts, 
and the careful evasion, after careful study by the taxpayer of
the Acts and decided cases, of the fair incidence of the tax on
profits which ought properly be charged."44
There is no mention in the Report or the Minutes of Evidence of the 
avoidance of tax by settlements, but it is clear that Sir T. Hewitt 
believed that all forms of avoidance were extending considerably.
"I know it is so. I can speak absolutely and positively."45 on 
being asked whether non-liability following tax avoidance was 
recognised by the inland Revenue he replied:-
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"We have been trying hard to see that it is not recognised, 
because it is so grossly unfair. The inland Revenue should be 
looked upon as representing the other taxpayers, and its 
interest is to protect those who pay the taxes against frauds or 
evasions by those who do not. it is in that relationship that 
the Inland Revenue has taken up the cudgels and have said that 
these persons to all intents and purposes are liable."46
This is perhaps the first clear sign of the inland Revenue*s antipathy 
towards avoidance and their determination to challenge its 
effectiveness and is in stark contrast to the neutral attitude of the 
officials giving evidence to the Select committee in 1851, who seemed 
to believe that avoidance was merely the sensible arrangement of a 
persons affairs.47 perhaps the best illustration of the changed 
attitude is the response of Hewitt to the question of whether the law 
was in a satisfactory condition.48
"I consider that strong measures should be taken to put down all 
trickery to evade what is the plain duty of every man having the 
protection of the government".
Hewitt told the Committee that the avoidance he had described to them 
had arisen within the previous 5 years. He could offer no explanation 
for its growth, but rather surprisingly, stated that he did not 
believe that increases in the rate of income tax had been the main 
cause of it.49 Given the evidence on the behavioural effects of rate 
increases on repayment claims (see below) his views are a little 
suspect.
Settlements could at this time only be used to benefit from further 
exemptions or abatements which would not otherwise be utilized by 
members of a person's family or others. With income tax being 
deducted at source, repayment claims would have beeen necessary in
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cases where income had been transferred to another person for 
avoidance purposes, in 1904, total repayment was available where the 
income did not exceed £160, while abatement was available where income 
did not exceed £700. The virtual doubling of the rate of income tax 
from eight pence in 1900, to one shilling and threepence in 1902, was 
accompanied by very large increases in the numbers of claims to 
repayment. The total number of repayments made in the year to April 
5, 1904, was 435,000, (of which over 70% related to exemption claims 
by individuals, while only 1% related to charities),50 an increase of 
just over 100% in four years.51
It might be thought that this rapid growth in repayment claims was 
related to transfers of income to avoid the increasing rates of tax, 
but this was not the explanation given to the Committee by the Inland 
Revenue. The Principal of the Income Tax Repayment Department at 
Somerset House thought that the chief cause of the increase in the 
number of claims was that those who had considered it hardly worth 
their while making claims when the tax rate was eight pence did think 
it worthwhile to claim when the rate was increased.52 He did concede 
that there were other causes, citing the increase in population and 
changes in the distribution of'wealth, but did not specifically refer
to settlements.52
Given a background of rapidly increasing tax rates and a climate in 
which some forms of tax avoidance were beginning to grow and spread, 
it seems likely that the exploitation of the exemption and abatement 
limits would begin to take place, and this may have contributed to the 
changes in the distribution of wealth mentioned above. However,
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obtaining a tax repayment was neither a simple nor a speedy matter,54 
and the claimant would often be troubled with various queries before 
repayment would be made. These factors must have weighed against 
creating settlements to avoid small amounts of tax.
To sane degree there is probably a relationship between avoidance and 
the extent to which evasion is possible with little risk of
detection. As the probabililty of detection of evasion, as perceived
by the evader, is increased, more evaders will probably replace their 
illegal activities by avoidance, in 1905 there apparently was 
"abundant evidence to show that, in the sphere in which 
self-assessment is still requisite, there is a substantial amount of 
fraud and evasion"55 Revenue officials apparently had evidence 
showing "that grossly insufficient returns, or no returns at all, are 
made over long periods of years with impunity, the probability of 
detection being slight until some event occurs to bring the true facts 
to light ...."56 The Revenue thought that their powers to obtain 
information in order to detect evasion were totally insufficient and 
that even if an evader was caught the penalty powers and period for 
which recovery could be made were "far from adequate".57 it was 
believed that "many persons or their advisers, and their number is
increasing rapidly, are aware of the very limited powers of the
department, and therefore refuse to make restitution."58 The evader 
was therefore in a very strong position in that the risk of detection 
was slight and even if detected, the penalty was relatively 
insignificant. As the committee record "even in cases of persistent 
and deliberate evasions of duty, continued it may be, over a long 
series of years, only a small portion of the evaded duty can be
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legally recovered and only very insignificant penalties can be 
inflicted when the fraud is finally detected."59 The Committee 
recommended the extension of the time limit for recovering back duty 
from one year, to three years after the end of the year assessment 
involved, and that the maximum penalty should be treble the duty for 
the whole period involved rather than for the one year to which 
penalties could at that time be applied. Furthermore, they 
recommended an extension to the Revenue*s information powers 
concerning income from employment.50
The Committee's suggestions relating to evasion were implemented in 
1907 and heralded the beginning of a major shift in the manner in 
which evaders were detected and dealt with. This may have driven many 
erstwhile evaders into avoidance.
The pace of change was gathering speed and a Select committee was set 
up in 1906 to enquire and report "upon the practicability of 
graduating the income tax and differentiating between permanent and 
precarious incomes".51 This Committee had a major influence on the 
radical changes which occurred over the following few years because it 
concluded that graduation by way of a superimposed tax (super-tax) was 
practicable if it was confined to larger incomes and that 
differentiation between earned and unearned income was feasible by 
charging a lower rate on earned income.
Differentiation was introduced in the Finance Act 190752 but a return 
of total income was required in order to claim the benefit of the 
lower rate of tax on earned income.
31
Graduation was introduced by the Budget of 1909 with the imposition of 
a super-tax on individuals with incomes over £5,000. The rate of tax 
was sixpence in the pound on the income in excess of £3,000, but as it 
was estimated that there were only 12,500 taxpayers with income in 
excess of £5,000,63 few people were expected to be affected. The same 
Budget increased the income tax rate on incomes exceeding £3,000 to 
one shilling and two pence but there were no other major changes in 
income tax or super-tax, except for certain super-tax loopholes being 
closed, until the last Finance Act before the outbreak of war in 
1914. That Finance Act reduced the exenption limit for super-tax to 
£3,000 and introduced a graduated scale of super-tax up to a maximum 
of one shilling and fourpence on incomes exceeding eight thousand 
pounds. It also switched income tax to a graduated scale; from 
ninepence on earned income of £1,000 or less, to one shilling and two 
pence on earned income exceeding £2,500 with the rate on unearned 
income being fixed at one shilling and two pence. The maximum rate of 
tax was therefore approximately thirteen percent on unearned incomes 
exceeding £8,000; a level at which the shoe began to pinch.
Even with these tax rates, as Lloyd George pointed out, although 
avoidance was possible, much of it "was not worthwhile".64 as the 
inconvenience of tax avoidance was in many cases not justified by the 
small tax savings obtained; a point emphasised in 1911 in perhaps the 
first published article entirely devoted to the subject of 
avoidance.65 However, none of the seven examples of methods of 
avoidance in the article involved any form of settlement. Although 
readers were reminded to satisfy themselves as to the honesty as well 
as the legality of avoidance schemes, and to remember "that what is
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legal is not necessarily h o n o u r a b l e , " * ^  within a few years, questions 
of honour would have been overshadowed by the very considerable 
increases in tax rates and the consequent attractions of tax avoidance.
Rate Increases Magnify the Attraction of Avoidance 
By the introduction of a super-tax and the attack on evasion, the 
seeds of widespread avoidance were sown, but it was not until the 
major increases in tax rates were imposed in order to assist in the 
financing of the First World War that avoidance grew and blossomed. 
Between 1913-14 and 1918-19, the standard rate of income tax increased 
from Is.2d to 6 shillings,*>? and the rate of super-tax increased from 
a flat 6d in the pound to a top rate of 6 shillings in the pound on 
incomes above £30,000 per annum.*>8
Other factors were also at work. The lowering of the incane tax 
exemption limit fron £160 per annum to £130 per annum in 1915 when 
combined with the rapidly rising level of wages, brought into 
assessment a greatly increased number of individuals*^ There was 
more than a three-fold increase in the number of individuals charged 
to income tax over the period 1913-14 to 1919-20.?0 The reduction in 
the limit below which super-tax was not payable from £5,000 in 1913-14 
to £2,000 by 1921/22 led to an increase in the numbers liable to 
super-tax from 14,000 to 93,000 while the super-tax charged over this 
period increased over twentyfold?!
The effect these income tax and super-tax changes had upon various 
classes of individual can be seen fron Appendix A5. The unmarried 
individual whose sole income was from investments and who was liable
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to super-tax in 1920-21 (income exceeding £2,000) had on the 
assumption of no change in his income, suffered an increase in tax of 
between 450 and 700 percent, and the married individual with three 
children and whose income was all earned and who was liable to 
super-tax had suffered broadly equivalent increases. It seems 
unlikely that the relatively well-off individual who received the 
major part of his income from investments would have been able to 
maintain his real incane with a rapid price inflation and a major 
portion of any increased profits available to pay his dividends being 
eroded by excess profits duty or the munitions levy. With a shrinking 
disposable income due to taxation and the real value of that income 
being eroded by inflation those individuals with investments must 
surely have felt a considerable burden and may well have attempted to 
maximise the family income through the creation of settlements.?2
There had also been a dramatic shift in the relative burden of 
taxation towards the more wealthy. In 1912 the indirect taxes 
produced 42% of all revenue and direct taxes 53%, but by 1918 indirect 
taxes produced only 18%, with direct taxes accounting for82%?3 
Increases in the indirect taxes were relatively insignificant and 
could hardly be said to have borne harshly upon anything other than 
the very smallest of incomes.74 Larger incomes clearly bore the brunt 
of the increased total tax burden and it was this that lead to claims 
that they were "already inequitably overtaxed"^
A further push towards avoidance was provided by the manner in which 
graduation of the income tax rates operated prior to the Finance Act 
of 1916. Once the income exceeded the limit for any particular lower
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rate of tax, the next rate was applied to the whole of the income. A 
similar situation could arise where an individual ceased to be 
entitled to an exemption or abatement or became entitled to a reduced 
exemption or abatement on account of his incane exceeding a certain 
limit. Section 32 of the Finance Act 1916 rectified this position by 
introducing a marginal relief but prior to this such a gross inequity 
occurred that those adversely affected would probably have been 
strongly inclined to take any necessary action to avoid the inequity.
Between 1914 and 1919 the rate of estate duty more than doubled on 
estates with a value in excess of £350,000, but the duty was easily 
avoided by making gifts inter vivos provided they were made more than 
3 years before death. With an effective rate of duty of 23% on an 
estate of £200,000 and 30% on £1,000,000 and, as high as 40% on 
£2,000,000, the combined effect of income tax, super-tax and the 
potential estate duty probably created a powerful force towards the 
spreading of assets within the family.
Although excess profits duty and the complementary munitions levy were 
not easily avoidable, they may, because of their very high rates,76 
have caused businessmen to do whatever they could to reduce the income 
tax and super-tax liabilities on their other incane, it is reasonable 
to assume that efforts to find ways of avoiding excess profits duty 
had a knock-on effect upon income tax avoidance.
Over the period 1914 to 1920 various changes to the income tax system 
were made which were aimed at mitigating the high nominal rates of tax 
particularly for those with low incomes. However, there were sane
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changes which increased liability or reduced the scope for avoidance. 
The child allowance, which had been re-introduced in 1909, was doubled 
in 1914 and was again increased in 1915 so that its value became the 
tax on £25. No allowance was given if the total incane of the 
taxpayer in 1915/16 exceeded £500J 7 There was no scaling down of 
the child allowance where the child had income in its own right and 
therefore transfers of income to children could be made without any 
adverse effect upon the parent's tax liability, and each child would 
be able to utilise its own personal allowances and lower rates of
tax.*78
The Finance Act 1918 introduced the Married Man's Allowance and the 
Housekeeper and Dependent Relative allowances, but they were 
unavailable to those with incomes in excess of £800.79 The married 
man with children and with no super-tax liability, suffered a much 
less severe increase in his tax liability, and may have been less 
inclined towards avoidance.80
The Finance Act 1920 removed the incane restrictions on these 
allowances and provided that all allowances should be given as 
reductions from gross income (except for super-tax purposes) thereby 
giving relief at the marginal rate.
For the payer of super-tax, not only had the rate of tax increased 
and the threshold of income decreased with no personal allowances 
being given, but the Finance Act 1916 had removed the right to deduct 
life assurance premiums in calculating the income liable. More 
sophisticated means of avoidance would therefore have had to be used.
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Up until 1911/ where inccane was accumulated during the period of 
minority of a child with a contingent interest, then when the minor 
came into possession of the property, he could claim repayment of 
income tax on the income accumulated over the whole period of 
minority, provided that he was entitled to exemption or abatement for 
each of the tax years involved.81 m  1911 the inland Revenue changed 
their view on this and were refusing to make repayments on the grounds 
that such accumulated income could not be regarded as the income of 
any individual and that in fact it had become capital.82 The effect 
of this change of practice must have been to strongly discourage the 
creation of such trusts and to encourage transfers under which the 
child had an immediate entitlement to income. However, as the 
original position was reinstated by Section 14 of the Finance Act 1917 
the accumulation settlement probably came back into vogue.
The position at the end of 1919 was well described by Sir Josiah 
Stamp.
"Taxation is now rapidly developing from a merely unpleasant 
incident into a dominating feature of daily life, and those 
features which hitherto have been of little interest, ifecause 
they have been too small to matter, now become of great 
importance; the blemishes which were insignificant may now be 
intolerable simply because in the magnitude of the burden they 
have become sufficiently magnified or intensified to be within 
the range of ordinary human feeling."83
CLOSING IN UPON WIDESPREAD EVASION
Those dissatisfied by the level of taxation could either pay up and 
complain, attenpt to evade it, or take steps to avoid it. The 
evidence discussed below indicates that evasion was widespread but it 
also shows that the inland Revenue were becoming better at detecting
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evaders and that some of those who were caught were receiving well 
publicised jail sentences.
The Minutes of Evidence of the 1920 Royal Commission on income Tax8  ^
indicate that the Inland Revenue were still attempting to "taint" 
avoidance by referring to it as part of evasion.
"Evasion may result from at least four causes (a) fraud (b) 
wilful withholding or misstatement of material facts (c) 
ignorance or carelessness and (d) legal avoidance."85
The Revenue*s explanation of the main reasons for systematic evasion 
were as follows:
(a) the absence of any serious social disgrace attaching to 
successful evasion.
(b) the absence of adequate powers of investigation;
(c) a feeling of injustice engendered by the belief that income 
tax contained many anomalies needing correction?
(d) a widespread impression that other taxpayers were evading 
their just liability? and
(e) the high rates of tax.86
If these were reasons for evasion (in the strict sense) then they were 
all the more strongly reasons for avoidance.
It is always difficult to accurately estimate the extent of evasion 
but the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission suggests a broadly 
held belief that evasion was both widespread and considerable.8? 
Evasion of super-tax was a relatively low risk matter prior to the 
Finance Act 1922 because the Revenue had no power to obtain any 
detailed information on how an individual's total income was made up.
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The Revenue presented statistics to the Royal Commission which showed 
the total amounts of unassessed income tax, including compounded 
penalties, recovered in England and Wales.
Year ended 31st March 1914 £229,000
Year ended 31st March 1915 £260,000
Year ended 31st March 1916 £415,000
Year ended 31st March 1917 £929,000
Year ended 31st March 1918 £1,227,000
Year ended 31st March 1919 £1,216,000 88
Revenue officials did point out that the rapid increase in the rates 
of tax explained a considerable part of the increase in the amounts of 
back duty recovered, but thought it probable that the actual amount of 
income concealed in the year ended 31st March 1919 was not less that 
two or three times the corresponding amount for the year ended 31st of 
March 1914.89
The view that evasion was widespread and considerable was not merely 
one held by the inland Revenue. Evidence submitted to the Royal 
Commission on behalf of the London Chamber of commerce indicates their 
belief that large amounts of tax were lost through evasion^8 but no 
concrete evidence was provided.91 contemporary authors on taxation 
also believed that evasion was rampant. A typical statement is that 
by Sir Josiah Stamp:-
"On the whole I am inclined to think that the general sentiment 
of tax honesty in this country was rapidly improving prior to 
the war. But the fever of profit making and the high rates of 
taxation brought about a bad relapse, and it has recently been 
estimated that the loss in income tax and excess profits duty in 
the last few years has amounted to one hundred million 
sterling."92
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In the light of all the evidence the Royal canmission concluded that 
it was beyond question that, serious evasion of income tax existed.
"Although a taxpayer is obliged by law to make a return...in 
many cases a return is in the nature of things capable of only a 
partial or imperfect check, and when this is known or suspected 
by a taxpayer he is tempted to speculate on the chance of 
escaping detection if the return is inaccurate. He may not 
always be guilty of fraud; he may be culpably careless; he may
decide every doubtful point in his own favour by deliberately
refraining fron inquiry; he may cultivate a profitable 
ignorance or a negligence that is not free from guile."93
The Committee believed there was so much tax evasion already 
discovered "with the imperfect means now at the disposal of the 
authorities" that there must have been much tax evasion which had not 
been discovered.94 They thought that the greatly increased rates of 
tax and the imposition of the excess profits duty had exposed the 
taxpayer to much more serious temptation.95 jt is difficult to 
comment upon the statements of the Royal Commission because evidence 
was put before then on the subject which was "undesirable to describe 
in detail" but which "fully convinced us that there is a serious loss
of revenue caused by fraud, negligence and ignorance."96
The extent of super-tax evasion (as opposed to income tax evasion), 
was not so fully discussed in the Minutes of Evidence or in the report 
of the Royal Commission. The absence of sufficient powers to detect 
evasion and the lack of any internal system to enable evaders to be 
caught, when coupled with the shortage of trained staff due to the 
war, probably resulted in a very low risk of a super-tax evader being
detected.97
The Royal Canmission were "perfectly convinced that with the present
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rates of tax, the hands of the authorities must be strengthened in the 
difficult task of discovering inaccuracies"^ and believed that the 
powers of investigation of the Inland Revenue were extremely limited 
"and there can be no doubt at all that the knowledge of this 
limitation is taken advantage of by the unscrupulous".99
As might be expected during a period of war, the public1s attitude 
towards evasion became highly critical. "The Accountant" for this 
period contains regular references to prosecutions for tax evasion and 
the correspondence columns leave little doubt as to the adverse public 
attitude to evaders.1 The Royal Commission commented that the views 
expressed by witnesses unconnected with the Revenue on the necessity 
of measures to catch and deter evaders "were even more vigorous and 
far reaching than those put forward by witnesses who represented the 
Revenue," and that there was a growing feeling among the community 
against evaders so that the public would accept a more stringent
administration. ^
It was during the war years that the Inland Revenue began the regular 
prosecution of tax evaders. They thought that successful 
prosecutions, and particularly imprisonments, had radically altered 
the public attitude towards evasion and that taxpayers were no longer 
proud of the fact that they had defrauded the Revenue.3
The journals of the period show plentiful examples of criminal 
prosecutions. In 1914, the first prosecution of a chartered 
accountant by the Board of Inland Revenue (for furnishing false 
accounts) is fully reported in "The Accountant".4 This must have had
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a considerable effect upon the attitude of accountants towards clients 
whom they suspected of evasion and may even have encouraged them to 
put forward means of avoidance to such clients.5 in August 1919 "The 
Accountant" carried a report that the 1Daily Mail* contained a 
reference to the formation of a special body of Surveyors for the 
purposes of investigating evasion. The war against evaders had begun 
in earnest.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE STARTS TO DEVELOP
From around 1910 onwards, the professional journals show that there
was a greatly increased interest in taxation. More and more technical
questions were dealt with by the journals and "The Accountant" even
set up a regular column "in view of the increasing importance of
income tax...and the expanding individual practices in the matter
caused by the taxpayer realising the advantages of professional
assistance in a subject of such intricacy...."5 This column quickly
established itself as a major source of advice to accountants and many
of the queries they raised concerned the efficacy of simple tax
avoidance schemes. The sophistication and know-how of accountants on
tax matters increased rapidly, and so much so that by August 1922 the
following note appeared in the Accountant.
"In view of the increasing complexity of the problems submitted 
to us we have still further strengthened the advisory committee 
by whom such problems are considered. The organisation now 
placed at the disposal of our readers is an expensive one, and 
it involves a rearrangement of our scale of fees."7
The standard of professional advice on tax matters seems to have 
improved dramatically before the end of the war and simple tax 
avoidance schemes were being discussed in the journals.5 With tax 
rates having increased so much and with evasion having become both
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unacceptable and risky, tax avoidance was the main escape route. The 
professions dealing with tax matters began to adopt a frame of mind 
which did not just accept tax liabilities as inevitable, but which 
actively searched out methods of tax minimisation. This could be said 
to be the period in which the tax avoidance industry was born.
The first evidence in "The Accountant" of the use of settlements for 
tax avoidance appears in a letter at the end of 1913.9
"A had income from investments of over £7,000 per annum. To 
avoid paying income tax he transfers in proper form to his 
children paying the full stamp duty on the considerations, 
sufficient capital to reduce income below £5,000. Dividends 
received by the children from the shares in their names are 
handed by then to their father. A has been advised that these 
payments by his children are in the nature of gifts and are not 
part of his income, and that his income for super-tax is less 
than £5,000 per annum. It is true that the payment of the 
dividends by the children is a voluntary act and could not be 
enforced by the father. Are you of the opinion that the 
super-tax returns would be correctly rendered excluding the 
dividends received from the children?"
The journal's "legal contributor" provided the following published 
reply.
"If the payment by the children to the father is really a 
voluntary contribution which they may withdraw at any time and 
which they are under no obligation to make, I agree that 
super-tax is not payable. If, however, on the true facts of the 
case it is either payable as a charge on the property of the 
person paying the same by virtue of any deed or otherwise or as
a reservation thereout or as a personal debt or obligation by
virtue of any contract within Section 1 and 2 of the Act of
1842, the tax would be payable."10
The airing of such problems and the authoritative answers obtained must 
have given confidence to tax advisers so that such practices would become 
more widespread. Further queries of a similar nature arose occasionally
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over the following few years and the details of such queries are shown in 
Appendix A6.
Queries began to appear concerning disputes with the inland Revenue over 
the amounts of wages and salaries paid to sons and daughters employed by 
parents in their business.H There is no clear evidence on the point, but 
it may well be that such wages and salaries were merely another form of 
settlement because of their being in excess of the amounts justified by 
the amount of work done. The inland Revenue resisted such excessive 
payments and the advice given to querists supported the inland Revenue*s 
view.
THE COLWYN COMMITTEE CONSIDERS SETTLEMENTS AND MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS 
Only three people gave evidence to the Royal commission concerning 
avoidance through the use of settlements; Mr G F Howe, the Presiding 
Special Commissioner, Mr W Allen on behalf of the Middle classes Union, 
and Mr E R Harrison, Assistant Secretary to the Board of inland Revenue. 
All three witnesses were of the view that this form of avoidance was 
common. Mr Howe advised the commission that he had "seen enormous sums 
escaping taxation that ought to have borne taxation...."12
Mr Allen had no concrete evidence that this form of avoidance was taking 
place but was adamant that he knew it was being done on a considerable 
s c a l e . According to Mr Harrison
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..."A good deal of use is made at the present time (of) the 
settlement of incane, the creation of trusts and charges, and the 
transfer of securities to or for the benefit of members of .the 
family of the individual whose liability is affected. The same 
methods may also be adopted by persons... not liable to super-tax 
[but] liable ...at one of the higher of the graduated rates [of 
income tax]. The evil is however most marked and the loss of 
revenue is most serious in connection with incomes which exceed the 
limit of exemption for super-tax.11
He had no doubts that it was the high tax rates which had caused 
people to take action to reduce their personal liability and believed 
that the tendency to avoidance would continue and, unless checked, 
would materially reduce the yield of tax.15
Each of the three witnesses gave examples of the methods used to avoid 
liability.
"Some striking cases have occurred. A father by a revocable 
deed settles a sum of money in trust for his children. The 
annual income is to be paid to him for maintenance and education 
of the children, for whom, as father, he would in any case be 
responsible. There is no check upon him as to how he expends 
the income, nor as to whether he expends it all; he is 
responsible to no-one, and may himself be trustee. Before the
date, if any, at which the estate would vest in the
beneficiaries the deed can be revoked. The settlor runs no
risks as he can put an end to the whole arrangement whenever he
likes, and in the meantime escapes payment of income tax and 
super-tax."15
Mr Allen had an example of a rather different form.
"A father has an income of £15,000 a year. Assume he has four 
children. He charges £1,000 a year on the estate for each of 
the two sons and £500 a year for the two daughters, the charges 
to remain in force until each child reaches the age of 21. The 
income tax and super-tax he would have to pay on the £3,000 
amounts to £1,575. Under the arrangement each son would pay ... 
£187.10s a year and each daugher ... £75 a year. The total 
taxation for the children would thus be £527. The loss to the 
State through what is really a fictitious transaction amounts to 
£1,050 per annum."1?
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Mr Harrison gave a similar but more extreme example.
"A had originally an income of £15,000 a year. The amount of 
super-tax payable for 1918/19 on an income of £15,000 would be 
£2312. If A has alienated or charged this income so that only 
£3,000 now renains to him whilst £2,000 represents the income of 
each of his six children A will pay only £62 in super-tax and 
his children will be totally exempt."18
The inland Revenue were apparently not concerned about cases where 
individuals had paid voluntary allowances to poor relatives and then 
converted such allowances to a compulsory form in order to reduce tax 
liabilities. Mr Harrison believed that in such circumstances 
"no objection can properly be raised"19
The attitude towards transfers to children was quite different. Mr 
Howe believed it to be an "evil" which ought to be remedied and 
suggested that even accumulated income should be deemed to be the 
settlor*s.20 Mr. Harrison expressed great hostility to this form of 
avoidance but accepted that nothing could be done under the then 
current law to attack such schemes. The main problem was that the 
parent "gets out of an expense which other parents have to bear 
without.obtaining any allowance for super-tax purposes"21
Each of the three witnesses had views as to how in practice such 
avoidance could be stopped. Mr Howe thought -that any revocable deed 
should have no effect on the settlor*s liability and that irrevocable 
parental settlements on any child for whan they were responsible 
should not diminish the parent*s liability to taxation, in the latter 
case he thought it irrelevant whether the income was accumulated or 
not22 under examination, the question was posed as to whether Mr 
Howe thought that even in a case where the settlor could not in any
46
way touch the income, it should nevertheless be treated as his. He 
believed that in all cases, if the benefit was for one of his own 
children who was an infant, then the income should be treated as the 
settlors,23 and that even if the parent had other means to support the 
child and did so fron such other sources, it should make no 
difference.24 Lord Colwyn did not appear to think that the argument 
was sound in regard to an irrevocable deed but Mr Howe was unmoved in
his views.25
Mr Allen thought that the way round this problem was to introduce into 
the income tax code analogous provisions to those applying to 
avoidance of excess profits duty by artificial or fictitious 
transactions. Lord colwyn gave this proposal short shrift, pointing 
out that it would be dangerous to give permission for even the most 
trustworthy and impartial officials to decide whether a transaction is 
fictitious or not.
"It is rather a dangerous power, is it not, that the law should 
come in and practically upset modes of settlement which are 
otherwise recognised by the law.... is it not practically saying 
to A, B, c and D .'you shall not, except under very severe 
penalties, make this or that use of your property, even for your 
own children1?.... Answer: Personally I do not think it is. I 
think if a transaction is merely entered into for the sake of 
avoiding tax, as these transactions are, it is perfectly 
legitimate, for the State to say 'we will not recognise a 
transaction of that k i n d r,{26
It is perhaps surprising to see a representative of the middle classes
putting forward proposals which would have given the Inland Revenue
such wide power and discretion. However, the Royal Commission clearly
rejected the idea and it was not discussed again or mentioned in their
Report, it may be that the experience of the operation of the general
anti-avoidance provision for excess profits duty which required that a
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person should not "enter into any fictitious or artificial transaction 
or carry out any fictitious or artificial operation" (S44(3)
F.A.(No.2) 1915) indicated that the granting of such powers created as 
many problems as it attempted to solve, and what was needed here was a 
set of more objective tests.
The views put forward by the inland Revenue as to how this avoidance 
could be prevented were fairly practical and well thought out. They 
rejected the idea of any type of motive test,2? but wanted to be 
empowered to disregard any alienation, transfer or charge on income 
which was:-
"(a) made in favour or for the benefit of an unmarried infant 
child of the settlor;
(b) variable or revocable by the settlor - to the extent that it 
is possible for such variation or revocation to be exercised in 
favour or for the benefit of the settlor, or his wife or an 
unmarried infant child."28
They desired that any income so transferred should be treated as the 
income of the transferor and not of the transferee. This was not a 
novel idea at the time because, in the United States, provisions were 
already in force by virtue of which "the income of a revocable trust 
must be included in the gross income of the grantor."2^
The principle which the Inland Revenue had in mind was that there must 
be a genuine alienation which actually deprived the settlor of the 
income of the estate from which it arose.
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"...if the settlor retains any power over that income we should 
be entitled to tax it. If he really finally divests himself of 
the income...I think we could do nothing. I think if he finally 
deprives himself of his income...we are bound to accept the 
consequence. He has lost the income and we must lose the
tax."30
It was this principle which underpinned much of the later legislation 
on settlements, though action was often not forthcoming until revenue 
lost became relatively high. Under examination Mr Harrison explained 
that it would be impractical to have an enquiry into the motives of a 
parent who had made a settlement on a minor child,31 and unnecessary 
to interfere with irrevocable settlements in favour of sons or 
daughters who were not under-age because liability to maintain the 
child would have ceased.32
The Royal Commission discussed the question of retrospection of any 
anti-avoidance provisions in two senses. Firstly, in the sense of 
altering tax liabilities for periods prior to the date of introduction 
of the anti-avoidance legislation, and secondly, altering for future 
years the tax effects of settlements entered into prior to the date 
the legislation was introduced. Mr. Howe was adamant that any 
legislation should operate on settlements created prior to the change 
in the law and the alteration in the treatment of life insurance 
premiums for super-tax purposes was pointed to as a precedent for 
doing this.33 Mr Harrison was also of the view that future years 
should be affected but that "we should not rake up past year1s 
super-tax."34 some members of the commission were not happy with the 
idea of future years being affected in this way35 and the report of 
the Royal commission avoids the issue, it contains only one paragraph 
on the subject of settlements.
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"There are plain indications that super-tax is being avoided 
also by the alienation of income by means of deeds under which 
income is applied for the education or maintainance of the 
infant children of the super-tax payer. These deeds often 
contain a clause giving the settlor power to revoke all or any 
of the trusts declared by the deed. As the parent is in any 
case obliged to maintain his infant children it would seem 
unreasonable that he should be able to avoid super-tax on part 
of his income in this way. We recommend that in all cases of 
revocable deeds the income so alienated should be regarded for 
super-tax purposes as the income of the settlor and that in 
cases of irrevocable deeds the income of a trust fund settled by 
a parent for the benefit of his unmarried infant children, with 
or without other beneficiaries, should be treated as the income 
of the parent to the extent to which it is actually paid to or 
for the benefit of the unmarried infant children."36
It should be noted that the deeming process envisaged by the 
Commission was for super-tax purposes only and that nothing was said 
about income .tax. Thus it seems they were not too concerned by the 
income tax avoidance which was taking place through the use of the 
exemption and abatements. Furthermore, no mention was made of 
dispositions for short periods which were to form a fundamental part 
of the eventual anti-avoidance provisions in 1922.37 it is also 
noticeable that the recommendations of Mr Howe concerning income 
accumulated in childrens' settlements was not taken up by the 
Commission and they recommended that the deeming process only be 
applied to income actually paid to or*for the benefit of unmarried 
infant children. Within a few years of the introduction of the first 
anti-avoidance provisions to deal with settlements, the transfer of 
income to charities had become a major issue. It is interesting to 
note that neither the Minutes of Evidence nor the Report of the Royal 
Commission mentioned anything about this problem, though evidence was 
presented on the income of charities and the amount of money repaid to 
them.38 According to the Revenue there were only a few cases of 
people transferring income to charity in a manner which reduced their
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personal tax liability.39 The Royal commission merely suggested that 
the term "charity" should be explicitly redefined by Parliament but 
did not express any view on which activities should be excluded4^
An investigation of the tax system by a Royal Commission had been 
promised shortly before the outbreak of the First World War but was 
delayed by the war and by the belief that the work would be made much 
easier after the consolidation of the legislation. Had it not been 
for these factors, the anti-avoidance provisions concerning 
settlements would probably have been introduced a few years earlier 
than they were. As it was, the understaffing of the inland Revenue 
which had existed prior to 1914 was made worse by new legislation, the 
millions of new taxpayers and the fact that the war had taken the 
greater part of the trained clerical staff.4! <phe Department was 
hardly in a position to research the avoidance that was going on, let 
alone think through and implement the appropriate anti-avoidance 
provisions, until after the war.
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CONCLUSION
The basic flaw upon which avoidance through the use of settlements was 
based was inherent in the income tax system from the start but was 
hardly exploited until high tax rates were imposed. Although, 
initially, the Revenue were apparently unconcerned by this class of 
avoidance, once it became costly through fairly common use and it 
looked likely that it would spread,because it was being regularly 
discussed in the professional journals, their attitude began to change.
The 1920 Royal commission was sympathetic to the Revenue's views on 
settlements and the principles upon which anti-avoidance legislation 
should be based, it is surprising therefore that their 
recommendations were not put into effect earlier than 1922.
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CHAPTER 3
1920-1922: THE FIRST ATTACK ON SETTLEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The legislation introduced by section 20 of the Finance Act of 1922 
was aimed at revocable dispositions, short-term dispositions and 
certain dispositions by parents in favour of their children. Although 
recommendations had been made on this subject by a Royal commission 
some two years earlier, there was a curious pause before any action 
was taken, and even then the subject seems to have arisen almost by 
chance following the Chancellor's questioning of the Revenue about 
evasion.
Once the inertia had been overcome, the proposals for dealing with the 
problem were broadly formulated upon the Royal Commission's 
recommendations but with the Revenue generally getting their own way 
in respect of certain changes of principle and differences of opinion 
on the drafting.
With the weight of a Royal commission to back them up, it was 
difficult for MP's to argue that the proposals were unnecessary and 
there was therefore little resistance to the general principles though 
there was considerable debate about the precise details, especially in 
respect of parental settlements on their children.
DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ROYAL COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the Royal Commission reported on March 11, 1920 it was just
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over two years before its recommendations (in a modified form) were 
put into effect. It is interesting to consider the possible causes of 
the delay. Obviously it would have been difficult, if not impossible, 
to rush through the appropriate legislation for inclusion in the 
Finance Act of 1920 but there was plenty of time to introduce the 
provisions in the Finance Bill of 1921.^
One possible explanation for the delay could be the burden put upon 
the inland Revenue by the major reforms introduced in the Finance Act 
of 19202 combined with the continuation of excess profits duty and the 
introduction of corporation profits tax. All this must have 
considerably stretched the resources available at all levels within 
the inland Revenue and perhaps the minds of the most senior members of 
the department were too fully occupied with implementation problems to 
be concerned about settlements.
Another possible explanation for the delay relates to introduction in 
1920 of the modified form of child allowance such that no allowance • 
was to be given if the child*s income in its own right was greater 
than £40.3 It might have been thought that the loss of child 
allowance resulting frcm large income-transfers to children was 
sufficient penalty for those who had already made such transfers and 
would discourage anything other than small transfers in other cases. 
This may have been seen as a holding operation before the whole 
question of anti-avoidance provisions could be fully reviewed and 
implemented. However, the Finance Act 1921 contained few major 
changes and it is perhaps surprising that time was not found to bring 
forward detailed anti-avoidance provisions in that year.
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THE REVENUE PERSUADE THE CHANCELLOR TO LET THEM HAVE THEIR WAY 
Those files which are not closed to public in the Public Record Office 
are peculiarly silent on the matter of tax avoidance in 1920 and 1921 
and the first reference to the provisions which eventually became 
Section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 are in a note of interview with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on August 29, 1921.4 The chancellor (Sir 
Robert Horne) had raised the question of incane tax evasion and wanted 
to know the meaning of the frequent parliamentary references to this 
by Mr William Graham. Although it was explained to him that those 
references were mainly to the securing of additional powers and the 
imposition of additional penalties, the Chancellor "thought that the 
time was not opportune for legislation in that sense"5 but he did 
"desire to have detailed proposals placed before him in time for the 
next Budget in regard to the stoppage of avoidance of super-tax by 
legal devices"5 It appears therefore that the initial prompting for 
this legislation came fron the chancellor rather than, as was usually 
the case for later refinements to the legislation, the inland 
Revenue. The raising of the point appears to have been almost 
fortuitous and as a result of a question from the chancellor on 
something entirely different. It is possible that the inland Revenue 
or the Treasury siezed upon the opportunity to raise this related 
though entirely different matter with the chancellor, though why they 
did not do so earlier is not known.
The Treasury files for 1922 indicate that considerable efforts were 
being made to search for a new form of taxation in order to raise 
revenue?, and it may well be therefore, that the chancellor saw the 
blocking up of loopholes as a more politically acceptable basis for 
raising revenue than the introduction of any new tax.
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Payers of super-tax were experiencing difficulty in meeting their tax 
liabilities and the fact that many companies were reducing or even not 
paying dividends was causing further financial embarrassment to the 
wealthier classes.8 Such pressure may have led to a growth in the use 
of avoidance techniques and the Revenue's realisation of this may have 
heightened the urgency for anti-avoidance legislation.
The matter of tax avoidance was not raised with the Chancellor again 
until the Budget Conference on January 23, 1922.9 However it was not 
until March 1, 1922 that the chairman of the Board of inland Revenue 
wrote to the Chancellor to illustrate how settlements were being used, 
and to put forward suggestions for modification to the preventive 
legislation recommended by the Royal Commission.10
The Revenue informed the Chancellor of the large loss of revenue which 
resulted from "devices adopted by an increasing number of taxpayers in 
order legally to avoid their true liability to inccme tax and 
especially to super-tax,"11 but admitted that the problem of 
preventing it was "in its technical aspects a very complex one".12 
They believed that the legislation would prove very contentious and 
suggested that it should be confined to catching "the most glaring and 
indefensible cases, leaving their extension and elaboration for future 
years when public opinion may be more ripe."13
The attempt to persuade the Chancellor of the need for action was 
buttressed by telling him that this problem was not in any way 
confined to the UK but had parallels in other countries, several of 
which were endeavouring to find solutions, and by the rather dubious
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statement that the indisputable intention of the law was that the tax 
avoided should have been paid.!4 The latter argument was quite 
commonly used in support of anti-avoidance legislation even though it 
would appear that it was more true to say that the legislature had 
never considered the problem and could not in any real sense have had 
any such intention.
The Revenue asserted that "the practice of avoiding the true 
liabilities...by means of the creation of trusts etc. is markedly on 
the increase and with the present high rates of taxation the incentive 
to follow this form of activity is very great."!5 
Hypothetical cases to illustrate the methods of avoidance being used 
were set out for the Chancellor's benefit and show :-
1. a parental settlement in favour of his children where the
children have a vested interest in the property and income;
2. a parental settlement in favour of his children where there is
a partial accumulation of income;
3. a wealthy batchelor creating a revocable trust or covenant in 
favour of impecunious relatives or friends;
4. a trust or covenant for needy friends and relatives which is 
not revocable but which is limited to a fixed period of time; 
and
5. a disposition for a short period in favour of a charity.!5
The Revenue praised the Royal commission to the Chancellor for dealing 
with revocable deeds separately fran other deeds because "there can be 
no real hardship in treating as a settlor's income for incane tax and 
super-tax purposes, income of which a settlor can resume complete and
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unfettered enjoyment at any m o m e n t . T h e  Royal Commission had in 
fact only mentioned super-tax but the Revenue apparently were able to 
gloss over this without being noticed. They also forcefully made the 
crucial point that it was essential to have a wide definition of 
revocability.18
The recommendations of the Royal Commission were ambiguous on the 
question of whether the deeming provisions should only apply to 
revocable deeds in favour of the settlor*s unmarried children, but the 
Revenue argued that such a limitation would "leave untouched a large 
amount of the whole field"19 and urged that "if a practicable 
method...to deal...effectively with this growing problem of evasion" 
was to be found, then all revocable deeds would have to be dealt 
with.20 in no other part of the paper to the Chancellor is the word 
evasion used as a synonym for avoidance and it may have been inserted 
deliberately to help tip the balance of the argument in the Revenue's 
favour. If so, it succeeded.
As regards irrevocable deeds in favour of unmarried infant children it 
was admitted that there were considerable difficulties in deciding the 
best approach to the solution of what was a technical and awkward 
problem because the proposals of the Royal Commission could easily 
have been circumvented by the interposition of a "dummy settlor",2 -^ 
The Board of Inland Revenue had already considered this objection to 
be so weighty22 that they originally intended to recommend that in all 
cases, (whether the income came from funds provided by the parents or 
anybody else), the income of unmarried infant children should be 
deemed to be the income of parents for all purposes but decided that
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it would be too difficult to justify such a novel approach, especially 
when it was not one of the proposals of the Royal Commission.22 it 
was recommended therefore, that the Royal commission's proposals 
should be implemented with safeguards against the interposition of 
"dummy settlors" though the need for aggregation of such childrens' 
income was not ruled out if future experience showed it to be
necessary.24
There were no recommendations by the Royal commission concerning 
irrevocable deeds for limited periods but it was pointed out to the 
Chancellor "that an inevitable result of dealing with revocable 
deeds...will be that the people concerned will... attain their ends by 
the creation of trusts irrevocable for a short period of time."25 It 
was thus absolutely essential that dispositions for short periods 
should not be effective for income tax and super-tax purposes, and the 
Revenue suggested that if the period of disposition did not exceed six 
years then the income should be deemed to be the settlors.25
*
The Revenue put various other matters to the chancellor concerning 
settlements which had either not been considered by the Royal 
Commission or which had not been subject to a recommendation by them. 
Firstly, they argued that the time might come when action would be 
necessary in regard to discretionary trusts but hesitated to recommend 
legislation at that time because* it was thought to be too contentious 
and it did not have the support of recommendations of the Royal 
Commission to back it up.27 There were two other problem areas which 
the Board suggested should be considered at a future date; temporary 
charitable trusts where the capital would revert to the settlor's
59
estate upon his death, and accumulation of income within irrevocable 
trusts (whether for children or others).28
The chancellor's reaction to the inland Revenue's arguments is not 
known but the final form of the legislation so closely follows the 
proposals of the Board of inland Revenue that he must have found them 
totally acceptable. However, it seems that he was wary about reliance 
upon the hypothetical cases which had been put to him in support of 
the Revenue's views, because on May 2, 1922, the day after presenting 
his Budget Speech, he requested details of actual cases.29 The 
response was made on the same day and consisted of four examples of 
revocable dispositions and three of irrevocable dispositions.30
The only points of interest arising out of these cases concern the 
dates on which the dispositions were made, (two of them were made in 
1918 and the others show no dates), and the attitude the Revenue 
adopted towards them. Legal opinions had been obtained, and in each 
case the advice was against contesting the matter.31 . in one of them, 
claims to repayment on behalf of minors had been refused and the 
District commissioners of income Tax had confirmed this refusal on 
appeal. However, a stated case was demanded and was submitted to the 
Solicitor of inland Revenue and to counsel who both advised that "it 
was useless for the Crown to resist the appeal."32 obviously the 
Inland Revenue had tried very hard to prevent avoidance using the 
existing law but apparently with no success.
One of the cases put to the Chancellor shows the first time that any 
of the papers examined specifically mention the use of charitable
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covenants. A number of charities were inviting their subscribers to 
enter into deeds for a short period, (usually two or three years), and 
legal opinions obtained by the Revenue indicated that it was 
impossible either to successfully resist the claim that such payments 
were deductible in computing the donorfs total income or the 
entitlement of the charity's claim to repayment.33
The Chancellor's request for actual examples of the problem appears to 
have been an afterthought because he had already made his Budget 
Speech promising action and a considerable amount of drafting had 
already taken place. The procedures by virtue of which the inland 
Revenue's proposals were to travel on their bumpy way towards 
legislation were therefore already well advanced.
DRAFTING
Once the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been persuaded of the 
necessity for legislation and had agreed its broad nature, the next 
stage was for the inland Revenue to agree the details of the budget 
resolution and clause with parliamentary Counsel. The draftsman was 
therefore sent a copy of all the background information that had been 
provided to the Chancellor and draft clauses which the Revenue had
prepared.34
Parliamentary Counsel's primary concern appears to have been the 
putting together of the Budget resolutions, (as these would be 
required on Budget Day), and in the space of six days three drafts of 
it were prepared, with the fourth and final version not being printed 
until Budget Day itself, it is clear from the first version that the
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draftsman thought that the provisions were only to apply to 
trusts,35 but the next version corrected this by referring to 
dispositions and disponors, instead of merely trusts and settlors.36 
It was not until the second draft that provision was made for the 
recovery by the disponor of additional tax payable by him as a result 
of the income being deemed to be his, and not even in the final 
version was there any reference to the fact that the disponor would 
not be allowed to benefit from any additional tax repaid to him as a 
result of the deeming process. The overall impression gained from all 
this is that Parliamentary Counsel was working under intense pressure 
and that the whole subject was rather ill thought-out.
The first three drafts of the Finance Bill contained no references to 
the proposed settlement legislation, and the fourth draft37 had a 
version which in many respects was a long way from that finally 
adopted. The Revenue's own draft38 was, in matters of substance, much 
nearer to the final legislation than Parliamentary Counsel's first 
version; though it was rather more long-winded because it had three 
independent clauses dealing with three different sets of 
circumstances.
The Revenue clause concerning revocable dispositions contained an 
exception for cases where revocation required the consent of some 
person other than the disponor or the spouse of the disponor, but the 
draftsman did not have such a let-out in his first version. The 
eventual legislation shows the Revenue's dominance on this and 
contained the relevant let-out, but with the benefit of hindsight it 
is clear that there was merit in the draftsman's version because
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within a few years the Revenue found that the let-out was being used 
in a manner which made the whole provision on revocable dispositions 
virtually ineffectual.39
Both the Revenue's and parliamentary Counsel's first drafts referred 
to revocable dispositions by individuals but the Bill presented to 
Parliament applied the provisions to such dispositions by any person. 
Although this change clearly made the provisions more widely drawn, it 
is not clear in what circumstances they would apply to anyone other 
than an individual unless a company were to make a revocable 
settlement.
Considerable differences of opinion also existed between the Revenue 
and the draftsman on the provisions for dispositions for short 
periods. Again the draftsman widened their scope by making them apply 
to any person and not merely to individuals. Although the Revenue 
version specifically referred to the fact that the deeming process was 
only to apply if the individual was still living, the draftsman 
thought this unnecessary, because income could not be treated as 
belonging to someone who was not alive. The Revenue view eventually 
prevailed.40 The Revenue also made it clear that dispositions for 
valuable consideration were not to be caught,41 and it is therefore 
strange that the draftsman ignored this until drawing up the final 
version of the Bill.
There were few differences between the two sides about the draft 
clause on dispositions for the benefit of unmarried, infant children 
of the disponor. The draftsman did, however, remove considerable
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verbiage from the Revenue’s draft, widened its scope, and removed 
references to the deeming process only applying if the disponor was
still living.42
FROM BUDGET TO SECOND READING
The Budget statement made only the following short reference to tax 
avoidance.
"I wish....to direct....attention....to certain instances of 
legal avoidance of income tax and super-tax which have recently 
become so prevalent as to produce....startling inequalities in 
the incidence of taxation as between different taxpayers. I 
think it is fairly generally known that many people, by creating 
temporary or revocable trusts, have succeeded in avoiding their
due share of tax and super-tax......I think most people will
recognise that it is not fair that those that are clever enough 
to find ways to do these things should benefit at the expense of
others.”42
The Budget resolution on settlements was in three main parts dealing 
with:
(a) revocable dispositions;
(b) dispositions for short periods; and
(c) dispositions for the benefit of unmarried infant children of the
disponor.44
Some members had a fair idea of what the resolution was aimed at but, 
perhaps not surprisingly, there were serious errors of detail in their 
understanding.
”1 should like to ask what this resolution means. It is very 
involved, and on the face of it it may mean nothing...."45
There was general support from all sides on the parts of the
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resolution dealing with revocable dispositions and dispositions for 
short periods.
"As far as paragraphs (a) and (b) are concerned I am inclined to 
think the Chancellor of the Exchequer is right, for there a man 
says 'I will give my property to somebody until such time as I 
take it back'".46
It was the proposals on parental settlements on their children which 
was least well understood and to which great exception was taken. One 
member freely admitted that he did not understand the relevant part of 
the resolution and considered it unintelligible to the ordinary layman 
and incomprehensible to the majority of the House.47 The Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury duly explained the paragraph with a heavy 
reliance upon the notes provided to him by the Inland Revenue but 
caused sane controversy with the following statement.
"Supposing he makes an irrevocable trust for ten years for the
purpose of maintaining the child. Why should it cease to be
looked upon as his income any more than the incane that goes in 
the working class household and is spent on the daily food of 
the child? That surely is evasion to which the practical common 
sense of all would object."48
Some members were quick to argue that there was no evasion as no law
was being infringed and it is clear from the ensuing debate that the
present-day distinction between evasion and avoidance was not at all 
clear in the minds of Members of Parliament in 1922.49
The precise extent of operation of the children's settlement 
proposals was poorly understood, even by the Financial Secretary, 
who, when asked whether they would catch the case of a disponor who 
still wished to retain some control and inserted a provision for the 
trust to end on the happening of some event, indicated that it was a
65
matter which needed consideration.50 jt is suspected that he was
really just unsure about what his briefing notes meant. Criticism was 
levelled at the proposals because they would make a parent tend to 
keep his wealth in his own hands, and also because there were a large 
number of settlements in which, because a man could not tell how his 
children would turn out or what his own circumstances might be in the 
future, the power was retained for the father to revoke the settlement 
with the consent of the trustee on special grounds.51
Strong disapproval was expressed of the apparent retrospective nature 
of the resolution.
"[The] settlement may have been made years ago, and I want to 
know whether it is the intention of the chancellor of the 
Exchequer to make this entirely retrospective. I wholly object 
to retrospective legislation. What has been done has been 
lawfully done under the existing law. ...When the settlement 
has been made years ago I suggest that this clause would hit it, 
and that would not be just."52
No response was given to this objection at this stage, but the matter 
was fully debated later.
At the second reading stage there was very little debate on the 
settlements clause, (clause 13), but Mr. Dennis Herbert expressed his 
thanks to the Chancellor for the alterations of principle which had 
been made since the Budget resolution.53 He was referring to two 
modifications which were to be made; firstly, only revocable 
dispositions which did not require the consent of any other person 
were to be caught, and secondly, children's settlements were to be 
caught even if they had been made in some indirect manner by the 
parent. The second change was a clear tightening up of the provisions
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and was unlikely to have stimulated Mr Herbert to express his 
gratitude, and the first did not go any way towards meeting the case 
originally raised by him. What he had wanted was for children1s 
settlements which included a power to revoke with the consent of a 
third party to be treated as for the life of the child and therefore 
outside the provisions. The proposed modification only related to the 
effect of consent on revocable settlements but Herbert clearly thought 
that he had won a concession. The inland Revenue must have known that 
they had not met his point, because in the case of Wiggins V.
Watson,54 where a father had power to revoke a settlement on his child 
with the consent of one of five other persons, they contended that, 
because of this power, the disposition was for a period less than the 
life of the child, and that unless that contention was agreed, the 
Court would be defeating the obvious intention of the legislature.55 
The Inland Revenue lost the case at all stages up to and including the 
House of Lords, and presumably, therefore, thought the matter most 
important and capable of being won. One of the reasons the case was 
lost was that the inclusion of the reference to consent in the .part of 
the section dealing with revocable dispositions excluded its relevance 
in determining whether a settlement was for the life of the child. 
Therefore, Mr. Herbert had won a victory, but the inland Revenue did 
not know it until some ten years later!
Mr Herbert had suggestions for further modifications to the provisions 
relating to children. Firstly, he proposed that determination of the 
interest of the child on bankruptcy or alienation should not be 
construed as producing a disposition for less that the life of the 
child. Secondly, he suggested that where the disposition was to cease
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on the death of the disponor, it should not be treated as a 
disposition for a period less than the life of the child.
"...many a man is trying to make provision for his children, not 
out of capital which he already owns, but out of money which he 
is making, because he has no other means of providing for them. 
... it would be quite impracticable for him to saddle his estate 
and executors with the burden of making those payments after his 
death."56
Both of his suggestions were eventually taken up.
As might be expected at the second reading, the major subjects of 
debate tended to be more a matter of political point scoring than a 
detailed analysis or critique, but neither the Chancellor nor any 
Treasury Minister made any comment at all on the clause, though it did 
arouse a considerable amount of interest outside Parliament.5?
AN ANALYSIS OF CLAUSE 13 AND ITS PROGRESS THROUGH THE COMMITTEE AND 
REPORT STAGES
The Board of Inland Revenue explained the purpose.of the clause to 
ministers in the following way.
"It is designed to counteract the growing loss of revenue arising 
from dispositions made by taxpayers under which incane spent by 
them on their children and in other ways is legally alienated so 
as no longer to be returnable in their statement of total 
income.... The object which is sought by this legal alienation is 
to cause incane, which in reality is the income of one individual, 
to become in strict law the income of two or more individuals, and 
by this means to reduce the effective rate at which income tax and 
super-tax is charged upon it."5**
The substance of the clause was contained in the three paragraphs of 
sub-clause 1 and each of them is examined in turn below. (A copy of the 
clause is in Appendix B together with a copy of the eventual legislation)
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Revocable Dispositions
Paragraph (a) of sub-clause 1 dealt with dispositions in which the 
disponer had reserved to himself a full power of revocation so that he 
could resume the legal possession of the income. It was to operate on 
any disposition no matter when it was made, provided that beneficial 
enjoyment of the income could be obtained by the disponor after April 5, 
1922. However, where the disponor could not obtain the beneficial 
enjoyment of the income without first obtaining the consent of someone, 
other than his spouse, the provisions did not apply.
A considerable number of amendments to paragraph (a) were put down at 
both the committee and report stages.
The first amendment to be considered was an attempt to restrict the 
clause to cases where the disponor actually obtained the beneficial 
enjoyment of the income, rather than to cases where he merely had 
power to do so. It was meant to provide a let-out for cases where "a 
man has put aside a certain sum of money to maintain an imbecile 
relative,1160 or "leaves a sum to be used for the purpose of setting up 
seme institution.1161 However, as the Board of inland Revenue 
explained to ministers, the amendment would have defeated the whole 
purpose of paragraph (a), because if a person actually obtained the 
beneficial enjoyment of income it would already automatically be 
included in his total income without the deeming process envisaged by 
the clause.62 The Board therefore advised that the amendment would be 
nugatory, and as it did not raise any question there was nothing to
debate.63
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Because the clause, as drafted, applied to anyone who was able to 
obtain for himself the beneficial enjoyment of the income, whether or 
not he had made the disposition, an amendment was put down in an 
attempt to ensure that it would only apply to the disponor.64 The 
unfairness of the existing draft was that where A conferred on B an 
unlimited power of appointment over property or income which until 
such appointment was to go to c, there would be some difficulty in 
arguing that the income should be treated as belonging to B if he 
refrained from exercising his power of appointment, had never in fact 
enjoyed the income, and perhaps would never enjoy it. The anomaly was 
illustrated in the following way:-
•
"The father of a family may have a close friend who dies and 
leaves a sum of money, the income of which is to be paid to that 
father*s children unless and until the father should see fit to 
deprive them of the income and take it for himself.”65
The Attorney-General agreed that this amendment was not inconsistent 
with the general scope of the clause, but pointed out that, as 
drafted, it would open up a loophole, because the disponor could grant 
an unlimited power of appointment to his or her spouse when alienating 
income for the benefit of a third party, with the result that the 
spouse with the power of appointment would not be caught, (as he or 
she was not the disponor), while the disponor would escape as well,
(as he or she did not have any power of appointment). Such a case 
would clearly have been within the mischief at which the clause was 
aimed.66 The chancellor introduced appropriate amendments at the 
report stage to meet the point but without creating a loophole.67
The provisions were to apply to the income arising for the whole of
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the tax year 1922/23, but due to a misunderstanding as to their manner 
of operation an amendment was suggested such that they would only 
operate from Royal Assent.68 The proposer of the amendment appears to 
have thought that the deeming process was to be applied to pre-April 
6, 1922 settlements, even after any right of revocation was given up, 
but on being assured by the Attorney-General (on the Revenue's advice) 
that this was not the case, he withdrew his amendment.69
Dispositions for Short periods
Paragraph (b) of sub-clause 1, was an essential provision to work in 
conjunction with paragraph (a), because the inevitable result of 
dealing only with revocable dispositions would have been to invite the 
avoidance of taxation by means of irrevocable dispositions operating 
for short periods. The Board of inland Revenue suggested'that a six 
year period was the minimum that would effectively safe-guard against 
short-term dispositions, and advised that any much longer period might 
be difficult to justify, though experience would perhaps make an 
extension necessary.An amendment which would have increased the 
six year period to one of not less than the life of the person for 
whose benefit the disposition had been made, was on Revenue advice, 
ruled out of order.71 The provisions were restricted to dispositions 
made after May 1, 1922, because the Revenue thought it would be unfair 
and might cause hardship if transactions made before any intimation 
had been given of the changes in the law were detrimentally 
affected."72 However, an amendment was proposed under which any 
disposition, no matter when it was made, would have been caught. As 
the Revenue pointed out to ministers, such an amendment would have 
extended the charge beyond the scope of the corresponding budget
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resolution and was therefore out of order.73
A short-term disposition was not to be caught if it was made for 
valuable and sufficient consideration, but as Mr Dennis Herbert, (a 
prominent solicitor), did not know the meaning of "sufficient 
consideration" and was not aware that it had any recognised legal 
meaning, he put down an amendment to ensure that the let-out applied 
if the consideration was merely valuable.74 The Revenue argued that 
without the words "and sufficient" it would be possible to escape the 
provisions by giving some purely nominal consideration.75 
Parliamentary concern was expressed as to who was to judge the 
sufficiency of any consideration and it was hoped that taxpayers would 
not be "at the mercy of an official".75 Although the
Solicitor-General promised to reconsider the matter,77 more effective 
words apparently could not be found.
There were two further amendments put down relating to paragraph (b)
which on the face of things were very different but whose underlying 
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purpose was very similar. The first was an attempt to have paragraph
(b) removed entirely, while the other sought to exclude charitable 
dispositions from its scope. The first amendment was also motivated 
by a desire to protect charities and the background to the debate on 
it gives an interesting insight into the Government's attitudes 
towards the support of charities.
In the ministerial briefing notes, the Board of inland Revenue 
forcefully made the point that claims for tax deductions for 
contributions to charitable objects had been repeatedly put forward
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and had been uniformly resisted.78 They pointed out that the whole 
subject had been dealt with during the passage of the Finance Bill 
1920, where the Chancellor had said:-
"I could not possibly accept...any concessions in this respect 
in regard either to incane tax or super-tax. The proposal has 
been made again and again to my predecessors, and one and all, 
whatever their political conplexion, they have repulsed it with 
a unanimity which is truly wonderful. I find myself in the same 
position of unalterable opposition to it. The richer the man 
the greater the proportion of his so-called subscription which 
is found by the State. The poorer the man the greater the 
proportion of his so-called subscription which is found by 
himself. That cannot be right."79
The inland Revenue also reminded ministers that with relief through
the tax system the selection of the institution to be benefited and
the amount of the State's contribution would be determined by the
individual taxpayer, and that as the practice was growing among
charities of inviting subscribers to pledge themselves by means of a
short-term convenant, the cost to the Exchequer could increase
rapidly. 80
Sir Robert Horne took on board the views of his predecessors and of 
the Inland Revenue and made out an effective case against any 
concession for charities in the debate on the amendment.81 His 
opposition came from Lord Robert Cecil who believed that the injury 
done to charities would be out of all proportion to the "few thousand 
pounds" benefit to the State.82 He believed the provisions would 
cause great discouragement at a time when it was difficult to get 
money for any charity and asked that the position be reconsidered.83 
When the chancellor agreed to do this the amendment was dropped, but 
none of the relevant files84 indicate that any reconsideration
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actually took place, and nothing was said about it at the report stage.
Dispositions by Parents on Their Minor, Unmarried children 
The Revenue indicated to ministers that in their view "avoidance of 
tax is commonest and easiest [in cases] of dispositions by parents in 
favour of their unmarried infant children,"33 and argued that it was 
necessary to introduce provisions going beyond paragraphs (a) and (b) 
in cases of this type.33 Ministers apparently agreed, and under 
paragraph (c) the whole income under a parental disposition was to be 
deemed the parent's if and so long as the child was an infant and 
unmarried. The effect was to exclude the income from being taken into 
account in any repayment claim on behalf of the child. Because of the 
one major let-out which was to apply when the income was payable to or 
for the benefit of the child for a period not less than its life, 
out-and-out dispositions were not caught.37
Of the three provisions, paragraph (c) was by far the most 
controversial. There were five amendments put down for consideration 
at the committee stage, and of these three of them were dressed up in 
a different form and presented for reconsideration at the report 
stage. The chancellor put forward the official version of four of 
them at the report stage so that, although, in all, thirteen 
amendments were put down, the position was not quite as contentious as 
a cursory inspection of the number of amendments tabled might 
indicate.
By far the most contentious matter was the retrospective application 
of the paragraph to dispositions made before the commencement of the
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Act.88 An amendment was considered at the committee stage which 
attempted to limit its application to dispositions made after the 
commencement of the Act and because the Revenue provided very little 
guidance as to the principles underlying their intentions and gave no 
indication of any arguments to help counter any claims of 
retrospection, ministers were left with a difficult task in justifying 
the position.
It would appear that the Board completely underestimated the strength 
of feeling about this retrospective element of the clause, as those 
criticising it were quite fierce in arguing that dispositions made 
before the Act were perfectly legal and resulted in no adverse tax 
consequences.89 They pointed out that "great judges have said over 
and over again that the subject is entitled to avoid - not to evade - 
taxation if he can."90 some appeared to have total misconceptions 
about the Bill, thinking that it would go over years in which 
liabilities had been settled, or make such settlements illegal, but 
those who made these points later admitted that they did not mean 
precisely what they had said. Clearly this was a case of exaggeration 
in an attempt to support a case; but it got nowhere.91
In defence of the provisions, the Chancellor argued that it would have 
been absurd to have a situation where one set of citizens who set 
aside funds prior to the Act would escape, while others who had not 
been clever enough to have thought of this device soon enough would 
not.92 The Solicitor-General put the matter rather well.
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"...if this criticism were accepted and the amendment adopted, 
the result would be that those parents who knew perfectly well 
what they were about, and that it was their duty to maintain 
their children and wanted simply and solely to escape their 
proper burden and put it on to other people's shoulders, would 
get off, while everyone doing it in the future would be hit."93
He also pointed out that it was open to the disponor to get out of the 
clause by extending the existing settlement to the whole life of the 
child by a supplementary deed.94 The overall principle involved here 
seemed to be that:-
"Every parent...who has put income out of his power should be 
treated in the same way as any other parent who maintains his 
children by the same expenditure of money, paying it out of his 
pocket instead of through a trustee. insofar as that is 
justifiable, no question whatever of retrospective legislation 
arises because it is simply the expression of a view of what is 
right and proper in the way of taxation of individual members of
the community."95
Despite the support for the government from those who could not see 
that the proposal was in any way retrospective,96 and from those who 
found it disturbing that "large numbers of people [had] for four or 
five years avoided... tax by deliberately creating trusts,"9*7 the 
Solicitor-General promised to reconsider the matter to see whether 
there were any grounds for the apprehension which others had 
expressed.98 Even with such a promise, an amendment was put down at 
the report stage in terms broadly similar to that at the committee 
stage, but the Government had already decided to modify the paragraph 
so that it only applied to dispositions made after April 5, 1914.99 
This date was chosen because it coincided with the first appreciable 
increase in the rate of super-tax and it was believed that by 
operating the paragraph from that date the gaps through which tax had 
been slipping away would be stopped.! The proposers of the amendment 
saw that the Government's concession would be of very little value but
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it was agreed to with little complaint.2
Mr Dennis Herbert tabled a committee stage amendment intended to 
secure a let-out where, although the disposition was not for the whole 
life of the child, it was for the whole life of the disponor. The 
wording of the amendment did not actually achieve this, but the Board 
of Inland Revenue's notes to ministers indicate that they understood 
the spirit of it and that they did not think it unreasonable.2 They 
reminded ministers that an out-and-out disposition by a parent was not 
affected by Clause 13, and argued that a disposition operating for the 
parent's life would be so similar a case as to make it difficult to 
argue that such a disposition should not be similarly treated.4 The 
Solicitor General was thus persuaded of the merits of the amendment 
and he agreed to give it favourable consideration5. An appropriate 
modification was later inserted.6
Mr Herbert also expressed concern that a disposition might not be for
the life of a child if there was some provision for its "termination
*
on bankruptcy, insolvency, alienation or other like event or matter," 
and brought forward an amendment to provide an exception for such 
events?. The Board's notes on this indicate that they believed that 
where a disposition was made defeasible on the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the child or upon the alienation of his interest, it 
would nonetheless be for the life of the child, and indicated that the 
clause was drafted with this intention and would be interpreted by the 
Revenue in that.sense.2 They did however object to the final words 
"or other like event or matter" as these were so extremely wide that 
even the ejusdem generis rule might have been insufficient to limit
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their scope adequately.9 Although the amendment was not even raised 
for discussion and the Inland Revenue believed it unnecessary, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer inserted a proviso to paragraph (c) to 
remove any doubts as to the position where the child's interest was 
defeasible in the event of bankruptcy or the alienating or mortgaging 
of the income.10 The proviso was clearly aimed at the protective 
trust rather than dispositions which could cane to an end, as can be 
seen from the fact that, on such an event, the income had to become 
payable to some other person if the proviso was to apply. This 
proviso was to form the model for future settlements legislation.
The only other amendment to be accepted in principle at the committee 
stage was that the deeming process should not apply where capital was 
required to be held on trust absolutely for the child at the end of 
any period less than the life of that child.H The Revenue thought 
that the amendment was obscure but believed it was aimed at the case 
where the parent settled, say, £20,000, the income from which was 
applicable for the benefit of the child until he reached the age of 
21, at which time £10,000 of capital became the child's absolutely.!2 
If this was its meaning, the Revenue thought it unnecessary, because 
the income fran one half of the capital in the illustration would be 
payable for a period less than the life of the child and would be 
caught, while the other half would not, as the interest of the child 
in that half would be for his life.13 Even though the Revenue thought 
that the amendment was unnecessary, (assuming it meant what they 
thought), and suggested to ministers that it should be rejected 
because of its obscurity,14 the Solicitor-General agreed it in 
principle subject to drafting
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considerations and it was accepted at the committee stage.I5 However, 
at the report stage the Chancellor put down a clarifying amendment to 
indicate with rather more precision the actual facts of the class of 
case at which the provision was directed.16
Despite the fact that the remaining amendments put down for 
consideration were not actually made, they are interesting for the 
insights the responses of the Revenue and ministers give to the 
intention behind the legislation.
One suggestion was that a disposition should not be caught merely 
because it could be terminated with the consent of some person other 
than the parent.1? This would of course have provided an easy means 
of escape fran the provisions by using a friendly trustee with whose 
consent the disposition could be terminated, and would have defeated 
the whole object of the clause, in their response to the amendment 
the inland Revenue were dismissive of the suggestion but indicated 
their concern over another unrelated matter.!8 Their worry was that 
one person might provide funds to another who would then at some later 
time create a settlement on the original donor*s child, and whilst 
they believed that the provision was wide enough to catch this 
situation
”...legal ingenuity is multiform, manifold and menacing and 
there is often an element of uncertainty in the decisions of the 
courts. It may happen, therefore, that at some later stage it 
will become necessary to seek some tightening of these 
provisions in order to ensure their effective working.Ifl9
A further suggestion was made by some MP's who thought it was not
within the intention of the provisions to catch cases where the
parent, although having made a disposition for less than the life of
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the child, had nevertheless irrevocably disposed of income in such a 
manner that it could never become payable to or applicable for the 
parent's benefit.20 It is perfectly clear from the cases used to 
illustrate their point that the anti-avoidance provisions would have 
had no affect on the particular circumstances which they had in mind 
because the child was over the age of majority. Nobody pointed this 
out. After some explanations of the clause as it stood, which were 
heavily reliant upon the notes provided by the Board of Inland 
Revenue, the Chancellor promised to review the situation.2^ It seems 
that few MP's really understood the scope of these provisions and were 
worrying unnecessarily.
A second attempt'was made to introduce a similar amendment at the 
report stage but this time the Solicitor-General appears to have 
agreed with the Revenue's advice.
"Even if he wished to make an out-and-out gift over to some 
stranger when the child's interest ceased, there is no reason 
whatever why, during that child's minority, he, the parent, 
should not continue to bear tax upon income which he has himself 
provided for the maintenance etc., for the child during its 
minority, i.e. whilst it is the natural and proper duty of the 
parent to provide for his child."22 
A further illustration of how complex these provisions must have seemed
can be seen from an amendment which, although intended to narrow down
their scope, would, if it had been accepted, actually have had the
opposite effect. A memorandum by the mover of the amendment to the
Solicitor-General explained that it was designed to meet the case of a
settlement in favour of a number of children where the power was reserved
for the settlor to appoint the fund in different shares between different
children.22 The Solicitor-General explained that this had been very
carefully considered and it had been concluded that the section would not
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apply, and that the amendment as drafted would have created unintended
traps.24
Another point which worried some MP's25 was the position where a parent 
created a trust for the benefit of his children under which the trustees 
were to apply the income for the benefit of all or any of the children as 
they thought fit, with a power to appoint capital to one or more of those 
children, or to their husband or wife or their issue.26 it was feared 
that in such a case it would be sought to claim that the trust income was 
payable for a period less than the life of the child. The Board's advice 
to ministers indicates that these fears were groundless because regard 
would be had to the position of each child and it would be impossible to 
contend successfuly that as regards any one of the children the 
disposition was for a period less than his life.2? This matter was 
considered by the Solicitor-General and Parliamentary Counsel as well as 
the Revenue in order to be sure that the case postulated was entirely
outside the scope of the clause.28
Although support for the clause came from colonel Wedgewood, the 
Vice-Chairman of the Labour Party, who saw it as a means by which the 
child "will be able to marry as it thinks fit,... to quarrel with its
parents and to adopt a different line of business to the one the parent
desires it to follow,"29 he put down a most curious amendment which was 
inconsistent with all that he had said.30 He wanted to leave out clause 
13 altogether I The Revenue could not see why he should "rush into the 
arena in support of the avoidance of income tax and super-tax... 
especially when it is borne in mind that the legal devices by means of 
which this avoidance is effected are not easily available to the poorer
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classes of taxpayers."31 The only explanation the Revenue could think of 
for Colonel Wedge wood* s amendment was that by the removal of clause 13 he 
would show his approval of the distribution of property even though as 
they pointed out, taxpayers would remain perfectly at liberty to dispose 
of their property as they thought fit and the clause would not affect 
out-and-out dispositions of property.32 we shall probably never know his 
reasons because the amendment was not debated
Recovery Rights, Definitions and Supplementary Provisions 
It was realised that it would be inequitable to leave the disponor to 
bear any additional tax which might be charged by virtue of these 
anti-avoidance provisions, and it was therefore provided that he should 
be entitled to recover that.tax frcm the trustee or other person to whom
the income was payable,33 unless it related to a revocable 
disposition.34 The right of recovery related to both additional income
tax and additional super-tax, and in order to provide evidence of the 
amount of that tax the disponor could require the Commissioners
concerned35 to provide him with a certificate specifying the income and
the tax charged.
In calculating the additional tax payable as a result of the deeming 
process, the income caught by the anti-avoidance provisions was to be 
treated as the highest part of the income.36 However, the problem of 
what was to be done when several items of income had to be treated as the 
highest part of the income was not addressed, and it is assumed that in 
practice the several items would have been aggregated and that the tax 
attributable to that aggregate apportioned amongst the several items of 
income according to their respective amounts.
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It was foreseen that in some cases the deeming process might cause the 
disponor to become entitled to a greater repayment than he would 
otherwise have obtained. On the other hand the person to whom the income 
was actually payable could be deprived of any repayment in respect of 
that income. Sub-clause 3 therefore provided that where a person 
received a repayment which was greater than he would have had but for the 
deeming process, the excess repayment would have to paid over to the 
actual recipient of the incane.
It is probably rare now to have circumstances in which this situation 
would arise,37 but in 1922 no child allowance was given if the child had 
income of more than £40. Therefore, by deeming the child not to have the 
settlement income the child allowance might again be available to the 
parent. The child on the other hand would not get any repayment in 
connection with the income deemed to be the parent's and therefore would 
be worse off. Sub-clause 3 corrected such a situation and even provided 
that in cases where there had been more than one disposition, the total 
excess repayment was to be apportioned "as the case may require".
Although there is no reference to repayments of super-tax in sub-clause 
3, it is believed that this was deliberate, because the deeming process 
could not result in any additional allowance or relief for super-tax 
purposes and therefore no additional repayment could arise.38
Sub-clause 5 provided some definitions. A child included a step-child or 
an illegitmate child, and a disposition included a trust, covenant, 
agreement or arrangement. It is clear fran the fact that the term 
"disposition" included an agreement or arrangement that the inland
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Revenue were aware of the fact that disponors might try to make their 
dispositions by complex and tortuous means.39 judging by some of the 
cases which were to follow many years later, it was quite correct to make 
the meaning of "dispositions" as wide as possible, although perhaps some 
uncertainty was created by doing so.
CONCLUSION
The need for anti-avoidance provisions to attack settlements seems to 
have been accepted without anything like an exact knowledge of the extent 
of the problem. The Revenue did not present any statistical information 
to the 1920 Royal Commission or to the chancellor concerning the value of 
assets transferred or the amount of income involved. The need for action 
was proved to the chancellor by showing him a few hypothetical examples 
and by asserting that they were unacceptable and by telling him that the 
number of cases was already large and was likely to grow rapidly. It 
seems that the inland Revenue saw the potential difficulties of not being 
able to provide hard evidence of the extent of avoidance, because by 
1936, when the first major overhaul of the settlement provisions took 
place, detailed statistics were available of the number of cases, the 
amounts of income involved and their effect in tax terms.40
The legislation eventually introduced in 1922 was largely modelled upon 
the recommendations of the 1920 Royal Commission and those 
recommendations very much represented the views put forward by the Inland 
Revenue, influence on tax legislation appears to be closely linked with
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influence on the Royal Commission, and this point was certainly not lost 
on the Revenue.
Conversion of the Royal commission's suggestions into a set of clearly 
defined rules caused considerable difficulty, particularly as they 
represented one of the first efforts at specifically targeted incane tax 
anti-avoidance provisions. The Revenue had little to go on and it is not 
surprising therefore that many refinements took place between the first 
draft and the passing of the Act.
No clear evidence could be found as to why the Revenue did not attempt to 
introduce a short, widely-drawn, generalised rule, but it is likely that 
such an approach did not find favour with them due to the problems they 
had had with such an approach in the Excess Profits Duty provisions 
attacking artificial or fictitious transactions. Furthermore, the 
possibility of using widely drawn legislation was discussed by the Royal 
Commission and firmly rejected, though without giving substantial 
reasons.41
The only part of the 1922 legislation on settlements which remains in 
any recognisable form today is that which deals with dispositions for 
short periods.42 The other provisions of the section were very 
rapidly to prove almost worthless, but were not recast until 1936 and 
1938, by which time they had been virtually ineffective for ten or 
more years, it should not however be thought that the parts which 
were repealed were of no value because the Revenue's desire to use 
familiar methods and shun the untried and untested, led to the use of
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elements which were effective as precedents for future legislation. 
The shape of a considerable amount of the current settlement 
legislation owes much to the Revenue's experience of its first attack 
on settlements.
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CHAPTER 4
1922-1936: THE FAILURE OF SECTION 20 FINANCE ACT 1922 AND THE DISCOVERY 
OF OTHER MEANS OF AVOIDANCE USING SETTLEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 quickly proved to be a flimsy 
barrier to the tax avoider, and although the mechanism by which 
knowledge of avoidance techniques was passed on was only embryonic, by 
1927 the Inland Revenue considered the provisions to be a failure.
Even though a detailed account of its shortcomings was presented to a 
Cabinet Committee examining tax avoidance, the Committee decided to 
take no action except in relation to charitable covenants, but their 
proposals flopped even before reaching the statute book.
The publicity surrounding the Revenue's loss of important cases in the 
courts seriously damaged any residual effectiveness section 20 might 
have retained through ignorance of the methods of avoiding it. Not 
only did knowledge of such avoidance schemes spread, but new methods 
not contemplated when the section was drafted began to take root. The 
Board of Inland Revenue had the foresight to investigate thoroughly 
all known methods of avoidance and put together their proposals for 
tackling them, even going so far as to draft appropriate clauses.
When the time came for action, they were well prepared.
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THE CABINET REVIEW OF TAX AVOIDANCE
The journals of the time show little to indicate it, but by 1927 
section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 had, for those who were well 
advised, become virtually ineffective. Evidence of this failure can 
be found in a memorandum by the Board of Inland Revenue to the 1926 
Cabinet Tax Evasion Committee. 1
The Inland Revenue had begun to notice the disparities in treatment of 
individuals whose ability to pay was apparently identical but who, 
because of their legal status or the manner in which they carried out 
their transactions, actually paid considerably different amounts of 
tax. Their first paper to the Committee put the matter in the 
following way:
"Legal avoidance (or legal evasion) may perhaps more properly be 
said to begin when a taxpayer makes some artificial or unnatural 
disposition of his property or his income of such a nature that 
its object may be derived to be, and its effect is, greatly to 
reduce the burden of taxation upon him without materially 
altering his power of enjoyment of the property or income so 
treated."2
The paper went on to outline the main forms of avoidance known to the 
Revenue at that time, and pointed out that although the settlement 
provisions had at first proved quite effective, lawyers were beginning to 
find ways of avoiding them, and amending legislation would soon become 
necessary.2 It was to be nine years before anything was done.
A second and much more detailed paper was presented to the Committee,
(now re-named the Cabinet Revision Committee), setting out the general
defects in Section 20 of the Finance Act 1922.4
"It was to be expected that the ingenuity of lawyers would in 
the course of time find means of reducing this section to 
impotence, and that time has now arrived. That is to say while 
the section now deters many people, all those who are skilfully 
advised walk round it without any difficulty."2
Details of the three main loopholes in the section were explained.
The first consisted of "the most formidable engine of destruction"2 
and involved a provision in the deed that if the disponor revoked it 
he should be free of any liability under it upon payment of a small 
penalty. Treasury Counsel had advised that there was no chance of 
successfully contending that such a deed was revocable.^ it was 
therefore outside the scope of the anti-avoidance provisions and the 
small penalty payable was outweighed by the potential tax savings.
The Revenue appear to have accepted this advice and took no case 
before the courts on the point.
The second loophole was thought to be almost as serious as the first,2 
and arose from the let-out which was provided where consent was 
required to the revocation. An extremely simple method of getting 
within the escape clause was to name in the deed a series of intimate 
friends and to provide that with the consent, and only with the 
consent, of one of those persons, the disponor could revoke the 
disposition and resume beneficial enjoyment of the income. If the 
first friend refused to give consent then the settlor would ask the 
next, and so on until he found one who would.9
A third though less serious problem concerned short-term dispositions.
The Board believed that the words "which cannot exceed six years" 
ought to be altered to "which is less than six years".10 It would 
appear that what the Inland Revenue had in mind was the adoption of a 
"wait and see approach" so that if a disposition which could exceed 
six years did not in the event exceed six years, it would be caught. 
This would presumably have meant that prior years assessments would be 
reopened, but the practical problems of implementing such a system 
were not examined in the paper. This is the only time this matter 
appears to have been raised by the Revenue and the existing provisions 
remain with us to this day.
A further defect in the section had only recently come to light at the 
time of writing the paper.H Although it was under consideration by 
the Law Officers, the Revenue believed that the need for legislation 
on the point had not been established and did not provide details to 
the Committee or give any indication of its nature.
A clear attempt was made by the Inland Revenue to persuade the Cabinet 
that modification of the law was essential in respect of the three 
main problem areas mentioned above.
*
"Having regard to the helplessness of the Revenue in the face of 
the devices and the loophole mentioned it is for consideration 
whether amendments of section 20 to deal with these points 
should be introduced in the forthcoming Finance Bill in 
conjunction with the other provisions against legal avoidance 
now under consideration."12
However, at a meeting on March 8, 1927, the Board of Inland Revenue 
explained the nature of the forms of avoidance and the remedies being 
contemplated, and the Committee decided, apparently without giving
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reasons, that it was unnecessary to legislate at that time, but agreed 
that the development of such practices should be carefully monitored.13
AN ATTEMPT TO REMOVE THE TAX ADVANTAGES OF CHARITABLE COVENANTS 
The treatment of covenants in favour of charities was the subject of a 
separate paper to the Cabinet Tax Revision Committee^ and in this case 
the Board's plea for modifications to the law got as far as the committee 
stage of the Finance Bill. The Board submitted evidence concerning 
charitable covenants even though at that time their cost to the Exchequer 
was relatively minor because they knew that the Chancellor intended 
introducing a further relief for charities by exempting certain trading 
profits which had been shown to be taxable in the 1926 case of Brighton 
College v Marriott.^5 They estimated that it would cost £100,000 per 
annum to provide this further exemption and explained to the Committee 
that this could be recovered by removing the relief for charitable 
covenants. The use of such covenants was described as a "small anomaly" 
which had recently arisen and which ought to be corrected because it was 
"a practice [which was] growing very fast...and might ultimately cost ... 
not far short of £1,000,000 per annum".^ It was pointed out that 
charities had been exploiting more and more widely what the Revenue 
described as "an ingenious scheme" but which was in fact merely a 
charitable covenant.^ Some indication of the persuasiveness of the 
Revenue's paper can be seen from the following extract.
"They are more or less sham deeds; although expressed to be 
irrevocable they are really revocable, because in the event of a 
subscriber failing to maintain his payments the charity would 
certainly not commit the folly of suing him under the deed; any 
such action would obviously destroy the market once and for all 
time. In fact the Board of Inland Revenue have been ingenuously
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asked by one of these charities whether there will be any danger 
of it being legally obliged to take action to enforce fulfilment 
of the covenant. ...These schemes are being widely advertised 
and...are on the whole more attractive to the less scrupulous 
taxpayer to the detriment of his more scrupulous fellow."18
The Revenue were able to produce evidence that they were not the only 
ones who were unhappy with the situation. A lawyer from Glasgow had 
written to the Chancellor in January 1926 because "I think it my duty 
to send...a circular which is being issued by the Glasgow Charity 
Organisation"^ The circular set out the details of how to make use 
of covenants which the lawyer criticised as "unfair to those who do
not believe in the State endowment of religion and object to have
(sic) their income tax increased"20
One of the banks2! was offering to act as a trustee on behalf of its
customers, receiving annuities for seven years and distributing the 
money to such charitable bodies as the customer might select.22 It 
had issued a form of draft deed which specified that it was not to be * 
liable for any omission or neglect to enforce the covenant, which, as . 
the Board pointed out to the Committee, meant that in effect the 
arrangement was voluntary and revocable.22
The Revenue put forward what they believed to be six cogent reasons 
for taking serious exception to the use of charitable covenants.24
(a) There was no general relief for money spent or saved in some 
desirable fashion.
(b) Such covenants led to larger subscriptions.
(c) There was no justification for substantial and irregular additions 
to the cost of the charity exemption.
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(a) Such covenants were mainly of benefit to the rich "as the poor 
have little or no tax to evade", (sic)
(e) They were attractive to the less scrupulous taxpayer.
(f) They were being used in connection with capital gifts to charities 
by spreading large lump sums over a period in excess of six years.
Although the case for introducing legislation to remove the tax relief 
for the payer had been made to look fairly strong, the Revenue warned 
that:
"...the legislation would no doubt arouse strong 
opposition...and past history has always proved that there are 
always serious difficulties in the way of carrying through an 
amendment of taxation law designed in any way to restrict or 
interfere with the privileges enjoyed by charities."25
The Revenue suggested that the way to proceed was for any disposition of 
income to be treated as the disponor's, unless it was in favour of and 
for the use of an individual.25 There was thus no intention to interfere 
with covenants in favour of needy relatives or friends. No case was made 
out as to why covenants to individuals should be treated any differently 
and this leads one to suspect that charitable covenants were being 
attacked on cost grounds rather than on principle.
The Minutes of the Cabinet Committee2? indicate that the Board met with 
no opposition to their proposals. A potted version of the Board1s 
arguments and proposals was included in the Committee's report2® which 
was put before the full Cabinet on March 23, 1927. After questions on 
certain technical aspects of the subject had been answered by the 
Chairman of the Board,2  ^the proposals concerning charitable deeds of
93
covenant were approved, subject to the proviso that the measures taken to 
block the avoidance should apply only to future covenants.30 Despite the 
support it had at the highest levels, the Board's prophecy of serious 
difficulties was correct.
Winston Churchill described the matter in his Financial Statement as "a 
small amendment, without retrospective consequences" and in the same 
breath gave details of his proposal to exempt "the profits of public 
schools and other similar trading profits of charities".31 The exemption 
was presumably intended to smooth the passage of what he described as the 
"small amendment" but which was in fact the complete removal of both 
super-tax relief and income tax relief on charitable covenants.
A very detailed explanation of the mischief aimed at and why it was to be 
stopped was given by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in the Ways 
and Means report stage debates.32 Because all the government cards were 
put on the table, by the time the clause came to be debated in 
committee^ powerful counter-arguments had been formulated by the charity 
lobby. • They pointed to some of the classes of charity which would be 
seriously injured - "The Voluntary Hospitals, The Great Educational 
Societies, The Universities, The National Libraries, The Cancer 
Campaign. "34 Those charities which did not have such a wide measure of 
public support were not, of course, mentioned. Example after example was 
given of the good works being done and the way in which the system had 
greatly encouraged charitable gifts. The cost to the Exchequer was 
ignored. Mr Philip Snowden, on behalf of the Opposition, even suggested 
that "in withdrawing this clause the Chancellor of the
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Exchequer is losing nothing at all"35. One of the arguments used against 
covenants was the fact that "if there were default in the payment... the 
charity would never take the defaulter to court; it would obviously 
spoil their market for subscriptionsf"36 but the lobbyists were able to 
point out that "there is actually at present a case before the court to 
compel a subscriber to carry out the agreement he has made".37 It is a 
matter for speculation as to whether this situation had not been set up 
in order to destroy one of the main planks of the Government's argument.
The interpretation of the clause caused some confusion in the legal 
profession/ and four questions about it were raised by Messrs Hasties in 
a letter published in The Times.38 These questions were brought up at an 
interview with the Financial Secretary by a leading member of the legal 
profession39 and answers were provided only after they had been cleared 
by Parliamentary Counsel.40
Some of the journals also indicate the unpopularity of the proposals.
The general attitude was that "...many people will think that the 
Chancellor might have found some less meritorious object of attack."41
Perhaps the most persuasive arguments were put by the charities 
themselves. A special written plea was submitted by Lord Knutsford on 
behalf of hospitals/ and although Churchill was "not very keen about 
this" he refused to make any special exception.42 Further 
representations were made on behalf of the Universities^3 and St. Thomas' 
Hospital London^-, but the Revenue drafted letters firmly refusing to 
compromise on the proposals on the grounds of cost to the
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Exchequer, and these were approved and issued.
Eventually however, the Financial Secretary agreed to meet a deputation 
representing hospitals, universities, religious organisations and general 
welfare organisations,^ and was subjected to a detailed account of the 
damage the proposals would cause and the areas in which they would cause 
increased claims upon the State. It was even argued that the provisions 
concerning short-term dispositions in the 1922 Act had been inserted in 
order to encourage charitable covenants. Even more surprisingly, the 
Financial Secretary described the provisions as a concession which was 
never intended to be applicable to charities.46
Although the Financial Secretary was much impressed by the claims that 
charitable covenants were never defaulted on and that charities did not 
fail to enforce them,47 he pointed out that the evidence he had from the 
Revenue told a different story.48
The Financial Secretary had been instructed by the Chancellor "not to 
give a very definite reply ... because he [was] really considering the 
whole matter"49 and had not been authorised "to hold out any very 
definite hope that he would materially alter the proposal which ... [had 
been] very carefully considered before anything was said about it at 
a n . "50 However, a promise was made to pass on the representations of 
the deputation to the Chancellor.
Faced with this opposition the Chancellor withdrew the clause. However, 
he thought that "in logic and in equity ... the case for this clause 
stands quite unassailed" but he acknowledged the fact that "sentiment
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plays its part ...and the practical considerations ...that, but for these 
benefactions, there are charitable institutions of many kinds which 
otherwise would be drawing very near to [making] a demand upon the 
State"51 haci led him to retreat.
This unsuccessful attack had left behind it a full public exposure of the 
precise details of the scheme and its advantages to the payers and the 
charities. It had also indirectly provided a form of government approval 
to the use of the scheme, and both of these factors no doubt encouraged 
the further rapid growth in the use of the charitable covenant.
THE IMPORTANT NQN-FOREIGN-ELEMENT REPORTED CASES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
Although there were no cases coming before the courts on the 
interpretation of section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 until 1928, the 
Revenue had already taken cases where they believed there was sane 
technical defect in the transfer of income such that it was ineffective 
under general principles without the need to resort to the anti-avoidance 
provisions. The first such case was C I R v Allan^2 in which the Revenue 
were successful, but in Linton v Chapman^2 the Revenue's contention that 
there had been no effective donation was rejected by the Court of 
Session.54 These cases show that the Revenue were determined not to let 
people get away with reductions in their tax liabilities too easily, 
particularly where there was the possibility that all the strict 
formalities had not been complied with.
The first case to come before the courts concerning section 20 was 
Gillies v CIR55 in which the appellant had bound himself to pay an 
annuity for three years to his adult, married son. He claimed that the
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annuity should be allowed as a deduction from his income, and contended 
that because the annuity was payable for a period less than the life of 
the child it was covered by, (but not caught by), paragraph (c) of 
sub-section 1, and that this took it outwith the scope of the more 
general provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b). Not surprisingly, it was 
held that there were no grounds for the suggestion that paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) were mutually exclusive. The annuity was therefore caught by 
paragraph (b) because it was payable for a period which could not exceed 
six years.
In May 1930, the case of CIR v The Trustees of The Hostel of St. Luke^G 
came before the High Court. It concerned incane received by a charity 
under a deed of covenant dated February 3, 1927 which required the 
covenantor to pay during the term of seven years from April 6, 1926, an 
annual sum, the first of which was backdated to December 31, 1926, with 
subsequent payments on December 31, each year. The’question arose as to 
whether or not payments under this covenant were for a period which could 
not exceed six years. The Inland Revenue obviously saw this case as 
involving an important matter of principle and had agreed beforehand that 
they would bear all costs irrespective of the outcome. In a unanimous 
judgement the Court of Appeal held that in calculating the six year 
period one had to look at the due dates of the payments which were to be 
m a d e , and the Revenue were therefore successful with their contention 
that there could be no backdating of a deed to escape the provisions 
applying to short-term dispositions.
The next case to reach the courts was that of Wiggins v. Watson5  ^ and 
its loss gave considerably publicity to a serious flaw in the
provisions. In March 1930, the settlor, by deed, covenanted to pay 
trustees during the joint lives of himself and his son, an annuity, to be 
held in trust for the son with power to the trustees during the son's 
minority to apply the annuity for the son's education, maintenance and 
benefit. The deed contained a power of revocation exercisable by the 
settlor with the consent of any one of five specified persons. Clearly 
the case was not caught as a revocable disposition because consent of a 
person other than the disponor or the disponor's wife was required, and 
neither could it be argued that the disposition could not exceed six 
years. The Inland Revenue therefore had to rely upon the contention 
that, by reason of the power of revocation, the annuity was applicable 
for the benefit of the child for some period less than its life.
Although the General Commissioners agreed with this contention, all the 
courts up to and including the House of Lords held without dissent that 
it was incorrect because the mere fact that there was a power of 
revocation did not mean that the interest was for a period less than the 
life of the child. The legal reasoning behind this was that the 
interest, while it lasted and was not set aside, was for the life of the 
child.59 There can be no doubt that this decision virtually destroyed 
the effectiveness of the children's settlement provisions, because the 
mere insertion of a power of revocation with the consent of others, 
(excluding the wife or husband of the disponor), would take any 
disposition capable of exceeding six years outside the section.
Although the House of Lords decision probably even further encouraged the 
creation of settlements of this type,60 it was just over three years 
before action was taken to recast the rules. Today such a gaping hole in 
an anti-avoidance provision would probably be blocked within days by a
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ministerial statement followed by legislation effective from the date of 
the statement.
A case with considerable similarities to Watson v. Wiggins was the 1932 
case of Levitt v. CIR^l in which the appellant transferred certain shares 
to trustees to apply the income for the maintenance, education and 
upbringing of his children until the youngest attained the age of 21, and 
then to divide the capital among the survivors. The deed contained a 
provision that a child marrying a person not of the Jewish faith, without 
the consent of its parents, should forfeit any interest in the trust 
estate. The Inspector of Taxes objected to a claim to repayment on the 
ground that by reason of the provision of forfeiture, income was payable 
to or applicable for the benefit of the children for some period less 
than their lives, and therefore was deemed to ,be the father’s under 
Section 20 (c) of the Finance Act 1922.
It was held by the Court of Session that the Revenue's contentions were 
correct because the matter was contingent. This view was supported by 
reference to the second proviso to paragraph (c) which it was argued set 
out exhaustively the only circumstances in which a disposition which was 
defeasible should nevertheless be treated as being for a period not less 
than the life of the child. Lord Sands did think it a little anomalous 
that an improbable contingency should cause the deeming provisions to 
apply but believed that if it were possible to condone the contingency in 
the Levitt case, then contingencies which were much less remote might 
also claim to be ignored.62
A case very similar to Levitt was the subject of correspondence in The
100
Accountant Tax Supplement in July 1930. Apparently a considerable number 
of deeds had been drawn up with events similar to that in Levitt v CIR 
which would cause the child to lose his interest in the trust. Clearly 
as the correspondent pointed out "many learned counsel who have drawn up 
these settlements have badly blundered."63
The difficulties of reconciling the Watson and Levitt cases caused 
problems for the Income Tax Codification Committee. They concluded that 
codification of the decision in Watson*s case was not desirable because 
this class of case depended upon very fine distinctions and intricate 
questions of law, such as the difference between limited and defeasible 
interests, and they realised that the result might depend on slight 
variations in the wording of any particular instrument.64
In December 1932 the High Court heard the case of CIR v Clarkson-Webb^5 
in which the respondent had covenanted with his brother on May 28, 1929, 
to pay an annual sum of £350 to be held by his brother upon trust for his 
nephew, the infant son of the brother. On the face of things the terms 
of the covenant were outside the scope of Section 20, but by a deed 
executed on the same date, the respondent*s brother had covenanted to pay 
the respondent the annual sum of £350 upon trust for the respondent's own 
son. It was admitted by the respondent that he would not have made the 
disposition had it not been for the fact that his brother made a 
reciprocal disposition. Although the Special Commissioners allowed the 
appeal on the grounds that the respondent had not made the disposition 
directly or indirectly for the benefit of his child, Mr Justice Findlay 
could not agree. He thought that the respondent's disposition was part 
of one transaction, and that by making the provision for the benefit of
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his nephew he was directly procuring the making of a provision of 
precisely the same amount for the benefit of his own son, and that 
therefore the two deeds had to be looked at together. Subsequent 
settlement legislation makes specific reference to reciprocal 
arrangements in defining the settlor,66 but Part I of Chapter XVI still 
relies on Clarkson-Webb to achieve the same effect.
The Clarkson-Webb case was one in which the Inland Revenue clearly had a 
good chance of success but in others their chances were, at best, very 
poor. Such a case is CIR v Firth,^ in which the respondent convenanted 
to pay an annuity to a widow for her life but:
"provided always that I may cease to pay the aforesaid three 
monthly sum on first obtaining the written consent of [the 
appellant’s accountant] or of some person appointed by me other 
than a wife of mine."
This pushed the limit of the consent let-out for revocable 
dispositions to its absolute limit, because the respondent could go 
first to one person and then to another until he found somebody who 
would consent to the cessation of his liability under the deed. The 
Attorney General argued that this was a means whereby the efficacy of 
the section could be destroyed but it was held that nevertheless, the 
let-out applied to such a case and that it was not permissible to go 
into the question of whether, if it had occurred to anybody that this 
plan would be adopted, the whole section would have been differently 
framed.
The Revenue had mentioned this loophole in their paper to the Cabinet 
Tax Evasion Conmittee in February 1927, and made no suggestion that it
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was other than perfectly effective in getting round what they believed 
to be the intent of the section. It is surprising therefore that they 
decided to take a case sane six years later, especially as a full copy 
of the deed was in the stated case, available for anyone to copy and 
use in the certain knowledge of obtaining the tax advantage involved. 
It seems to have been sheer folly for the Revenue to have taken this 
case and it is difficult to think of a reasonable explanation for 
having done so.
A further serious blow was dealt to the Inland Revenue by the decision 
in CIR v. The Duke of Westminister,*^ where a deed of covenant not 
caught by section 20 was used to substitute deductible charges on 
income for non-deductible payments to an agent and household 
employees. Although the case does not directly concern section 20, it 
illustrates the kind of modification required to that section to 
prevent such blatant cases of tax avoidance. It was jus-t over eleven 
years before anything was done to deal with this scheme and its 
repercussions are still regularly discussed even now.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FAILING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FOREIGN ELEMENT 
In June 1932 judgement was given by the High Court in the case of 
Ormonde v. Brown*>9 in which the appellant had in 1922 assigned certain 
foreign property to an American trustee to pay the net income to 
herself and her husband in equal shares during their joint lives. The 
settlor retained a power of revocation and modification but 
relinquished it until January 1, 1929. At this point she revoked the 
trust and by a separate deed transferred the trust estate to an 
American trust company, declaring trusts which provided for the 
payment of annuities
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to each of three persons named in the deed as a charge on the whole 
fund and for the payment to the appellant and her husband of the 
annual sum of £6,000 each. Again, however, she retained a power of 
revocation and modification, but if its exercise would infringe the 
rights of the annuitants it was only exercisable with their written 
consent.
The appellant was only liable under Schedule D case V on a remittance 
basis because the source of income was the trust.70 The Revenue 
contended however that by the exercise of the power of revocation the 
appellant could, without the consent of any other person, obtain for 
herself the beneficial enjoyment of the whole income arising frcm the 
assets comprising the trust funds except the sums required to meet the 
irrevocable annuities. Because of this they argued that the appellant 
was assessable in respect of the whole income arising from the trust 
funds less the amount of the irrevocable annuities.
Although the Special Commissioners agreed with the Revenue*s 
contentions, in the High Court it was held that section 20 was not a 
charging section and that therefore the words "any income" at the 
beginning of the section only referred to income which was already 
within the charge to UK tax.71
Under the rules then applicable to case V of Schedule D, income 
arising from stocks, shares or let property outside the UK was 
computed on an arising basis, whereas income from other sources 
outside the UK was charged on a remittance basis. Therefore, in order 
to shift income from an arising basis to a remittance basis it was
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only necessary to transfer the assets to a trust governed by the law 
of a State in which the income from the trust investments did not 
belong either legally or equitably to any of the beneficiaries. Under 
such a trust the identity of the various sources of income would be 
lost after receipt by the trustee, and the source of income to the 
beneficiary would be the trust itself. By such means, foreign income 
could be sheltered from UK income tax and surtax even though the trust 
was revocable by the settlor without anyone's consent. Ormonde v 
Brown therefore showed up yet another serious loophole for public 
view.
The Inland Revenue were dissatisfied with the decision in Ormonde v. 
Brown and admitted in the High Court in the case of Perry v. Astor^2 
that they had taken that case to test the decision in Ormonde. Astor 
had become absolutely entitled to certain American stocks and shares 
on attaining the age of 21 in August 1928, but in September 1929 he 
transferred them to an American corporation as trustee. Under the 
trusts the balance of income after paying taxes and expenses was 
payable to Astor during his life in such amounts and at such dates as 
he might from time to time direct. He also retained a power of 
revocation. Although the Revenue agreed that the settlement was 
governed by the law of New York State and that Astor was not entitled 
to the specific income arising from the stocks and shares but only to 
a right in equity to enforce performance of the trust, they assessed 
the income arising under case V of Schedule D on the grounds that the 
trust was revocable without consent. Not surprisingly, the Special 
Commissioners decided that the case was governed by Ormonde v. Brown 
and allowed the appeal. In the High Court both-sides merely agreed
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that the case should be bound by the decision in Ormonde v. Brown. 
However, the Inland Revenue seem to have thought that Perry v. Astor 
was more favourable for them than Ormonde v. Brown as no consent was 
required to the revocation, and they therefore took the case further. 
The Court of Appeal was unanimous in its view that Ormonde v. Brown 
was wrongly decided and that the deeming process envisaged by section 
20 could be applied to Astor.
The Revenue*s victory was short-lived because in March 1935 a four to 
one decision was given against them by the House of Lords who held 
that Ormonde v. Brown was rightly decided and that the words "any 
income" were to be construed to mean any income chargeable with tax 
under the British Finance Act of the year. Therefore, as the income 
was the foreign income of a non-resident, (the trustee), it was not 
chargeable and the deeming process of section 20'could not be applied 
to it.73
Thus, by March 1935, the tax shelter spotlighted by the Ormonde case 
had received further publicity, and the backing of the decision of the 
House of Lords meant that this method of avoidance could be used with 
certainty of success. Not only did these two cases raise the 
possibility of avoidance but also they drew the Revenue's attention to 
complex problems concerning the application of the settlement 
provisions to cases containing a foreign element.
There is no evidence in the preparatory papers leading to the 
introduction of section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 that any foreign 
aspects of the application of the legislation were even considered.
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As Lord Macmillan pointed out in Perry v Astor, "the possible 
extra-territorial effects of the section were obviously not thought 
out and the task which the legislature has omitted to perform is 
imposed upon your lordships of reconciling the resulting conflict".74 
He thought that the conflict and anomalies arising in cases with a 
foreign element had come about because the anti-avoidance provisions 
had been introduced without sufficient regard to the basic scheme upon 
which the taxes originally rested.75
The anomalies referred to by Lord Macmillan arose from the Revenue*s 
insistence that the words "any income" were to be read without any 
qualification, territorial or otherwise. He illustrated with four 
examples the anomalies which would arise if this view were correct.75
(1) The income arising under a revocable disposition to an 
American trustee of American stocks and shares by an 
American resident under which the income was payable to a UK 
resident would be deemed for UK tax purposes to be the income 
of the settlor and not the income of the person resident in 
this country.
(2) An American resident who made a disposition there under which 
income of American stocks and shares was payable to a UK 
resident for a period of five years would have that income 
deemed to be his and the UK resident would have no income 
from that source.
(3) If a UK resident made a revocable settlement of the income 
from foreign assets on another UK resident and then later the 
settlor ceased to be a UK resident, on the Revenue's 
contention the income would still be deemed to be the
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settlors, with the result that neither the settlor nor the 
beneficiary would pay any tax, even though the whole of the 
income might be received and enjoyed by the beneficiary in 
the UK.77
(4) The rights of recovery of tax paid by the disponor against an 
American citizen in respect of American stocks and shares was 
thought to be a remarkable result following from the Crown's 
contention. The requirement under section 20, sub-section 3, 
to make additional payments to such an American beneficiary 
was thought to be quite unreasonable unless the settlor could 
succeed in recovering from that beneficiary any tax paid in ! 
this country under the terms of sub-section 2. ‘ I
Lord Macmillan attempted to reconcile the conflict between the 
existing scheme of income tax and section 20 in the following way. i
"The reconciliation is, I suggest, to be effected by reading 
section 20 as designed to effect the notional amalgamation of 
two existing incomes both charged to income tax by the existing 
law. If the words "any income" are construed as they reasonably 
may be, to mean any income chargeable with tax under the British 
Finance Act of the year, the difficulties of the Crown's 
interpretation to a large extent disappear. For the income of 
the American trustee, being the incane of a foreign 
non-resident, is not brought into charge, while the income so 
far as received by the resident in this country is ... brought 
into charge under its appropriate head."7®
Lord Macmillan, it should be noted, only indicated that the difficulties 
arising would "to a large extent disappear"; he neither explained to what 
extent they would disappear, nor examined the anomalies and difficulties 
which would arise fran his own interpretation of the words "any income". 
The Inland Revenue were left with these problems and by July 1935 had
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begun a detailed investigation into precisely how they would be able 
to interpret Astor v. Perry in such a manner as to produce a sensible 
and coherent way of dealing with cases involving a foreign element.79
The Revenue seem to have been forced to consider these problems 
because of a claim by a taxpayer that section 20 was of benefit to her 
and should be applied.80 The facts of the case were that she had made 
a revocable UK settlement of UK assets in 1915, when she was UK 
resident, but had in the meantime become resident in the Irish Free 
State. She therefore claimed that as section 20 deemed the income of 
the trust to be hers, and she was a resident of the Irish Free State, 
she was entitled to exemption from UK tax and a repayment was due. 
After a painstaking analysis of the principles which could be derived 
from Astor v Perry her claim was refused.81
The core of the Revenue*s analysis was based upon the precise meaning
of "any incane chargeable with UK tax" and showed the ambiguity of the
word "chargeable" in this context.82 it could refer to any one of
%
four situations:
(a) the person is in receipt of income arising from a UK source and
(i) is resident in the UK, or
(ii) is not resident in the UK, or
(b) the person is resident in the UK and is in receipt of income,
(i) arising in the UK, or
(ii) arising outside the UK.
It was then shown that in the first anomaly raised by Lord Macmillan, 
(see above), the disponor in relation to the American stocks and
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shares was entirely outside the four classes of chargeability. In his 
third example the disponor was originally in the position shown by
(b)(ii) above, but then on becoming non-resident fell outside the four 
classes of chargeability. At this stage, therefore, Lord Macmillan 
was concentrating on the position of the disponor only, but later, 
when he proceeded to apply the principle that he laid down, he 
referred to an "amalgamation of two existing incomes both charged to 
income tax by the existing law". The condition required before 
amalgamation could take place was therefore that there should be two 
existing incomes both charged to income tax by the existing law.
Thus, it was argued that he must have been referring to the disponor 
and the person actually receiving the income. The Revenue accepted 
that they would have to look at the income after transfer by the 
disposition, with all the circumstances then prevailing, and ask 
whether that income might be deemed to be the income of the 
disponor.83 They realised that if they were not able to look through 
a trust, and the trust investments produced UK income, that income 
would be derived by a UK beneficiary from a foreign possession to 
which remittance basis would apply.
The next stage in their analysis examined the residence position of 
the disponor and recipient. Initially one member of the Board thought 
that both persons had to be resident in the UK for the deeming 
provisions to apply, but in the end he agreed that the only limitation 
implied by Lord Macmillan was that the disponor himself should be 
resident in.the UK. Such an interpretation avoided what the Board 
believed to be absurd situations*^ and avoided the inexpediency and 
impracticability of imposing taxes on non-residents. There does
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appear to be in all of this an element of the Board deciding which 
position would be best for them and then finding the logically 
defensible way of getting there.
The Irish resident claimant was not therefore entitled to repayment of 
the UK tax deducted frcm the income of her revocable trust. It was 
not merely grounds of non residence that scuppered her claim but also 
the Board's view that such income failed the chargeability test 
because, although it was chargeable on general principles, the effect 
of the Irish Free State resident's exemption was to make it 
non-chargeable and therefore not susceptible to the deeming process.
Correspondence passed between the office of the Revenue Commissioners 
in Dublin and the Board of Inland Revenue on this case because the 
Irish Revenue Authorities did not agree with the Board's view and said 
that they would have operated section 20 in a converse case.85 when 
the Board of Inland Revenue pointed out to the Irish Revenue 
Authorities that their revenue was not affected and there was no 
necessity to pursue agreement, the matter seems to have been dropped.86
The Inland Revenue had learned their lesson from all this and future 
modifications to the settlement legislation contained specific 
provisions to deal with any foreign elements which might arise.87
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING AVOIDANCE
There was little response in the journals to the introduction of
section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 and although a detailed article on
I l l
the subject was promised in "The Accountant", 8*3 ^  never 
materialised.
The August 19, 1922 issue of "The Accountant" indicates that new 
conditions were to be applied to tax queries because of their 
increasing complexity. The Advisory Committee by whom such problems 
were considered was increased, as were the fees for dealing with such 
cases. They decided to classify cases into half-guinea cases, guinea 
cases, special cases involving a fee exceeding one guinea and special 
cases in which Counsel*s opinion was required. It is likely that 
problems relating to this relatively new legislation would have fallen 
into the more expensive class and were not suitable for publication.
While there were many general queries concerning trusts, particularly 
arising out of repayment claims relating to relief for income 
accumulated during minority, there was only one query in the period up 
to December 1926 which specifically concerned section 20 of the 
Finance Act 1922.^9 up to that time there was nothing in the 
technical journals concerning how to avoid the operation of the 
section even though at the beginning of 1926:
"Recognising the value to accountants of the latest taxation news 
The Accountant has progressively increased the amount of space 
devoted to this subject and it is now felt that the time has 
arrived for a supplement [The Accountant Tax Supplement] dealing 
exclusively with taxation matters."90
Despite the fact that the means existed for the passing of information
on technical matters of taxation, it was a few years before detailed
articles on tax avoidance began to appear.
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Although according to the Inland Revenue, section 20 was virtually 
ineffective by 1927, the journals of the time do not reflect this and 
it was probably only the best-advised taxpayers with large incomes who 
were actually side-stepping the provisions. It is clear from sane of 
the queries in the journals, in the few years after 1927 that many 
advisers were only vaguely aware of the effect of section 20 and 
hardly had an understanding of its detail let alone the ability to 
advise on its avoidance.
In its first two years there were no articles on avoidance in The 
Accountant Tax Supplement and no queries about section 20. In 1928 
although some readers were writing in with simple tax planning ideas 
none related to section 20, and articles mentioned nothing of tax 
planning. Interest in the subject of avoidance seems to have been 
sparked by a series of eight articles based upon lectures entitled 
"The Legal Avoidance of Income Tax and Supertax by Individuals and 
Companies".91 The first article explained that avoidance had been 
recognised as perfectly acceptable by the highest legal authorities 
and then proceeded to explain schemes for avoidance "which are a 
matter of everyday practice by accountants who are brought into 
sustained contact with taxation".92 It went on to show how a covenant 
could be used to provide an overall tax advantage where it was payable 
to a dependent relative or other person with a low i n c o m e .93 Another 
scheme discussed the advantages of a covenant to an infant child of 
the covenantor, but stated that it was necessary to provide an 
absolute covenant by the settlor for himself and his executors to pay 
the annuity during the whole life of the child. The explanation given 
for this "whole life" requirement was the impossibility of escaping
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section 20 by having an annuity during the joint lives of parent and 
child because the covenant might not then be for the life of the 
child. This was clearly incorrect as a let-out existed for such 
cases.94
The publication of the above article resulted in correspondence 
involving variations on the theme and questions as to whether they 
would be successful,^ but the two queries on the subject in 1929 
reflect a poor understanding of the scope of the s e c t i o n .96
The Accountant Tax Supplement for 1930 reflects the greatest number of ; 
queries concerning section 20 in the period to 1936. There were six 
such queries and though some of than began to reflect slightly more 
sophisticated methods of avoidance, for the most part they represented 
simple transfers where the enquirer was worried that in sane way or 
another the Inland Revenue might be able to mount an attack under 
section 20. An interesting answer was provided in August 1930 in 
response to the question as to whether or not a client who did not 
carry on any trade profession or vocation could obtain a deduction in 
any way for the cost of employing a secretary. Although one of the 
answers indicates that the expenditure "can be likened to the payment 
of wages of danestic servants, gardeners etc. on account of which no 
deduction is allowed for taxation purposes",97 the other is far more 
inventive. It suggested that in order to obtain a deduction in an 
indirect way the client could, by deed, grant annuities to the 
secretary for at least seven years so that the salary would be 
converted to an annual payment and could be deducted as a charge on 
income. This is precisely the kind of arrangement used by the Duke of
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Westminster,^ and it indicates that this manner of avoidance may have 
become quite widely known amongst tax experts long before the Duke of 
Westminster case first came before the courts in March 1934.
Over the following few years the queries raised became more complex
and the avoidance schemes more refined. Covenants of a fixed
proportion of the payerfs income were suggested as well as the
voluntary repayment to a parent of the income arising under parental
dispositions in favour of their children. The journals began to be
used as a forum for the exchange of the experiences that practitioners
were having with the Inland Revenue and by this means began, to clarify
Revenue practices and provide information on Commissioner's decisions. 
*
Despite the detailed articles on the use of covenants and other 
dispositions and the thorough explanations of the relevant case law, 
some practitioners obviously were not convinced that the provisions of 
section 20 could be so easily avoided, and the queries and 
correspondence therefore continued.99 However, it is clear from the 
journals that, by 1933, knowledge of the loopholes in section 20 was 
fairly wide-spread amongst tax practitioners, even though for some 
there was a great deal of uncertainty concerning the exact procedure 
to- be followed.
By late 1934, the Inland Revenue were so concerned about the spread of 
this kind of avoidance that they monitored the journals; perhaps to 
get early warning of what was going on.l They were aware of the 
series of articles in The Law Journal in December 19 342 explaining in 
detail the operation of Section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 and the
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case law which had shown how it could be easily circumvented. Their 
concern must have increased on seeing that when The Financial News of 
January 2, 1935 carried an article5 explaining the main methods of 
avoidance, great interest was generated, and three further articles 
were published4 going into all aspects of the matter, including 
drafting a deed to attract the lowest possible amount of stamp duty.
By April of 1935 discussion of this means of avoidance had spilled 
over into the newspapers. For example short articles appeared in the 
Evening Standard giving sufficient information to whet the appetite of 
any person inclined to take avoidance measures.5
Shortly after the Duke of Westminster case had been decided in the 
House of Lords, the Financial News ran a detailed article5 explaining 
exactly what had happened and how the decision could be used by 
others. It was suggested that "...there is no reason why the scheme 
may not be adopted in other cases as well e.g. to payments to clubs 
and other annual subscriptions, the provision of board and lodging, 
the rendering of annual services by independent contractors, such as 
laundering, car maintenance and so on."?
As well as articles, newspapers and journals carried advertisements by 
charities encouraging the public to subscribe by covenant, pointing to 
the tax advantages of doing so, and offering advice on educational 
trusts to reduce the burden of school fees.5 The professional 
journals and newspapers of the time thus kept the general public in 
touch with the current means of avoidance. No doubt the professional 
adviser would have had little difficulty in drafting appropriate deeds
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and was probably under considerable pressure to do so from clients who 
knew from the publicity that considerable savings of tax were 
available.
By no means all public opinion was in favour of tax avoidance and seme 
dissenting voices could be heard after the publication of the Finance 
Bill 1935. The Law Times of June 8, 1935, expressed surprise that the 
Finance Bill contained no provisions to stop up the loopholes, while 
The Daily Telegraph of July 12, 1935 carried a letter expressing 
disappointment with the attitude of the Chancellor to income tax 
avoidance.9
OTHER FACTORS ENCOURAGING TAX AVOIDANCE
In the period from 1922 to 1936 there were changes in legislation and 
in the mode of operation of the Inland Revenue which considerably 
improved their chances of detecting evaders. The first stage in this 
process was the power given under section 22 of the Finance Act 1922 
to enable the Special Commissioners to obtain detailed particulars of 
the sources of income and deductions claimed in super-tax returns.
The Finance Act 1923 introduced an extension to the penalty provisions 
and an increase in their severitylO and extended the time limit for 
making an assessment to six years after the end of the year of 
assessment.H In 1925 procedures were put into effect for the 
intensive examination of all super-tax returns over a four year cycle 
and this proved to be most effective in detecting evasion.^2 Other 
procedures were set up to detect individuals who were liable to 
super-tax but who had not made returns.I2 As the odds became stacked 
against the evader it is highly probable that both the evaders
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who were detected and those who were not began to shift their 
attention to methods of avoidance.
The Finance Act 1927 considerably tightened up the anti-avoidance 
provisions concerning undistributed income of close companies^4 and 
may have caused a further push towards the use of avoidance techniques 
involving settlements.
In the slump of 1931 the second Finance Act for that year both 
increased the rate of tax by six pence, to five shillings in the 
pound, and made considerable reductions in the personal reliefs. 
Furthermore, the rates of surtax were increased by an addition of ten 
percent to the rates at each point in the scale. Such sudden and 
relatively drastic increases in the total tax payable must surely have 
given a new fillip to avoidance, and the ratchet effect would have 
ensured that subsequent reductions in tax rates would not result in 
the reduction of avoidance to the pre-tax increase levels.
THE BOARD'S COMMITTEE ON AVOIDANCE15
Although in March 1927 the Cabinet Revision Committee had decided not 
to bring forward legislation to close the loopholes in section 20 of 
the Finance Act-1922, it did ask the Board of Inland Revenue to keep 
the progress of the practice under review.!^ It is clear that the 
Board took this request seriously because it upgraded its systems for 
measuring the extent of avoidance and monitoring the development of 
the methods in use. The Intelligence Division of the Special 
Commissioners Office, (dealing with surtax), and the Research 
Division, (dealing with "millionaire cases"),^ kept records of the
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classes of avoidance they came across and the amounts of tax 
involved. Claims Branch had kept records of the numbers of minor*s 
claims since at least 1923, but was instructed to keep more detailed 
records so that
"If the duty lost becomes substantial some efforts will .... be 
made to stop the leakage? it is difficult to approach ministers 
unless we give them some idea of the yield of any proposal."I8
By October 1933 the Board was so concerned about avoidance that it set up 
a committee to investigate the problem and various papers were put to it 
by the Intelligence Division, the Research Division and other branches 
which had knowledge of the methods and extent of avoidance.^ Details 
were provided of the avoidance practices of millionaires as known to the 
Revenue in 1930.20 The main forms of avoidance considered by the 
committee had all been used by millionaires at least three years earlier 
and what seems to have happened over time was that the practices spread to 
lower incane groups.
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The following general classification of the methods of avoidance was 
prepared together with estimates of the amounts of income upon which tax 
was avoided and the tax lost for 1931/32.
Classes of Avoidance and Estimated Amounts Involved in 1931/32
Type of Avoidance Income^ on which Tax Surtax Avoided
Private holding companies, 
British
Private holding conpanies, 
abroad 
Trusts for accumulation 
Settlement on minors 
Settlements on adults 
Settlements on charities 
Out and Out gifts of capital 
or annuities 
Miscellaneous
was Avoided by the 
Largest 490 Incomes
(Research Div.)
£
1,300,993
1,103,517
844,859
154,019
276,765
597,864
478,898
62,395
£4,819,3102
in Other Cases
(Intelligence Div.) 
£
144.000
144.000
92.000
98.000
13.000
10.000
20,000
£521,000
Note 1 This column deals with income alienated, but the other is in tax 
terms. The amounts in each column are independent so that 
income in the first column is not reflected in tax in the other, 
and vice versa.
Note 2 This total represented almost 11% of the total income (including 
income upon which tax was avoided) in the 490 cases involved.
Source: Derived from reports to the Board's Tax Avoidance Committee (PRO
File IR40/4576).
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The Committee's report indicates that avoidance through the formation 
of British settlements and trusts had grown very rapidly, most 
particularly in the form of settlements in favour of minor children 
and charities, though many other classes of settlement and trust were 
also being used.21 The approach of the committee was not to consider 
what modifications to the original provisions were required, but to 
try to develop new proposals to deal with each problem area.
Parental Settlements for the Benefit of Their Minor Unmarried Children. 
The main evidence of this form of avoidance was submitted by the 
Research Division of the Special Commissioners Office which gave 
examples of some of the extremely large cases they had come a c r o s s .22 
For example, Lord Dulverton had settled shares on trustees for the 
benefit of his minor children and the value of the investments in 1933 
was three and a half million pounds while the income upon which surtax 
had been lost was two hundred and twelve thousand p o u n d s .23 in their 
view the purpose of these trusts was "evasion of surtax and death 
duties",24 and they pointed out that there was little to prevent the 
settlor destroying the trust deed once it had served its purpose.
There was seldom evidence of a separate bank account or actual payment 
of the trust income to or for the benefit of the b e n e f i c i a r y .25 They 
commonly came across cases where the settlor would borrow large sums 
from the trustees, at interest, thereby creating an annual charge 
which would further reduce his i n c o m e . 2 6
The evidence of Claims Branch showed that they had kept records of the 
total numbers of claims in respect of minors submitted for each year 
since 1922 but that until March 1928 they did not separate out claims
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where there had been a-parental transfer of income.27 The statistics 
up to March 1928 are shown in Appendix C2 and indicate only a 
relatively small increase in the number of such claims over the 
period, with almost half of the increase taking place in the year to 
March 31, 1928.22 For the year ending March 31, 1929 and following 
years details were kept of new cases submitted involving settlements 
by parents and settlements by other persons on minor children, and a 
detailed analysis of such cases is given in Appendix C3.
The Revenue estimated the loss of income tax at £387,000 and of surtax 
at £163,000,27 but pointed out that the surtax figure was probably 
grossly underestimated because it did not include cases where trusts 
had been set up primarily to accumulate incane in which the ultimate 
beneficiaries were the minor children of the settlor.20 Sane such 
accumulation settlements were very large and one case involved a loss 
of surtax of more than £80,000 per annum.21
Despite the fact that the bulk of the settlements purported to be 
irrevocable, the Revenue believed that there were many cases where 
payments were not continued after the child attained majority because 
he would not be aware of the existence of the settlement and the 
parents would either destroy the deed or simply ignore it.22 a 
further source of irritation to the Revenue were cases where 
investments alleged to have been given to the children absolutely had 
been re-transferred to the parent when the child attained majority, 
but the Board had already decided that no action could be taken to 
refuse relief during minority.23 The Committee agreed that nothing 
could usefully be done to meet either of these c a s e s .24
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After discussing the possibility of treating the whole family as the 
unit for taxation and whether a distinction could be drawn between 
cases where capital was transferred irrevocably and cases where only 
income was transferred, the Committee finally agreed that three 
alternative "remedies" were practicable:55
(a) as a comprehensive remedy, all deeds by parents in favour of minor 
children, (whether transferring income or capital and whether 
revocable or not), could be ignored for tax purposes and the 
income treated as the parent’s; or
(b) if the first measure was considered too drastic, a halfway house 
would be to treat as valid all settlements where the capital was 
transferred irrevocably; or
(c) if neither of the above remedies were acceptable, it would be 
possible to make a deduction of the child's income in calculating 
the amount of the parent's child allowance.
The Committee proposed that the age of majority for these purposes 
should be 21, though one member had argued that the age of 18 would be 
justified for cases in which settlements were made to provide for 
expensive university education, because of the lack of surtax relief 
for such expenditure.56
Detailed draft legislation to deal with all forms of settlement by 
parents on their children was appended to the Committee's report and 
included what was described as a comprehensive proposal and an 
alternate proposal limited to dispositions involving settlements with 
a power of revocation.5  ^ It was pointed out however, that if the 
latter proposal was enacted it would only affect about 20% of the
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settlements and would be unlikely to discourage further large-scale 
adoption of irrevocable settlements on children.38 The legislation 
eventually introduced was a watered down version of the comprehensive 
proposals. (See Chapter 5).
Settlements on Adult Children
A memorandum prepared for the Committee indicated that the majority of 
settlements on adult children were made by surtax payers and resulted 
in a loss of surtax estimated at £214,000 per annum.39 One case in 
particular was highlighted.4® The settlor had covenanted to pay 
trustees £200 per month which was to be paid at their discretion to 
him or his wife, adult children or remoter issue, but he had retained 
the power to displace or appoint trustees and to revoke the settlement 
with the trustee's consent. A payment had been made by the trustees 
to a son, and he in turn had made a voluntary payment of the same 
amount to the settlor. The settlor had thus obtained a deduction for 
surtax purposes in respect of the payments to the trustees while the 
voluntary payment from the son could not be included as part of the 
settlor's income for surtax purposes. It was thought that such 
devices were probably exceptional at that time but that there was a 
risk that they might be resorted to to a greater extent if any attenpt 
were made to attack settlements on minor children.4^
The committee decided that no major changes would be recommended to 
the existing provision regarding settlements on adults.4^ However, it 
was suggested that cases where the beneficiary voluntarily handed back 
the whole or part of the settlement income to the settlor should be 
dealt with by means of a general clause on artificial transactions.4^
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Cases where the beneficiary was kept in ignorance of the trust were 
described as being "semi-fradulent" and they argued that to deal with 
this problem and to assist generally in the enforcement of the 
provisions concerning trusts, the Special Commissioners should be 
given powers to obtain particulars of any trust or disposition from 
both the taxpayer and, where necessary, the beneficiary.44
The general principle adopted by the committee was that dispositions 
in favour of adult children, relatives and third parties (other than 
charities) should be recognised as transferring the income for 
taxation purposes provided
(a) there was no power under which the settlor could obtain directly 
or indirectly the beneficial enjoyment of the income either for 
himself, any child of his under 21, or any charity; and
(b) the transaction was a genuine one, so that for instance the
settlor was not getting back some consideration in capital or 
other non-taxable form.45
The fact that the period of any disposition only had to be capable of 
exceeding six years was thought to be unsatisfactory and the following 
alternative periods were suggested
(a) the joint lives of the donor and donee; or
(b) until either of them marries; or
(c) a definite minimum period of years.45
Dispositions In Favour Of Charities.
Many taxpayers, particularly wealthy ones, were adopting the seven
125
year deed as a means of paying subscriptions to charities, and by 
September 29 1929 there were a total of 8,000 such deeds in force, 
providing for annual payments of £830,000. ^  Over the next few years 
the rate of growth in the use of charitable covenants accelerated so 
that the numbers of new deeds recorded by the Revenue were:
Year to September 1930 5,000 
Year to September 1931 7,222 
Year to September 1932 9,545 
Year to September 1933 7,963 
Four months to January 1934 2,675.48
The total incane payable to charities under these deeds was put at not 
less than £2,000,000 per annum^^ with one case alone involving 
£240,000 per annum,50 and over one thousand new deeds in one year 
relating to one c h a r i t y . I n  1933, the total amount of tax lost as a 
result of these deeds was estimated "almost certainly [to] exceed one 
m i l l i o n  p o u n d s ,"52 out of an overall benefit to charities of their 
exemption estimated at twelve and a half million pounds.
By 1934 it had become a common practice for hospitals and other 
charities to have printed agreements for seven year periods available 
for subscribers together with a full explanation of the benefits of 
doing so.5  ^ The National Council of Social Service had taken the 
matter further. It had devised and publicly advertised a scheme under 
which subscribers could obtain exemption on their ordinary annual 
gifts, provided that they covenanted to pay a fixed sum, not to a 
specified charity, but to the Council, for seven years.54 The 
distribution of that sum to charities was then made by the Council at
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the subscriber's direction. The scheme was very popular, with the 
Council receiving some £200,000 a year in subscriptions.55
The committee believed that the need to prevent the loss of revenue 
through the use of such deeds was "based partly on principle, but 
rests mainly on the fact of its cost to the State,"55 and admitted that 
there was little in principle to distinguish payments to a charity 
from payments to a poor relative.5? They proposed that if it were 
decided to restrict the loss of revenue by differentiating between 
settlements in favour of charities and those in favour of individuals, 
the remedy would lie in one of two methods.55 Firstly, the original 
proposals put forward in 1927 could be reintroduced so that income
payable by an individual to a charity would be treated as his and not
that of the charity. Alternatively, they suggested that any inccme 
payable by an individual to a charity should be deemed to be his for
the purpose of surtax without interfering with the incane tax relief.
Neither of the above proposals were to apply to income arising from 
capital of which the donor had absolutely divested himself of all 
interest in favour of the charity.5^
*
Other proposals put forward to limit the loss of revenue included 
continuing to treat the individual in the same way but not permitting 
the charity to claim repayment of income tax deducted at source, and 
attempting a redefinition of charities for tax p u r p o s e s . Neither of 
these proposals found favour with the committee and the proppsal not 
to repay income tax was considered to be a minor tinkering with the 
charity exemption by refusing relief on only one relatively small item 
of their income.
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A further concern was the non-enforcement of settlements by charities 
and it was considered that this should be dealt with by drafting a 
general clause against artificial transactions. Such a clause was 
never prepared.
Revocable Dispositions
The committee suggested that it was desirable to make the 'revocable 
settlement provisions effective again following the decision in the 
Firth case.62 They proposed that an amendment should be made to the 
original provisions so that any income the beneficial enjoyment of 
which a person was able to regain in any way, with or without the
consent of any other person, should be deemed to be his income for tax
purposes.63
Accumulation Settlements
The first indication of the Revenue*s concern about tax avoidance
through accumulation of income in settlements was in a note in January
1931 on avoidance by millionaires.64 Although its use was not at that 
time common it was expected to increase.65 sane taxpayers had settled 
funds upon trustees to accumulate the income for a number of years and 
then pay it back with the capital to the settlor who then received the 
whole sum in a non-taxable form. While the income was accumulating 
the settlor usually had a power to borrow funds from the trustees so 
that his yearly net disposable income could be increased by the amount 
of surtax avoided.66 Three examples were given of cases the Revenue 
had come across up to 1931.67
Further evidence collected over the following two years indicated that
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the tax lost was very considerable indeed.68 in the largest four 
cases the sum total of the settled funds was £5,355,000 and the amount 
of income upon which surtax had been avoided had amounted to over 
£600,000.69 The trustees in these cases were usually the settlor and 
his wife, with perhaps one other person, but in the case of Lord 
Londonderry the settlor was the sole trustee. In these and similar 
cases there was usually a provision that when the accumulations 
reached a certain amount a portion of them should be payable to the 
settlor in the form of capital. For example when the accumulations of 
the Duke of Hamilton*s trust reached £100,000 he was eligible to 
receive £50,000 as capital. In other cases the accumulations were 
devoted to paying off mortgages and other charges upon the property 
which had been transferred to the trustees.70 The trust deeds in such 
cases generally permitted the trustees to make loans to the settlor 
and Revenue officials complained of the fact that they had no means of 
finding out whether the settlor had borrowed money from the trustees, 
even though that borrowing would not have caused a tax charge.71
A memorandum prepared for the Committee in September 1933 indicated 
that the largest case was that of Lord Dulverton who had settled 
shares on trustees consisting of himself, his wife and an employee of 
the Imperial Tobacco Company. The investments, as swollen by 
accumulations of income, had a value at that time of three and a half 
million pounds, and the income on which surtax had been lost for 
1931/32 was £212,000.72
A further form of accumulation trust was designed to enable indirect 
surtax relief to be obtained for life assurance premiums. If the
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settlor had paid such premiums himself he would only have been 
eligible for income tax relief, but by settling on trustees an annuity 
equivalent to the insurance premiums, (or investments which would 
produce a sum sufficient to pay those premiums), surtax relief could 
effectively be obtained. This formed a relatively cheap way of 
accumulating a large fund in an insurance policy which could 
eventually pass for the benefit of the family and it had been used by 
some particularly prominent people including Sir Victor Warrender, 
M.P., Sir James Leigh-Wood, Sir Godfrey Baring and Lord Bradford, with 
one of the trustees in the latter case being a former 
Attorney-General.73
A variation on this theme was found in the case of Captain 
Remington-Wilson who had settled money on trustees which was paid to a 
private company in exchange for shares. The company had paid all of 
that money back to the settlor in exchange for an annuity and then 
applied the annuity to the payment of premiums on a life assurance 
policy. This is perhaps the first example of the reverse-annuity 
scheme which Ronald Plummer and the Rossminster Group were to make 
famous some forty years later and which led to special anti-avoidance 
provisions in 1977.
At the second meeting of the committee, in October 1933, the problem 
was first considered and it was decided that insofar as the trust 
income was distributed and in whatever form, whether as a loan or as 
capital, it should be deemed to be the income of the recipient for tax 
purposes, but spread back over the years of accumulation without time 
limit. It was further decided that it would be impracticable to charge
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undistributed trust income year by year as there was frequently no 
person to whom it could be allocated due to the discretionary nature 
of the trust and the fact that certain beneficiaries might be unborn 
at that time.
By the eleventh meeting the original proposal was dropped and replaced 
by one under which, if the settlor, his wife or child were one of the 
potential beneficiaries, the income accumulated would be treated for 
surtax purposes as though it arose to the settlor himself. This 
treatment was to be applied in all cases where trustees had power to 
make loans to the settlor, or where by any means he might receive 
money from the trust.
The subsidiary problem of dealing with settlements under which income 
was accumulated but which were not caught under the proposals above 
were also considered. Three possible remedial measures were put 
forward:
(a) that all incane accumulated should be treated as the settlor's as 
long as he was alive; or
(b) that the income should be allocated for surtax purposes equally 
between all the living potential beneficiaries, even though they 
had not at that time any title to the income and might never 
receive it; or
(c) that no charge should be made while incane was accumulating for 
contingent interests, but that when any contingency arose and 
income was actually distributed, surtax should be charged for past 
years without time limit on the beneficiary in respect of the 
accumulated incane received.
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By the fifteenth meeting the committee had changed their minds again 
and decided that:
(a) a living settlor should be charged on accumulated income if he, 
his wife, or his minor child was a potential beneficiary, or if he 
had a power of revocation in favour of himself, his wife, or his 
minor child, but limited to the amount of the potential benefit so 
that it might not necessarily cover the whole of the income; and
(b) no change was to be made to the existing treatment of cases to 
which (a) above did not apply.
Various incidental matters were also decided upon; the settlor should 
be given the right of recovery of any extra tax from the trustees; 
foreign trusts should be treated in the same way as UK trusts; and the 
Special Commissioners should be given powers to demand information 
concerning such trusts from the trustees and the settlor.
The committee's report indicates that the decisions taken at their 
fifteenth meeting were final, and set out detailed proposals for 
legislation based on the principles they had formulated.75 They 
justified their proposals on the grounds that the position in such 
trusts was in essence substantially the same as if the settlor either 
made a definite disposition in favour of himself or his family, or, 
having made a disposition in favour of some other person, retained for 
himself a power of revocation.76 it was 1938 before any of these 
proposals were adopted. (See Chapter 6).
Avoidance Of The Settlement Provisions By Means Of A Company
This method of avoidance had apparently been devised by Messrs. Spicer
and Peglar and involved the disponor setting up a limited company in
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which he held the ordinary shares carrying the voting control while 
the persons to whan income was to be transferred held participating 
preferred ordinary shares carrying the right to a non-cumulative 
dividend of such amount as might be declared by the canpany in general 
meeting.^ The next stage was for the disponor to arrange for the 
company to buy investments or an annuity fran him out of the amount he 
subscribed for his shares. Then, through his voting control, he could 
in effect transfer whatever sum he chose as dividends to his intended 
beneficiaries, the holders of the participating preferred ordinary 
shares. Because those shares were not entitled to any surplus on a 
winding up, his capital could be returned to him intact whenever he 
liked by the dissolution of the company.
One case had been taken before" the Special Commissioners’^  where the 
annuity version of the scheme had been used and it was decided that 
the annuity must be allowed as a deduction in calculating the payer's 
surtax liability. The Board did not contest that decision even though 
they were aware of four other occasions on which Spicer and Peglar 
clients had used the scheme, including one in which Lady Louis 
Mountbatten was paying an annuity of £100,000, part of which was then 
being transferred to her children through the canpany.79
The committee believed that this type of scheme should be dealt with 
by introducing provisions which would empower the Special 
Commissioners to disregard the transfer of property entirely and 
charge both parties as if the transfer had never taken place.80 Such 
provisions were never to be introduced, but the Revenue eventually 
found that, contrary to the opinions they obtained from their own
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solicitor, a company could be part of an arrangement involving a 
settlement, and this type of scheme could be successfully attacked.81
Miscellaneous Devices
By September 1933 there were a number of cases involving persons 
employing servants and other personal attendants who had drawn up 
deeds under which those employees were entitled to receive an annuity 
instead of their ordinary salary or wages.82 At that time the appeal 
in the case of the Duke of Westminster had only recently gone through 
the Special Commissioners and the Inland Revenue were not confident 
that they would win the case in the High Court.83
Another scheme involved an individual covenanting to pay an annuity to 
a company, (usually on some technical grounds not a close company), 
and receiving in return either redeemable debentures or a lump sum 
payable in instalments spread over a number of years.84 The annuity 
ranked as a deduction in computing the person's incane for surtax, 
while the debentures or the instalments constituted capital receipts 
and were not liable to surtax. Variations of this device involved the 
transfer of the person's interest in mining rents and royalties to a 
company in consideration of redeemable debentures. The remedy 
suggested in these cases was that only the excess of the aggregate of 
the annual payments over the amount of the capital sum received or 
receivable should be deductable as a charge.85 The reverse annuity 
scheme which was to cause a massive potential loss of revenue in the 
1970's (see Chapter 11) was a development of the device considered by 
the Committee.
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CONCLUSION
The settlement provisions of the Finance Act 1922 were a failure 
because they had been inadequately thought out and failed to take 
account of the hostile analysis they would receive from tax 
specialists. However, they retained their prophylactic effect on a 
large proportion of taxpayers for a long time merely because knowledge 
of the tax avoidance methods was so slow to spread. The Revenue no 
doubt learned a great deal from this early experience and exercised 
much greater caution with later settlement anti-avoidance legislation.
The fact that tax avoidance was considered in detail by the Cabinet 
shows that it was thought to be a serious problem, yet one can only 
guess at the reason for their failure to recommend legislation to 
block the settlement loopholes. It is probable that the tax cost was 
not sufficient to be of concern and that the more widespread, well 
known and costly avoidance through close companies took precedence. 
Their decision to attack charitable covenants was a serious political 
misjudgement serving only to advertise the very scheme they were 
trying to stop.
It was not until the early 1930's that the mechanisms for spreading 
detailed knowledge about methods of avoidance of section 20 really got 
to work, but only when interest in the matter had reached fever pitch, 
with regular detailed newspaper articles and advertisements of 
avoidance schemes, was action contemplated. The cause of this long 
delay is not clear, but had the nettle been grasped earlier there 
could have been far fewer people who, having tasted the drug of tax 
avoidance, found themselves hooked!
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The Income Tax Codification Committee appointed in October 1927 and 
reporting in April 1936,^6 reviewed section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 
and concluded that it was unsatisfactory in many respects and plainly 
inadequate to fulfil its apparent intention. They suggested that the 
matter was worthy of the attention of Parliament.87
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CHAPTER 5
1936: THE SECOND ATTACK: PARENTAL TRANSFERS OF INCOME TO THEIR CHILDREN 
INTRODUCTION
Despite the Inland Revenue collecting evidence showing how avoidance 
through settlements by parents on their minor children had become 
widespread, they were unable to obtain approval for legislative action 
until the avoidance had become wholesale and flagrant and its growth 
rate had begun to almost double each year. By the time action was 
taken, so many people were using this form of avoidance that dealing 
with it was politically problematical and the Chancellor was very wary 
about the advice he received from the Revenue as to how it should be 
attacked. Preliminary detailed tactical and presentational planning 
did not prevent considerable criticism of the proposed legislation 
from all sides, even though many MP's, (including lawyers), admitted 
they found it almost unintelligible.
THE INLAND REVENUE BUILD UP THEIR CASE
Although in April 1929 the Board did not contemplate taking any 
action in connection with the increasing number of repayment claims 
which related to parental transfers of income to children,^ by May 
1930, a little more concern was being shown and discussions took place 
on how best to analyse the claims to produce useful statistics^. it 
was eventually decided to classify children's incomes in order to show 
the number of cases in which the parent's child allowance was being 
preserved, those in which the maximum relief at the standard rate was
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being secured, and those in which the apparent object was obtaining 
the maximum possible tax relief.3 Statistics based upon this exercise 
are shown in Appendix C3.
In October 1930, a bank employee called the inland Revenue and claimed 
that he knew of cases where deeds had been drawn up providing for 
considerable payments to children that were not intended to be acted 
on and would be destroyed before the child reached the age of 
majority.^ This claim was brought to the attention of very senior 
Inland Revenue officials, and was thought merely to confirm what they 
had suspected for sane time. They considered the whole question of 
fraudulent deeds and concluded that all dispositions in favour of 
children should be deemed inoperative for tax purposes during their 
minority, except where the disposition was on death.5 The problem of 
mala fides was raised again by claims Branch in their report on the 
statistics for the year ending March 31 1931. They suggested that 
District inspectors should be asked to submit any case in which the 
beneficiary ceased to receive settlement income or in which a settlor 
omitted an annuity from his declarations of income and advised the 
Revenue that payments had ceased. These submissions were expected to 
lead to investigations into "irregular revocations116, but it seems 
that the suggestion was not taken up.
In April 1931, Claims Branch were unable to offer any definite
explanation for the increase in dispositions but:
"Observation has revealed that several firms of solicitors and 
accountants have at last realised that easy money is to be 
obtained by acting as trustees, ... and are clearly bringing to 
the notice of their clients the possibility of settlements in 
favour of children, as existing clients are likely to acquaint 
their immediate friends, it is perhaps not too much to expect a
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mushroom growth of this form of avoidance, particularly when any 
revival in industry results in bigger income tax liability for 
an increasing number of people. The fact that a well known firm 
of Scottish legal advisers, who issue a roneoed form of 
settlement, have in the last twelve months put in a number of 
such settlements for residents this side of the border must be 
due mainly to recommendation and is indicative of the mushroom 
growth suggested above. If7
By July of 1931 the claims Branch reports indicated that the
"professional trusteeships" referred to in the report three months
earlier had continued to spread, and in the two months to June 30,
1931 ninety cases had been observed, embracing seven firms. It was
thought that:
"The rapid expansion of the last three months was due in no 
small measure to the fact that prohibiting legislation in this 
year's Finance Bill was anticipated in the professions".^
No evidence could be found to indicate that such legislation was being
seriously contemplated at the time.
In October 1931, estimates were made by the Revenue of the loss of tax 
arising from deeds of settlement on minor children, not only by their 
parents but also by others^. They calculated the loss at £587,000 per 
annum, but this figure was revised following the Finance (No. 2) Act 
of 1931, to £429,000. These calculations seem to have underestimated 
the true position because the Board had, in August 1931, made an order 
undergo which, pending the decision in Wiggins v Watson,^ inspectors 
were to reject any deed containing a limited power of revocation, and 
when that case was lost the 230 cases which had been rejected and 
excluded from the estimates would have considerably swelled the 
figure.
The total loss of tax had become so great that in the eyes of a claims
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Branch Official:
"We now have evidence of a scale of legal evasion large enough 
to warrant immediate consideration of legislative action, in 
considering what forms such action should take we must not lose 
sight of the ingenuity which has been displayed in defeating the 
object of the existing legislation. No mere tinkering will stop 
this leak, and for my part I can see little prospect of success 
short of [making] all dispositions in favour of children (any 
children, not merely children of the disponor) inoperative for 
income and surtax during minority - including dispositions of 
capital". 12
Despite such a strong plea, there is no evidence of any attempt to 
draft legislation or to consider the form it could take or to address 
the problems which might arise out of it, until the Board set up its 
tax avoidance committee in late 1933. (See later).
Meanwhile the avoidance continued to grow rapidly, and in April 1934 
Claims Branch reported that certain agents were submitting deeds in 
large numbers as a result of advertisements in the daily press and 
personal recommendation.
"...they...comb effectively through various large staffs of 
employees. One agency is for example "working" the dockyards, 
Royal Marines and other naval establishments." 12
Still nothing was done, but in 1933/34 and following years, records 
were kept of the total income involved in parental dispositions (see 
Appendix C3) and other dispositions (see Appendix Dl) in favour of 
minors.
By May 1934, Claims Branch were so concerned that they put forward a 
memorandum to the Chief Inspector setting out the amendments which 
they thought necessary to make section 20 of the Finance Act 1922 
effective. They told him that if it was too late to take action in
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the Finance Bill of 1934, or if the figures were not thought to be 
sufficiently alarming to persuade Parliament of the need for change, 
they would be happy to make an interim report at December 31, so that 
the position could be considered in good time for the next year's 
Bill.14
The Secretary of Taxes submitted the claims Branch memorandum to the 
Chief inspector and observed that the "procedure represents a 
substantial and cumulative waste of national effort and administrative 
time."!5 He suggested that a formal request should be made to the 
Board to set in motion the procedure to obtain appropriate amendments 
to the Finance Act 1922 provisions. The Chief inspector's reply 
merely pointed out that the chancellor had already told the House that 
there would be no preventative legislation in the 1934 Finance Bill.16
No evidence could be found to indicate why anti-avoidance provisions 
were not introduced in the Finance Bill 1935. The interim report to 
December 1934 volunteered by claims Branch does not appear to have 
been prepared and by the time the statistics for the year ending March 
1935 were submitted on April 15 1935, they were perhaps a little too 
late to influence the content of the Finance Bill of that year, even 
though they showed the epidemic proportions which avoidance had taken 
on.
In the year to March 31 1935, the number of claims submitted in 
respect of settlements by parents was over two and half times the 
figure for the previous year.1? claims Branch reported that April 
1935 had commenced with the receipt of an unprecedented number of
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deeds, and indicated that there was a marked increase in the number of 
agencies which were thriving almost exclusively on settlements by 
parents.Some agencies, and in particular those run by qualified 
accountants, "are advising clients to make dispositions which are out 
of all reasonable proportion to i n c o m e " .19 Banks were apparently a 
little more conservative and "are usually careful to emphasise that 
they pay regard to the grantor's income in advising upon the amount of 
the disposition."20 However, accountants were "as usual setting the 
pace [such that] it will only be a matter of time before every agency 
advises its clients to make covenants for the maximum sum on which 
repayment can be claimed."21
The Chief Inspector was updated on the current situation on April 30 
1935, and was told that the number of new settlements was likely to 
double in 1935/36 if no.action was taken. He referred the matter to 
the Board, and by November 1935 the chairman was writing to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer "to press upon you the urgency of taking 
scane step to check the e v i l " .22
PERSUADING MINISTERS AND DECIDING POLICY AND STRATEGY 
The Board of inland Revenue were worried about all forms of avoidance 
but decided to put forward a case for anti-avoidance legislation in 
only three areas; transfers of assets abroad, settlements in favour of 
minor children, and close companies.
The Revenue's case in respect of parental settlements on minors was 
extremely persuasive, though the language used was often very 
emotive. It did not involve a reasoned argument on a theoretical
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basis, but a wide variety of possible justifications for taking 
action.23 Three of the arguments were related to the likely growth in 
the problem and were based on the fact that;
(a) propoganda, (this was the word used by the Chairman of the Board)
in favour of avoidance had been considerably assisted by comments 
of the House of Lords in the Duke of Westminster case; and
(b) touting for business was taking place by the issue of circulars
worded in such a way as to reduce any pangs of conscience felt by 
potential clients; and
(c) the first book dealing purely with methods of tax avoidance had 
been recently p u b l i s h e d . 24
The other supporting arguments were more political and pointed out 
that:
(a) the situation had considerable possibilities for public scandal; 
and
(b) it would be politically advisable to deal with avoidance in the 
' earlier rather than the later years of a Parliament.
Sir Warren Fisher, (The Permanent Secretary to the Treasury), had 
mentioned to the Revenue that he thought the whole subject of taxation 
should be examined by a select committee of the House of commons. 
Although the inland Revenue could see this would have the advantage of 
facilitating the passage of anti-avoidance provisions through 
Parliament, they advised the Chancellor against it because of the 
difficulty of preventing the committee extracting evidence from them 
concerning not only the details of different types of avoidance but 
also the particulars of individual c a s e s 2 5. They believed that there
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would be a grave risk that such evidence might be exploited by the 
unscrupulous to create scandal and pointed out that examination by a 
select committee
"might well prove extremely embarrassing and lead to 
recommendations on certain aspects of evasion which you might 
feel involved questions of policy which it is for you alone to 
decide."2^
All this, when added to the delay which would take place between the 
setting up of the committee, its report, and the eventual introduction 
of any remedial legislation, led the chancellor to reject Fisher's 
suggestion.
The chairman of the Board explained to the Chancellor the "largely 
artificial... tax dodging" methods by which parents were avoiding tax 
by the creation of settlements on their minor children and argued that 
there was little "moral justification" for this because of a parent's 
obligation to maintain his children during their minority2?.
Statistics showing the growth in the number of these settlements were 
put before the chancellor together with copies of some of the leaflets 
being used by the "touts". Interestingly, at this initial stage, 
(November 1935) the chairman of the Board suggested that it was not 
necessary to deal with cases where a parent transferred capital 
outright to minor children, and that it was only covenanted payments 
which called for remedial action.2  ^ By January 1936, his view had 
changed and he was arguing that all settlements on minor children 
should be caught.2^
The Chairman got no direct reply to his paper, but heard indirectly
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from the Treasury that the Chancellor had asked them for their views 
"on the horrible topic of legal avoidance"after they had discussed it 
with Sir Warren Fisher.30 The Treasury were anxious to obtain 
legislation because "apart from anything else the growing loss of 
money is serious with the increasing burdens with which the Exchequer 
is faced."31 They were much impressed by the Revenue's statistics 
concerning the rapid growth in the number of deeds and by the 
disparity that this had caused between the liability of individuals 
whose circumstances were otherwise identical.32 They estimated that if 
everyone entered into these arrangements the tax lost would be fifty 
million pounds per annum33 but the Revenue calculated that twenty 
million pounds per annum was the maximum.34
The Treasury was most unhappy about the situation which would arise if 
a large number of people did not enter into such arrangements "either 
because they have not heard of the trick or because they dislike it"35 
and thought it at least arguable that the State should level things up 
either by removing the tax advantages or by explaining it on income 
Tax Returns so that everyone would be treated a l i k e .36
The Treasury made a suggestion to which the inland Revenue took great 
exception. It was that:
... "the sting could be taken out of the proposal if it were 
possible to accompany it by another proposal giving a relief, 
equal in amount to the present loss of duty, to taxpayers with 
young children. The Revenue would then save in the future all 
the successive cumulative losses that would otherwise arise 
through the perpetuation of this a n o m a l y ."37
The Revenue argued that as parliament had decided that £50 was the
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proper allowance for a child, any anti-avoidance provisions should be 
introduced "without any corresponding sop in compensation"^ and that 
any increase in child.allowance might well lead to the criticism that 
other allowances were inadequate.39 The question of "a sop" was to 
become one argument which the Revenue were eventually to lose.
The Treasury realised that any legislation on this matter would 
probably prove to be "in the parliamentary sense, extrememly 
troublesome".40 Although the details of their advice to the 
Chancellor are not known, he took the papers concerning tax avoidance 
away with him over Christmas and had by the New Year decided that he 
would like to deal with the main forms of avoidance together in the 
forthcoming Budget to "get the matter over, rather than have a series 
of difficult debates in successive years".41. His instructions were 
that the proposals should be considered with the utmost care, 
particularly from the point of view of the criticism which would be 
directed against them from lawyers and the business world.42 He 
expected the arguments for anti-avoidance legislation to be well 
supported by illustrations and he therefore delegated responsibility 
for the matter to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, who was to 
study the whole area with the support of the inland Revenue and report
back.43
The process of giving a detailed briefing to the Financial Secretary, 
Mr W S Morrison, began at an interview between him and three members 
of the Board on January 6, 1936.44 Morrison thought that avoidance 
through children's settlements was quite different from other forms of 
avoidance because it was practised to a considerable extent by the
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middle class taxpayer, who would contend that he was justified in 
adopting the device because of the coirparatively heavy burden of 
taxation on the family man.45 He therefore insisted that despite the 
Revenue's distaste, proper consideration be given to increasing child 
allowance, and requested alternative costed proposals so that he could 
make an appropriate recommendation to the chancellor.45
At this first meeting the inland Revenue modified the original 
proposals they had put to the Chancellor and urged that it was 
essential for the provisions to catch settlements of capital as well 
as transfers of income.47 They pointed out that if the provisions 
were restricted to cases where income was transferred, they would be 
seen as being aimed at the professional man and not the well-off 
capitalist.48 Morrison did not disagree but asked for a note on the
point.49
The Revenue took eleven days to reply to the Financial Secretary, 
which, in the context of preparatory work for forthcoming legislation, 
was an extremely long time. It is probable that they greatly 
regretted tiieir original blunder in suggesting that capital 
settlements should be outside the anti-avoidance provisions and were 
therefore being careful to make a watertight case to show why such 
settlements should be caught. The major points they made in their 
paper on this matter are set out below.50
(1) There were difficulties in finding any reason for drawing a 
distinction between capital settlements and income settlements.
(2) Difficulties could be expected in Parliament because the 
distinction would be represented as one between the middle classes 
and the wealthy classes.
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(3) The family was the normal unit of society and ideally should be 
the unit for taxation and although there were practical 
difficulties in adopting such a general rule, it was possible to 
go some way towards it by aggregating with the parents1 income any 
incane of their children which was derived from them.
(4) In the same way that protection of tax revenue required the income 
of a husband and wife to be aggregated, those same considerations 
applied to incane arising from children*s settlements.51
(5) If capital settlements were not included, it would be construed as 
Parliament's recognition of the propriety of reducing tax 
liabilities by such transfers of capital, and would therefore act 
as an incentive to further avoidance.
The Revenue were also unhappy with the idea of increasing child 
allowance as compensation for the proposed anti-avoidance provisions, 
and although the Financial Secretary did not ask for any comments on 
this, they could not resist putting forward detailed arguments against 
it. Firstly, they pointed out that "when similar legislation was 
passed in 1922 it was not found necessary to give any sop to 
compensate for the new liability".52 secondly, they suggested that 
the anti-avoidance provisions would not come as a surprise, because 
the professionals engaged in income tax work had long been expecting 
remedial legislation.53 Thirdly, they reminded him that the 
Chancellor had, in the previous two years, received many letters of 
complaint concerning the injustice caused to the honest taxpayer by 
those who were "involved in artificial arrangements".54 Finally, it 
was urged that the legislation could be shown to be so necessary in 
the interests of tax revenue and of justice that it should obtain
parliamentary consent without any quid pro quo.5^
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Clearly, the Revenue were not going to give in without a fight, but 
grudgingly accepted that "if there must be a sugaring of the pill11 the 
child allowance should be increased fran £50 to £60, at an annual cost 
of two million pounds in a full y e a r .56 Even at this point they could 
not resist a side-swipe at the suggested course of action by pointing 
out that the benefit would be much greater for those with small 
incanes, while for the person liable to surtax the increase would 
provide "little sugaring for the pill he has to face", because of the 
much larger settlements i n v o l v e d .57
Even by April 1936, the Revenue appear not to have given up hope, as
the chairman's comments in response to a request by the Treasury "for
a note on the nature of this sop to be given to make the children's
evasion clause more palatable," s h o w .58
"In principle it is quite unsound that the chancellor should not 
be able to retrieve losses from such evasion without giving up 
something in return .... However, on the present occasion the 
Chancellor may well think that the operation he has to perform 
necessitates some kind of anaesthetic. The trouble is that, so 
far as I can see, he can only have one kind of anaesthetic, in a 
large number of cases it will really be unnecessary, while in 
others it will do nothing effective to counter the pain and 
shock of the operation."59
Before making his report to the Chancellor, the Financial Secretary 
requested one further piece of information. He wanted an estimate of 
the number of settlements in five years time if no action was taken, 
and the annual loss which they would cause, assuming that the most 
recent rate of increase was maintained 60 # The answer was that there 
would be a quarter of a million settlements and an annual loss of 
revenue of eight million pounds.61
On February 11, 1936, the Financial Secretary advised the chancellor
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that there were two main reasons for immediate anti-avoidance 
legislation; firstly, the longer the delay the greater would be the 
number and strength of the interests adversely affected; and secondly, 
"the conjunction of such legislation with the necessity for repairing 
deficiencies in our armaments appears favourable".62 He had noticed 
that the material being circulated by "tax dodging agencies" had been 
combined with judicial pronouncements to create among those affected 
"a moral standard different from that which governs the memoranda of 
the Board,"62 and warned of the serious parliamentary opposition which 
this implied. He expected that most people would be reluctant to 
defend avoidance openly, and that the opposition would therefore take 
the form of wrecking amendments.6^
He advised the Chancellor that two things ought to be remembered about 
children's settlements:
(a) taxpayer's with small incomes did not generally attach the same 
degree of moral obliquity to the matter as the Board; and
(b) there were unconscious associations aroused by references to 
children and the family which tended to make people gloss over the 
ethical features of anything done for their benefit.65
Nevertheless, the principle upon which this form of avoidance was to 
be attacked was the injustice of having two men with the same incomes 
and the same burdens paying different amounts of tax.
Having provided the Chancellor with details of the loss to the 
Exchequer caused by this form of avoidance and the estimated loss in 
five years time if nothing were done, the Financial Secretary then put 
forward his views on minimising the political problems. He believed
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that the overall problem was to present the matter in a way which 
would ensure that the taxpayer saw the anti-avoidance provisions as 
defensible on the grounds of fairness and did not view them as "a mere 
tightening of the screw."65 jt appears to have been his idea to 
suggest that the presentation should be from the point of view of the 
taxation of the family unit, so that it could be argued that the
income of minor children was in reality the family income insofar as
it was obtained from the parents. This approach would enable 
ministers to symphathise with the financial struggles of parents 
bringing up children and to point out that no increased taxation on 
them was intended but that on the contrary, the intention was lighten 
their total burden, but "lightened by Parliament, fairly and equally 
all round, and not as at present unequally and unfairly by the 
activities of tax dodging experts."67 To buy this escape route he 
suggested that the child allowance be increased by £10 which, at a 
cost of two million pounds in a full year, was slightly less than the
annual loss of tax from the use of such avoidance.
The Financial Secretary was obviously much impressed by the Revenue's 
arguments concerning equality of treatment between capital settlements 
and inccme settlements and relied heavily on them in proposing to the 
Chancellor that capital settlements should be brought within the 
proposed anti-avoidance provision.
DRAFTING
Even though the Financial Secretary did not submit his suggestions to 
the Chancellor until February 11, 1936, the Board had, irrespective 
of the lack of authority from the Chancellor, written to Parliamentary
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Counsel some two weeks earlier with a suggested draft clause.68 The 
short covering letter merely explained the background to the need for 
legislation and that it was intended to cover,
(a) dispositions of income?
(b) outright capital transfers; and
(c) cases where income was accumulated for the benefit of the child.69 
The Revenue's draft clause was worded to achieve these aims and also 
included provision for recovery rights for the settlor and a 
requirement that he should pay over to the settlement any extra 
repayment he obtained as a result of the deeming process.
The Chancellor's reaction to the paper from the Financial Secretary is 
not known, but by March 4, 1936, Parliamentary Counsel had prepared 
his first draft of the legislation and it would appear therefore that 
the Chancellor had agreed to go ahead.70 A long memorandum from 
Parliamentary Counsel to the Inland Revenue gave a detailed account of 
why there were differences between his draft and theirs.71 Largely 
they arose from the draftsman's use of terminology from the 
Codification Bill which was to be published before the Finance Bill. 
Realising that any departures from the model drafting of the 
Codification Committee would have to be explained, he thought it 
better to follow their wording, even though it referred to section 20 
of the Finance Act 1922 and much of this was to be repealed in the 
forthcoming Bill.
The draft clause prepared by the Revenue contained a let-out where the 
income did not exceed £5. The provision was retained in Parliamentary 
Counsel's first draft which required the income arising in a 
settlement to be examined each year to see whether it exceeded the £5
152
limit when divided by the number of children affected. It was 
realised that difficulties would arise where income varied from year 
to year because of changes in rates of interest or dividends, or where 
in the case of a settlement on several children, one or more of them 
died, thereby increasing the incane payable for the benefit of the 
others. There is a handwritten note alongside these provisions 
indicating that they were only to be put in at the committee stage.
It is intriguing to see that there was a clear intention to include 
such a mitigation but that it was to be held back and presented as a 
concession so that the Government would appear to be open to 
reasonable suggestions. Sure enough, the National Savings committee 
made representations and the provisions were re-inserted as a 
"concession" at the report stage.
Parliamentary counsel's first draft contained information powers which
were so widely drawn that even he himself found it necessary to
comment on them.
"I hope to goodness the Special commissioners don't pitch on 
me. I am a €rustee of a dozen or more ordinary marriage 
settlements, which, though they are in no sense tax dodging, 
will be hit... and to comply with this sub-section will take me 
several days work."72
A considerable narrowing down of these information powers was 
eventually made at the committee stage.
Although the Revenue's original draft did not deal with adopted 
children, this point was taken up with them by the draftsman and it 
was agreed that he should include any adopted children, whether or not 
they were adopted under the Adoption of children Act 1926, or the
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Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930. A problem was foreseen if a 
child was adopted without an adoption order and then the real parents 
regained custody, because it would have been anomalous for income 
settled on such a child to continue to be treated as the settlor’s 
after the child had returned to his real parents, parliamentary 
Counsel's original draft could have been interpreted in such a way as 
to catch such a situation, but the draftsman thought it would only 
apply for the period of adoption. Although he thought it arguable 
that the deeming process would continue to apply even though the child 
subsequently ceased to be adopted, nothing was done to clarify the 
point. There was also some difficulty over the meaning of adoption, 
but the draftman suggested that if by chance it did not include a 
child adopted without a formal order, it probably would not matter, 
and it would hardly be worth putting the point beyond doubt. The 
Inland Revenue seem to have a g r e e d .73
The Revenue's original draft contained the following:
”... any incane which, by virtue or in consequence of any 
transfer of assets made by any person, is or may become payable 
to or applicable for the benefit of a child of that p e r s o n ."74
The draftsman pointed out that if transfers to any person were 
included, then no outright transfer by a parent with a minor child 
could escape the operation of the clause because the income derived 
from the assets could, if the donee chose, be payable to the child of 
the donor. He did not think that anything would be lost by confining 
the clause to transfers to children because if assets were transferred 
to some other person on the understanding that any income arising 
should be applied for the benefit of the transferor's children, that 
transaction would be an arrangement and accordingly would be caught as
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a settlement, parliamentary Counsel's first draft therefore excluded 
transfers of assets from the provisions but his second draft did not, 
and there is nothing to indicate why he changed his mind.
The informalities of the relationship between Parliamentary Counsel 
and the Inland Revenue at this time is reflected by the inclusion of a 
personal question at the end of one of the draftsman's letters.75 He 
asked the Revenue how the clause would apply to one of his own cases 
in which the settlor had settled his house and property on his son and 
the trustees had leased it back to the settlor. The draftsman was 
unsure if the settlor would be taxed on the rent which he paid the 
trustees as well as under the old Schedule A. It is perhaps a little 
surprising to see the draftsman of the legislation asking the Inland 
Revenue how it would operate, but it does illustrate that the Revenue 
were no mere junior partners in the drafting process.*76
On March 19, 1936, a copy of the draft clause was sent by the inland 
Revenue to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury along with a 
detailed note of its manner of operation and further points requiring 
consideration.The opportunity was taken, yet again, to explain in 
detail the need for and justification of the clause and the principles 
upon which it could be defended. Three pages were devoted to going 
over the same ground, thus creating the impression that the Revenue 
believed that unless they repeated themselves, the politicians would 
forget or not understand what was involved.
Even at this stage the Chancellor had not made a final decision to go 
ahead with l e g i s l a t i o n ,78 So the Financial Secretary's instructions to
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the Revenue had been to draft a clause "on wide lines".79 m  their
response to him they pointed out that if the Chancellor chose to go
ahead, a decision would be required on the following matters:
(a) whether the provisions should apply to irrevocable capital 
settlements
(b) whether the age of majority should be 21;
(c) whether any exemptions were to apply; and
(d) whether to include any compensatory increase in child allowance.80 
In their paper to the Financial Secretary the Revenue warned that 
there would almost certainly be vigorous attempts to draw a 
distinction between incane settlements and capital settlements, and 
yet again, most forcibly put forward their arguments for not making 
such a distinction. After explaining the manner of operation of each 
sub-clause the question of how to deal with alleged cases of hardship 
was examined. The Revenue thought that, initially, no exceptions 
should be admitted, but indicated to the Financial Secretary some of 
the possible lines of attack which might be used in support of 
let-outs.81 These included:
(a) children with small savings derived fron parents;
(b) a father paying maintenance for a child where the parents were 
divorced;
(c) a child working away from home where the father had provided 
income or capital for the chiId*s maintenance; and
(d) illegitimate children not living at hone with the father.
The Revenue put forward no suggestions for dealing with such cases or 
for resisting arguments concerning the hardships they involved.
Parliamentary Counsel's third draft on March 20, 1936^2 took account
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of the Revenue's insistence on the insertion of words making it clear 
that the section would only apply where the settlor was alive. Their 
concern was that if, on his death-bed, a settlor made a settlement on 
his minor child, it might be possible that the income arising under 
the settlement would be the deceased's and not the child's. This 
seems to be an extraordinary proposition, but the Inland Revenue were 
sufficiently concerned about it to take the possibility seriously, and 
unlike in 1922 when the draftsman had argued that there was no 
problem, this time the Revenue met with no resistance.
Following further discussions between both sides, a fourth draft was 
produced83 which included two significant changes. Firstly, it 
provided that no repayment could arise when a child obtained an 
absolute interest in income which had been accumulated for its benefit 
if that income had already been deemed to be the settlor's. Secondly, 
an insertion was made into the definition of income so that it 
included "any income whatsoever, whether or not it would have been 
chargeable to incane tax under any provision of the Income Tax Acts 
apart from the provisions of this section." The purpose of this 
definition was to over-ride the decision in Perry v Astor.84 This 
subject had caused disagreement between the Revenue and the draftman 
but in the end the.draftsman inserted his own wording on the grounds 
that it was very close to that used in Lord Macmillan's judgement.85 
This approach did not find favour with the Inland Revenue, who thought 
it was so wide that it might have caught receipts like capital gains 
chargeable under the United States income Tax Law but which would 
never be chargeable under the UK income Tax Acts. The draftsman 
admitted his error and modified the definition to fit the Revenue's
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requirements.86
Parliamentary Counsel prepared a draft resolution for the Ways and 
Means committee, setting out in some detail the way in which the 
eventual clause would apply,87 but the Revenue were unhappy with this 
and instructed that the resolution should be as non-committal as 
possible.88 Although he followed these instructions, the draftman 
made it clear that he had objections to doing so, not only because it 
was very unusual and unsupportable by precedent,89 but also because 
there was a risk that the authorities of the House might rule that 
such a general wording did not cover some point which it was 
particularly desired to include at sane later stage. He believed that 
the resolution was so wide that it would cause considerable alarm.
The underlying cause of this problem was the Chancellor*s indecision 
on what classes of settlement were to be caught.
4
In early April the Financial Secretary raised with the Revenue the 
question of whether irrevocable settlements of capital were to be
■ 4
caught. While he saw no difficulty if income was paid to or for the 
benefit of a minor child, he foresaw trouble in getting proposals for 
deeming accumulated income to be the parent's through the House of 
Commons.80 within twenty-four hours, the Revenue sent the Financial 
Secretary a seven page paper providing full arguments as to why it was 
essential for such accumulated incane to be caught.81
Not satisfied with these efforts to get their own way, the chairman of 
the Board wrote to the chancellor's Private Secretary under the 
pretext of explaining why the notes on the Budget resolution were so
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l o n g .92 After symphathising with the Chancellor's doubts in attacking 
irrevocable capital settlements in which income was accumulated and 
the settlor was excluded from benefit, (and yet still had to maintain 
and educate his child), he put forward the following five grounds for. 
treating such settlements on the same footing as others.93
(1) The essence of the proposals was to provide that shifting of 
resources within the family should not diminish tax liability.
"If the accumulated income referred to is to be excluded we are 
starting with a big hole in the net."94
(2) If irrevocable accumulation settlements were not treated in the 
same way as others, it would, in effect, be an admission that a 
particular form of saving carried a tax exemption while, in 
general, tax law did not recognise saving as diminishing tax 
liability.
(3) The loss would be serious, (three quarters of a million pounds in 
a full year), and it would grow.
(4) "The device is readily available to the rich surtax payer. It is 
in fact where the big money is. We have information of cases in 
which very large sums are involved. If the easier doors of 
evasion ... are closed there will certainly be increased resort to 
this method of e g r e s s ."95
(5) One could never be certain that once the settlement had served its 
purpose the capital would not pass back to the parent.
THE BUDGET STATEMENT, RESOLUTION AND DEBATES
On April 21, 1936, the Chancellor presented his Budget Statement and 
in introducing the various proposed anti-avoidance provisions 
described them as "certain minor changes in the legislation."95 He
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admitted it was natural that the higher the tax rate was raised the 
greater was the inducement to avoid it, but "the burden at the present 
time is high enough to attract the attention of ingenious minds, and 
discoveries and inventions have now proceeded to such a point that it 
is necessary to ask Parliament to intervene."97 Although he said he 
did not have time to describe in detail the various ways in which 
avoidance was taking place, he had not in fact decided the precise 
extent of the legislation he intended to introduce, and therefore had 
to be suitably vague.
However, he had decided that income settlements were to be dealt with 
and gave a fairly full account of how they operated and how they had 
grown. Detailed extracts were read out from the documents which were 
being "issued wholesale all over the country."98 a particularly 
blatant example was of course provided, which explained that "you 
would meet the technical requirements if you drew a cheque payable to 
Deed of Covenant or Bearer, and paid it into your own bank account as 
if it were a dividend warrant" and concluded by saying "your friends 
will thank you for an introduction to our scheme and I should be happy 
to send you a cheque for ten shillings and sixpence in respect of any 
new client introduced and accepted by us."99
The chancellor went on to paint the picture of a householder in the 
suburbs receiving such a document and reading it with growing delight 
as he found that he could substantially reduce his liability to tax, 
and then remembering that he should do unto others as he should be 
done by, and in an act of neighbourly kindness, passing the document 
over the fence. Within a short time there would not have been a
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householder in the neighbourhood who would not be introduced to this
philanthropic agent who had come to the assistance of the British
taxpayer. It was also explained that various insurance agents were
hawking schemes of this kind in the following terms:-
"We are going to save you money, and the only condition which I 
wish to make is that you regard this as confidential and apply 
every penny of the savings for the benefit of yourself, wife and 
children on a policy with my company. This will be the only 
gain I will receive, and as this is my profession I depend upon 
your word not to divulge the scheme to any other insurance 
representative.
While the chancellor was careful not to say that every transaction 
under which a man parted with some of his income for the benefit of 
his child was done for avoidance purposes, he opined that everybody 
would agree that all parents ought to be treated alike. He therefore 
proposed that "the legislation will take the form of saying that the 
income of an infant and unmarried child which is in any way derived 
from the parent shall be aggregated for all purposes of income tax law 
with the income of the parent."2 The reference to income which was in 
any way derived from the parent was to cause the chancellor problems 
later, as it implied that the legislation was going to be as widely 
drawn as possible. This may have been a misjudgement because he was 
apparently very uncertain at this time what the precise width of the 
anti-avoidance legislation was going to be but it is more likely that 
he made the statement deliberately in order to test the water and see 
what kind of reaction he got, while still leaving sufficient time to 
make appropriate modifications to the Bill before it was published.
The Board of inland Revenue provided ministers with eighteen pages of 
detailed notes on the Budget resolution concerning settlements on 
children, which itself only ran to seventy-one words^. The notes
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provided little new information but pressed home the old arguments in 
slightly different words. One new point put forward was that if no 
attempt was made to stop this method of tax avoidance, it would 
emphasise the inequality of the tax burden between those who had made 
use of the loophole and those who had not, and it would encourage the 
view that it was acceptable for taxpayers to avoid, by any colourable 
means, the tax liabilities which parliament had intended them to 
bear^. The Board thought that in the long run this might prejudice 
the willingness of the general body of taxpayers to pay, and it would 
then have serious knock-on effects for the administration of the tax 
system.5
Not surprisingly, the Board took the opportunity in the notes to 
impress upon ministers yet again, all the reasons for taking action 
against irrevocable accumulation settlements, even though they had 
already been fully rehearsed in the paper to the Financial Secretary. 
However, one entirely new aspect of the problem concerned the 
distinction between income spent.on a child and income accumulated for 
him.5 it was realised that payments from a trust might represent 
capital rather than income, and that a payment in any given year might 
exceed both the income of that year and the accumulated income of 
previous years. To deal with this the Board thought that all payments 
after 1935/36 should be deemed to be income to the extent of the 
income arising to the trust after 1935/36, and that the amount deemed 
to be income would have to be spread over more than one year if it 
exceeded the income arising in the year of payment.7
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Despite their hopes of persuading the Chancellor otherwise, the Board 
had begun to think about the details of the legislation they would 
find acceptable if he were to decide that irrevocable capital 
accumulation settlements were not to be caught. They therefore made 
the point in their notes that with such a let-out there would have to 
be "an absolute standard of irrevocability that would not permit of 
any discretion by the settlor or by any other person."8 The Revenue 
told the chancellor to expect demands for exceptions where the deed 
merely contained a clause permitting revocation to prevent the capital 
being squandered if the child turned out to be a spendthrift, or to 
prevent it being diverted into "channels repugnant to the parent."9 
They warned that if any revocation power was permitted "it would open 
the door once again to the tax dodger who could easily appoint tame 
trustees whom he could rely on to agree to revocation whenever the 
parent desired."10
The Times of April 23, 1936, carried an article by their parliamentary 
correspondent suggesting that the Budget resolution could be 
circumvented by mutual arrangements between A and B under which A 
provided for B's children and B provided for A's children, or by A 
transferring assets to B to make a settlement on A's children. The 
Inland Revenue wrote to the Treasury the following day stating that 
the article gave the Chancellor and his advisers little credit for 
imagination, and pointed out that the provisions under which CIR v 
Clarkson-Webbll was decided against the taxpayer were reproduced in 
the draft clausel2. It was suggested that if the point was raised in 
the House, the reply should be that such an obvious device would not
be overlooked.13
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There was a rapid response to the chancellor's statement that the 
anti-avoidance provisions would apply to any income which was "in any 
way derived fran the parent". The day after the Budget speech^ Major 
Hills asked the Chancellor to think again about where the lines should 
be drawn, because although he agreed that income settlements ought to 
be caught, he thought irrevocable capital settlements were on a 
different footing^. The latter settlements were described as 
"educational trusts", and an attempt was made to evoke synpathy for 
them by showing that they were only used to satisfy the need to ensure 
that a child received a decent education^. Concern was also 
expressed that the Chancellor's words would catch cases in which the 
parent took out an education policy with an insurance company^ but 
confirmation was later given that such policies would not be caught.
The Budget resolution made clear that it applied to settlements made 
both before and after the date of the resolution, and this, combined 
with the Chancellor's statement concerning its scope, drew 
considerable fire from his own party at the Ways and Means Report 
Stage. Though many conservative members expressed themselves to be 
generally in favour of the intention of the resolution, there were 
some, like Mr Alan.Herbert, who were openly against it on the grounds 
that the "old virtues of thrift, of looking after one's family and of 
preparing for the future were admirable."18 Mr Herbert believed that 
these settlements started from a fundamentally good instinct and 
openly admitted that he had entered into an income settlement for the 
benefit of his children.
Almost all the Conservatives speaking in the debate made strong pleas
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for the special treatment of irrevocable trusts. Their arguments took 
the following forms
(1) Their use had been prevalent long before the current high rates of 
tax came into operation.
(2) They were merely a prudent insurance to guarantee the child's 
future, whatever might happen to the settlor.
(3) They had all suffered their fair share of tax by payment of stamp 
duty at one per cent.
(4) The proposed provisions would charge income not being spent for 
the child's education.20
(5) If any change were to be made it should not affect what people had 
done perfectly legally and honestly and paid stamp duty for the 
privilege of so doing.
(6) The result of such settlements was that parents were able to send 
their child to a much more expensive school than would otherwise 
have been the case, and if they now had to pay extra tax the child 
might have to be moved to a cheaper school with resultant damage 
to his education.
It was however realised by some, that making a distinction between 
capital settlements and income settlements could be seen as putting 
the less wealthy into an unfavourable position and could be "a matter 
of great injustice to the middle classes."21
The question of the age of majority was also contentious. Twenty-one 
was thought to be far too high because it was quite common for an 
unmarried child under that age to leave home, and yet the parent would 
still be charged on income he could never u s e .22
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The provisions seem to have caused considerable uncertainty in some 
Member’s minds, and some were not clear whether the chancellor 
intended to annul these trusts.23 it was suggested that if he did, the 
stamp duty should be returned, and that if he did not, the law 
governing trusts should be altered to allow trustees to invest in more 
speculative stocks than were permitted under their trust deeds.24 
Such variations in investment powers were said to be necessary because 
people would have arranged their budgets only to find themselves taxed 
in a way they had not expected.25 This missed the whole point, because 
there was to be a right of recovery of additional tax paid by the 
settlor from the trustees or recipient of the income.
Perhaps not surprisingly, but rather embarrassingly from the point of 
view of the chancellor, his proposals were fully supported by the 
Labour Party which saw them as only "a tentative b e g i n n i n g " ,26 and 
argued that there were a large number of other irrevocable trusts 
which could have been attacked before this more legitimate form. The 
Duke of Westminster case was used as an illustration of the kind of 
situation they found most objectionable but more general concern was 
expressed that wealthy taxpayers would be able to escape these new 
provisions.
In his replies, the Chancellor made it clear that he recognised there 
might be cases falling within the terms of the resolution which he 
would not wish to touch, and emphasised that the House should not 
assume that every conceivable case would be covered by the clauses of 
the Bill.27 He told the House that he wanted to hear what Members had 
to say on the subject, because they might be able to identify cases of
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hardship which ought to be taken into account.28 He admitted, 
however, that he was unconvinced that a proper distinction could be 
drawn between revocable and irrevocable trusts, but promised to 
consider all the points made in the debate in the drafting of the 
relevant clauses.29
THE CHANCELLOR FINALLY DECIDES UPON THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS 
Even by early May, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was undecided as to 
precisely what policy should be adopted towards settlements in the 
Finance Bill and asked the chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue to 
provide him with a paper detailing the implications of each of the 
following three p r o p o s a l s .20
(1) To provide an exclusion for existing irrevocable parental 
settlements, but to apply the anti-avoidance provisions to all 
such future settlements and to existing revocable settlements, 
irrespective of whether the income was spent or accumulated.
(2) To provide an exclusion for a limited amount of income of 
existing irrevocable parental settlements so that income in 
excess of the amount required for maintenance would be deemed to 
be intended to be used for the parent's own purposes and would be 
charged on him.
(3) To provide a complete let-out for income accumulated in 
irrevocable parental settlements so that only income applied 
during the minority of the child would be deemed to be the 
parent's.
The Chairman dealt with the first proposal by providing statistics 
concerning revocable and irrevocable settlements, but with no records 
available for capital settlements in favour of minor children, he"
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could only estimate that there were a maximum of ten thousand such 
settlements, and guessed that in most of them the income was to be 
accumulated.31 He expected the proposal to halve the two and a half 
million pound gain estimated to accrue from the Revenue's own 
suggested approach.32 Although he could see no practical difficulties 
with the proposal, (provided there were no exceptions and there was a 
straightforward test of irrevocability), he could find no merit in its
principles.33
During the debates, one of the reasons put forward for special 
treatment of irrevocable settlements was that parents would have 
entered into commitments on the strength of the existing tax 
treatment, and it would be unfair to alter their position.34 The 
Chairman doubted whether this was a reasonable argument because in 
most cases the amount of tax at stake was not a material factor.35 He 
also pointed out that this kind of argument could be put forward 
whenever there was any increase in the income tax rates, because 
increased liability could equally be attacked on the grounds that the 
taxpayer had ordered his life in such a fashion that he could not 
afford to pay the higher liability imposed.36 such claims were 
therefore absurd.
The Revenue believed it would be anomalous to have different treatment 
applied to taxpayers who were otherwise in the same circumstances, 
merely because one had made an irrevocable settlement before the 
Budget and the other after, especially as these settlements were mere 
"tax dodging devices". Because the literature of the agencies pushing 
these schemes often stated that although the law might be altered the
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gain up to the date of change would make the use of the scheme 
worthwhile, the Revenue were able to argue that such a change was 
anticipated, the benefits were not expected to continue, and it was 
unnecessary to provide a dispensation for existing settlements.37
A further reason given for not distinguishing between existing and new 
settlements was that to do so would set a precedent for the future, and 
it might encourage similar dispensations being sought for other 
anti-avoidance provisions in the Finance Bill.38
The Chairman thought the second proposal would be practicable if there 
was a specified figure, rather than a sum which varied according to the 
amount of settlement income or parent's i n c o m e .39 He suggested a figure 
of £200-£300 a year, but estimated that this would result in hardly any 
additional tax being r a i s e d .40
The third proposal was one which, except for the inclusion of irrevocable 
income settlements, had been fully explored in previous papers. On this 
new point the Revenue argued that where a parent made a settlement of 
capital he was settling an accumulation of income on which he had already 
paid tax, but where the settlement involved annual payments by the parent 
they would be allowed as deductions for surtax purposes and would escape 
t a x . T h e y  urged that there should be no breach of the general 
principle that a man ought to pay tax on his income before any deductions 
to provide for his family, and that therefore the settlor's income should 
not be reduced by an annuity payable to a children's settlement.42
The chairman did not repeat the arguments against giving special
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treatment to such settlements, but merely referred the chancellor to 
the Revenue's previous reports. However, he did point out the rapid 
growth in the number of accumulation trusts for adults,(by parents on 
children and between husband and wife), where income was being stored 
up free of surtax, and warned that it might prejudice effective action 
on this problem in a future year if the statute set down a precedent 
by exempting frcm surtax income accumulated for a minor c h i l d .43
Within two days of receiving the Chairman's report, the chancellor had
almost made up his mind.
"After full consideration and discussion I am of the opinion 
that the arguments here adduced against the exemption of 
irrevocable trusts existing before the Bill, although 
formidable, do not outweigh the arguments in its favour. As a 
variant, however, I should be ready to consider a provision that 
the exemption should be limited in time, e.g. to five years, 
which would clear those whose children were already committed to 
the "expensive school". I propose to exempt the accumulative 
irrevocable trusts, both past and future, but agree that in the 
case of income trusts the income should be counted in for 
surtax."44
The following day, the chairman of the Board provided a paper for the 
Chancellor concerning the feasibility of a five year exemption period 
for existing irrevocable settlements45 and, not surprisingly, was very 
much in favour of it. He could foresee no difficulties in 
administering it and thought it would lessen any feeling of inequality 
between taxpayers who had entered into such settlements in the past 
and those who might enter into them in the future.45
Time was by now running very short, and by the afternoon of May 5, the 
Chancellor had at last made his final decisions and the Board had
170
written to parliamentary Counsel setting out the details.47 it had 
been decided:
(a) to exclude all irrevocable settlements, whether of income or of 
capital, made on or before Budget Day;
(b) in the case of irrevocable settlements made after Budget Day to 
exclude income arising to the trustees which under the terms of 
the settlement was to be accumulated for the benefit of the child 
on attaining majority or on marriage, but to charge any income 
paid to or for the benefit of the child;
(c) in the case of any future irrevocable annual payment settlement, 
to allow no deduction in computing the payer's total income; and
(d) in the case of future outright transfers of assets, to charge the 
incane arising from those assets as the parent's income during the 
minority of the child.
The inland Revenue suggested to the draftsman that the first task 
would be to develop a definition of irrevocability, and said that the 
Chancellor had agreed that the definition must be such as would 
exclude any personal discretion^. They had foreseen difficulties in 
drawing a distinction between income payments and capital payments and 
suggested that any payment made by the trustees to the parent should 
be regarded as income insofar as the trustees had received income 
sufficient to cover the payment.49
Parliamentary Counsel had at last got instructions in something like 
final form and within twenty-four hours was reluctantly sending the 
Revenue his re-draft "which I am quite sure is nowhere near 
right."50 Over the following six days, three further re-drafts were
171
made, with the final one being ready on May 12. The changes made on 
each draft were relatively minor and, probably due to the fact that 
there was great urgency in finalising the clause, they were explained 
over the telephone or at meetings and there is nothing on the files to 
explain why they were necessary.51
REACTION TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE BILL
By May 14 the Bill had been published and the chancellor began to 
receive the first in a stream of critical letters, most of which 
concerned the definition of an irrevocable settlement.52 The Revenue 
had already warned that this was likely to attract the greatest 
attention, because if the settlement could pass as being irrevocable 
it would have complete exemption if made before the Budget, and 
partial exemption, to the extent of accumulated income, if made after 
the Budget. The Revenue provided the chancellor with a review of all 
the criticisms, and suggested that the governing principle in 
considering them was that an irrevocable settlement had to be one in 
which the settlor could not obtain any sum for his own benefit at any
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time or in any contingency.53
In a letter to "The Times" which was also sent to ministers,54 a 
barrister criticised the definition of irrevocability because it only 
set out particular instances where a settlement was deemed not to be 
irrevocable and he wanted it worded in such a way that if the deeming . 
provisions did not apply, the settlement would be treated as 
irrevocable. As drafted the definition only intended to show the 
particular circumstances under which an irrevocable settlement would 
be treated as revocable, and as it was designed to catch any
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settlement which by its very terms provided for revocation by the 
settlor, the barrister's suggestion for modification was not
entertained.55
Seme correspondents had mentioned cases where the settlor had power to 
direct the trustees to re-allocate the income in new proportions. The 
Revenue received legal advice that such a power would not of itself 
turn what would otherwise have been an irrevocable settlement into a 
revocable settlement, but that where the settlor had a power of 
revocation and re-settlement, it would be caught.56
Irrevocable status was denied to any settlement which provided for 
total or partial indemnification or exoneration of any person in the 
event of his failing to enforce the settlement. This was criticised 
by seme correspondents as being much too wide as it would have caught 
innocent and common form indemnifications of trustees. The Lord 
Advocate of Scotland told the Financial Secretary that Scottish 
settlements usually contained an indemnification provision which 
merely reflected the provision in the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921, 
which applied to all settlements.5? As the purpose of the provision 
was to deal with cases where the settlor undertook to make an annual 
payment and then used the indemnification route to enable him to cease 
payment, the Revenue agreed to a re-casting so that it only caught 
cases where indemnification was given to trustees in the event of 
their failing to enforce any obligation on the settlor under the
settlement.58
The Attorney-General drew attention to the fact that many settlements
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provided for suspension or determination of the settlement in the 
event of bankruptcy of any of the children, and suggested that it 
might be desirable to provide that such a provision would not make the 
settlement revocable.59 The inland Revenue saw no objection to this 
but thought it was not desirable to move an official amendment at the 
caranittee stage and the Chancellor agreed with them.60
A major firm of solicitors suggested that because a parent's payments 
of maintenance under a court order would be outside the clause, 
maintenance payments made under an agreement should be similarly 
treated.The  inland Revenue advised the Chancellor that "though 
this may be equitable I think you will agree that it is not a matter 
on which you should move and that its consideration can be left over 
till it is raised by way of amendment."62 Again, he agreed with this 
tactical proposal,63 but when an amendment was put down the Board 
resisted it and it was rejected. A ridiculous and unjustifiable 
distinction between court orders and maintenance agreements was thus 
allowed to creep into the tax system.
Within ten days of publication of the Bill, the Revenue discovered 
that one of the agencies promoting children's deeds was issuing 
circulars suggesting that pre-Budget revocable deeds could be made 
irrevocable by a supplemental deed and thereby come within the let-out 
for pre-Budget irrevocable settlements.6^ The circular explained the 
reasons for taking such action, included a suitable form of wording, 
and also pointed out that a deed made before April 22, 1936 could be 
lodged for stamping at any time up to May 21, 1936. The Revenue 
interpreted this latter point as a suggestion that deeds entered into
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after the Budget might be ante-dated and stated their intention to 
take steps to discover such fraud.Parliamentary counsel was 
instructed to draft amendments to strengthen the provisions to ensure 
that pre-Budget revocable settlements could not be amended so as to 
pass as irrevocable settlements.*^
SECOND READING
At the second reading, the Labour Party's attack was led by Mr Benson, 
who believed "lack of resilience of the public revenue ... [was] 
unquestionably the result of the vast amount of evasion that is taking 
place."67 He wanted to know why settlements not involving children 
had not been dealt with, and instanced revocable settlements, seven 
year covenants, and annuities to pay wages as being just as in need of 
attention. He was convinced the chancellor was approaching the 
problem from the wrong end and suggested introducing legislation to 
invalidate any trust for tax purposes and then making limited \ 
exceptions. A vigorous attack was mounted against the chancellor's 
decision to exempt pre-Budget irrevocable settlements because the 
Opposition could not be seen how it "was ... any less immoral three 
months ago to create an irrevocable trust for the purpose of dodging 
income tax and surtax than it is today."*>8 Benson believed such a 
distinction was invidious, but the Financial Secretary thought it 
justified where a settlement was truly irrevocable because of the 
harshness of taxing a settlor who could not get his money back in the 
same way as one who could.69
The Chancellor explained that although he was not dealing with every 
class of avoidance known to occur, those which were most costly and
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commonly used would be caught.70 The other types of settlement which 
Benson had described did not, according to the Chancellor, involve 
considerable loss of tax but he promised to deal with them if they did 
become costly, it seems that cost dominated principle where tax 
avoidance was concerned.71
The only criticism from Conservative Members was the extreme 
complexity of the clause, which in parts was said to be almost 
incomprehensible. The chancellor admitted that the anti-avoidance 
aspects of the Finance Bill were more technical and complicated than 
any for which he had been responsible, but contended that the variety 
of avoidance and the necessity to make the provisions watertight made 
plain, simple language impossible.72 He invited any Member who was 
unconvinced to try using simpler language, but indicated that his own 
frequent experiments to do so had always shown that there was a good 
reason for every word.73
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SETTLEMENT PROVISION IN THE BILL 
A copy of the settlement provision of the Finance Bill as originally 
introduced is in Appendix D2, and the following material explains its 
manner of operation in detail.
General Review
The clause can be analysed according to its effect on revocable 
settlements, irrevocable settlements made on or after April 22, 1936, 
and irrevocable settlements made before that date.
All income of revocable settlements by parents on their children,
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whether made before or after the Budget, was to be treated as the 
parent's so long as the child was both an infant and unmarried and the 
settlor was alive. This rule was to apply to both income and capital 
settlements if they were revocable in any circumstances whatever, 
whether with or without the consent of any other person. By 1936, 
these settlements were the most popular, but all their income tax and 
surtax benefits were to be terminated.
For irrevocable settlements made on or after April 22, 1936, a 
distinction was made between income accumulated and income spent on 
the maintenance of the child. Sums applied for maintenance were to be 
treated during the child's minority as the income of the parent, but 
incane accumulated was not. However, annual payments by a parent to 
such a settlement were to be treated as the parent's income even if 
they were accumulated by the trustees.
Irrevocable settlements made before April 22, 1936, were to be 
entirely outside the scope of the clause, whether the income was 
distributed or accumulated. The reason for this was that parents 
might in good faith have entered into commitments, particularly for 
education of the child, based upon the tax advantages derived from 
such settlements, and it would have been harsh to have removed those 
advantages while leaving them bound by the irrevocable nature of the 
settlement. However, a new much more stringent definition of 
irrevocability was to be applied.
Sub-Section 1
This provided that if any income was paid from a parental settlement
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to or for the benefit of a minor unmarried child of the settlor it was 
deemed to be the parent's. Although this apparently applied to all 
settlements, pre-Budget irrevocable settlements were excluded by 
virtue of sub-section 9.
Sub-Section 2
This sub-section provided that income accumulated under the settlement 
was deemed to be paid for the benefit of the child, and consequently 
caught by sub-section 1, unless the settlement was irrevocable, in 
which case sub-section 3, provided a let-out. Revocable settlements 
in which accumulated incane was not required to be allocated to any 
particular child, or in which some children might be infants and 
others might not or in which some persons other than the settlor's 
children were beneficiaries, were dealt with by special provisions,^ 
which deemed the accumulated income to be divided equally between 
beneficiaries who were children of the settlor. For example, if the 
parent created a revocable settlement for the benefit of his five 
children with the income to be accumulated until the youngest was 
twenty-one and then distributed between the children at the discretion 
of the trustees, then if at the commencement of a particular tax year 
three of the children were over twenty-one and two were under 
twenty-one and unmarried, two-fifths of the income would be deemed to 
have been paid for the benefit of the two minor children, and would 
consequently be treated as caught under sub-section 1.
Sub-Section 3
Under this sub-section, with one exception, accumulated income of 
irrevocable settlements made on or after April 22, 1936, was not to be
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treated as the parent's. The exception applied to accumulations 
consisting of, or representing directly or indirectly, annual payments 
made by the parent. The words "directly or indirectly" were designed 
to prevent devices being used to transform what were really income 
settlements into capital settlements. For example, if B transferred 
one thousand pounds to trustees to be accumulated for his minor child, 
and then borrowed that sum from the trustees at interest, that 
interest would be deductible in computing his total income, but 
because of these provisions it would also be treated as his, thus 
negating the deduction from his total incane. (The Revenue had come 
across a case vtfiere this device had been used and the agreed interest 
rate had been one hundred per cent per annum.) If a company was 
interposed between the trustees and the parent, this too would be 
caught. For example, if a parent transferred capital to a settlement 
and the trustees used those funds to subscribe for shares in a company 
which then lent the money to the parent at interest and used the 
interest to pay dividends for accumulation by the trustees, those 
dividends would indirectly represent the interest paid by the parent 
and would be treated as his income.
An important second aspect of this sub-section was that all sums paid 
under irrevocable settlements were to be deemed to be payments of 
income for the purposes of sub-section 1 in so far as there was income 
available to cover them. By this means, capital sums were to be 
treated as income to the extent that they could have been paid out of 
income.
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Sub Section 4
Any additional tax payable by the parent as a result of the deeming 
process was recoverable under this sub-section from the trustees or 
other person to whom the income was paid, conversely, where the 
parent received a greater repayment than he would have if the income 
had not been deemed to be his, that excess repayment had to be paid 
over to the trustees or other person receiving the income.
Sub Section 5
Where incane was accumulated under the provisions of a will or 
settlement for the benefit of some person contingent on his attaining 
some specified age or marrying, that person could, when the 
contingency occurred, claim the income tax reliefs to which he would 
have been entitled had his income year by year included the amounts 
accumulated. Where that income had already been deemed to be that of 
the settlor, this sub-section prevented any such claim.
Sub Section 6
Any particulars which the Special Commissioners thought were necessary 
for the purposes of the section were obtainable under sub-section 6. 
The Revenue would normally have obtained all the information necessary 
for operating the provisions from the evidence in support of repayment 
claims, but as they needed to determine what income had been spent and 
what had been accumulated they needed additional statutory powers.
Sub-Section 7
To ensure that the term "irrevocable settlement” only applied to those 
which were completely irrevocable, a settlement was to be deemed to be
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revocable if any of paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) applied. Paragraph (a) 
made sure that the settlor had parted with the capital and income 
completely, and prevented the device of inserting sane special 
provision under which funds would be returned on the happening of some 
highly likely contingency, such as the death of an aged relative. 
Paragraph (b) stopped settlements which could be revoked with the 
consent of some other person being regarded as irrevocable, and was 
based upon the Revenue's experience of avoidance of the provisions of 
section 20 of the Finance Act 1922. Paragraph (c) excluded 
settlements which could be terminated on payment of a nominal penalty 
and was thought to be particularly relevant to annuities paid undert 
covenant.
Sub-Section 8
This provided definitions for the clause. The definition of a child 
was the same as that used in section 20 of the Finance Act 1922, but 
with the inclusion of adopted children. The definition of a 
"settlement" was the same as that for a 'disposition' in the Finance 
Act 1922, but with the added words "transfer of assets" which were 
inserted to make it clear that an outright gift of capital would be 
caught. The term "settlor" was introduced for the first-time, and 
although reciprocal arrangements and the indirect provision of funds 
were covered by the approach used in the Finance Act 1922,75 the 
Chancellor met his promise to include a more explicit form of words.
A definition of income was necessary to overcome the problem created 
by Perry v Astor^G in which a restricted interpretation had been 
applied. To ensure that income was not deemed to belong to a person
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who was not chargeable to U.K. tax, (foreign income), or who, if 
chargeable, could not be forced to pay, (U.K. source income), the 
clause was to apply only so long as the settlor was resident in the 
U.K. At that time, foreign income of a foreign trust was not 
chargeable if it was not remitted to the U.K., and therefore, to 
escape the clause, a taxpayer in the U.K. would have been able to 
transfer foreign securities to a foreign trust for the benefit of his 
child. However, this device was blocked by extending the definition 
of income to include any income which would have been chargeable if it 
had been received in the U.K.
Sub-Section 9
This not only provided a let-out for pre-Budget irrevocable 
settlements but also made it clear that the clause applied to a 
settlement wherever it is made or entered into.
Sub-Section 10
The Finance Act 1922 provisions relating to settlements on children 
were not to apply to settlements within sub-section 9 but were to 
remain in operation for revocable settlements made before April 27, 
1936.
THE COMMITTEE STAGE
Consideration of the settlement provisions at the committee stage was 
a long and drawn-out affair in which twenty-four of the forty-five 
amendments put down were moved. Those which were not moved were 
either covered by some other amendment or involved a misunderstanding 
of the effect of the provisions or an attempt to introduce some
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modification totally inconsistent with them. Only the more 
interesting amendments discussed in the House are examined here.
Many Members thought there was an element of retrospection in the 
clause and therefore moved an amendment to ensure that this could not 
happen. The Board's notes indicate that they were unsure of the 
reason for the amendment and thought it possible that it was designed 
to exclude any charge on income for the two weeks of the tax year 
which had expired at the time of the Budget.77 The debate shows that 
they were wrong and that the concern was over the first year for which 
the clause was to apply. Once it was confirmed to be 1936/37/ the 
amendment was negatived.78
The deeming provision were only to apply if the child was an infant 
and unmarried at the commencement of the tax year, but an amendment 
was put down under which the age of the child at the time of payment 
would be the determining factor. The Board's notes indicate that in 
the first year of the child's life, (unless it was born on 6th April), 
the provisions would not apply because the child was not an infant and 
unmarried at the commencement of that year, as it did not in fact 
exist at that time79. correspondingly, the clause would apply for the 
whole year in which the child attained the age of 21, because on April 
6 of that year the child would have been an infant and unmarried. The 
Revenue realised they would gain in the year of majority but lose in 
the year of birth and advised ministers that although the amendment 
was theoretically sound, it was objectionable on practical grounds 
because it would involve an apportionment in the first and last 
years^O. Although the amendment was negatived the discussion of
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the matter in the House lead to such wide exploitation of the loophole 
in the year of the child's birth that in 1958 the legislation was 
changed so that the determining factor was the age of the child at the 
time of the payment. Thus, some twenty-two years later, the amendment 
was accepted!
On Revenue advice the Chancellor introduced amendments to ensure that 
pre-Budget revocable settlements could not be amended so as to obtain 
the dispensation available for pre-Budget irrevocable settlements, and 
to alter sub-section 3 so that if a revocable settlement was converted 
to an irrevocable settlement, income accumulated prior to the 
alteration was still liable to the deeming process. Double counting 
of the same income, (once due to revocability and again due to paying 
out accumulated income after the settlement had become irrevocable), 
was achieved by providing that accumulations of income prior to the 
settlement becoming irrevocable were not counted as available for 
making payments to beneficiaries.
An attempt to treat irrevocable annual payment settlements in the same 
way as irrevocable capital settlements and exclude them from 
sub-section 3, led to an interesting debate on the rationale for 
their different treatment. Supporters of the amendment believed it 
unfair that someone only having earned income was treated more 
severely than one fortunate enough to have capital. After explaining 
that only the annual payment was to be treated as the settlor's and 
not the income derived from its investment by the trustees, the 
Attorney-General defended the proposals for annual payments out of 
earnings, on the grounds that they should not be given more
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advantageous treatment than settlements of capital sums built up out 
of after-tax income.82 He was challenged on this because it contained 
the basic flaw that not all capital had been built up out of after-tax 
income; some was inherited wealth and wealth accumulated by capital 
accretion. The Attorney-General clearly had relied too heavily upon 
the notes provided by the Board of inland Revenue without considering 
their veracity. Mr Benson, for the Opposition, pointed out that once 
a capital settlement had been made, the settlor would no longer be 
taxable on the accumulated income, and that this produced ,fa 
differentiation against the man who can't afford to make a capital 
settlement and in favour of the man who can."82 He was right, and 
although various Labour Members reinforced the point, no response was 
made and the dicrimination between capital and income settlements was 
allowed to stand.
An amendment to restrict the information powers so that only a settlor
or trustee of the settlement, (rather than any person), could be
required to supply information was resisted by the Board. They
*
believed it would make the sub-section too narrow by making it 
impossible to obtain information from a bank, solicitor, accountant or 
other professional person, even though they had "of course no 
intention of making use of the information provision in this way."8  ^
The clause was, according to one Conservative Member, "an 
unwarrantable interference with liberty ... which..may lead to grave 
abuses."82 Labour Members, however, were against any restriction of 
its scope because "the only thing that an inspector of taxes can find 
out is income, and if everybody declared their income, as they ought 
to do, there is no reason why an inspector of taxes should not have 
every facility
185
afforded to him."86 as the Revenue were not averse to sane 
restriction on their powers the Attorney-General agreed to consider 
whether they were unnecessarily wide.
The debates on the definition of irrevocability centred on various 
provisions found in existing irrevocable settlements which though 
there for good reasons, would have resulted in them being treated as 
revocable for tax purposes.87 Many settlements were determinable on 
the bankruptcy of any of the children who were beneficiaries, and as 
the Revenue agreed it was unreasonable to treat such settlements as 
revocable,88 a let-out was provided on the basis that such a provision 
did not give the parent power to revoke the settlement.
Both an attempt to make the provisions only apply if the parent was 
eligible for child allowance and an alternative amendment to reduce 
the period of infancy to 16 years, with an extension beyond that time 
if the parent was eligible for child allowance, failed.89 The Board 
advised ministers that to accept either suggestion would prejudice the 
parent whose child*s education continued beyond the age of 16. They 
dismissed this as "topsy-turvy discrimination"^0 and ignored the 
ananalies which the amendments would have removed for cases in which a 
minor child had left home and was earning his own living.
An amendment to exclude maintenance payments to a child whether under 
a separation agreement or court order was rejected.91 The Board seem 
to have been content that a court order was not a settlement, but 
objected to separation agreements resulting in more favourable tax 
treatment after separation or divorce than before it, and insisted
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they should be caught.92 Their main argument was that the parent was 
providing for the expense of maintaining his offspring out of his 
income, and the citizen who had not separated or divorced might well 
be aggrieved if he found himself worse off than those who had93. 
Although this objection applied equally to court orders, the 
Attorney-General seems either not to have noticed or not to have 
thought it important, and after his speech relying heavily upon the 
notes provided by the Board the amendment was negatived without 
further discussion.
An important part of the debate concerned the let-out for pre-Budget 
irrevocable settlements which had been inserted even though the 
Chancellor had originally described it as indefensible during the 
debate on the Budget resolution. This was latched onto by Mr Benson 
who believed that the change of mind was a result of "back-stairs 
influence by honourable gentlemen behind the Chancellor."94 He 
protested that the exemption of such trusts was unjustified because:
(a) they were confined to the extremely wealthy;
(b) they had been established mainly for tax motives, (and for those 
that had not it would cause no hardship to deem the income to be 
the settlor's); and
(c) their irrevocable form was largely a question of luck, in many 
cases depending upon which agency he used.
The Chancellor dismissed these objections on the grounds that these 
trusts were quite lawfully made and the settlor would be bound by 
undertakings or engagements which, because of the irrevocability of 
the trust, he could not escape. It was stressed that the exception
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only applied to settlements meeting the new more stringent tests of 
irrevocability, and that therefore as many of them contained offending 
provisions which effectively made them revocable, they would be caught.
At the conclusion of the committee stage debate a number of Members
grumbled about the difficulties they had had in understanding the
clause. Three typical comments were as follows.
"Several honourable members learned in the law have complained 
of the drafting of this clause. I, as an ordinary layman, have 
found it extremely difficult to understand, and I imagine that 
there are many others in the committee who, like me, do not know 
exactly what we are doing or what the effect of this clause 
is.”95
"... The real proof of the unintelligibility of the clause was 
found in the debate last night ... in which practically every 
speech was read, although the standing orders say that they 
should not be read. Those speeches included all those made from 
the Treasury Bench, because neither ministers nor members could 
make speeches on this subject without lavishly prepared 
briefs."96
"It is the most complicated clause that I have ever had to deal 
with. I have had to deal with settlements of various kinds for 
the past forty-five years, and I have taken this clause hone and 
tried to read it and understand it but I have entirely failed.
I sent it to the very best counsel at the Bar and have received 
several letters from them to say that it is totally 
unintelligible. There has been a Committee of the Law Society 
studying it. This morning I spoke to a leading member of the 
Committee and I was told that they are thoroughly puzzled by 
it."97
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury answered this criticism by 
explaining that although clarity was desirable, certainty of meaning 
through the use of highly technical language was essential to 
safeguard against litigation, and this had to be offset against any 
disadvantage arising from loss of clarity to the lay mind.98
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THE REPORT STAGE AND THIRD READING
Foreseeing that the difficulty of understanding this clause would be 
exacerbated by the large number of Government amendments, the Revenue 
had suggested to the chancellor that some be held over to the report 
stage. The chancellor agreed, but as promises had been made in 
committee to reconsider certain matters, the amendments were numerous 
and there was a further flurry of activity to enable all the points to 
be considered and appropriate amendments drafted.
At the committee stage concern was expressed that educational policies 
would be caught^ because they contained provisions under which, if 
the child died before attaining school age, the premiums or a part of 
them would be returned to the insurer.^ - The Board drafted a letter to 
the Financial Secretary explaining that such policies were not caught 
because there was no settlement and the annual payments made by the 
insurance company would be direct to the parent with no obligation to 
apply then for the child's benefit.2 The draft was reviewed by 
Parliamentary counsel, who advised that although such policies might 
be settlements, they would not be caught because the payments under 
the policy were not to or for the benefit of the child.3 no special 
let-out was therefore required.
As explained earlier, the original draft clause included a £5 de 
minimus limit which was removed from later drafts so that a political 
advantage could be obtained by waiting for the point to be raised and 
then appearing generous by giving a concession, it was not until 
early June 1936 that the National Savings Committee realised the 
implications of the clause and wrote to the Treasury to argue that it
189
"appears to go beyond the intention at which it is aimed, and in doing
so is likely to act as a deterrent to thrift on the part of the
millions of small investors with whom we deal."4 The inland Revenue
suggested a £5 exemption so that a total deposit of £200 in the Post
Office or the Trustee Savings Bank would not be caught. The draftsman
was requested to prepare an appropriate amendment but despite having
done so in the earlier draft, he now had great difficulty, as the
following extract shows.
"I am afraid that I have been completely defeated by your 
proposal ... There must be some way of giving effect to this 
proposal without enabling a settlor to evade the clause by
making a large number of £5 settlements, but I have not
succeeded in finding it. As a matter of drafting it is 
extraordinarily difficult."5
Within a few days the draftsman had "at last got it right"^ and
produced the let-out which still exists today.?
Further evidence of the draftsman's difficulties are provided by his 
comments on certain other amendments.8 m  drafting one let-out he 
admitted that "it needs a more extensive aquaintance with settlements 
than I possess to say whether it is too wide or not wide enough."9
On June 23, the chairman of the Board wrote to the Chancellor with the 
Revenue's views on matters arising out of the committee stage.10 Not 
only did he deal with points on which a review had been promised, but 
also with certain others, in an attempt to remove any lingering doubts 
the chancellor might have had as to their merits.
Although there were many amendments at the report stage, the major 
concern was with the tests of irrevocability. Committee stage
190
comments about the possibility of settlements being treated as 
revocable if trustees had a discretionary power to hand over funds to 
the child on marriage or on attaining majority or a later age, led to 
an amendment to exclude such cases from the deemed revocability 
provisions.^
Criticism which had been levelled at the provisions relating to 
indemnification of trustees resulted in a review of the whole question 
of indemnification and exoneration and a decision that the inclusion 
of such provisions would not make settlements revocable if they were 
otherwise irrevocable. The only evidence of the reason for this 
change of mind is in the report stage debates where it was explained 
that in,Scotland practically every deed contained a provision for 
total or partial exoneration of the trustees.12 The Opposition 
warned^ that this modification would create a loophole for trustees 
to pay accumulated income of a capital settlement to the parent as a 
gift because even though they would be violating the terms of the 
trust, they would be exonerated. The clause would not catch payments 
to the parent because they would not have been applied for the benefit 
of the children. The contrary view was that because such a trust 
would not be valid, the loophole would not exist,^ but as was pointed 
out, such a case would not come before the courts until the 
beneficiary was of age and capable of suing, and in all probability 
the parent would be able to rely upon the goodwill of his child in not 
suing him. Unfortunately further discussion of this point did not 
take place.
Another relaxation of the deemed revocability rules was introduced to 
exclude cases where funds might revert to the parent in the event of
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the bankruptcy of the child or his assignment of, or execution of a 
charge on, the income. A similar dispensation existed in the 1922 
provisions under which it had been the practice of the Revenue since 
the Trustee Act 1925 "to pass without question the mere inclusion in a 
settlement of a protective trust clause, on the ground that it is 
covered by the provisions relating to bankruptcy, assignment or 
execution of a charge."15 The Attorney-General thought this practice 
was not strictly correct because section 33 of Trustee Act covered an 
attanpted as well as an actual assignment or execution of a charge.
For this reason special measures were included in the tax legislation 
to deal with protective trusts, because without them certain acts or 
events would determine the settlement and the income would then be 
held on discretionary trust for the benefit of a variety of persons.
As the parents would be included among the objects of the the 
trustees' discretion, the settlement would from the very beginning be 
treated as revocable, and hence a let-out was required.
The Revenue were concerned that if every protective trust was excluded 
the settlor could insert a clause which would in effect make the 
settlement revocable by specifying some particular event which would 
be treated as a divesting event. They therefore proposed that any 
let-out should be strictly confined to those events specified in the 
Trustee Act which would result in the beneficiary losing title to 
income, and this was agreed by the chancellor. The only risk 
attaching to such a provision was that a parent might obtain 
revocation of a settlement by persuading the child to attempt to 
perform an act which caused divestment, for example by causing the 
child to apply for an advance of money on the security of an
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assignment of his rights under the settlement. The Revenue were not 
unduly concerned about this possibility and thought that although "it 
is not easy to prophesy what the tax dodger will do, and experience 
has shown that he is capable of doing many strange things, we doubt 
very much whether there is any danger in the present connection."^
As the income would be paid to the child prior to the attempt at 
divestment it would be deemed to be the parent's anyway, and therefore 
the connivance at divestment would be of little purpose because the 
income would then usually be actually received by the parent.
With one exception all Government amendments at the report stage were 
passed without difficulty. Although the Chancellor had intended to 
restrict the Revenue's information powers, Sir Stafford Cripps 
persuaded him that it would be undesirable to do sol7 because 
information concerning payments made from the settlement could be 
relevant and would not have been obtainable under the Chancellor's 
restricted provisions.18 The amendment was withdrawn and no such 
restrictions were introduced.
A further concession on the deemed revocability rules consisted of a- 
let-out for settlements on children containing a power for trustees, 
after the death of the settlor, to apply part of the children's income 
to make up the income of the widow to a specified sum. Although this 
relaxation was not expected to affect many settlements, the Financial 
Secretary accepted there were undoubtedly some in which hardship would 
otherwise be involved. The supporting argument for this amendment was 
based upon existing settlements, but as Sir Stafford Cripps was quick 
to point out, it would also have affected future settlements and might
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have represented a l o o p h o l e .19 ^he amendment was also criticised 
because it would apply to income payable to a widower after the death 
of the widow; a case in which the need for an exception was not so 
strong. These objections were dismissed on the grounds that such 
cases were very unusual anyway but the amendment was accepted with a 
promise to "keep our eye on any sinister purposes for which it might 
be used."20
As drafted, the clause treated a settlement as revocable if it 
provided for a penalty to be paid by any person on failing to comply 
with its terms. The Government, thinking the words "any person" were 
too wide, wanted to subsitute "the settlor" but the Opposition 
believed that it would be simple to avoid such an amended provision by 
specifying that the penalty should be paid by the settlor or some 
other person on his behalf. When the Attorney-General explained that 
future settlements of income would be caught anyway and that the 
amendment would only affect existing income settlements, all known 
cases of which contained a provision for payment of any penalty by the 
settlor, the amendment was agreed to.21
At the third reading warnings of their future attitude towards tax
avoidance were given both by the Financial Secretary and the Chancellor
"I give warning that the people who indulge in practices of that 
kind must not consider that because this time we have not passed 
retrospective legislation we shall be debarred from doing so in 
any future legislation."22
Although criticism was levelled at the Government for failing to deal 
with other forms of avoidance, the Chancellor was adamant that all
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known serious forms of tax avoidance had been dealt with. Those which 
had not been touched by the Finance Bill of 1936 were said not to have 
been sufficiently extensive or subversive to require legislation. It 
was, according to the chancellor, all a matter of degree, but before 
very long he was to find that other forms of avoidance involving 
settlements had grown to such a level that they could no longer be 
ignored.
CONCLUSION
There is no clear evidence of the reason for such a long delay in 
introducing anti-avoidance legislation once the Revenue had statistics 
showing its extent and growth, and information about the manner in 
which it was spreading. There was almost five years between the first 
clear call for action by claims Branch and the introduction of 
legislation, and it appears that it was not until the tax being lost 
became very considerable that ministers could be persuaded to act.
Rather unusually, the legislation eventually introduced did not fully 
reflect what the Revenue had wanted, but this was not through any lack 
of effort to get their own way. Having managed to convince the 
Financial Secretary that irrevocable capital settlements should be 
caught, they found the Chancellor much more cautious. The Revenue 
used every available opportunity to press their point of view on him, 
and when the main argument was lost they had various fall-back 
positions. None of them however were accepted by the rather timid 
Chancellor, who even agreed to increase child allowance to smooth the 
passage of the anti-avoidance provisions.
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Neville chamberlain seems to have been so concerned about the 
political acceptability of the legislation that he used a deliberately 
vague and ambiguous Budget Statement to draw fire from potential 
opponents so that he could assess the potential difficulties which lay 
ahead. Because he had not decided the precise extent of the 
proposals, he was able to use the information so obtained to enable 
him to formulate the policy of the legislation. This was a method not 
seen again in determining later settlement legislation, where 
principles seem to have retained their dominance over political 
expediency.
The delay in introducing these provisions was certainly a major factor 
contributing to the political difficulty of taking action, because as 
time went by the numbers of people who would be adversely affected 
increased in an almost geometric progression. It was this delay which 
probably resulted in the Revenue not getting the legislation they 
wanted, and realisation of this may have encouraged them to apply 
pressure earlier on the ministers responsible for future 
anti-avoidance legislation. It was only twelve months later that the 
Revenue brought to the Chancellor's attention the growing problems 
arising from those areas which had been left untouched by the 1936 
legislation. However, as can be seen from Appendix D4, the 1936 
provisions were a great success in preventing the avoidance at which 
they were aimed.
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CHAPTER 6
1936-1938: THREATS PROVE INEFFECTIVE AND WIDE-RANGING
LEGISLATION IS INTRODUCED
INTRODUCTION
Even though in 1936 the Chancellor had stated that all known serious 
forms of avoidance had been dealt with, and had threatened that in 
future avoidance might be attacked retrospectively,1 by 1937 it had 
grown to such an extent that his successor, (Sir John Simon), decided 
to take further action. Ironically, it was probably the success of 
the children's settlement provisions of the Finance Act 1936 2 which 
stimulated growth in the use of various forms of accumulation 
settlement as an alternative means of sheltering income from surtax, 
and led to the need for additional anti-avoidance measures.
The problem of how to deal with such settlements was not new to the 
Inland Revenue, as they had fully explored it when the whole question 
of tax avoidance was scrutinised by the Board's Tax Avoidance 
Caiunittee in late 1933 and early 1934.3 This investigation had 
involved consideration of the various avoidance methods known to the 
Revenue and the possible ways of dealing with them, and had even gone 
so far as to put forward draft clauses. When, therefore, the Revenue 
were asked to devise anti-avoidance proposals, it was merely necessary 
for them to refer to the Committee's recommendations. There is 
therefore great similarity between some of the clauses introduced in 
the Finance Bill 1938 and those of the Committee some four years 
earlier.
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The settlement provisions introduced by the Finance Act 1938 now make 
up a considerable portion of Part XVI I.C.T.A. 1970, (sections 445, 
446, 447, 450 and 451), and are still largely in the same form as 
originally enacted. (Section 451 has been subject to the greatest 
modification but the basic approach remains unaltered).
THE CHANCELLOR'S WARNING
During the third reading of the Finance Bill 1937, the chancellor 
issued a stern warning to the effect that if tax avoiders continued 
exploiting loopholes he would have to introduce retrospective 
legislation.^ The stimulus which led to this threat was the following 
letter from a practising barrister.5
2 Hare Court
Temple
EC4
24 June 1937
Dear Simon,
Here is a copy of the deed about which I spoke to you at 
Bradfield. Under this it is possible to save everybody surtax 
on a ten shilling stamp and by a very simple operation.
I am sorry I did not send it to you before. I am going to 
worry you with a memorandum on a general clause designed to 
prevent all sham transactions. I am waiting for the text of 
the German clause, which is designed to achieve a similar 
object.
Yours sincerely
John Foster
The chancellor's handwritten note on the letter indicates how seriously 
he considered the matter.
"I should like Sir E Forber^ to see this. I am told it is going 
on all over the place, (chancellor's underlining), is a new 
clause in this year's Finance Bill out of the question? 29 June 
1937.1,7
198
On July 3, the Daily Herald carried an article which not only 
explained in some detail how settlements could be used to avoid 
surtax, but also said that the Chancellor was "understood to be 
considering more drastic methods than any yet devised for preventing 
evasion of surtax.''^
The Chancellor believed that the problem had become "the more serious 
as the Daily Herald had advertised how it is done!"9 By this time it 
had been explained to him that it was too late to legislate in the 
Finance Act of 1937, so instead, he asked for a carefully framed 
warning to be prepared in such a way as to justify retrospective 
legislation.10
A copy of the relevant correspondence and offending deed was passed to 
Forber, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, and on July 13, 
1937 he wrote a long memorandum to the chancellor explaining why the 
deed was not caught by the existing provisions, the general nature of 
the remedial legislation required, the method of achieving 
retrospection for surtax purposes and the form of warning which might 
be suitable.11
The Revenue estimated that the loss of tax arising fran the use of 
accumulation settlements amounted to half a million pounds a year. As 
might be expected, Forber suggested action going slightly beyond that 
required to prevent the avoidance covered by the specific deed under 
consideration and the matters mentioned in the Daily Herald article. 
However, it would have been unwise for him to disregard other related 
loopholes, because these would probably have been rapidly exploited if
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they were left open and would have required further legislation at 
some later date.
Forber suggested that the way to proceed was to introduce legislation 
in the Finance Act of 1938 and make it applicable to surtax becoming 
due in 1938/39. As that surtax would be based upon the income of 
1937/38, the legislation would apply to settlements made during that 
year and the desired retrospection would be achieved. He advised 
against making the legislation apply to any year earlier than 
1937/38.12
The Revenue provided a detailed form of words to the chancellor for 
use at the third reading of the Bill and the actual words he usedl3 
were almost identical to those provided.14 Given the fact that the 
third reading took place only three days after the memorandum from the 
Chairman of the Board of inland Revenue, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the Chancellor chose to use the suggested wording but it shows 
his willingness to go along with the Revenuefs advice and his 
agreement to action being taken.
While the Chancellor's statement did not make it plain that there 
definitely would be retrospective legislation and people may well have 
continued to enter into such arrangements in the hope that the threat 
would not materialise, the die was cast.
Reporting the Chancellor's warning, "Taxation" 15 lamented the threat 
of retrospective legislation which "must be regarded by all reasonable 
taxpayers as un-British" but agreed that it was the duty of the
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Chancellor to close up all material loopholes.
In the event, retrospective anti-avoidance legislation was introduced 
in the following Finance Bill, and it would appear that the only 
reason that it was not brought in in 1937 was that the matter was not 
brought to the Chancellor*s attention in time. It is rather 
surprising that the inland Revenue themselves did not raise the 
problem with the Chancellor as they appear to have been aware of such 
avoidance, perhaps the explanation is that they were not aware of its 
extent.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A BLANKET ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISION 
Although the Chancellor had decided to introduce anti-avoidance 
provisions in the next Finance Bill, the exact form of the legislation 
had not been decided and the possibility of widely drawn general 
anti-avoidance provisions had apparently not been ruled out. The 
barrister, Foster, wrote again to the Chancellor on July 26, 1937, 
enclosing his suggestions for the "complete prevention of tax 
avoidance"!^ together with a translation of the relevant German law 
designed to block all tax avoidance. 17
Foster also enclosed specific suggestions for dealing with 
accumulation settlements, but these were at best half-baked and 
amounted to no more than an extension to all settlements of the tests 
of irrevocability which applied to children*s settlements. However, 
his proposals concerning a general anti-avoidance provision were far 
more radical.
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He argued that the existing method of dealing with tax avoidance 
resulted in legislation which was always several moves behind the tax 
avoider, and thought that it was bound to contain many gaps through 
which ingenious lawyers and accountants would be able to find a way.
In his view, it was ridiculous that large numbers of accountants and 
lawyers spent their time and exercised their ingenuity in devising 
methods by which one body of taxpayers could throw the burden of 
taxation on to the remainder, and suggested that all forms of tax 
avoidance could be made impossible by framing a general clause 
enabling all sham or artificial transactions to be disregarded for tax 
purposes. Such a provision was to catch all schemes designed for the 
main purpose of avoiding taxation.
The practicability of this proposal was questionable, and he admitted 
that the copy of the German legislation which he provided was "not 
suitable for an English statute."18 The only precedent he could find
for legislation of a similar character related to an order of The 
Ministry of Food, in 1917, designed to prevent persons from evading 
the law as to the maximum prices of potatoes by fictitious or 
artificial transactions.19 There is however, a very considerable 
difference between a piece of legislation designed to operate over a 
limited class of transactions and one which would range over all the 
possible transactions which would cane within the scope of taxation. 
Foster did not address the difficulties which would have arisen from 
an attempt to operate a general anti-avoidance provision. While he 
suggested that it would be necessary to provide a right of appeal on 
the question of intent to avoid tax, the difficulties of determining a 
person's intent were entirely glossed over.
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Foster's suggestion appears to have received no consideration by any 
of the officials involved. There are no marginal comments alongside 
anything he wrote2  ^and there is no mention of his suggestions in any 
of the papers concerning tax avoidance in contemporary or later 
files. By this time, British anti-avoidance legislation had generally 
taken the form of specifically targeted provisions designed to be as 
objective as possible, clearly, the inland Revenue was geared up to 
this way of dealing with tax avoidance, and neither the administration 
nor its political masters seem to have been interested in any other 
approach. The anti-avoidance provisions introduced in 1938 therefore 
continued to follow the narrow, targeted approach and Foster's 
influence was restricted to hastening that legislation.2^
OBTAINING THE CHANCELLOR'S AGREEMENT TO THE ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
Although Foster's proposal for a general clause to block all avoidance 
transactions had apparently been rejected, the nature of the further 
provisions to prevent avoidance through the use of settlements had 
still to be determined, and this required the Chancellor's authority.
A lengthy memorandum was sent to him by the Board on February 11,
1938,22 setting out their suggestions for dealing with what they 
believed to be the most serious form of avoidance existing at that 
time.22 After giving an overall review of the income tax and surtax 
treatment of trust income, the Board argued that four further 
anti-avoidance provisions relating to settlements were necessary. All 
four of their suggestions are analysed under the various headings 
below. Only two of them were accepted by the Chancellor.
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Settlor Retaining An interest and Revocable Settlements.
The Revenue believed that revocable settlements led to the most 
serious form of a v o i d a n c e .24 The problem arose from the fact that 
although the loophole highlighted by Watson v Wiggins2  ^had been 
blocked in relation to parental settlements on their children by the 
Finance Act 1936, surtax avoiders merely modified the device by making 
their settlements on other beneficiaries.26 As a modification of this 
there were many cases where the trustee had power to make loans to the 
settlor and his annual payments were being lent back by the trustees 
so that he never really lost the use and enjoyment of the funds but 
nevertheless obtained a reduction of his liability to surtax. There 
was apparently considerable growth in this type of avoidance after 
' 1936.27.
The principle upon which the Revenue thought that action should be 
based was that where an individual had not parted with his wealth 
beyond recall, he should be treated as still being in possession of 
it. The remedy they suggested was for the tests of irrevocability to 
be brought into line with those for children's settlements laid down 
in section 21(8) of the Finance Act 1936.28 The effect of the change 
would be that no annual payments under a revocable settlement would be 
allowed as charges in computing the settlor's income, and any incane 
arising to the trustees would be income of the settlor, whether or not 
that income was accumulated or paid out to a beneficiary. In effect 
the revocable trust was to be ignored and the settlor was to be 
treated as having the funds in his possession.
The Inland Revenue did point out to the Chancellor that their
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suggested remedy would affect some settlements which had been entered 
into for reasons other than avoidance of tax, but thought that it 
would be impossible to provide an exception for such cases because any 
exception would require an inquiry into the settlor's motives. The 
Chancellor agreed that no exception should be provided 29 and 
authorised the drafting of legislation in accordance with the 
Revenue's proposals.30
The detailed arguments put to the Chancellor concerning the need for 
these provisions were entirely couched in terms of revocable 
settlements but the covering note referred to their application to 
cases in which the settlor "can secure for himself or his,wife the 
enjoyment of any of the funds of the settlement."31 With a little 
effort it can be concluded from the Revenue's reference to the 
application of the definition of revocability from the children's 
settlement provisions that settlements in which the settlor retained 
an interest would be caught, but it is perhaps surprising that they 
did not make this more clear. The inland Revenue were either careless 
or devious in not bringing the precise details of their proposals to 
the Chancellor's attention and in advising him that they did "not 
anticipate that you will find any difficulty in accepting this 
particular proposal."33 The apparent reason for their belief was that 
the Chancellor had given a warning on this matter in the debates on 
the third reading of the Finance Bill 1937. However, the only class 
of avoidance which had been brought to his attention at that time 
concerned settlements revocable with consent, and not irrevocable 
settlements under which the settlor retained an interest. Within a 
few days of receiving the Revenue's paper the Chancellor gave his
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approval for the drafting of legislation in accordance with their 
proposals.
Shortly after authorising the drafting the Chancellor had second 
thoughts and sought further clarification, as the following letter 
from Gregg of the Board of inland Revenue to Parliamentary counsel 
indicates.
"I was summoned suddenly for an audience with the chancellor at 
6 p.m. and was cross-examined by him for over an hour on what we 
proposed to do as regards surtax on trusts. I shall have to 
write him a note tomorrow outlining our proposals in the light 
of our conversation and I want to have a word with you in the 
morning if you are free before writing the note.
He criticised the application to all trusts of a condition 
similar to Section 21(8)(a) (irrevocability definition of Act of 
1936) on the ground that in an ordinary marriage settlement the 
bride's father would in its terms provide for the funds of the 
settlement to revert to the settlor in the event of the death of 
the married couple without issue. I advised him that marriage 
settlements would not be caught and that if necessary we could 
exclude settlements for valuable consideration whereupon he 
challenged me as to the danger inherent of speaking of "valuable 
consideration"I
Yours in haste (and very muddled in mind)
C J Gregg" 33
The Chancellor was also unhappy with the Revenue's proposal that all 
the income arising under a settlement in which there was a mere 
possibility of reversion of the funds to the settlor was to be treated 
as the settlor's income. Modifications were therefore made so that it 
was only accumulated income which could be so treated.3^ The 
Chancellor thus played a very significant part in determining the 
final form of what is now section 447 ICTA 1970, and this is probably 
in no small measure because he was, as a former practising barrister, 
able to understand the legal details of the complex problems being put 
before him.
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Irrevocable capital Settlements
For a considerable timers the Revenue had been aware of the 
possibility of surtax avoidance through the creation of irrevocable 
capital settlements under which income was accumulated, and they 
therefore took this opportunity to bring the matter to the attention 
of the chancellor. The accumulated income escaped surtax because it
1
did not belong to any individual during the period of accumulation, 
and usually no surtax was payable when it was distributed because it 
was then a capital receipt in the hands of the beneficiary. An 
additional Revenue grievance was that if, under the provisions of any 
will or settlement, income was accumulated for the benefit of any 
person contingently on his attaining some specified age or marrying, 
then relief fran income tax at the standard rate to which that person 
would have been entitled if the income had been deemed to be his 
throughout the period of accumulation could be claimed on the 
happening of the contingency.36
"The Revenue is thus in the extraordinary position that such a 
person may come forward on the contingency happening and claim 
relief from income tax for all the years,•irrespective of time 
limit, during which the income has been accumulated, but though 
the incane is treated as his for relief from the standard rate, 
the individual in question cannot be charged to surtax in 
respect of the same income if its magnitude was such as to 
render him liable to surtax."37
The Revenue admitted to the chancellor that it would be very difficult 
to defend on principle any proposal for the accumulated income to be 
treated as the settlor's, even if the settlor could recover any 
additional surtax from the trust.3B Even in the case of children's 
settlements, where there were fairly strong grounds for treating the 
income as that of the parent, an exception had been provided for 
accumulated income, and thus other settlements were all the more
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strongly entitled to such an exception. It seems that the provision 
of a let-out for the accumulated income of children's settlements made 
it impossible for the Revenue to argue that the settlor should be 
charged on accumulated income in other settlements. It was necessary 
for them to find sane other more acceptable principle which could be 
applied on a logical basis and which would enable them to obtain 
surtax on the accumulated income.
They therefore argued that a sound principle would be to charge the 
beneficiary when accumulated income was paid out for his benefit. A 
tax charge at that time could be justified on the grounds that it 
could then be shown that the accumulations were ultimately for his 
benefit. The remedy they suggested was that accumulated income paid 
to the beneficiary should be apportioned over the years in which it 
had been accumulated and assessed on him for those years.39
The Revenue advised the Chancellor that of the four proposals this 
one would evoke the most criticism and opposition.40 The weaknesses 
were that assessments might be made for years which were otherwise 
out of date, and that it could be argued that advantage was being 
taken of the situation for one class of settlement to create a charge 
on another class which was generally bona fide and not usually a 
device for tax avoidance. A memorandum to Parliamentary counsel 
indicates that the Revenue thought it unlikely that the chancellor 
would accept these proposals.41
Given the Revenue's openness about the political difficulties of 
obtaining legislation on the subject, it is not suprising that the
208
Attorney-General told the Revenue of his opposition to their 
p r o p o s a l s .42 as the chancellor also disliked them, the Revenue 
decided to drop the matter.43 The problem was raised again by the 
Revenue in 1965 but they still could find no convincing grounds upon 
which a tax charge on the accumulated income could be based, and no 
action was t a k e n .44 The imposition of additional rate tax on certain 
accumulated income by section 16 of the Finance Act 1973 may well be 
seen by the inland Revenue as a compromise solution.
Irrevocable Annual payment Settlements
The Revenue thought that the treatment of income accumulated in 
irrevocable annual payment settlements was anomalous.45 The trust was 
seen as, in effect, a kind of savings box into which the settlor was 
paying an annual sum to be used for some future purpose. The 
principle they thought was being infringed was that annual savings by 
individuals out of their incane should not be allowed as deductions in 
conputing income.45 a precedent for this existed in the childrens' 
settlement provisions of the Finance Act 1936.47 They therefore 
suggested to the chancellor that annual payments should not be allowed 
as deductions from total incane in computing surtax liability if they 
were being accumulated in the hands of the trustees.48 
The importance of such a provision arose from the fact that any surtax 
payer, (not just those with capital), could adopt this method of 
reducing his surtax liability provided he was prepared to earmark an 
annual sum irrevocably for beneficiaries other than his minor 
children. The Revenue thought that the potential exposure of surtax 
to this form of avoidance was extremely great and their proposals 
accordingly met with little resistance from the chancellor.49 The
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Attorney-General was "rather against the annual payment proposal"50 
but he appears to have changed his mind, and a draft clause was 
prepared.
Settlor Having a Dispositive Power Under an irrevocable Settlement.
A further cause of concern to the inland Revenue were cases in which 
the settlor had totally parted with his funds, but had reserved the 
power to direct the trustees to use the funds for the benefit of such 
beneficiaries, other than himself and his wife, as he might select.
It was apparently common to find that the settlor had stipulated that 
the trustees were to accumulate the income during his life and dispose 
of the funds in accordance with his will.51
The Revenue argued that in such cases the income so accumulated should 
be regarded as the settlor's because the trust was being used by him 
as a surtax free savings box.52 Although initially neither the 
Chancellor nor the Attorney-General objected to this proposal, later, 
the chancellor apparently decided that no action was to be taken.53 
The Revenue seem to have accepted that this battle was lost and the 
matter does not appear to have been raised again on any later reviews 
of the relevant legislation.
Tax Lost Through This Avoidance
The inland Revenue estimated that the loss of tax resulting from all 
four of the devices above was not less than one and half million 
pounds per annum, of which between half a million and three quarters 
of a million pounds related to settlements which were revocable with
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consent and the balance related to irrevocable settlements.5  ^ no 
details were provided to the Chancellor concerning the growth in the 
incidence of these classes of avoidance or the number of cases which 
would be caught by the Revenue's proposals.55
Capital Sums Paid to the Settlor
Despite the fact that the above proposals concerning settlements taken 
together with those in three other unrelated areas, were said by the 
Inland Revenue to complete their programme concerning tax avoidance,55 
events made it necessary for them to hastily bring forward one further 
measure concerning settlements.
The Revenue were aware in 1934 that trustees were sometimes making 
loans to the settlor out of accumulated income but it only occurred 
occasionally.5^ It was probably because of the rarity of such loans 
that no proposals were put forward to the Chancellor in the Revenue's 
original submission. However, their attitude was changed by the 
appearance of an article in "The Spectator" on March 4, 1938 entitled 
"The Art of Tax Dodging" which drew attention to the use of loans to 
the settlor as a device for tax avoidance.
The Revenue realised that if their suggestions regarding irrevocable 
annual payment settlements were enacted, then although the loan device 
would not work in connection with such settlements, irrevocable 
capital settlements would remain untouched. Therefore on March 8,
1938 they put forward a proposal to the Chancellor that in the case of 
any irrevocable settlement, loans made to the settlor were to be 
deemed to be the settlor's income insofar as there was accumulated
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incane to cover the l o a n .58 They were nnot blind to the fact that this 
is a pretty stiff proposition, but we feel that we must advance it for 
the consideration of the Chancellor, so that he may appreciate, not 
only the method of avoidance afforded by loans but the drastic 
character of any remedy designed to check it."59
There is nothing to indicate that the Chancellor found any difficulty 
in accepting the Revenue's proposed remedy, even though they 
themselves thought it to be so severe. The lack of any detailed paper 
fran the Revenue to argue the case for the introduction of their 
proposals may well have been a major contribution to the legislation 
being illogical and faulty and consequently the subject of scathing 
judicial criticism.80
THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S DRAFT
In the field of taxation it is most unusual for the Lord chancellor to 
attempt to influence the detailed form of the legislation. However, 
he drafted a clause to prevent surtax avoidance by means of trusts and 
submitted them along with accompanying notes to the chancellor of the 
Exchequer, who on April 1, passed them on to the Board of inland 
Revenue.81 They prepared detailed notes for Parliamentary Counsel, 
indicating where the draft went beyond what was required, and the 
major areas it left untouched. The main faults they found were as 
follows
1. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had decided to deal only with 
accumulated income of irrevocable settlements, yet the Lord 
Chancellor's draft went wider than this and caught income arising.
2. The draft would have caught irrevocable accumulation settlements
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for the benefit of minor children, but it had already been decided 
that these should be left untouched.
3. He had not dealt with the problem of revocable settlements except 
for those which could benefit the settlor's family.
4. The Lord chancellor had referred to the need to include measures
to deal with the effect of the Archer-Shee v Garland c a s e . 62 This
was totally unnecessary as the provisions of Section 18 of the
Finance Act 1936 relating to transfers of assets abroad already 
caught the creation of trusts abroad.
All in all the Lord chancellor's suggestions were largely beside the 
point, if not totally irrelevant, and they had no effect whatever on 
the final shape of the legislation.
The Revenue's notes were passed to Parliamentary Counsel with the
following covering note:-
"Here is the retort courteous to Maugham, [the Lord Chancellor] 
which you may amend as you will."63
The precise form of words used in any communication with the Lord 
Chancellor is not available from the files examined but there does not 
appear to have been any further direct intervention by him.
THE CHANCELLOR TAKES ADVICE ON HIS BUDGET SPEECH
The Chancellor took the unusual step64 of circulating extracts of his 
draft budget speech to various people for their comments, including 
the Lord Chancellor, josiah Stamp and a Kings Counsel named A.M. 
Latter. It was to Latter that he turned for advice on the proposals 
concerning settlements, and on April 14, 1938, he sent him a copy of
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the relevant part of his draft speech.65
Latter went carefully through the draft making pencilled alterations 
before returning it to the Chancellor. Virtually every one of his 
suggestions was accepted.66 Latter also provided the Chancellor with 
detailed notes on the difficulties he could foresee with the 
implementation of some of the proposals. He quite obviously had a 
thorough grasp of the subject, and each of his ccmments was given 
serious consideration by the draftsman. However, Latter was not 
provided with a
copy of the draft clauses and therefore some of his suggestions merely 
reflected the lack of detail in the Chancellor's proposed statement.
He was, like the Revenue, in favour of charging surtax on 
accumulations of income in capital settlements, but the Chancellor had 
already decided that that was an area which he would not touch "at any 
pate at present."6?
The importance of this extraordinary, informal consultation process is 
that the Chancellor seems to have believed that there were advantages 
in having trusted outside advisers to consider the complex problems 
with which he was trying to grapple. The process helped to ensure 
that all aspects of these problems had been fully considered and no 
doubt resulted in some improvements, if not in the legislation itself, 
at least in the Chancellor's understanding of what his civil servants 
were asking him to approve. The only criticism is that he did not 
take the matter further and allow consultation on the draft 
legislation so that it could be altered before it became encumbered by 
parliamentary procedures. Perhaps the provisions governing loans to
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settlors would not have been subjected to such severe criticism, (see 
Chapter 11), had the consultation been extended.
DRAFTING, PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS 
The drafting process began on March 11, 1938, when Parliamentary 
Counsel sent his first draft to the Inland Revenue for comment.
Because of MP's previous complaints about the incomprehensibility of 
legislation of this type, all the machinery provisions were inserted 
in a separate schedule so that there was no referential legislation.68
There were four major provisions concerning settlements in the Finance 
Bill 1938, and all of them are still in operation in largely the same 
form as originally enacted.
1) Clause 32 (1) and (2),(the equivalent of what is now ICTA 1970 
section 445 and 446 respectively), dealt with revocable income 
settlements and revocable capital settlements.
2) Clause 32 (3), (the predecessor of ICTA 1970 section 447), 
dealt with settlements where the settlor retained an interest.
3) Clause 33, (the predecessor of what is now ICTA 1970 section
450), dealt with the disallowance of deductions from total 
incane in respect of annual payments by the settlor where those 
annual payments were not distributed by the recipient 
trustees.
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4) Clause 34, (the equivalent of what is now ICTA. 1970 section
451), dealt with capital sums paid to the settlor where there 
was accumulated income in the settlement.69
Various supplementary provisions were included to deal with such 
matters as definitions, rights of recovery for the settlor and 
let-outs for certain situations under which the settlor might with 
good reason obtain a benefit from the settled property.
Much of the groundwork in connection with basic definitions and the 
tests of irrevocability had been covered in the Finance Act of 1936 
and this may explain why there were far fewer amendments put down and 
far less parliamentary debate than there had been on the less 
extensive childrens' settlement provisions in 1936.
Each of the clauses were drafted, discussed with the inland Revenue
and put through the Parliamentary procedure at the same time, but they
have been dealt with separately below for the sake of clarity. A copy
■ *
of each clause, as introduced, is in Appendix E2 and a copy of the 
legislation is in Appendix E3.
Clause 32
This clause dealt with two distinct but related classes of case. 
Firstly it applied to settlements which were wholly or partly 
revocable under any circumstances whatsoever, and secondly to 
settlements which contained provisions under which there was a 
possibility of funds reverting to the settlor or his spouse.
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In the case of revocable settlements, sub-section 1, (which dealt with 
annual payment settlements), and sub-section 2, (which dealt with 
capital settlements), provided that all the income, irrespective of 
distribution, was to be treated as the settlor*s. However, no such 
deeming was to apply where any power of revocation could not be 
exercised within six years of the time the first annual payment was 
made, (income settlements), or the time property first became 
comprised in the settlement, (capital settlements).70
Where the settlement was such that funds could revert to the settlor 
or his spouse, sub-section 3 specified that any undistributed income 
was to be treated as the settlor*s.^1 However, certain cases were 
excluded from the deeming process by the proviso to sub-section 4.
The remainder of the clause dealt with certain incidental provisions 
and specified that the whole clause was to take effect for surtax 
purposes from 1937/38 and for standard rate purposes from 1938/39. By 
this means the retrospection threatened by the chancellor in 1937 was 
achieved.
There were few problems with the drafting of sub sections 1 and 2.
Ihis was probably due to the fact that the basic proposition was 
simple - if there was any power of revocation under which the settlor 
could obtain the benefit of the funds settled, then the income was to 
be deemed to be his. There were to be no exceptions and so there were 
no difficulties with "line drawing".72 However, the review of 
possible further loopholes which might arise from the introduction of 
these provisions was extremely thorough and seem to indicate a far
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more cynical view than had been taken in 1922 of the extreme measures 
which might be adopted to avoid tax.
One area where opinion was divided was the question of whether the 
settlor should be deemed to have retained an interest in income for 
the purposes of sub-section 3 where incane or assets could become 
payable to his or her widow or widower. In the end it was decided to 
exclude such a situation from the provisions’^  and it is surprising 
therefore that in the case of Vestey's Executors and vestey v. CIR in 
193974 the Revenue should have argued that the word "wife" included 
the settlor's widow for these purposes. The House of Lords decided 
that it did not.
Another -question which exercised the minds of the Revenue and the 
draftsman was whether sub-section 3 should apply to protective 
trusts. The children's settlement provisions had provided a let-out 
for such trusts, but the difference in this case was that there was a 
"considerable possibility that the creation of a protective trust will 
make it possible that the settlor may be one of those persons who may 
have incane paid to him ...."75 The Revenue were concerned because 
protective trusts were a very common feature of settlements and 
objections would be raised unless some special exemption was allowed. 
Without an exemption a settlor, with no intention other than that of 
providing an advantage to a beneficiary, might find that in certain 
events settlement incane would be treated as his.76 if, however, an 
exemption was granted, then it would have been possible for a settlor 
to select some beneficiary over whom he had sufficient influence to 
enable him to induce that beneficiary to bring the protective trust
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into operation. The result of this would be that the settlor might be 
one of the persons in whose favour that trust could be operated.77 
The draftsman's view of protective trusts was that so long as the 
first trust, (the trust mentioned in section 33(1)(i) of the Trustee 
Act 1925) subsisted, the income held on that trust would have to be 
distributed, and it could not therefore be caught by sub-section 3 of 
the clause. However, once the first trust had failed, he believed 
that the income would then to be caught by the clause and that 
therefore it was unnecessary to provide a let-out for protective 
trusts.78 This view seemed to attain general acceptance without 
further discussion and hence there was no exception for protective 
trusts in sub-section 4.
Parliamentary Counsel was concerned about the position where a married 
settlor had made a settlement under which, on the death of the wife, 
part of the income was to be paid to the husband and the remainder was 
to be applied for the benefit of the children, because in such a case 
the let-out in sub-section 4 paragraph (c) would not apply. Although 
the draftsman argued that such cases should be excluded fron the 
provisions, the Inland Revenue disagreed and as the draftsman did not 
press the point, no change was m a d e .79
The question of marriage settlements attracted the attention of the 
Scottish Law Officers, because under Scots Law, by virtue of the 
doctrine of radical right, the funds comprised in any marriage 
settlement would fall to be held for behoof of the spouse from whcm 
they were derived in the event of failure of the matrimonial purpose 
through, for example, death or divorce. Although they advised the
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draftsman that sub-clause (3) would apply to every marriage 
settlement, the problem was not specially provided for in the 
legislation.80
Discussions on the drafting thus resulted in few changes and the 
Parliamentary process was almost entirely concerned with the 
retrospective effect of the clause.8^ The combined effect of the two 
provisos to sub-section 7 was to ensure that for surtax purposes the 
income was deemed to be the settlor's for 1937/38, but that 
nevertheless, it was still treated as the beneficiary's for the 
purposes of relief from standard rate tax. By this means the 
retrospective effect of the clause was limited to surtax. This 
element of retrospectivity only applied to clause 32 and not to the 
other clauses affecting settlements.
The MP, Sir William Brass, was so perturbed by the restrospection that 
he arranged to meet the chancellor, who discussed the matter with him 
and asked him to confer with the Board of Inland Revenue.82 According 
to their notes of the meeting with him88 on June 15, Brass had himself 
entered into four settlements in 1937 to provide for needy 
relatives,8  ^ and they all included a power of revocation with the 
consent of certain specified persons. The kinds of argument used by 
Brass are recorded in the Revenue's notes.
"He was very vehement in protesting against the unfairness of 
denying him a deduction in respect of the annual payments for 
surtax purposes.... As the law stood when he entered into these 
agreements he was entitled to a deduction. He was not a tax 
dodger and the chancellor's speech about tax dodging last year 
was not addresssed to him and so on."85
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Brass quoted the Chancellor as agreeing with him that it was not fair 
that in his circumstances he should be caught, but admitted that he 
had been challenged as to how deserving cases could be differentiated 
from others.86 He had already thought out a solution to this 
difficulty by the time he approached the Revenue. His remedy was to 
insert a proviso to sub-section 1 to the effect that if any deed 
contained a power of revocation and the settlement was amended in 
1938/39 so as to become completely irrevocable, the provisions would 
not apply in computing surtax liability for 1937/38.87 The Revenue's 
notes indicate that Brass's suggestion was of the kind they would have 
recommended to the chancellor had he thought it necessary to protect 
certain bona fide classes of revocable settlement.88
By June 13, 1938, the Chancellor had received only five written 
representations of protest concerning clause 32.89 The Revenue 
appear to have been surprised90 that only three of them related to the 
effect of the clause on deeds in favour of charities, because a letter 
in "The Times" from Lord Queensberry on May 27, had drawn attention to 
the fact that many charitable deeds would be affected. At first, the 
Revenue were against giving in to such pressure, arguing that 
revocable covenants were really voluntary payments and were in effect 
free gifts made frcm year to year.91 They drafted replies for the 
Chancellor based on this view, but advised him not to issue them until 
he had seen how things developed at the Committee Stage.92
Immediately after the meeting with Brass, the Revenue's attitude 
altered, as the following extract shows.
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"A lot can be said in support of the Brass proposal for we must 
admit that where a taxpayer binds himself to pay the annuity for 
seven years certain, the annuity qualifies as a deduction in 
computing his total income and it is difficult to disallow a 
deduction for last year on the grounds that the settlement was 
then revocable if the taxpayer is prepared this year to make it 
irrevocable so that it will certainly be paid for seven years 
including last year."^3
The Revenue pointed out to the draftsman that it would be "a perfectly 
complete answer in the House ... to say that if the deed is made 
irrevocable it will be treated so for the year 1937/38."94 Thus when 
Brass put down his amendment for consideration at the committee stage 
there was no impediment to accepting it. He proposed that if the 
settlor released any power of revocation in an annual payment 
settlement within three months of the Finance Bill becoming law then
m
sub-section 1 would not apply. Two other amendments were put down of 
a similar character to that of Brass; one extended the let-out to 
sub-section 2 as well as sub-section 1; the other provided that if by 
December 31 1938, any power of revocation or any provisions under 
which funds might revert to the settlor were cancelled then clause 32 
should not apply at all. The Revenue indicated to ministers that 
there was a good deal to be said in favour of some concession on the 
lines of all of the proposed amendments, but advised that if a 
concession was to be made it should be introduced at the report stage 
because of the technical deficiencies of the current amendments.
Only Brass's amendment was debated in any detail, and in moving it he 
illustrated the problem by reference to "four settlements that have 
been made by a friend of mine. "95 He argued his case persuasively and 
created the feeling that entirely reasonable and charitable settlors
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would be caught through being unaware of the chancellor's warning in
1937.
"All my life I have been told that ignorance of the law ... is 
no excuse, but now I am being told that ignorance of the 
Chancellor's speech is no excuse. I think that that is going 
rather too far."81
He had obviously researched previous parliamentary commentary 
concerning retrospective tax legislation, and was able to refer to an 
attack on such retrospection made in 1922 by the current Minister for 
the Coordination of D e f e n c e .97 This enabled him rather pointedly to 
suggest to the Chancellor that he should discuss the matter with his 
fellow cabinet m e m b e r . 98
There was considerable support in the House for Brass's amendment, and 
while all those speaking in favour of it expressed their abhorrance of 
avoidance, they suggested that there were many bona fide cases which 
ought to be given the opportunity to escape from the clause. In 
particular, it was agreed that many charitable covenants would be 
caught, and that in most cases people would be prepared to make 
amendments to remove the offending p o w e r s .99 various other hard cases 
were put forwardl but Mr Benson, who had been highly critical of the 
restricted scope of the 1936 provisions, believed that the examples 
used showed how hard cases would make bad law, because the 
retrospective effect of the clause would only be confined to. surtax, 
and the hard cases would not have involved a significant surtax 
liability, in his view, the provision of a let-out would apply to 
many settlements which had been "definitely evasive in their 
object".2
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In reply, the chancellor of the Exchequer defended his action in 
issuing the warning in 1937, and expressed the view that it had 
greatly limited the use of such schemes. He did, however, agree that 
there were undoubtedly cases which would be caught which were 
"perfectly understandable, straightforward and honourable,"5 but he 
thought it impossible to draw a workable distinction between the 
meritorious case and other settlements. He suggested that the 
practical way of dealing with this problem was to say to settlors:
"If you do not use this power of revocation and if you are 
prepared now to turn your settlement into a really irrevocable 
settlement, these are such indications of your real intention to 
get within the spirit of the provisions of the law, that you 
ought not to be retrospectively hit."4
However, in those cases where the powers of revocation had been used
already to get money back into the settlor's hands, the chancellor
believed that they "ought to be shown [no] mercy, because it was not a
genuine and straightforward settlement."5 He had, in effect, decided
that he would prefer to avoid doing an injustice to people who had
acted bona fide than make them suffer because others had not, and he
therefore promised to introduce an amendment on report.
At the report stage, a carefully guarded let-out from retrospection 
was introduced which became Part II of Schedule 3 to the Finance Act
1938. Paragraph 1 provided that annual payment settlements made 
before the Budget date were to be excepted if any of the following 
conditions were satisfied:
(a) the settlor had released his power of revocation within three 
months from the date of the passing of the Act and had not 
received any consideration in respect of that release; or
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(b) annual payments were made for a continuous period of seven years; 
or
(c) the settlement had been revoked within three months of passing the 
Act, and a new irrevocable settlement had been put in its place.
Capital settlements were dealt with by paragraph 2 in a similar way to 
annual payment settlements, but in both cases a further condition was 
imposed by paragraph 3 such that the let-out would not apply if, since 
April 5, 1937, the settlor had received any capital sum, either from 
the trustees of the settlement or any company connected with it. This 
stipulation was included to ensure that nobody who had made use of the 
avoidance methods struck at by clause 34 could claim that 
retrospection did not apply.
Mr Benson, for the Opposition, argued that the chancellor was giving 
in to back-bench pressure in providing a considerable and unwarranted 
concession. He was fiercely critical of providing a let-out for a 
seven year settlement of income which had a revocation clause, because 
in his opinion "it is merely an annual gift cast in the form of a 
settlement ... [so that] you can set it against your income for tax 
purposes."6
All the non-government amendments put down for consideration at the 
committee stage concerning matters other than retrospection were not 
moved. One of the amendments was to the effect that any settlement 
made for valuable consideration, or as part of family arrangements, or 
by a person under the age of 25, should be excluded from the clause. 
The Revenue could not understand why the settlor's age-should be
225
relevant and thought that the relaxation in favour of marriage 
settlements in sub-section 4 covered all the classes of settlement 
entered into for valuable consideration which were worthy of special 
treatment. They pointed out to ministers that a concession in favour 
of settlements on members of the settlor’s family would make the whole 
clause virtually useless. Another amendment attempted to exclude any 
resulting trust arising by reason of the failure of the trusts of the 
settlement. A modified version of this amendment was put down at the 
report stage but was dismissed on the grounds that it would have 
created a very large loophole, because the settlor would be able to 
make a settlement giving a contingent interest to an aged beneficiary 
and provide that the income was to be accumulated for a period of 
years, and so be practically certain that the beneficiary would die 
within the period for accumulation and that the whole undistributed 
income would revert to him under the resulting trust without any 
surtax liability.7 The only government amendment involved a minor 
drafting point.
At the report stage an attempt was made to substitute an age limit of 
30 instead of 25 for the let-out for funds reverting to the settlor on 
the death of the beneficiary under a specified age. The mover of the 
amendment contended that there were a very great number of settlements 
in which an age of 30 was laid down. However, the Board of inland 
Revenue had advised ministers that such settlements were quite 
exceptional and that usually where income was being accumulated for 
minor children, the age limit would be fixed at 25 or some lower age. 
The Solicitor-General resisted the amendment on these grounds and 
argued that the drawing of the line at the age of 25 was very
reasonable.8
226
Representations had been made to the Chancellor to the effect that 
paragraph (d) of sub-section 4 did not go far enough, in that it did 
not provide an exception where the beneficiary, on obtaining the age 
of 25, would not obtain any title to the accumulated income, but would 
only have a life interest in future income.9 The chancellor had 
agreed that this type of case should be excepted, and a government 
amendment was put down at the report stage to add a further proviso to 
sub-section 4 letting out any case in which income was being 
accumulated for a beneficiary under the age of 25, irrespective of his 
interest on attaining that age.
Overall, therefore, there were three amendments made to clause 32., and 
the only major relaxation obtained was the introduction of 
transitional provisions under which settlements could be modified so 
that the settlor would not be caught by the retrospective surtax 
element of the clause.
Clause 33
The aim of this clause was to prevent a surtax deduction being allowed 
for annual payments made by a settlor to the trustees of an 
irrevocable settlement to the extent that those annual payments were 
accumulated by the trustees.10 It was thought that there was no 
logical reason why the settlor should not obtain a deduction for 
annual payments to trustees which were paid out year by year to a 
beneficiary, because had the settlor made these payments direct to the 
beneficiary under a deed creating a charge on his income for a term 
exceeding six years, he would have obtained a deduction for surtax 
purposes. Thus, the clause only prevented annual payments being
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stored up surtax free in a trust, and was an application of the 
principle that no deduction should be allowed for savings in computing 
total income.
The conversion of these aims into a draft clause seems to have caused 
very little problem for Parliamentary Counsel. After only his second 
attempt, the inland Revenue were able to agree the clause subject to 
one final modification to ensure that annual payments made to foreign 
companies would be caught.^
Sub-section 1 contained the basic deeming provision for undistributed 
income, but in order to prevent any double charge, it excluded any 
income which was treated as the settlor’s under clause 32 from being 
counted as his again under clause 33.
Sub-section 2 provided that annual payments made by a settlor to a 
company connected with the settlement were to be treated as made to 
the trustees so that such payments would also be ineligible for 
deduction from income for surtax purposes, it was necessary to have 
such an extension to the basic provisions in order to catch 
arrangements under which the settlor interposed a company, (or a chain 
of companies), between himself and the trustees, and made annual 
payments to the company in return for an allotment of shares which 
were then transferred to the settlement so that the annual payments 
could be accumulated and eventually paid out as capital to the 
trustees on the liquidation of the company.
The Board's notes for ministers concerning sub-section 3 indicate that
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it was designed to ensure that the subsequent distribution of 
accumulated annual payments which had already been treated as the 
settlor's income would be counted as part of the beneficiary's
income.
Sub-section 4 ensured that the clause only applied to post-Budget 
settlements and existing settlements made irrevocable after the Budget 
date, while sub-section 5 treated a husband and wife as one person.14
In their briefing of ministers for the parliamentary discussion of the
clause, the Revenue warned of possible criticism on the grounds that
it hit the salary earner as opposed to the person who could make an
irrevocable settlement of capital.15 Their suggested answer to any
such criticism was that a person who was able to put aside a capital
sum had built up that sum out of his taxed income.15 The
over-simplification of such an argument had been pointed out in the
debates concerning a similar provision made in the 1936 Act in
connection with settlements on minor children,1? but in the event,
%
this time the point was not raised.
There was little parliamentary debate on the clause, and the only 
amendment put down was at the committee stage where Mr Benson for the 
Opposition attempted to extend its operation so that it would apply to 
all settlements no matter when they were made. The Revenue advised 
ministers to resist this amendment on the grounds that the settlor had 
no power to terminate the settlement and it would therefore have been 
harsh to have imposed an additional tax liability on him.15 
Furthermore, they believed that settlements within clause 33 were
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quite different from those under which the taxpayer still retained a 
power to enjoy the income, because in cases solely within clause 33 
the settlor had parted completely with the annual payment. 19 Mr 
Benson's amendment was really untenable and he withdrew it without 
fuss on realising that he had misinterpreted its object in thinking it 
was designed to strengthen a clause of the 1936 Act dealing with 
accumulation trusts for the benefit of ch i l d r e n . 20
Clause 34
The drafting of clause 34 was a much more hurried and less well 
thought out affair than the drafting of the other clauses, because it 
was not until March 1938 that the Revenue decided that the avoidance 
at which the clause was aimed ought to be blocked in the Finance Bill 
of that year. It was only press articles drawing attention to the 
various devices in the few months prior to the Budget that led the 
Inland Revenue to make a late request to the Chancellor for 
legislative action. The type of avoidance at which the clause was 
aimed showed a sudden potential for rapid increase, and although its 
simplest form had been known of by the inland Revenue for a number of 
years, some extremely complex arrangements were discovered by them 
during the course of the drafting process.21
The basic feature of the avoidance was that accumulated income was 
used to make non-taxable payments to the settlor. Usually, in simple 
cases, loans were made to the settlor which created a debt on his 
part, but the beneficiary of the trust to which the amount was owed 
would often be a member of the settlor's family and also a beneficiary 
under his will. Normally therefore, the repayment of the loan would
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make no difference to the beneficiary as he would receive the repaid 
loan from the trustees but with the amount received from the estate 
being correspondingly reduced, in effect the scheme enabled the 
settlor to enjoy the income of the settlement during his life without 
having a surtax liability in respect of it.
There were two main variants on the theme of direct loans to the 
settlor. Firstly, there were cases where the settlor transferred 
securities to a company for a consideration which for a short time was 
unpaid (say £100,000) and then settled a small sum (say £100) on trust 
with the income to be accumulated during the settlor's lifetime. The 
next step would be for the settlor to make a loan (say £99,900) to the 
trustees, who would use it, together with the amount settled, to 
subscribe for shares in the company to which the securities were 
originally transferred. By this means the company acquired the sum 
necessary to pay the settlor for the securities he had transferred to 
it. The company would subsequently pay dividends to the trustees 
corresponding to the income from the securities it had acquired from 
the settlor, and the trustees would use those dividends to repay the 
settlor's loan. As a variation on this scheme, cases had been found 
where the securities were transferred for an inflated consideration 
which the loan to the trustees covered. The effect of this variation 
was to extend the period over which the settlor would receive the 
income of the trust in repayment of his loan.
The second device took the form of the settlor selling assets to the 
trustees at a figure greatly in excess of their real value under an 
agreement by which the purchase price would be paid by instalments
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over a number of years, in effect this created an artificial loan to 
the extent of the excessive consideration and that loan was repaid by 
the trustees out of the income of the settlement.
These more complex schemes had only come to the attention of the 
Inland Revenue shortly before the drafting of the Finance Bill clauses 
began. The Parliamentary counsel file contains a copy of a deed dated 
April 7, 1936, which a covering note indicates had "been supplied to 
us"22 These methods of avoidance had therefore started at least a 
couple of years earlier without the Revenue realising it, and it 
appears that there was someone outside the inland Revenue who passed 
the deed to them in order to-bring the matter to their attention. The 
terms of the deed of interest in the present context were that the 
trustees were given power to borrow money and to repay it out of 
capital or income, and that any money borrowed was to become part of 
the trust funds without the trustees having any personal liability in 
respect of it. It was these basic features of the deed which made it 
possible for the settlor to exploit the settlement to obtain a tax 
advantage.
The person analysing the deed23 believed that:
"legislation upon the lines of attacking loans by the settlor 
to the trustee of the settlement, or companies which then 
pass on those loans to the trustees of the settlement, does not 
seem to me to go to the root of the matter. Further, such 
legislation would be exceedingly complicated ....,l2^
The writer of the note believed that the essential feature of all the
offending transactions lay in the fact that the terms of the
settlement provided for the trustees to borrow money and repay it out
of income, and he suggested that there was no proper reason for
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trustees to do this. On these grounds he argued that legislation 
should be drafted which merely attacked settlements which contained 
the offending powers. This method was thought to avoid the 
complications of defining the relationship of the settlor to the 
settlement, and the settlor to any company which lent money to the 
trustees. Two clauses based upon this manner of attack were 
prepared2  ^but unfortunately do not appear on any of the files 
examined. What is clear, however, is that they must have been thought 
totally inappropriate as there is no further reference to them.
Because of the very late stage at which it was decided to include 
provisions to catch capital sums paid out of accumulated income, the 
Inland Revenue had hardly given any thought to the detail of the 
required legislation by the time the draftsman sent then his first 
draft on March 11, 1938. That draft merely referred to the lending of
money to the settlor by the trustees and would not have caught the
more complex schemes. The Revenue's response was to suggest a 
complete revision which bore little relationship to the original but 
which was wide enough to catch loans made indirectly and loans through 
companies. The basic provisions of the Revenue's draft did bear some 
relationship to the eventual legislation but did not require the 
grossing up of the sums paid to the settlor and did not deal with the
position where the capital sums paid exceed the accumulated income. A
computational exanple was provided to the draftsman indicating what 
the Revenue was seeking to charge in cases where the capital sum 
exceeded the accumulated income, but this approach confused the 
draftsman who was looking for words in the draft legislation which 
achieved the objectives shown in the computational example. No such
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words were there because the Revenue wanted him to draft the 
appropriate words. The draftsman readily admitted that he did not 
understand the following example provided by the Revenue.
Example Provided by the Revenue to the Draftsman
Loan
Year 1 1,000
charge 500
Year 2 Nil
charge 500
Year 3 Nil
charge Nil
Year 4 1,500
charge 1,000
Source:- Parliamentary Counsel Finance Bill 1938 File, P4041
Parliamentary counsel's main criticism of the Revenue's draft centred on
the definition of accumulated income as being income arising under a 
settlement to which no person was beneficially entitled. He argued that 
almost always someone would be beneficially entitled because even if one
Accumulated income
500
500
500
500
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person was beneficially entitled subject to a contingency, he and the 
person who would take in default of the contingency might together 
constitute the persons who were entitled to that income. Clearly the 
legislation had to approach the problem by reference to undistributed 
income arising under the settlement.
parliamentary Counsel*s next draft was very largely a development of 
his original, but it did take into account the representations of the 
Inland Revenue by extending the provisions to catch loans made by a 
company to the settlor where the trustees of the settlement were 
members of the company. This latter proposal was too wide and the 
next draft limited it to companies whose income had been apportioned 
to the 'trustees under the close company legislation in the same tax 
year as the capital payment to the settlor.26 The fourth draft 
extended the clause to catch repayments of loans as well as the making 
of loans, but still only caught indirect arrangements through close 
companies where income had actually been apportioned to the company.
It was not until the fifth draft that the provisions were altered so 
that the company merely had to be a close company connected with the 
settlement to bring indirect arrangements within the clause.
As each further draft was prepared so the inland Revenue realised that 
there were other matters which had to be dealt with and refinements to 
be made. For example, the income available had to be reduced by the 
tax on that income, and the capital sum had to be grossed up; the 
provisions had to be extended to include foreign companies; and income 
already caught by the other settlement anti-avoidance provisions had 
to be excluded. Even at the end of April the draftsman was still 
having great difficulties as the following extract shows.
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"I [have] tried to find some formula for equating the 
income arising under the settlements with the loans.
I am afraid that I not only found this very complicated 
but utterly beyond my mathematical powers. Would you 
mind taking this case and trying to invent some formula 
which will fit it?"2?
Not only did the draftsman have difficulties putting together this
clause but the inland Revenue lacked time to think it through fully.
Various last minute amendments were made28 and doubts expressed,2  ^and
the whole drafting process creates an impression of pressure of time,
confusion and lack of background research. It is perhaps not
surprising therefore that the legislation resulting from this process
was subjected to severe judicial criticism. (See chapter 11.) The
whole episode is a prime example of the dangers of introducing complex
anti-avoidance provisions without adequate planning and time for
considering all the details.
Sub-section 1 specified that any capital sum paid to the settlor was 
to be treated as his income for the tax year in which it was paid, to 
the extent that it fell within the amount of incane available at the 
end of that year. Where the capital sum exceeded the income available 
then, up to the amount of the income available at the end of the 
following year, the excess was to be treated as his income for that 
following year, and so on for succeeding years until all of the 
capital payment had been treated as the settlor's incane. Although 
this was the stated intent of sub-section 1 according to the Board of 
Inland Revenue's notes on clause 34, 30 subsequent judicial comment 
indicates that it did not achieve its objective.31
The amount of the undistributed income at the end of a tax year was
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defined in sub-section 2 as the aggregate amount of any undistributed 
income of that and any previous year, less certain deductions. Those 
deductions were set out in paragraphs (a) to (e) and represented 
income which had already been deemed to be the settlor's under the 
clause; income deemed to be the settlor's already under clauses 32 and 
33? and the amount of tax at the standard rate on the undistributed 
income, (after deduction of income which had been taken into account 
under clause 32 and 33). The basic idea, therefore, was to ensure 
that there was no duplication of charge on the same income.
The more complex methods of avoidance were caught by sub-section 3. 
This provided that any capital sum paid to the settlor by a company or 
other corporate body connected with the settlement was to be treated 
as having been paid by the trustees so that it would fall within 
sub-section 1. Thus, sub-section 3 caught the situation where the 
settlor transferred investments to a company in return for an 
allotment of shares, and then settled those shares on trustees, while 
the company paid no dividends and used its income to .pay a capital 
sum, (usually a loan), to the settlor.32
The amount which was to be treated as the settlor's income was, by 
virtue of sub-section 4, the gross equivalent of the amount to which 
the deeming process was applied. Grossing up was needed in order to 
take account of the fact that the trustees would be making the capital 
payment out of taxed income.
The clause was to apply to all existing and future settlements, 
whether made in the UK or abroad, but only in respect of capital sums 
paid after April 5, 1938 out of income accumulated after that date.
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Not only was a loan or repayment of a loan to be caught, but also any 
other sum which was not treated as income in the hands of the 
recipient and which was not paid for full consideration in money or 
money's worth. The reference to full consideration was aimed at 
artificial arrangements for the payment of inflated amounts for 
over-valued assets and was not intended to catch genuine situations 
where the settlor sold investments to the trustees at their market 
value. Any capital sum paid to the settlor in the exceptional 
circumstances specified in the proviso to clause 32(4), (bankruptcy of 
a beneficiary, death of the parties to a marriage settlement or death 
of a beneficiary under the age of 25), was not deemed to be income.
A husband and wife were to be treated as one, so that, for example, if 
the settlement was made by the husband, any capital sum received by 
his wife would.be caught. It was thought that such treatment would 
prevent any artificial arrangements betweeen husband and wife which 
might otherwise escape the clause.
At the committee stage there were only three amendments put down, and 
at the report stage there were none. The amendment put down by Mr 
Spens to provide a let-out for settlements made prior to the Finance 
Act which were for valuable consideration, or part of a family 
arrangement or involving a person under the age of 25, was not moved, 
and similar comments apply to it as applied to the analogous amendment 
put down under clause 32. 33
The sole Government amendment related to a modification to sub-section 
2(a) so that not all capital sums paid would reduce undistributed
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incane, only capital sums paid to the settlor. The reason for this 
change was that without it the trustees could pay capital sums to 
other persons, and such sums would have reduced the amount of 
undistributed income available to be deemed the settlor1s.34
The only amendment debated concerned an attempt to exclude from the 
clause any loan to the settlor where he had mortgaged or charged 
property as security. It was proposed that this exclusion should be 
up to an amount not exceeding two thirds of the value of the mortgaged 
property. The intention was to exclude genuine loans for which 
adequate security had been given, but as the Board of Inland Revenue 
pointed out, this would have defeated the main object of the clause, 
because a person wishing to avoid tax would be willing to provide 
such security for a loan if he could thereby ensure that clause 34 
would not apply and that he could enjoy the accumulated income without 
a surtax liability.35 . The Attorney-General explained that the need 
for the clause was
"that certain people have set up machinery under which the 
income goes in at one slot and the same amount of money comes 
out below, but when it comes out below, they say it is a capital 
payment, whereas they deduct from their total income return what 
they have put into the slot above."36
Whilst he was sympathetic with the view that it would be unfair to
exclude genuine loan transactions, he did not think that the
amendment, as drawn, would achieve that end, and the Inland Revenue
advised him that "there is really no means of distinguishing the
genuine loan from the loan obtained as part of a tax avoidance
scheme."37 The Attorney-General was careful to point out that anyone
who genuinely desired to raise money would have to be careful not to
raise it from the trustees of a settlement in which income had not
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been fully distributed. As the Revenue said, "it is really no part of 
the function of trustees to be providing loans for the settlor, and 
there is no particular hardship if, in future, the settlor ... has to 
look elsewhere for his l o a n ."38
Clause 35
The main purposes of clause 35 were to set out the relationship 
between the new and the existing settlement provisions; to introduce 
machinery provisions; and to define various words and phrases. The 
terms "settlement" and "settlor" had already been defined in the 
Finance Act 1936, and the draftsman was able to utilise the same 
definitions, with the exclusion of the words "transfer of assets" 
which appeared in the earlier Act. There were, however, a' 
considerable number of matters which required new definitions but none 
of them excited any parliamentary comment.
Although each of the clauses were applicable to any settlement 
wherever it was made, a territorial limitation was set by clause 
35(4), paragraph (a)(i) of which defined incane arising under a 
settlement to include any income chargeable to tax and any income 
which would have been so chargeable had it been received in the UK by 
a person domiciled, resident or ordinarily resident there. Such a 
wide definition was necessary in order to get around the difficulties 
created by perry v Astor, (see chapter 4), which had shown that a 
taxpayer in the UK could transfer foreign securities to a revocable 
foreign trust without the 1922 anti-avoidance provisions applying 
because those provisions only caught income already liable to UK tax 
before the application of the deeming process. Other than the
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inclusion of the word "domicile," there is no difference between the 
definition of income in section 21 (9)(d) of the Finance Act 1936 and 
the 1938 provisions. However, an extension of the meaning of "income 
arising" was applied by paragraph (a)(ii) so that it included any 
income of a body corporate which could be apportioned to the trustees 
under the close company apportionment provisions.40 This enabled 
apportioned income to be treated as undistributed income for the 
purposes of the various settlement clauses of the Finance Bill. The 
Revenue were aware of a large number of cases in which the close 
company apportionment provisions were being avoided by the transfer of 
assets to a company in return for an allotment of shares which were 
immediately settled on trust for beneficiaries having only a 
contingent interest, and in which the settled funds would revert for 
the benefit of the settlor or his spouse in the future.41 Any 
apportionment to the trustees in such a case was to no avail as the 
trustees were not liable to surtax. The extended meaning of income 
arising was an indirect attack on income being accumulated in a close 
company. An amendment to the definition was made at the committee 
stage so that income which could be apportioned direct to a 
beneficiary could be counted as income apportioned to the trustees, 
and hence subjected to the deeming process and treated as the 
settlor*s. The need for this arose from the decision in the case of 
Drew & Sons Ltd., v C.I.R.,42 in which it was held that apportionment 
could be made direct to a beneficiary having a life interest in shares 
in a close company.
A limitation was.placed on the meaning of "income arising" by the 
final part of paragraph (a). It was designed to exclude income of a
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year in which the settlor, on the assumption that he was actually 
entitled to the income, would not be chargeable to tax because of his 
domicile, residence or ordinary residence status. Thus, where he was 
not resident and would not have been chargeable in respect of 
dividends from foreign securities, or where he was not ordinarily 
resident and would not have been chargeable in respect of interest on 
UK government securities, those classes of income would be excluded in 
calculating the amount deemed to be his under the settlement 
provisions.
The rules for determining how much income had not been distributed 
were laid down by sub-section 4(d). This permitted three classes of 
deduction from’the income arising:
(a) any sum paid which formed taxable income in the hands of the
recipient;43 and
(b) expenses properly chargeable to income, (e.g. management and 
administration expenses); and
(c) in the case of charitable trustees, any amount exempted from 
income tax because of its application for charitable purposes.
Government amendments were put down at the committee stage to ensure 
that deductions could not be taken into account more than once. The 
Revenuefs concern was that trustees might pay a salary to a clerk 
which would be taken into account under (a) above, and which would 
also constitute an expense of the trustees falling within deductions 
of class (b). in a similar fashion, trustees of a charity might have 
made payments which fell within class (a) or (b), and in the absence 
of the amendment they could also be deductible as part of the income 
in respect of which tax exemption was available under class (c).
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The only other new concept was that of a body corporate connected with 
a settlement. A wide definition ensured that a body corporate was 
connected with a settlement not only if an apportionment was made to 
the trustees, but also if an apportionment could have been had the 
income not been distributed or had the corporate body been 
incorporated in the UK.44
CONCLUSION
The new Chancellor appears to have been bolder and more knowledgeable 
than his predecessor, and this, in combination with a more aggressive 
and cynical Inland Revenue, seems to have resulted in a much more 
speedy reaction to the problem than the more hesitant approach to the 
1936 provisions. The Chancellor's legal training no doubt was of 
great assistance in ensuring that the clauses he brought forward 
achieved precisely what he wanted, but did not prevent serious 
anomalies slipping into the provisions applying to loans to settlors.
Parliamentary influence on the legislation was very slight and this 
was probably in part due to its extreme complexity. Although the 
Chancellor and the Law Officers were congratulated for having "given 
us extraordinarily limpid and lucid explanations of the different 
clauses ... they were in a favourable position ... for no matter what 
they said nobody was in a position to contradict them.”45
The 1938 legislation, together with the Finance Act 1936 provisions, 
forms the basis of a major part of the current anti-avoidance rules 
concerning settlements. Most of the subsequent changes merely blocked
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loopholes discovered in the existing legislation or made relatively 
minor additions to the existing code. Many of the provisions which 
were to be introduced at a later date merely attacked avoidance 
methods which were known of in 1938 but which were not thought to be 
sufficiently important by the conservative government to require 
legislation. The changes needed to prevent these methods of avoidance 
had to await future Labour Governments.46
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CHAPTER 7
1938-43: THE NEW LEGISLATION HITS ITS TARGETS AND A POSSIBLE
LOOPHOLE IS RETROSPECTIVELY BLOCKED
INTRODUCTION
By 1938 most of the major legislation dealing with avoidance through 
the use of settlements was in place, but initially the general level 
of awareness and understanding of it seems to have been low.
The period is notable in two main respects. Firstly, for the
considerable success the Revenue had in settlement cases brought
before the Courts, and secondly, for the apparent change of attitude
towards tax avoidance brought about by the increased level of
patriotism during the war.
#■
Although the cases the Revenue lost before the courts mainly involved 
relatively unimportant matters, the case of Herbert v CIR^ created 
sufficient doubt as to the efficacy of the settlement provisions in 
cases involving joint settlors to justify the Revenue in requesting 
and obtaining immediate legislation to close any potential loophole. 
Schedule 6 of the Finance Act of 1943 contained the appropriate 
provisions, and although these were expressed to be merely declaratory 
of the existing law, they were retrospective in their effect. The 
Revenue were aware of one case involving a considerable amount of tax 
in which it would have been possible to argue that the joint settlor 
loophole applied, and it is probably for this reason that corrective
245
legislation was introduced with a speed not previously seen in 
connection with the settlement legislation.
DIFFICULTIES IN COMMUNICATING THE CHANGES
In 1938 a circular was issued to all surtax payers drawing attention 
to the settlement provisions of the Finance Act 1938 with the aim of 
helping taxpayers and their advisers to understand how they were 
affected.2 Despite this, and despite the fact- that many of the 
professional journals were carrying lengthy articles explaining the 
general operation of the new rules and advising that adjustments 
should be made to revocable settlements to bring them within the 
let-out of Schedule 3 Part II of the Finance Act 1938, the query 
columns of the journal "Taxation" indicate that many advisers were 
either unaware of, or totally misunderstood, the provisions concerning 
children’s settlements in the Finance Act 1936, and had hardly begun 
to understand the complexities of the 1938 provisions.3 The editor of 
"Taxation" may have realised the existence of this gap in the 
knowledge of his readers because the journal contains many articles on 
the subject and detailed explanations of the basics of the legislation 
whenever a relevant case was decided, even though that case had 
already been fully explained in the "Current Taxation Cases" column.4
With this apparent lack of understanding of the provisions, it is very 
likely that there was no widespread avoidance of them. Because of 
their complexity, it was only the highly skilled tax specialist who 
might successfully attempt to find loopholes.
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THE SUCCESS OF THE PROVISIONS
The statistics in Appendix D4 indicate the great success of the 
provisions attacking transfers of income by parents to their minor 
children, and the number of claims refused gives an indication of how 
poorly understood they were. The writer was unable to find such 
direct evidence of the success of the Finance Act 1938 provisions, but 
indirect evidence of their effectiveness is provided by answers to 
parliamentary questions. In 1940, in reply to a question concerning 
how many people were avoiding tax by making revocable settlements^, 
Captain Crookshank, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, stated 
that he was not in a position to provide statistics as to the 
operation of the changes of the law in either the Finance Acts of 1936 
or 1938, but he was "advised that they have proved generally to be 
effective in checking avoidance of tax by way of settlements of 
income."6
General satisfaction with the state of the anti-avoidance provisions 
concerning income tax and surtax was expressed by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, in moving the second reading of the 
Finance Bill of 1941. Clause 26 of that Bill introduced extremely 
wide powers enabling the Revenue to set aside any transaction or 
transactions whose object was to reduce liability to excess profits 
tax. Consideration had been given as to whether to take similar 
powers to deal with avoidance of income tax and surtax, but it had 
been decided that
"on the whole ... these tax avoidance provisions ... have 
fulfilled their object, and as at present advised I do not 
consider it necessary to arm myself with general powers 
comparable to those I am proposing in the case of excess profits 
tax."7
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The Chancellor made it clear that he intended keeping the matter under 
constant review and that if it was found that wide general powers were 
required he would not hesitate to introduce them with retrospective 
effect.8
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON ATTITUDES TO AVOIDANCE
The outbreak of war in 1939 appears to have marked the beginning of a
considerable change in attitude of the public to tax avoidance. In a
leading article in "Taxation" of April 16, 1938, full support was
given for what was described as the legal avoidance of taxation. The
leading article in the same journal of January 14, 1939, was headed
"Avoidance: The Ethical Aspect" and again gave support to tax
avoidance. It ended:
"One is ... sometimes forced to the conclusion that the sins of 
the taxpayer in exercising any careful scheme of avoidance are 
no greater than those of the State which permits and enforces 
the rigidity of the law ...."9
Avoidance was seen as "perfectly legitimate in any State which
recognises private ownership".^
By March 1941, the tone of the journal had completely changed and 
readers were being advised that it was "the duty of every citizen to 
pay the full measure of all taxation according to the circumstances 
in which it finds him when it is imposed."H There was apparently 
thought to be no justification in attempting to avoid liability as 
the "legal liability of the taxpayer has given place to the moral 
liability; a moral liability which is without parallel in the 
history of taxation."I2. Throughout the war years the journal is 
virtually devoid of references to methods of tax avoidance.
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Not all the technical journals were taking this view. "Taxation 
Practitioner" expressed entirely the opposite opinion. It argued that 
no one needed to have any compunction in advising their clients of any 
legal way to reduce their tax liability, because resources retained in 
a business would more effectively serve the national interests by 
remaining within the business than being diverted to the Exchequer.^
A short article appeared in "Taxation" which expressed amazement at 
such a view being put forward by "the official organ of the Institute 
of Taxation "I5.
The subject was returned to in the leading article in "Taxation" of 
February 17, 1943. This time it was made clear that the views being 
expressed concerning tax avoidance only applied for the duration of 
the war and "when, at last this nightmare of war has passed we may 
revert to our former opinion ...."16
Correspondence was published in "Taxation" both for and against the 
points of view which the journal had put forward in its leading 
articles.1^ Some of the correspondents were totally against the idea 
of accountants acting as a moral conscience on behalf of their 
clients. They believed that it was the responsibility of the 
Chancellor with his legal advisers, to put their intentions into 
words, and there was no duty on the part of a tax consultant to hold 
the balance between his client and the State on any ethical grounds.
The debate was also taking place in seme of the newspapers, and the 
leading article in "The Times" of February 12, 1943 argued that 
under war conditions it was the duty of every citizen to
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recognise his moral obligation to pay the full measure of taxation 
due. Lord Quickswood responded by expressing the view that it was a 
good thing that "human ingenuity can always find a way by which the 
minority can escape from tyrannical imposts."19 (The standard rate of 
incane tax had increased fran a pre-war level of 5s 6d, to 10s, and 
the top rate of surtax from 8s 3d to 9s 6d, with a reduction in the 
income level above which the maximum was paid fran £50,000 to £20,000.)
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion and the increased 
attractions of tax avoidance due to the severe increases in tax 
rates,it is likely that anti-avoidance legislation was not put to a 
severe test during the war years, because many tax advisers would not 
have canvassed tax avoidance schemes, and many taxpayers would not 
have taken up such schemes even if they had been told of their 
existence. However, despite the change of attitude and the generally 
satisfactory way in which the legislation was thought to be operating, 
the Inland Revenue remained vigilant for new methods of avoidance 
involving settlements and not only did Claims Branch and the Research 
Division remain active in their review of unusual cases,21 but also 
they began investigating cases in which they suspected that the 
settlement would not be implemented. (See Appendix FI)
SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS OF 1938-1943
In the period from April 1938 to the end of March 1943, 23 cases were 
heard in the courts concerning the settlement provisions, and the 
Inland Revenue were successful in all but the following 5 of them: 
Chamberlain v CIR, (1943), 25 TC 326; Whigham v CIR, (1941), 24 TC 41; 
CIR v Fitte, (1943) 25 TC 345; Mauray v CIR, (1943), 26 TC 96; and
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Herbert v CIR, (1943), 25 TC 93. Two of the cases which the Revenue 
lost, (Mauray v CIR and Whigham v CIR), were of little long term 
inportance to them as they concerned parts of the 1922 settlement 
legislation which had been superseded by wider provisions in 1936, and 
the Fitte case was "a pure question of construction of very special 
deeds".22 The Revenue’s failure to win Herbert v CIR in 1943 
identified the first weakness in the new settlement legislation, and 
it was removed immediately by the introduction of corrective 
provisions in the Finance Act of 1943. The Revenue lost the
Chamberlain case because they attempted to push the principle which
formed the basis of their success in Copsnan v Coleman, too far, (see 
later).
The first case to cane before the courts in the period 1938-1943 was 
CIR v Warden,22 in which the Revenue successfully argued that if 
trustees had the power to cancel the obligations arising under a 
settlement without the consent of the settlor or the beneficiaries, 
then that settlement was not irrevocable within the meaning of the 
1936 legislation. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the 
settlement was made prior to April 22, 1936, the income arising under 
the settlement was deemed to be the settlor's and no repayment could 
be made to the minor child in respect of that income. At the time of
taking the case the Inland Revenue were aware of five others
concerning the same point.2^
If the Revenue had lost the Warden case it would have been a very 
simple matter to sidestep the irrevocability requirements of the 
Finance Act 1936 provisions, and in a major respect they would have
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been virtually useless. The Revenue won all of the many cases they 
took on the question of irrevocability in the period 1938 to 1943, 
except CIR v Prince-Smith22 which, though lost on the irrevocability 
point, was won on the point that the incane was not payable for a 
period'which could exceed six years. There were, however, other cases 
which were not brought before the courts in which the Revenue gave up 
any claim that the settlement was not irrevocable. An example of this 
kind of case is in Appendix F2.
The Inland Revenue were successful in all the reported cases in the 
period 1938 to 1943 dealing with the childrens settlement provisions 
of the Finance Act 1936. However, again there is evidence which 
indicates that, in one instance at least, (see Appendix F3), the 
Revenue eventually accepted the taxpayer’s contentions even though 
they had won the case before the Special Commissioners.
Perhaps one of the most important victories for the Inland Revenue was 
the decision in Copeman v Coleman.22 This involved the allotment of 
a preference share to each of two minor children by a conpany which 
was controlled by their parents. It was held that the allotment of 
shares was a settlement, and that the settlor was the father because 
he had indirectly provided the funds for the settlement.
Prior to this case the Revenue were very uncertain of the extent to 
which the settlement provisions could be applied to arrangements which 
did not involve any trust,2? as well as to cases where trusts existed 
but the arrangements also included transactions involving 
companies.22 The doubt in cases involving companies was whether the
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income and funds of the company formed part of the settlement. The 
Solicitor of Inland Revenue had advised the Board on July 23, 1937, 
that a case involving trusts and transactions with a company would not 
be caught as a settlement by the Finance Act 1936 provisions.29 The 
Revenue also had counsel's opinion that for the purposes of section 38 
(2) and (3) of the Finance Act 1938 there had to be a trust before it 
was possible to argue that there was a settlement, and that 
furthermore it was not possible to look outside the trust for any 
power of revocation or determination.
Despite these opinions, the Board decided to attempt to apply the 
settlement provisions to such cases and their success in Copeman v 
Coleman opened the door to a considerable new territory of complex, 
convoluted arrangorients which could be caught. Other similar cases 
were brought before the courts and in each of them the Revenue was 
successful.3° At this time, it must have seemed to the Revenue that 
they had acquired a new and devastating weapon, as almost anything the 
taxpayer did could be part of an arrangement and therefore a 
settlement. The only restriction imposed by Copeman v Coleman was 
that the settlement provisions did not apply to bona fide commercial 
arrangements.
The favourable outcome in Copeman v Coleman led to a review of 
previous decisions in which the Revenue had decided that no action was 
possible under the settlement provisions. Although the number of such 
cases was not thought to be very large, the duty at stake was thought 
to be substantial.31 There were problems of identification, but it 
was decided that as most of the cases had been the work of Messrs
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Spicer and Pegler, the Special Commissioners Office might be able to 
provide a list of them.32 it is not known whether they could.
The Board's solicitor was asked to reconsider a case in which he had 
previously advised that the Revenue stood little chance of success.
He indicated that there was now "sufficient chance of success to 
justify the Board in attacking the scheme." (See Appendix F4) It is 
clear from his analysis that two similar cases had been taken before 
the Special Commissioners^ who though agreeing that the arrangements 
amounted to settlements, had decided that there was no power to revoke 
them and that they were therefore not caught. Neither of these cases 
actually reached the courts, but the case of Chamberlain v CIR,34 in 
which the facts were similar, was brought before the Special 
Commissioners on November 19, 1940. The Revenue won the case at each 
stage until, in the House of Lords, it was decided that the 
arrangements forming the settlement did not go so far as to include 
the assets of a company connected to a trust where those assets had 
been provided to the company by the settlor in return for full 
consideration. The Revenue were probably not too concerned over the 
loss of the Chamberlain case, because in the other cases of a similar 
nature they had a very much stronger argument due to the fact that the 
settlors had transferred assets to companies at a considerable 
undervalue. These cases did not reach the courts, and it seems likely 
that following the Chamberlain decision, the taxpayers gave up their 
fight despite their success before the Special Commissioners.
The case of Lord Herbert v CIR was decided on January 26, 194335
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and led to an almost immediate change in the relevant legislation.
The facts of the case were that the appellant's grandfather had 
settled certain landed estates and investments on his son, Lord 
Pembroke, as tenant for life with the remainder to his grandson, the 
appellant. Some year's later, a further settlement was made of the 
property in the first settlement consisting of a part of the settled 
landed estates. The settlors of the second settlement were therefore 
both the tenant for life and the remainderman. The appointment of the 
property from the first settlement to the second settlement was 
revocable, and if it were revoked it was possible that Lord Pembroke 
and Lord Herbert might become entitled to the property. On these 
grounds the Revenue assessed Lord Herbert, as the settlor, in respect 
of the settlement income under the provisions of Section 38(2) of the 
Finance Act 1938. These assessments were confirmed by the Special 
Commissioners on appeal.
In the King's Bench Division, the Crown contended that where there 
were joint settlors there was an option on the Crown to assess one 
settlor to the exclusion of the other. Mr Justice Macnaghten refused 
to accept that contention.
The Crown also contended that where there were two or more settlors, 
the assessment could be made upon the settlor to whom income would 
have belonged if the settlement had not been made. In his judgement, 
Mr Justice Macnaghten explained that this argument did not assist the 
Crown, because if the settlement had not been made Lord Pembroke, as 
tenant for life, would have been entitled to the income, but the
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assessment was on Lord Herbert, the remainderman. It was decided that 
"no assessment under the Finance Act 1938, can be made upon Lord 
Herbert during the lifetime of his father ... " The legal reasoning 
for the decision was therefore that because the remainderman had no 
interest in the income arising from the property during his father's 
lifetime, he was not a settlor in respect of that incane.
The Solicitor-General advised the Revenue that the court appeared to 
be impressed by the argument that the section 38 liability should 
follow the original destination of the settlement income, although it 
did not decide the point.36 On this basis he advised that an 
assessment could be made on Lord Pembroke with a good prospect of 
success because it was Lord Pembroke who brought the life interest 
into the settlement.37
On the face of things this was not an important case for the Inland 
Revenue as they were still apparently able to assess the person who 
would have received the income had the settlement not been made. 
However, a line of argument was used which shook their confidence in 
the effectiveness of all the settlement anti-avoidance provisions in 
cases where there were joint settlors.
The cause of concern was that where the settlement provisions applied, 
the legislation required that the income "shall be treated as the 
income of the settlor ... and not as the income of any other person." 
If there were two settlors, A and B, it could be argued that the 
settlement provisions could not apply to either of them, because if 
settlor A were assessed, he could say that B was a settlor and the
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income must be regarded as the income of B and nobody else, and if 
settlor B were assessed he could use a similar argument to escape 
liability. Mr Justice Macnaghten did not expressly approve or reject 
this contention as it was not necessary to do so to arrive at a 
conclusion in the Herbert case. However, as the Board advised 
ministers:
"Publicity has been given to the contention that cases where 
there are two or more settlors are outside the legislation and 
that contention may be raised in sane other case where ... it is 
vital to the decision."38
THE BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION TO LEGISLATE - THE VESTEY CASE
Despite the views which were being expressed in the journals of the
time,39 the Inland Revenue were fairly confident that Mr Justice
Macnaghten's decision in Herbert v CIR was not authority for the
proposition that the settlement provisions did not apply to cases
where there were two or more settlors, and they had legal opinions in
support of this.40 Those opinions also stated that the decision was
consistent with the view that in the case of a joint settlement of
capital, the property or incane to be looked at in relation to each
particular settlor was the property which that settlor brought into
the settlement, or the income arising from that property. Similarly,
in the case of income settlements, the income to be looked at in
relation to each settlor was the income which he provided for the
settlement.41
On March 23, 1943, the Chairman of the Board informed the 
Attorney-General of the background to the Herbert case and the legal 
opinions they had received in respect of the effect of decision.42 it 
was explained that ordinarily, because of the advice they had 
received, the Board would have left the question of joint settlors to
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be decided by the courts, and would have maintained their view that
the sections did apply to joint settlors. However, the Chairman was
very concerned with "the bearing of the joint settlor point on a very
important case which has been decided by the Special Commissioners in
our favour and will find its way to the courts - the Vestey case 
"43
• • • •
This case was concerned with the settlement referred to in the Union 
Cold Storage Company v Adamson,44 and involved a settlement under 
which the Vestey brothers had settled upon non-resident trustees the 
rent from property they had leased to the company. Since 1921 the 
fund had been built up out of the accumulation of rent received by the 
trustees. The Revenue had taken Counsel's opinion on whether they 
should mount an attack under the provisions of the Finance Act 1938 on 
the grounds that because the Vestey brothers could determine the lease 
of their property to the company at six months notice, the settlement 
was revocable.45 "After repeated and prolonged consideration of the 
question" Counsel had concluded that the anti-avoidance provisions 
could be invoked.45 The amount of.duty for the years 1937/38 to 
1941/42 was expected to be in the order of four million pounds, and 
the Revenue wished to ensure that there should be no chance of the 
Vesteys being successful in claiming that the joint settlor loophole 
applied.47 The Revenue believed, however, that on the joint settlor 
point, the Vestey case was as strong a case in their favour as was 
likely to exist, because the property in the settlement was largely 
segregated into two separate funds. Nevertheless, they feared the 
possibility of losing the case and advised the Attorney-General that 
if the courts eventually decided that the joint settlor point did
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provide a let-out, legislation would be necessary. The Board argued 
that:
"Such legislation ought to be retrospective - the Inland Revenue 
has always taken the view that this section applies to joint 
settlors - but it will be contrary to precedent to revoke by 
retrospective legislation the decision of the House of Lords in 
a particular case of this kind."48
Realising that it would not be possible to introduce retrospective 
legislation to directly overcome the effects of an adverse decision, 
the Revenue*s proposed solution to this problem was ingenious. They 
suggested to the Attorney-General that legislation should be 
introduced which was expressed to be merely declaratory of the 
existing law and therefore retrospective, and justified this on the 
grounds that there had been no decision of either the Special 
Commissioners or the courts against the Inland Revenue on the joint 
settlor point. As the Chairman of the Board put it:
"The Vesteys have not yet got a vested interest in possible 
imperfections of existing legislation."49
This proposal does appear to be retrospective legislation by another
name. It seems to be splitting hairs to say that the Vestey
brothers did not have an interest in any loopholes in the existing
legislation. In effect, what the Revenue were saying was that they
believed that there never was a loophole, but if there was, and anyone
had made use of it, then the loophole could be stopped up after it had
been used, and the legislation would be applied as if the loophole had
never existed. This is an extraordinary line of reasoning but it
seems to have been accepted by the Attorney-General.80
The Board also argued that there was a need for legislation to clarify
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the point irrespective of the Vestey case. They did not wish to leave 
the point open to anyone who had sufficient money at stake to take a 
case before the courts, because if the decision was unfavourable to 
the Revenue, it would have required corrective legislation. It was 
admitted however that,
"If it were not for the Vestey millions... it would probably
have been thought proper to let events take their course. ”55-
A rough outline of the form of the required legislation was put to the 
Attorney-General and he was asked to authorise detailed drafting. At 
this stage the Chancellor had not been informed of the position 
because the Chairman of the Board believed that he would almost 
certainly merely ask the Attorney-General for his opinion before 
authorising the drafting of a clause.52 The Attorney-General 
discussed the matter with the Solicitor-General and they concluded 
that appropriate legislation should be introduced,55 but they were so 
concerned about its exact form that they retained an interest in its 
drafting.
Even before the Chancellor had been made aware of the problem, 
Parliamentary Counsel had written to the Public Bill Office to explain 
the need for the proposed legislation, and had enclosed a copy of a 
draft budget resolution. He asked whether there was any possibility 
of the point being successfully taken that the resolution was too 
vague, even though he did not think it any more vague than other 
anti-avoidance resolutions he had been involved with.5  ^ The 
confidence with which it was assumed that the Chancellor would give 
authority for the legislation is worthy of note, as is the apparent
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intentional vagueness of the Budget resolution.
On March 30, 1943, the Board asked the Chancellor for authority to 
request Parliamentary Counsel to draft an appropriate clause. The 
following day this authority was given.55
DRAFTING OF THE PROVISIONS
Because of the need to be able to show that the clause was merely a 
declaration of the existing law, the Attorney-General and 
Solicitor-General were closely involved in its preparation. Some 
comfort must have been provided to them by Parliamentary Counsel's 
first draft which was sent with a covering note indicating that in his 
opinion
"It is at any rate almost (Parliamentary Counsel's underlining) 
decent to say that [the clause] merely declares the existing law."56
However, although the Revenue advised that the way cases involving 
joint settlors were dealt with in practice was precisely that provided 
for in the draft legislation, there has to be some doubt about this in 
view of the fact that they failed to do so in the cases of Lord 
Herbert and Prince-Smith (below).
What started off as a short, straightforward clause prepared by the 
Inland Revenue, ended up as a fairly lengthy three-part schedule to 
the Finance Act of 1943. It seems that the reason for this was that 
the original legislation had been introduced in a piecemeal fashion, 
and contained slight differences in wording, such that it was simpler 
and clearer to have separate provisions relating to joint settlors for
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each of the three Finance Acts dealing with settlements.57
By 1943, the Inland Revenue appear to have had a very jaundiced view 
of the extremes to which taxpayers would go to avoid taxation. They 
scrutinised the drafts produced by Parliamentary Counsel extremely 
closely, and made numerous suggestions, some of which covered very 
unlikely situations. Even though the Revenue's Head Office was at the 
time operating from a hotel in Llandundo, there does not seem to have 
been any reduction in their standard of examination of draft clauses. 
Complex matters were dealt with by long telexes supported by the 
occasional visit to London for discussions with the draftsman.
By April 22, 1943, after a few disagreements between the Revenue and 
Parliamentary Counsel, the final draft of the clause was ready. 
Although it was sent to the Attorney-General- with an apology for its 
increased complexity, the Inland Revenue nevertheless told him that 
this would in no way increase his difficulties in defending it as one 
which only declared existing law.5  ^ It was clear that the 
Attorney-General was most concerned in case anyone would be able to 
find a basis upon which to argue that some change in the law was being 
introduced. The Solicitor-General seems to have been equally 
concerned and drew to the attention of the Revenue and the draftsman5  ^
the case of CIR v Prince-Smith^O which had been decided three months 
earlier. He pointed out that it was an instance of a case involving 
joint settlors where the courts had operated the existing provisions 
without finding any difficulty. His concern was that the new clause 
might produce a result inconsistent with the decision in Prince-Smith, 
and therefore would not merely be declaring existing law, but altering 
it.
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The Prince-Smith case concerned a settlement of £2,500 by a 
grandfather on his grandchildren. That £2,500 was used to buy 50,000 
£1 ordinary shares in a company controlled by the childrens' father. 
Those shares were then converted to preference shares with 
particularly valuable income and capital rights for a five year 
period. It was held that the father was a settlor in relation to the 
wide arrangement which included the special resolution of the company 
converting the ordinary shares to preference shares. Under that 
arrangement very large dividends were paid to the trustees. The point 
that the grandfather was also a settlor was not raised before the 
courts, and the whole income was treated as that of the father. The 
cause of concern to the Solicitor-General was that there was no 
apportionment of the income between the father and the grandfather. 
Both the Revenue and the draftsman investigated the problem created by 
this case and came to different conclusions.
The draftsman believed that when the draft Part III of the sixth 
schedule to the Finance Bill 1943 was applied to the facts of the 
Prince-Smith case, a double charge on the same income would arise; 
once on the father and once on the grandfather. Under paragraph 2(a) 
of Part III, the income on the preference shares represented income 
from property which the grandfather had directly or indirectly 
provided. Under paragraph 2(d), the income was provided directly or 
indirectly by the father, because it could not have been paid but for 
the resolution passed at the extraordinary general meeting, and as 
virtually the whole share capital belonged to the father prior to that 
meeting, he had effectively ensured that a resolution beneficial to 
the settlement had been passed. Paragraph 1 of Part III made it clear
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that the liability of the father and the grandfather were to be 
ascertained as if the other were not a party to the disposition, and 
therefore, according to the draftsman, there was "a perfectly clear 
double charge".61- He could see no obvious way out of this problem, 
because an apportionment would have been inconsistent with the 
decision in Prince-Smith, and yet a provision which enabled the 
Revenue to charge whichever person they liked would have been 
inconsistent with the decision in Herbert.62
The Inland Revenue's view was that there were two settlors; the 
grandfather who had brought in £2,500; and the father, who had brought 
in an interest in the company equal to the value of 50,000 preference 
shares, with their special dividend and winding-up rights, less the 
£2,500 paid for those shares. They believed that there was a joint 
capital settlement and that an apportionment under paragraph 2(c) of 
Part III of Schedule 6 would be required to apportion the income 
between the father and grandfather. Because of the special income and 
capital rights of the preference shares, the Revenue thought that only 
a very small proportion of the income ought to be attributed to the 
£2,500 provided by the grandfather. They submitted that the 
Prince-Smith case, although not involving any apportionment, did not 
invalidate the apportionment required by Part III of the-draft 
Schedule because it would have made little difference to the ultimate 
result if an apportionment had been made. As they pointed out, "in 
complicated matters there is always a tendency for small points to be
overlooked."63
The draftsman was unconvinced by the Revenue's argument and found
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difficulty in seeing how the shares on which the dividend was paid 
represented property provided by the father. He maintained that those 
shares represented capital provided by the grandfather, but that the 
income was nevertheless provided by the father, and that therefore 
double assessment would apply. He drafted a letter for the 
Attorney-General to explain the point,64 but passed it to the Inland 
Revenue who managed to persuade him to make modifications which gave 
greater emphasis to their point of view.65 The Revenue argued that 
the main flaw in the draftsmans argument was that, in an extreme 
case, where the grandfather had settled, say, one shilling on his 
grandchildren, and the father sold shares worth a million pounds to 
the trustees for a shilling those shares would represent the 
grandfather's shilling and would not be, or not represent, property 
provided by the father. Although they found it "almost impossible to 
swallow this",66 they seem to have missed the draftsman's point; he 
believed that the whole income would be assessable on both settlors.
The problem was resolved by the Solicitor-General who felt "no 
difficulty about the Prince-Smith case,"67 and believed the Revenue's 
view was correct.
PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION
The presentation of the matter in Parliament was very low key, and 
made no reference to the fact that the pending Vestey case was the 
main reason for introduction of the proposed legislation. There was 
no mention of the proposals in the Budget speech, and the only 
discussion that took place was at the Ways and Means Report Stage
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where the Attorney-General gave a short account of the difficulties 
created by the Herbert case and gave an assurance that the clause was 
designed to make it clear that tax would not be charged twice on the 
same income.68 There was no comment on the clause at any other stage 
in the parliamentary process. No evidence could be found of the 
Vestey family making any representations to MP's concerning the effect 
this legislation might have on the case which they were taking before 
the courts. If they had done so, perhaps a rather more suspicious 
attitude might have been taken in Parliament.
ANALYSIS OF SCHEDULE 6 TO THE FINANCE ACT 1943
As there is no difference between the Bill and the Act, the discussion 
below is in terms of the Act, and only a copy of the Act is provided 
in Appendix F5.
The general principle of the legislation was to declare that where 
there were two or more settlors each was to be treated as though he 
had made a separate settlement of the property or income which he 
brought into the settlement, and that regard would only be had to that 
property or income in determining his liability to tax. The change 
was to have retrospective effect, because it was supposed to be merely 
declaring what the law had always been thought to mean.
Schedule 6, Part I (now I.C.T.A. 1970, Section 452)
This part of the schedule applied the joint settlor rules to the 
settlement provisions of the Finance Act 1938. The general principle 
was that where there were two or more settlors, each settlor should be
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dealt with as though he had made a separate settlement of the property 
or income which he had provided. Paragraph 1 therefore ensured that 
the Finance Act 1938 provisions applied to each settlor as if he were 
the only settlor, and paragraph 2 required that those provisions were 
to be applied only to property or income originating from that settlor.
The term "property originating from the settlor" was defined in 
sub-paragraphs 1 and 3 of paragraph 5, and ensured that the property 
attributed to a particular settlor would include only:
(a) the original property provided directly or indirectly by that 
settlor, including any property provided by another person in 
pursuance of reciprocal arrangements;*^
(b) property representing the property referred to in (a);70 ana
(c) the proportion of any property which represented both the original 
property provided by one settlor and some other property.71 
Similar definitions were applied by paragraph 5(2) and 5(3)(a) to 
the term "income originating from the settlor."
Paragraph 3 provided for the situation where there were outgoings from 
a settlement which were to be taken into account in calculating the 
undistributed income but the settlement made no provision for the 
allocation of those outgoings between the income originating from 
different settlors. In such a case, outgoings were to be apportioned 
according to the income derived from the different settlors.
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Schedule 6, Part II (now I.C.T.A. 1970, Section 442)
The general principles of operation of Part II were the same as those 
which applied to Part I. The intention behind the legislation was to 
split out the property or income arising from the different settlors, 
so that each could be treated according to whether or not the 
childrens* settlement provisions applied to the property or income 
settled by him. The definitions of the terms "property originating 
fran a settlor" and "income originating fran a settlor" were the same 
as those applying for Part I, except that apportioned income of a 
close company was to be omitted from the definition of "income 
originating from a settlor" because such apportioned incane was not 
caught by the Finance Act 1936 provisions.
Schedule 6, Part III (now I.C.T.A. 1970, Section 436)
This only applied to dispositions of income, and provided a fairly 
straightforward separation of the income derived fran each settlor and 
the property or income directly or indirectly derived from that income.
CONCLUSION
«
The statistics concerning parental settlements on children give an 
indication of the effectiveness of the 1936 provisions, and the case 
law shows that both the 1936 and the 1938 settlement legislation was 
proving to be very robust. However, these were early days, and poor 
understanding of the legislation, combined with the war and the 
changed public attitudes to avoidance, probably resulted in the 
provisions not being severely tested. It was fortunate that the 
legislation was in place before the war caused drastic increases in 
tax rates and reductions in personal allowances, as otherwise many
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more people would have been tempted as they were in the First World 
War, to enter into settlements to avoid the increased burden.
The Revenue's speedy reaction to the appearance of a mere potential 
loophole is indicative of their degree of concern over tax avoidance. 
The relatively simple concept of apportionment of income between joint 
settlors was extremely difficult to put into effect due to the 
complexity of, and slight differences in wording between, the 
underlying legislation of 1922, 1936 and 1938, and this problem was 
compounded by the Revenue's fear of creating further opportunities for 
avoidance. Even at the final drafting stage there were major 
differences of opinion between Parliamentary Counsel and the Revenue 
as to the interpretation of the proposed legislation. Although this 
disagreement was settled by the Solicitor-General siding with the 
Revenue, it did not auger well for the clarity of the legislation when 
the draftsman took a view of its interpretation which differed in such 
a material way from those who were to implement it.
Although the existing settlement provisions were a great success 
during this period, there were certain forms of avoidance through 
settlements which had to await the changed political climate after the 
war before they could be tackled.
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CHAPTER 8
1944-46: THE REVENUE'S SUCCESS CONTINUES AND THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER
SCHEME AND CHARITABLE COVENANTS ARE ATTACKED
INTRODUCTION
In the two years to the end of March 1946, the Revenue's success with 
the legislation continued, and although they lost two cases,! as they 
both related to deeds executed prior to the Finance Act 1936, they 
were of little long term relevance. The Revenue therefore probably 
considered the legislation to be most satisfactory, especially as they 
had won the important case of Jenkins v CIR,2 which showed that a 
settlor retained an interest in a settlement where he had made a loan 
to it which was being repaid out of dividends on shares acquired with 
the loan, and they had had success in four other cases^.
Notwithstanding the satisfactory manner in which the legislation was 
operating, the change of Government after the war provided the Revenue 
with an opportunity to obtain two further provisions attacking 
settlements, because members of the new Government had, when in 
opposition, regularly argued that there was a need to close-up these 
further loopholes.4 Modifications were thought to be necessary in two 
areas. Firstly, to prevent the use of the method of avoidance used in 
the Duke of Westminster case,5 and secondly to check the explosive 
growth in the cost to the Exchequer of charitable deeds of covenant. 
Legislation was introduced which prevented surtax relief on the 
relevant classes of settlement whilst retaining income tax relief, but 
as it only applied to settlements made on or after April 10, 1946, the
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Exchequer was left exposed to the effects of not having taken earlier, 
action.
The approach of the legislation was to specify that all income arising 
under a settlement was to be treated as that of the settlor unless one 
of four let-outs applied, or the income was already deemed to be his.
It was impossible for charitable covenants to come within any of the 
four let-outs, although where a settlor was prepared to divest himself 
absolutely of property in favour of a charity, for example by creating 
a charitable trust, the income arising would not be caught.6 The new 
provisions did not strike at covenants to relatives or other 
individuals, unless they were employees. The reason for dealing with 
charitable covenants but not covenants to individuals was solely based 
upon the relatively low cost of the latter to the Exchequer.?
THE ATTACK ON THE AVOIDANCE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER CASE 
The Duke had paid his employees, and an architect he had regularly 
engaged, by means of covenants, and by this means had converted 
salaries, wages and fees from a non-tax-deductible form to a 
tax-deductible form. The decision in favour of the Duke in this case 
was said to have caused "a great deal of indignation among the staff 
of the Board of inland Revenue."8 Although the matter had been 
discussed by the Board's Tax Avoidance committee in 1933,9 no attempt 
was made by the Revenue to persuade any chancellor to introduce 
appropriate anti-avoidance legislation. Although the annuities in the 
Duke of Westminster case were more than £20,000 per annum, and the 
Report of the Board's Tax Avoidance Committee indicates that there
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were a number of similar cases, 1° it is unlikely that the total 
amount of tax lost was very significant, as normally only the 
extremely wealthy would have been able to use the scheme.
From the time that the facts of the Duke of Westminister case came 
into the public domain to the time that the loophole was blocked, 
there were various parliamentary criticisms of the lack of Government 
action.11 Because the method of avoidance had been fully explained in 
both parliament and the professional journals, it is likely that it 
had been taken up by all those who had the inclination and 
circumstances to take advantage of it.
Although there was very little parliamentary discussion of the 
proposed legislation to prevent this means of avoidance,12 concern was 
expressed that the many people who covenanted pensions to their former 
servants might be caught.13 Parliamentary Counsel's first draft14 
specified that only a covenant to an individual "in the service of the 
settlor" was to be caught, and these words were carried right through 
to the Finance Act. clearly, there was no intention to catch pensions 
paid under covenant as the payee was not then "in service". This was 
never explained to parliament, but the notes for ministers by the 
Board of inland Revenue pointed out that such pensions would not be 
affected,15 and presumably those who had expressed concern were told 
privately of this exclusion.
The only parliamentary criticism of the exclusion came from Mr James 
Callaghan who argued that there was no reason why the State should 
assist in the payment of pensions by wealthy landlords to their
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previous employees.16 it is interesting to note that nineteen years 
later, in Mr Callaghan's first Budget as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
he introduced settlement provisions much more restrictive than those 
of the Finance Act 1946 and caught, amongst other things, covenanted 
pensions to previous e m p l o y e e s .17
Mr Callaghan made an effort to explain to the House what the Duke of 
Westminster had done and why he thought it reprehensible. However, 
his speech was interrupted incessantly on points of order concerning 
his description of the avoidance as "a ramp" and "a racket," and also 
on the technicality that as the Duke of Westminster was a member of 
the House of Lords, no member was entitled, according to Erskine May, 
to make a statement which reflected on his personal honour.1® Even 
though Mr Callaghan was only making use of information available from 
the reported case, points of order were raised as to whether it was 
proper for him to use information which he had obtained by virtue of 
having been an employee of the Inland Revenue.19 The debate certainly 
seems to indicate that friends of the Duke of Westminster, or those 
sympathetic to what he had done, were determined to try to muzzle Mr 
Callaghan. Eventually, however, he was allowed, albeit in a piecemeal 
fashion, to paint a rather unpleasant picture of the kind of avoidance 
which had been allowed to go on by previous Governments.
At the committee stage there were no amendments put down concerning 
this particular aspect of the clause, although a question was raised 
as to whether the provisions could be dodged by making the covenanted 
payment in favour of the wife of the enployee, agent or solicitor 
involved. The Solicitor-General merely pointed out that the payment
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would have to be to the wife for her own use in order to escape the 
provisions.20 Apparently, he thought that if a payment was made to 
the wife of an employee, agent or solicitor of the settlor, the 
Revenue would be able to show that it was not for her own use, unless 
there were special circumstances.
COVENANTS TO CHARITIES BY INDIVIDUALS
The inland Revenue had waited a long time for a further opportunity to 
attempt to introduce legislation to restrict the tax relief for payers 
of charitable covenants. The bid to do so in 1927 had failed,21 and 
even though the whole question of covenants to charities had been 
fully investigated by the Board's Tax Avoidance Committee and a full 
report had been given to the Chancellor in 1934, no further action had
been taken.22 The eventual impetus for the introduction of
legislation was mainly the excessive cost to the Exchequer of 
permitting the deduction of such covenanted payments from the inccxne
of the payer.23
The income tax loss to the Exchequer was related to the standard rate 
of tax, and although this had been in the range 20% to 25% between 
1927/28 and 1935/36, each year thereafter saw an increase, until 
finally in 1941/42 the rate reached 50% and remained there until 
1946/47. As a by-product of the increased tax rates the net cost of a
covenant had become less and tax repayments to charities had
increased.24 surtax rates had also increased significantly, so that 
by 1939/40, a person with an income of £25,000 who covenanted to pay 
£1,000 per annum to a charity, could do so at a net cost of £25 to
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himself and £975 to the Exchequer. Such a minimal net cost had 
encouraged one individual to enter into charitable covenants under 
which he was obliged to pay a total of £275,000 per annum and 
according to the Revenue there were plenty of examples of covenants 
for tens of thousands of pounds per annum.25
As can be seen from the table below, the reduced net cost of making a 
charitable covenant seems to have greatly encouraged their use.
Number Of Operative Deeds in Favour Of charities 
Year Ended September 30th Number of Deeds New Deeds
1929 8,000 Not available1
1930 Not available2 5,000
1931 " " 7,222
1932 " " 9,545
1933 " " 7,963
1934 35,000 Not available
1935 55,000 11 "
1936 to 1941 Not available 11 ”
1942 158,000 " "
1943 185,000 11 "
1944 221,654 60,000
1945 259,331 67,000
Note 1 - The figures are not available from the files examined by
the writer but probably were known to the inland Revenue at 
the time.
Source: Derived From PRO File IR63/172.
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By the early 1940s, new deeds were being created at more than double 
the rate at which old deeds were expiring, and by 1943 the cost to the 
Exchequer had again attracted the attention of the chancellor. During 
the discussion of the Finance Bill 1943, the Chancellor had said that 
he would have to consider whether the privileges attaching to 
charitable covenants could be justified.26 on subsequent 
consideration of the matter he decided
"that the time was not opportune for action which would have a 
prejudicial effect on war charities and hospitals in particular, 
[because the] Red cross, etc. made extensive use of the seven-year 
deed to get funds and it was not considered politic to make any 
alteration of the law that might dry up the sources of supply 
during the war."27
However, once the war was over the time was ripe to consider imposing 
restrictions on the loss of tax arising through the use of charitable 
covenants.
In early 1946 the new Labour Chancellor, (Mr Dalton), received letters 
fran members of the public explaining the nature of the relief for 
charitable covenants and calling into question its justification.28 
The Board were able to confirm to him that the letters were 
"substantially correct,"29 and siezed the opportunity to review the 
history of and costs associated with this relief. They then suggested 
that "the full-blooded remedy is to withdraw both the income tax 
relief to the charity and the surtax relief to the payer"20 but they 
did point out that "there would be opposition by the charities, and 
the House of commons has always a tender heart for charities."21 as 
an alternative a "more limited remedy" was described which "would 
probably ... stop the present abnormal growth."22 This involved 
merely denying surtax relief to the payer so that "he will not be so
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ready to enter such deeds as when he may have to provide only so 
little as six pence in the pound.”33 The Chancellor's handwritten 
note on the Revenue's submission states that his "inclination is to 
... stop relief of surtax though not of income tax,"34 and he gave 
instructions35 for a clause to be drafted.
The Revenue also pointed out to the Chancellor that there was evidence 
to show that there was some artificiality in the case of certain 
covenants to charities, in that although- they were irrevocable, the 
charity would normally not enforce payment.36 They said that they had 
sometimes even been asked by charities whether there was any legal 
obligation to take action to enforce payment.37 jn some cases 
charities had gone so far as to give the subscriber an undertaking 
that there would be no legal action in the event of non payment.38 
The Chancellor apparently decided that nothing was to be done to deal 
with such cases.
The discussions between the Revenue and Parliamentary Counsel 
concerning the drafting of the required clause went very smoothly 
indeed, but considering that this was a matter which had been under 
review for many years, the Revenue produced a rather poor draft clause 
as the starting point.39 parliamentary counsel's first draft was very 
close to the final form in the Finance Act, and only required minor 
modifications to take into account various afterthoughts on the part 
of the inland Revenue. They suggested that a definition was required 
of the words "divested himself absolutely by the settlement"40 and 
suggested that the analogous provisions in section 38(4) of the 
Finance Act 1938 could be used with appropriate modifications. The
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latter provisions caught settlements in which the wife or husband of 
the settlor could benefit, and it is surprising therefore that the 
Finance Act 1946 provisions did not also deal with this, thus leaving 
a possible loophole. No explanation appears on the files for this 
omission. However, the further tightening up of the provisions in 
196541 removed the lacuna in the previous legislation, though it is 
not known to what extent it had been used.
It is probable that the drafting process passed very smoothly because 
there was a considerable body of settlement legislation on which the 
new provisions could be hung. For instance, the various definitions 
were available, as were the provisions concerning joint settlors and 
recovery by the settlor of any additional tax resulting from the 
deeming process.
Although the section was represented to Parliament^ as being aimed at 
covenanted payments to charities, it was drawn in much wider terms. 
This was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, if only annual payments 
had been dealt with, the Revenue realised that
"the experts in tax avoidance could at once have recourse to a 
disposition of capital for a limited period, and could thus 
escape the mischief of the new legislation."42
A further reason the section did not specifically mention charities 
was that tax efficient subscriptions were being made by means of 
covenants to non-charitable bodies, and these were also to be 
stopped.43 it clearly would have been unjustifiable to allow a surtax 
deduction for covenanted payments to non-charitable institutions while 
denying it for such payments to charitable institutions.
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Despite the considerable and well orchestrated parliamentary 
opposition to these provisions, the fact that they were intended to 
remove only surtax relief in respect of future settlements helped 
greatly in the presentation of the Governments case, because there 
would be no immediate fall in the covenanted income of charities, and 
therefore no immediate hardship.
A great deal of debate on the matter took place when the Budget 
resolutions were being considered but, unlike in 1927, little 
information was provided by the Solicitor-General until all those 
opposing the resolution had had their say. Tactically this was a good 
move, because some of those speaking against, had, due to lack of 
information, inadvertently lent support to the resolution. For 
example, it was said that, "if the Treasury is losing £1,000,000 a 
year it will be something to worry about, but we are not told how much 
money is being lost."44 At a later stage the Solicitor-General was 
able to show that the figure of tax lost was in fact £1,250,000, and 
thereby seriously damaged the Opposition's arguments.45
The case put in favour of the resolution was based on the following: 
total cost to the Exchequer; the net cost of a covenant after surtax 
relief; the rate of growth in the use of covenants; and the fact that 
in many cases the Treasury was the main contributor while "others get
the honours".46
The counter-arguments were at this stage very weak, merely pointing to 
the assured income that covenants provided to charities and the fact 
that if relief was acceptable for covenants payable to needy
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individuals, (in certain circumstances), then it should be acceptable 
for those to worthy charities.47
Limited support for the resolution came from all sides, but there were 
those who thought that income tax relief should be removed as well.48 
The chancellor himself indicated that this was merely the first stage 
in the removal of relief for he advised the House that "we begin by 
stopping it in respect of surtax"49 though he did not wish to push 
the matter too far "at this stage".50 it may well be for this reason 
that he chose not to attack settlements for the support of relatives 
and dependents that were not already caught.
Considerable anger seems to have been generated through the 
description, (by the chancellor and others), of such charitable 
settlements as being "a bit of a ramp".51 Many Members could see 
nothing wrong with making use of charitable covenants and made 
forceful statements to that effect.
"Before the Government dry up the springs of charity, let them 
bear in mind what has happened. Were those gifts immoral in 
their direction? Were they devoted to some vile purpose or 
contrary to the best interest of the State? Did they do any 
evil in any direction at any time? Were they covenants that any 
honest citizen could have said were undesirable? If the answers 
to those questions is "No" then His Majesty's Government are 
taking a step which will stop the outpourings of human 
charity."52
Before the Finance Bill reached its committee stage, Mr Keeling had 
asked two questions on the subject, both designed to elicit further 
information about the total annual surtax cost to the Exchequer of 
charitable covenants.53 He had also put down an amendment to exclude 
covenants to the National Trust and to charities from the new
280
p r o p o s a l s .54 The questions and the amendment enabled the Revenue to 
consider carefully the arguments which Mr Keeling would be likely to 
use and to provide a brief for the chancellor setting out the detailed 
counter-arguments.55
Mr Keeling was a member of the Executive committee of the National 
Trust, and the Revenue expected him to make special pleas on its 
behalf if the wider proposal to exclude all charities was rejected.
The Board advised ministers that there was no ground for treating 
covenanted payments to the National Trust in any different way than 
such payments to any other charity. However, it was pointed out that 
the National Trust derived income from capital endowment funds for the 
maintenance of particular properties and that the Revenue had always 
taken the view that income from such a fund was applied solely for the 
purposes of the National Trust itself, and not for the benefit of the 
person who transferred the property, even though that person might 
continue to occupy the property under a lease granted by the Trust.55 
They therefore suggested that an assurance might be given to Mr 
Keeling that sub-section (l^(d), which provided a let-out in respect 
of income from property which the settlor had divested himself of 
absolutely, would be treated as satisfied in the above circumstances. 
However, Mr Keeling did not specifically raise the point in debate and 
may well have received a private explanation.
In outline, the main arguments used at the committee stage by those 
opposing the clause were as follows:
(a) The average annual income of surtax payers was four an a half
thousand pounds and therefore the actual net cost of a covenant to
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most of them was a significant amount.57
(b) A net cost to contributors of one million pounds was not 
negligible.58
(c) It was anomalous that the relief was available for a covenant to, 
say, an orphan grandchild, yet it was not available for such 
payments to an orphanage.59
(d) The clause would result in a reduction in the income of charities 
"and the incidence of this blow would be very uneven"50
As regards the last argument, evidence was given to the effect that 
the National Council of Social Services handled £20,000 of new 
covenants in April and May of 1945 as compared to £5,000 in the 
equivalent period of 1946. It was argued that the proposals would 
provide a powerful discouragement to such settlements being made or 
renewed.51
The Solicitor-General was not really able to produce satisfactory 
answers to these contentions and the matter really boiled down to a 
question of the large loss of tax "which the Treasury cannot 
afford."52 a  distinction was made between convenants to individuals 
and charitable covenants on the basis that the former were very few as 
compared to the latter.53
Once it became clear that the Government were not prepared to concede 
completely, it was suggested that what was needed was "some 
re-definition of charities"54 or a set of "clearly defined charitable 
objects"55 in respect of which relief would be available. Another 
suggestion involved putting some overall limit on the amount which
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would qualify for relief.
Under pressure, the chancellor agreed "to give thought to arguments 
which have been advanced from the other side ... but with no kind of 
commitment to agree to any modification at all."66 it was clear that 
the chancellorfs position was strong, as Churchill, who instigated the 
1927 attempt to remove relief altogether, was now the Leader of the 
Opposition, and Mr Dalton was able to point to Churchill’s 
unsuccessful attempt and to the fact that "conservative predecessors 
of mine (a reference to Sir Kingsley Wood in 1943), have shared my 
view that this is an arrangement which cannot be defended."67
The Chancellor’s promise to review the position came to nought. The 
Board advised him that the suggestion regarding re-definition of 
charities "should be dismissed as simply impractible" and that "the 
allowance of a proportion of the incane would mean in effect the 
continuance of the present system under which the Exchequer bears the 
cost."66
A last ditch attempt was made to draw the teeth of the clause at the 
report stage, but the amendment put down by Mr Keeling has a 
handwritten note on it:- "Out of order - Solicitor-General"6^
The provisions were enacted in section 28 of the Finance Act 1946 in 
exactly the same form as they appeared in the clause introduced in the 
Finance Bill. (A copy of section 28 is in Appendix Gl)
The Revenue had expected that the abnormal growth in covenants would
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be stopped by the new provisions and the cost to the Exchequer held 
steady.*70 Neither of these expectations were to be realised, although 
for the following two years the number of new deeds did reduce 
slightly. Thereafter, for every year up to 1953 there was an increase 
in the number of new deeds. Statistics for the period 1946-1954 are 
in Appendix G2.71
CONCLUSION
The avoidance and loss of tax aimed at by section 28 of the Finance 
Act 1946 had been known about by the Revenue for many years and was 
well understood by tax practitioners, if not by the general public.
The "Duke of Westminster loophole" could quite easily have been 
remedied over ten years earlier, but even though the scheme was almost 
impossible to justify the Governments of the period up to 1946 seemed 
to have lacked the political will to act. The question of tax relief 
for charitable covenants was far more contentious because it was of a 
completely different character and was at best at the very fringe of 
avoidance.
The timing of the removal of surtax relief was almost perfect as the 
war had just finished and there could therefore be no special pleading 
by the war charities. Furthermore, the public attitude during the war 
had shifted against tax avoidance and that attitude probably lingered 
on for at least a few years thereafter.
It is clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer considered that the 
action he had taken was only a first stage and, although he did not 
specify what further measures were required, it is almost certain that
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he was considering the removal of income tax relief on covenanted 
payments. Such a change was never to be made, but the Finance Act of 
1965 considerably restricted the situations in which surtax relief 
could be obtained on covenanted payments to individuals. For the 
period fran 1946 to 1965, however, income tax relief and surtax relief 
were available for covenanted payments to relatives, (other than minor 
children of the payer), and to former employees. It was the Finance 
Act of 1965 which removed surtax relief for such cases.
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CHAPTER 9
1946 - 1958: FURTHER REFINEMENTS LEAD TO THE MATURE STAGE 
OF THE LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
In contrast with the period from 1938 to 1946, the period from 1946 to 
1958 saw far fewer cases concerning settlements being taken through 
the courts and a far higher proportion being lost by the Revenue. 
Although some of the cases which they lost were on highly specific and 
narrow points which were unlikely to recur and which did not show up 
any significant loopholes, two decisions of the House of Lords in 1957 
resulted in a very swift reaction by the Revenue in order to obtain 
remedial legislation. In the first case, CIR v Countess of Kenmare^, 
although the Inland Revenue were successful, judicial comments were 
made which suggested that there was a fault on the consolidation of 
section 38(7) of the Finance Act 1938 into the Income Tax Act 1952.
The second case, Saunders v CIR,2 showed up a gaping hole in the 
revocable settlement provisions of section 404 of the Income Tax Act 
1952.3
Corrective legislation was introduced in the Finance Bill of 1958, and 
at a very late stage in the parliamentary process the opportunity was 
taken to introduce two minor changes to the provisions concerning 
settlements on children,4 and a brand new provision in anticipation of 
possible avoidance through settlements giving a discretionary power 
for the benefit of the settlor or his spouse.5
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THE 1952 CONSOLIDATION CREATES A DEFECT
Despite the fact that consolidation is normally only meant to repeal 
and re-enact the existing statute law in an improved form and without 
amendments of substance**, certain modifications were made to the 
legislation concerning settlements in the process of consolidation 
which remained undiscovered for five years and which were thought to 
involve substantive changes. Declaratory legislation therefore had to 
be introduced in the Finance Act of 1958 so that the relevant sections 
of the consolidated legislation could be treated as if they had not 
contained the offending alterations?. (A copy of the settlement 
provisions of Income Tax Act 1952 is in Appendix HI)
An examination of the details of the consolidation process and the 
discovery and correction of the fault it brought about, provides an 
excellent example of the difficulty and dangers of consolidation - 
particularly where piecemeal and complex anti-avoidance provisions are 
involved.
The process leading to consolidation began in the Spring of 1949,8 ana 
took almost three years to complete. After six months "trying to get 
a Consolidation Bill on its feet,"9 Parliamentary Counsel wrote a five 
page memorandum explaining why he believed "the idea of consolidating 
[the Income Tax Acts] is misconceived and should be abandoned."10 
There were many strands to his argument but one of the main ones was 
that it would be impossible to give anyone an assurance that the 
consolidation did not amend the law. He believed it to be "obvious 
that no honest draftsman could give any such assurance in anything but 
the most qualified form"H and that "the only conclusion
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... would be that the Bill altered the law to a quite unpredictable 
extent."12 in his view consolidation tended "to degenerate quickly 
into a shameful, demoralising attempt to cover every doubt, and avoid 
every difficulty ..."I3
It could be argued that the draftsman's attitude merely reflected the
fact that he did not relish the thought of carrying out the work, but
it is fairly clear that the opinions he expressed were honestly and
strongly held, as the following quotation shows:
"... I have reached the above conclusions with some regret. To 
help to clear up the income tax mess has been one of my 
ambitions, and consolidation seemed to offer by far the best 
hope of actually achieving something toward this end. But if I 
am right in thinking that consolidation is impracticable and 
that, if it were practicable it would be worse than useless, it 
surely follows that it ought not to be proceeded with merely 
because the alternative plans for reform appear unpromising."14 
The draftsman's memorandum does not indicate to whom it was addressed,
but there is nothing on the files to indicate that his words fell on
anything but deaf ears and that the consolidation process continued
totally unaffected.
The Inland Revenue formed a committee^5 which was charged with 
responsibility for considering the draft clauses. After some fifty 
specialists from the Inland Revenue had pored over the details, 
various minor amendments in wording and punctuation were made. The 
Special Commissioners Office made observations on the settlement 
provisions, and their suggestions were incorporated into the Bill 
which was published in March 1951 as a Command Paper.16 In 
accordance with normal practice, it was referred to a joint committee 
of both Houses who examined the clauses with the assistance of the 
draftsman and Inland Revenue experts in order to satisfy themselves 
that the Bill was merely a consolidation and did not alter the law.17
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Despite such a great effort to ensure that no changes in the law were 
made, substantive changes slipped through. In their original form 
section 404 and 405 of the Income Tax Act 1952 did not contain the 
words "wherever made", whereas the provision fran which those sections 
were derived - Finance Act 1938 section 38 (7) - clearly stated that 
they "shall apply in relation to any settlement, wherever made 
The draftsmans warning of the unpredictable consequences of 
consolidation had become a reality.
The point was not discovered until the case of Countess of Kenmare v 
CIR18 came before the courts. The appellant, who was neither resident 
nor ordinarily resident in the U.K., had made a settlement in 1947 
governed by the laws of, Bermuda, under which the trust funds were 
invested in the U.K. It was contended by the Revenue that, due to 
certain provisions of the trust which enabled the trustees, at their 
discretion, to declare that part of the trust funds should be held for 
the settlor in trust for her benefit absolutely, the settlement was 
revocable or determinable and caught by section 38 (2) of the Finance 
Act 1938. The House of Lords decided that the case was caught, and in 
arriving at that conclusion they attached some importance to the words 
"wherever made" in sub-section (7) of Section 3 8 . It was this that 
seems to have prompted the Inland Revenue to look for the 
corresponding words in the consolidated Act, and, on discovering that 
they did not exist, to discuss with Parliamentary Counsel the problems 
that this omission might cause.28
The Inland Revenue consulted their records concerning the 
consolidation but were unable to find any explanation for the
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exclusion.2^ They thought it possible that because so much of 
sub-section (7) was transitional, the officials involved might have 
assumed that the whole of it was transitional and failed to reproduce 
the one small part which was not.22
The Revenue's concern was that although there was a presumption that 
consolidation was not intended to alter the law, as it had already 
been recognised that the 1918 consolidation might have effected some 
change,22 the presumption was easily rebuttable. Such a rebuttal 
could have been mounted on the grounds that although section 404 and 
405 did not contain the words "wherever made" section 407(4) and 
408(7), which were in the same chapter of the Act, did. Further 
support for the argument could be based on the fact that section 
397(2), which was in a different chapter of the Act, also contained 
those words. In view of these differences in wording the Revenue 
sought a legal opinion as to whether a court might be persuaded that a 
settlement made abroad was outside sections 404 and 405. The opinion 
was that the risk of the court being so persuaded would be "rather 
substantial."2  ^ On this basis the Board decided that they could not 
ignore the problem25 and suggested to the draftsman that what was 
required was a declaratory clause to make it clear that the sections 
were to apply to settlements wherever they were made.
The draftsman did not think it prudent to include such a provision.
He believed that the language used in sections 404 and 405 was 
all-embracing and that there was no reason in the sections themselves 
to suggest that the words "any settlement" or "a settlement" meant 
anything other than that, and would apply to any settlement, no matter
where it was made.28 He argued that it would be the taxpayer who 
would be contending that the plain language of sections 404 and 405 
must be given less than its full effect. Although he could see that 
the inclusion of the words "wherever made" in section 408 (7) would be 
useful ammunition for the taxpayer, he noticed that the Revenue had 
some defence in the shape of section 407 (4) which did refer to 
settlements "wherever made," and in doing so also directly referred to 
settlements on which section 404 operated.2? The draftsman was much 
impressed by this reference back to section 404 in section 407 (4), 
and considered the risk of problems arising out of the Kenmare case to 
be far less serious than the Revenue had made out.28 The Revenue for 
their part dismissed the draftsman's argument on the grounds that the 
courts would be able to find that the reference to "wherever made" 
only related to settlements made prior to 1936.28
Parliamentary Counsel speculated as to why the previous draftsman had 
omitted the words "wherever made" from the relevant sections. He 
pointed out that section 415 also contained no such reference and yet 
felt sure that the section ought .to apply to a settlement made while 
on holiday abroad just as much as to one made before departure abroad 
or on return.28 The definition of a "settlement" which applied for 
the purposes of section 28 of the 1946 Finance Act, (from which 
section 415 was derived), was based upon the definitions in the 
Finance Act 1938, but the words "wherever made" did not appear in the 
definition section of the 1938 Act either. Because of the history of 
this section Parliamentary Counsel believed that the draftsman of the 
1952 Act might not have thought it justified to incorporate the phrase 
into section 415 and also may have thought that if he used it in
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section 404 or 405 he would be reinforcing any doubt there might be as 
to the scope of section 415.
"I think it would have been natural for him to have left the 
phrase out of the earlier sections in Chapter III of Part XVIII 
but to have started using it when he first had, because of the 
time factor, to repeat the peg to which it was attached in the 
previous Act."31
The draftsman therefore urged that if anything was to be done with 
sections 404 and 405 it would be necessary to deal also with 
sections 415, 392 and 393; none of which contained the words 
"wherever made."
The Revenue were not persuaded by Parliamentary Counsel's speculation 
as to why the draftsman of the 1952 Act chose to exclude the words, 
and believed that it would be possible for a court to guess with some 
plausibility about the motive which could have made Parliament wish to 
change the law by excluding certain settlements from sections 404 and 
405.32 They thought it could be argued that:
(a) the section 407 settlor was morally within the jurisdiction since 
he was claiming a deduction from total income for the annual 
payments to the trustees;
(b) the section 408 settlor was an understandable target since he was 
at least getting his hands on the trustee's money; but
(c) the section 404 or section 405 settlor, who may have had no 
connection with this country when he made his settlement was being 
taxed in respect of a mere potentiality, since the power might 
never be exercised or the retained interest might never 
fructify,33 and therefore sane territorial limitation should be 
inposed.
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The Revenuefs concern was that such arguments could be used against 
them to show why the words "wherever made" appeared in sections 407 
and 408 but not in sections 404 or 405.34
The Revenue were also unimpressed with the draftman's arguments based 
upon the history of the sections.35 They believed that given the 
distinct chapters of Part XVIII represented additions to the Taxes 
Acts at widely different dates, the contrasts which appeared within a 
single chapter were much more weighty than the contrast between more 
remote provisions.36 They thought that because section 415 was within 
Chapter IV and was consolidated without any change of wording, there 
would be a strong presumption that its meaning was unchanged and that 
it would not be affected by "a mere domestic tidying up inside Chapter 
H I."37 They argued that in practice, because the real targets of 
section 415 were charitable settlements, relief for which was 
restricted to bodies and trusts subject to the jurisdiction of the 
U.K. courts,38 they were not greatly concerned about foreign elements 
in relation to the section.39
A further danger foreseen by Parliamentary Counsel^ was that 
following the insertion of the missing words, it would be possible to 
argue that "expressio unius, exclusio alterius," and that therefore, 
by implication, other foreign matters besides the place of making the 
settlement would no longer be regarded as irrelevant - as they had 
been in the Kenmare case. The Revenue were not convinced by this, 41 
believing that the intention to cut down the effect of a House of 
Lords decision would normally manifest itself in some much more direct
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way. They thought that the courts would still regard the Kenmare 
decision as good law in spite of the insertion of the words "wherever 
m a d e " . jt does seem that the draftsmans arguments on this point 
were rather too refined.
At this stage the Parliamentary Counsel dealing with the Finance Bill 
was changed, but his replacement also had misgivings about the 
Revenue's views. He particularly did not agree that the insertion of 
the words could be made with no risk of throwing doubt on other 
sections.43 He had in mind the observations of Lord Evershed and 
Hodson L J in Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc. v CIR44 which 
had showed what might happen if nothing was said about the effect on 
other sections. Furthermore, he was not satisfied that much comfort 
could be obtained fran the fact that the words of section 415 were 
identical with those of section 28 of the Finance Act 1946, as this 
was of little help unless the meaning had been explored in a decided 
case - which it had not.45
The Revenue1s assertion that they were not concerned with foreign 
matters in connection with covenants to charities did not impress the 
draftsman, who pointed out that although they were not concerned at 
that moment they might well be "once it has become fashionable for 
settlors, when entering into covenants with charities to do so on a 
holiday in France or Switzerland."46
The new draftsman also raised a fresh argument based upon the effect a 
declaratory clause might have on the behaviour of tax specialists.4*7
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He thought that it was safe to assume that, on seeing a case reported 
in 1957, the professionals would not be drawn into making a comparison 
between the 1952 Act and its predecessors in order to try to discover 
possible discrepancies. They would, he thought, be more likely to 
take for granted that as section 38 of the 1938 Act was now section 
404 and 405 of the 1952 Act, the Kenmare case would also apply for the 
purposes of the 1952 Act, and argued that if the declaratory clause 
was inserted it would be more likely to attract attention to the 
wording of section 415, and such attention might cause problems.48
The Revenue's response was merely to send the draftsman a photo-copy 
of an article in "Taxation" of December 28, 195749 "which shows that 
something has already happened to stimulate a move to a comparison 
between the 1952 Act and its forerunners in this particular respect."50
There is no further correspondence concerning the above differences of 
opinion on the files of Parliamentary Counsel, and it appears that the 
points of disagreement were probably resolved at a meeting.
Interestingly, even up to this stage, no authority from ministers had 
been obtained for the inclusion of a clause, but this formality was 
complied with on March 16, 1958. By March 21, 1958, Parliamentary 
Counsel had prepared a draft of the required Budget resolution 
authorising with retrospective effect the insertion of the correction 
requested by the Revenue.51 Clearly, by this time the Inland Revenue 
had won the argument. They did not, however, like the reference to 
retrospection as they thought it might convey an impression that 
ministers had something much fiercer in mind than their actual
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proposals.52 A milder form of words was suggested and the draftsman 
made an appropriate amendment.52 The clause passed through Parliament 
with only the briefest of explanation and debate.54 The provisions 
became section 21(5) of the Finance Act 1958 and this is shown in 
Appendix H2.
SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS OF THE PERIOD
In the period from April 1946 to March 1958, 16 cases were heard which 
in one way or another concerned the income tax settlement provisions. 
The Inland Revenue eventually won 9 of them? a far lower success rate 
than they had experienced between 1938 and 1946. Many cases that the 
Revenue won were ones in which there were few principles, or involved 
an awkward or ill-advised taxpayer who had little chance of 
success,55 while others were based upon rather narrow and special 
facts and did not result in the development of any new major points of 
principle which they could apply to other cases on a wholesale basis.55
Besides the Vestey case, whose importance to the Revenue to a 
considerable extent lay in the many millions of pounds of tax 
involved, (see chapter 7), there were two cases the Revenue lost which 
involved points of principle of great significance because of the tax 
avoidance possibilities they highlighted.
The first such case, Potts* Executors v CIR,5  ^involved section 40 of 
the Finance Act 1938 - sums paid to settlors otherwise then as 
income.52 A settlement had been made by Potts on his infant 
grandchildren, and the funds of the settlement had been used to 
purchase shares in a company controlled by him. All the income of the
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settlement was accumulated. Potts had a current account with the 
company which was credited with his remuneration and debited with 
various items, including payments of his own surtax liability, 
charitable donations and payments direct to him. Although the account 
had been in credit for many years, when it became overdrawn the 
Revenue assessed Potts on the basis that section 40 caught payments by 
the company to third parties on his instructions as well as direct 
payments to him. It was held that the section did not apply to 
payments by a connected company to persons other than the settlor or 
persons accountable to him, and that therefore payments of Potts* 
surtax liabilities and charitable donations did not result in a tax 
charge on him. Although this decision made it relatively 
straightforward to avoid the connected company aspects of the section, 
it was not until 1981 that legislation was introduced to reverse its 
effect.59 The reason for the delay appears to centre on the severe 
judicial criticism of the section in the Potts case and later cases; a 
matter fully discussed in Chapter 11.
The second significant loss by the Revenue was in Saunders v CIR.^O 
Its consequences were extremely serious because it showed just how 
easy it was to circumvent the revocable settlements provisions of 
section 38 (2) of the Finance Act 1938. The case involved a settlor 
who had set up a settlement with £100 and added a further £25,000 a 
fortnight later. Under the settlement, with the settlor*s permission, 
the trustees had discretion to pay capital to members of a specified 
class, (which included the settlor's wife), provided that the trust 
funds immediately after the exercise of their discretion should not be 
less than £100. The question was whether or not this involved a power
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to revoke or otherwise determine the settlement or any provision 
thereof. If it did then any income arising under the settlement would 
be treated as the settlor's.
By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords held, on July 25, 
1957, that the settlement was not caught, because no provision of the 
settlement would be entirely brought to an end by the exercise of the 
power to pay over the trust capital. There would always be £100 
within the trust, and every part of the trust would remain in 
operation, though affecting only a reduced fund. Furthermore, the 
word "revoke" was held not to include partial revocation, and the word 
"determine" was held not to include partial determination. A major 
part of the settlement legislation had been rendered virtually useless
and clearly a swift response by the Revenue was essential.
LEGISLATION TO REVERSE THE EFFECT OF THE SAUNDERS CASE 
Difficulties With The Chancellor
It is interesting to note that the Revenue believed that the Saunders 
case showed up the first major failure of the 1938 legislation.61 
They had apparently been considering one or two other defects for some 
years but had found that those faults did not readily lend themselves 
to exploitation and had not been exploited on a substantial scale up 
to that t i m e . There is, however, no indication on the files of what 
those other weaknesses were, and it was only the Saunders defect which
was brought to the attention of the Chancellor and corrected.
By early December, 1957, the Board were writing to the Chancellor,
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(Mr Thorneycroft), to alert him to the Saunders problem. He was urged
to take action in the forthcoming Finance Bill because:
"The device ... was a very simple one which can easily be 
adopted by anyone making a similar settlement and it is 
essential that it should be dealt with as soon as possible 
before it is widely exploited."63
After explaining the background to the provisions of the Finance Act
1938 and the broad basis of the Saunders decision, the Revenue pointed
out to the Chancellor that two of the majority opinions in the House
of Lords had expressly referred to the fact that Mr Saunder's
settlement was a plain and obvious attempt to evade the 1938
provisions.64 The Revenue argued that the original legislation was
meant to catch such a case and that, without corrective legislation,
the Saunderfs device would be imitated on a large scale and "the
legislation directed against tax avoidance by means of settlements
would become largely a dead letter."65 This rather overstated the
case as it would only have been the revocable settlement provisions
which would have been rendered virtually impotent.
It was explained to Mr Thorneycroft that what was required was not 
only a provision to deal with the capital settlement cases such as 
Saunders, but also one to deal with annual payment settlements, 
because a similar device could be used for them. Perhaps in order to 
make the proposed legislation more attractive to the Chancellor, the 
Revenue advised him that the required legislation would probably not 
be lengthy. In the event, it66 ran to just over 800 words I
The date upon which the legislation was to become effective, and 
whether it was to catch settlements made prior to that date, were 
questions upon which the Revenue had great difficulty in persuading
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the Chancellor to take their view. They believed that there were some 
grounds for proposing full retrospection, because in the 1938 Budget 
Speech, the Chancellor, (Sir John Simon), had given a warning that he 
intended to keep a close watch on the subject, and if necessary, to 
introduce further anti-avoidance provisions with retrospective 
effect.67 However, because, as far as the Revenue were aware, there 
had been few cases of imitation of the Saunder's settlement, and 
because of the time which had elapsed since the warning given in 1938, 
they suggested to the Chancellor that he might "consider it ... 
sufficient if the legislation first operated for the taxes actually 
imposed by the 1958 Finance Bill ..."68 The Revenue believed it to be 
obvious that the.provisions should apply to all settlements no matter 
when they were made, but on the advice of the Financial Secretary 
(Enoch Powell) the Chancellor decided that although the legislation 
proposed by the Revenue should be introduced, it should only apply to 
settlements made after publication of the Finance Bill.69
The Inland Revenue were unhappy with this decision and luckily for 
them, on January 6, 1958, shortly after making their decision, Mr 
Thorneycroft and Mr Powell resigned. The Revenue had apparently 
prepared a further detailed submission for Mr Thorneycroft in an 
attempt to persuade him to change his mind, and although the 
memorandum is headed "drafted for submission to Mr Thorneycroft", in 
view of the fact that it was not sent until January 10, 1958, it is 
suspected that the Revenue were merely grasping an opportunity for 
reconsideration following the change of Chancellor but did not want it 
to look as if that were the case.70
The major points made in the memorandum were as follows:71
1. No sympathy should be given to those affected by the proposals 
because they were involved in a form of deliberate avoidance which 
was clearly contrary to the intention of the original legislation.
2. The settlor would be able to obtain reimbursement from the 
trustees for any additional tax he had to pay.
3. The provisions directed against revocable settlements had always 
applied to both existing and future settlements.72
4. The avoidance in Saunders involved the very section in relation to 
which Sir John Simon (as Chancellor) had issued the warning 
concerning the introduction of further anti-avoidance legislation 
with retrospective effect.
5. If the legislation were only to apply to future settlements, it 
would encourage tax avoidance because it would engender the belief 
that any new scheme taken up prior to the introduction of 
anti-avoidance legislation would be able to retain its tax 
advantages indefinitely.
6. Because income tax and surtax were annual taxes it was fundamental 
that they could be altered from year to year with nobody claiming 
a vested right to the continuance in his favour of any particular 
feature.
Although quite clearly the Revenue were fighting very hard to get 
their own way, they were prepared to put forward a compromise solution 
involving a let-out for those settlements in which the offending 
provisions were removed within three months of the passing of the 
Finance Act.73 jf the Revenue had put forward this suggestion in the 
first place it is likely that Mr. Thorneycroft would have agreed to 
their proposals, but it seems that they misjudged the attitude of 
ministers to tax avoidance, perhaps believing that they abhorred it as 
much as the Revenue did.
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The result of this further submission was that the new Financial 
Secretary agreed with the Revenue's compromise solution but suggested 
that the legislation should be introduced with no such let-out, 
"keeping the locus poenitentiae up the Chancellor's sleeve as a 
possible concession for a later stage."74 The Paymaster-General 
thought it imperative to include the let-out from the outset but the 
Chancellor was initially undecided.75 By the middle of February 1958, 
the Chancellor had accepted the Revenue's compromise solution 
concerning which settlements were to be caught and had agreed to 
include a let-out for settlements which had the offending provisions 
removed not later than three months after Royal Assent.76
Drafting
Rather unusually, the drafting instructions did not include the 
Revenue's attempt at a draft clause, but only described what the 
legislation was to achieve. This was done by reference to capital 
settlements of the Saunders type but it was also explained that it was 
necessary to have similar provisions to prevent the device being used 
where the settlement only involved an annual payment. As an example 
of this, the_Revenue instanced a covenant to make an annual payment of 
£100 which could be reduced to £1 if the trustees saw fit to so 
direct. They had not in fact seen any such cases but wanted to "run 
no risks for the future".77
Lord Reid had made a reference in the Saunders case to innocent 
situations which ought to be excluded from the scope of the revocable 
settlement provisions.78 The Revenue had attempted to guess what 
these were but could not think of any examples for the draftsman.79
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However, they believed that in all probability Lord Reid was thinking 
not of cases where there was a power of partial revocation, but of 
cases where there was some event upon which the settlor would obtain a 
benefit.80 Such cases were caught by section 405 of the Income Tax 
Act 1952 and the appropriate let-outs for innocent events were 
provided for in sub-section 2 of that section. The Revenue believed 
that there were no innocent cases within section 404 and the draftsman 
appears to have agreed with them.81
The drafting of the commencement provisions caused disagreement 
between the Revenue and Parliamentary Counsel. The Revenue wanted 
them to be based upon the analogous provisions of the Finance Act 
193882 but the draftsman preferred a shorter and more direct 
approach83 and also put forward a highly esoteric argument that the 
corresponding provisions in the 1938 Act should not be used as they 
would result in no standard rate tax being charged on any of the 
settlement income.84 The Revenue told him that they had never seen a 
case in which that argument had been used and were nervous to adopt 
the shortened form of words "because the idea that income is at one 
and the same time beneficially A's income for surtax and B's income 
for standard rate purposes is so bizarre that it seems safer to spell 
it out step by step in some detail."85 Their concern really seems to 
have been that any break from the accustomed pattern set in the 1936 
and 1938 provisions might have invited troublesome contentions by 
taxpayers.
The draftsman had originally proposed that the commencement provision 
merely said that for the purposes of surtax the clause was to have
303
effect for 1957/58 and subsequent years.86 Because of the Revenue*s 
uncertainty as to effect of this bare formula87 he agreed to elaborate 
it, but pointed out that section 14 of the 1957 Act had made it 
impossible to base the commencement provisions on the corresponding 
provisions in the 1938 Act.88 The 1957 Act had modified personal 
reliefs for surtax purposes so that they were related to the standard 
rate of tax, and because of this, the draftsman believed that the use 
of the formula in the Finance Act 1938, which also referred to 
granting relief from tax at the standard rate, would cause 
complications and confusion. It was this point which seems to have 
clinched the argument for the draftsman and a slightly expanded 
version of his short formula approach was eventually enacted.89
The final draft of the clause was completed on April 2, 1958, in good 
time for the parliamentary process which began on April 15.
Representations And Parliamentary Discussion 
The Budget statement gave a short explanation of the facts and 
decision in.the Saunders case and expressed disapproval of the 
strategem u s e d .90 The Chancellor said that he wished to restore the 
law to what was originally intended, but promised that any pre-Budget 
settlements would be excluded from the new provisions if they were 
"made truly irrevocable within three months after the Royal Assent to 
the Finance Bill."91
At the second reading, the Financial Secretary said that he had 
nothing to add to the explanation which had already been given in the 
Budget Speech and there was no discussion whatever of the c l a u s e .92
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Before the committee stage began, the Revenue had received 
representations from the Law Society, the Accountancy bodies^ and the 
Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, (IGCUS), all of which 
had expressed the view that the clause went too far.94 The Law 
Society and the Accountants made the point that divorce and separation 
agreements often contained provisions under which the husband had 
power to reduce his annual payments if his incane fell below a certain 
level, or on the remarriage of the divorced wife. Such powers were 
caught by the clause but the Revenue believed it was difficult to do 
anything about this class of case without undermining the whole 
structure of the provisions.95 They thought that for such settlements 
made in the future, conveyancers would be able to devise a form of 
words which would provide automatic consequences in certain events 
such that the same results would be achieved in practice as were 
achieved by covenants involving a power to reduce the annual 
payments.96 They did, however, agree that there was a case for an 
additional let-out to be provided for pre-Budget divorce and 
separation agreements, without requiring the parties to remove the 
offending power. They suggested this extension of the let-out to the 
Chancellor, even though the matter was not raised in the committee 
stage debate. The basis of their generous attitude was that they 
believed that such agreements were more genuinely at arms length than 
other family settlements.97 An appropriate insertion was drafted and 
introduced at the report stage by the Solicitor-General, who commented 
that such agreements were remote from tax avoidance because they were 
only designed to protect the husband from paying excessive maintenance 
following a reduction in his income.98
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The I.C.C.U.S. raised the problem of covenants in favour of relatives 
in which the covenantor was bound to pay an annuity for any year in 
which his income exceeded a specified amount. The Revenue did not 
believe that such a case would be caught and took the matter no 
further, but the point was raised at the committee stage.99 The 
concern was that it was in a man's power to diminish his income by not 
earning as much as in the previous year and therefore the amount 
payable under the covenant could be reduced to nil. The 
Solicitor-General was honest enough to admit that he had never 
considered the point and although he thought that it would not be 
caught, he promised to review the matter.1 There is no evidence of 
such reconsideration on the files of Parliamentary Counsel.
Besides the Solicitor-General, there were only three members who spoke 
on any matters of substance at the ccmmittee stage. Mr Diamond, who 
was not a lawyer, made only a political attack on the intention to 
provide a let-out for those who had avoided tax in the past,2 but in 
reply the Solicitor-General forcefully made the point that sane of the 
settlements were made for perfectly innocent reasons, even though the 
bulk of them were tinged with tax avoidance. The main answer to Mr. 
Diamond's criticism was that:
"... The person who has brought about this kind of tax avoidance 
can purge himself of that altogether, and it seems reasonable to 
allow him to do that."3
The Solicitor-General was also able to point to the precedent of Part 
2 of Schedule III to the Finance Act 1938 for providing such a 
let-out.4
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Both of the other two members who spoke on the clause were lawyers. 
Even so, one of them, (Major Hicks Beach), was so obscure in his 
explanation of what he believed to be faults in the let-out section 
that the Revenue suggested to the Solicitor-General that he should be 
asked for some elucidation of his views so that they could be given 
proper consideration.5 (Major Hicks Beach appears to have been making 
the point that in certain circumstances an application to the court 
would have been required if a power was being released to the possible 
detriment of a beneficiary under the settlement and that the time 
limit of three months was insufficient for such cases.5 This was a 
point explained more clearly by another Member and is discussed below.)
The other lawyer, Mr Fletcher-Cooke, made three main points concerning 
the conditions of the let-out and all of them had already been made to 
the Financial Secretary in a memorandum from the ICCUS.7 The first 
was that the time limit for taking advantage of the let-out would 
expire at the end of October 1958 and this was too short if the 
offending power was vested in trustees, because they would have to 
apply to the court for approval and the court did not sit in August 
and September.8 The Solicitor-General retorted that in effect there 
was six months notice of the requirement to "properly purge" such 
settlements of the offending power, but promised to review the matter.9
As regards approval from the courts, the Solicitor-General believed 
that in the ordinary case, if the beneficiary gave consent, there 
would be no difficulty.10 The Inland Revenue investigated this matter 
further and obtained legal advice to the effect that where the 
settlor, (and his wife, if she was concerned), was of full age and
307
capacity then he, (or they), could consent to a trustee releasing a 
power exercisable in their favour without recourse to the court.H 
Where such circumstances did not exist, an application to the court 
would be n e c e s s a r y ,12 and the Revenue therefore recommended to 
ministers that the time limit should be extended to April 5, 1959, 
with an over-riding power to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to 
extend that time limit in cases where it would be too s h o r t . 12
The Government was apparently in favour of the Revenue's suggestion 
and an appropriate amendment was put through at the report stage.14 
The Solicitor-General explained that the discretionary power to extend 
the time limit beyond April 5, 1959 was intended to be used only in 
cases where the parties had taken all reasonable steps to secure the 
extinction of the power by that date and their failure to do so was 
due to circumstances .beyond their control.I5 As-the extension was to 
cover delay in obtaining the courts' approval, it was explained that 
there was to be no extension of the time limit in cases where a person 
was merely unaware of the conditions of the let-out.1®
Conservative members seem to have been reasonably satisfied with the 
extension of the time limit and thought that it made the let-out 
workable, "whereas, as originally drawn ... the kindest thing one 
could say ... was that it must have been drawn by someone who had 
never been in practice. "17 The Opposition noticed that the time limit 
had been extended by six months beyond that requested by the movers of 
the original amendment and asked the Government to reconsider the 
matter and insert a six month time limit.12 The Solicitor-General 
argued that there would have to be a considerable amount of searching
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through the files in solicitors* offices to find out which of the 
settlements required "purging" and that as this would take some time 
to do, there should be no such reduction in the time limit.^
The second point made by Mr Fletcher-Cooke was that where the wife was 
a minor or either spouse was of unsound mind, or where the offending 
power was exercisable in favour of a future wife, then that power 
could not be released or disclaimed.2  ^ The Solicitor-General 
expressed no view on this point, but the Revenue advised the 
Chancellor that in view of the jurisdiction which was to be vested in 
the court by the Variation of Trusts Bill, (which was then going 
through the House of Lords), it was unnecessary to make any provision 
in the Finance Bill, as these classes of case would be brought within 
the jurisdiction of the court.2  ^ The Revenue were also advised that 
no difficulty would arise in Scotland in such cases.22
The I.C.C.U.S. had made representations in connection with a similar 
class of case where the offending power was vested in a person under a 
disability or in a person who was not yet ascertainable.22 Again the 
Revenue believed that such cases would be covered by the Variation of 
Trusts Bill but were advised that in Scotland such cases might cause 
difficulty in the case of a power vested in a person not yet 
ascertainable.2  ^ However, as no representations had been made 
concerning the position in Scotland, the Revenue thought it 
"unnecessary to go out of our way to legislate for such an exceptional 
case."25
The Inland Revenue recommended that no action should be taken on any
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of these matters2** and that recommendation appears to have been 
accepted by ministers without comment. The problem was not raised 
again at any other stage in the parliamentary process.
Mr Fletcher-Cooke1s third point was that because the doctrines of 
equity might cause the court to insist upon some consideration, the 
requirement that neither the settlor nor the wife or husband of the 
settlor should receive or be entitled to any consideration for the 
release or disclaimer was too harsh.2? He therefore argued that 
nominal consideration should be permitted to prevent settlements being 
caught between the tax provisions, which required no consideration, 
and the courts, which did.22
The Solicitor-General explained that the background to the requirement 
was to prevent abuse of the let-out by receiving funds from the 
settlement under the guise of consideration for the release or 
disclaimer.2  ^ This was, in effect, part of the mischief against which 
the clause as a whole was aimed but he promised to consider the matter 
again.30
The Inland Revenue obtained advice to the effect that if the courts 
required consideration it must be-"real consideration"2 .^ They argued 
that normally there would be sufficient benefit to satisfy the courts, 
because the settlement would be freed from the provisions of the 
clause which would have otherwise imposed a tax liability on the 
settlor who in turn would have recovered that tax from the trustees at 
the expense of the persons entitled to the income under the 
settlement. On this basis, and on the grounds that they saw any
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relaxation of the condition barring consideration to be dangerous, 
they recommended that no action should be taken, and their advice 
appears to have been accepted without comment.32 The close scrutiny 
which the Inland Revenue gave to the let-out in order to examine the 
problems raised by Mr Fletcher-Cooke, resulted in them realising that 
as drafted, it left a loophole.33 it would have been possible for the 
power to be exercised to some extent in favour of a settlor or a 
settlor*s wife within the prescribed time limit and for it to be 
released thereafter insofar as it was not exercised. For example, 
using the facts of the Saunders case, it would have been possible to 
pay £24,000 to the settlor*s wife and then subsequently give up the 
offending power and still be within the let-out. As the 
Solicitor-General explained to the House:
"... [It] did not deal with the kind of villain who might choose 
before the expiry of that time limit to exercise the power in 
favour of the settlor."34
At first, the Inland Revenue suggested that the remedy would be to 
provide that the escape clause would not be available if the offending 
power had been exercised in 1957/58 or a later year.35 However, after 
the Financial Secretary had agreed to this proposal, the Inland 
Revenue realised that there could be criticism of such a remedy 
because it could deprive settlements of the let-out due to some action 
taken before Budget Day. The Revenue were concerned that their 
proposal would raise the question of retrospection but nevertheless 
put forward two rather weak justifications of their proposals based 
upon the Chancellor*s Budget speech and comments of the 
Solicitor-General in committee.36 Fearing any claim of retrospection, 
ministers required the let-out to be amended so that it would only
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apply if the power had been exercised before April 16, 1958.37 The 
provisions became section 21 of the Finance Act 1958 and this is 
reproduced in Appendix H2.
DISCRETIONARY POWER FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE SETTLOR OR SPOUSE 
The examination of the revocable settlement provisions made the 
Revenue realise that their proposal to deal with the Saunders mischief 
did not go far enough in two respects.38 Firstly, it did not cover 
the case of a capital settlement where no part of the capital could 
revert to the settlor or his wife during the settlor's lifetime, but 
he or his wife were members of a discretionary class who could be 
entitled to the incane. In such a case the trustees might decide that 
virtually the whole income for a year should be paid to him or his 
wife to the exclusion of the other members of the class. For example", 
a capital settlement could be made under which the income was to be 
divided annually between X and the settlor's wife in such proportions 
as the trustee thought fit, but so that X would always receive at 
least £1. In such a case, X would receive virtually no income unless 
the trustees decided to let him have it. The settlement would, in 
effect, be virtually revocable in relation to income because it could 
pass back to the settlor's wife in any year in which the trustees 
decided to pay income to her. Such a settlement was within one of the 
general principles of the anti-avoidance legislation - i.e. that a 
settlor should be charged on income unless he had effectively 
alienated it in advance - yet it would not have been caught by the 
then existing anti-avoidance provisions.
The second class of case involved settlements taking the form of a
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covenant to pay an annual sum for seven years to a trustee upon trust 
to pay the incane annually to X, or the settlor's wife, as the trustee 
may from time to time decide. Again, in this case, there would be no 
effective alienation of income until it was actually decided to pay 
that incane to X, and yet such a case would not be caught by the then 
current anti-avoidance provisions.
Even though the Revenue knew of no such cases of avoidance, the 
Chancellor's private secretary (Mr Maude) was approached on June 13, 
1958 so that authority could be obtained to introduce an additional 
resolution and new clause.
The Revenue had been criticised by.Parliament in the past for always 
being at least a step behind those involved with tax avoidance, 39 
and therefore when proposals were put forward to block loopholes even 
before they had been used, ministers were probably grateful for the 
opportunity to appear to be in control of the situation. The Revenue 
thus obtained their authority for drafting, apparently with no 
questions asked. As the Solicitor-General said at the time of 
introducing the new clause
"... the Revenue ... is trying to get a move ahead - and it seems 
a wise thing that that should be done."40
By June 19, 1958, the Inland Revenue had sent what they described as 
"a spoof draft"41 to Parliamentary Counsel with additional notes 
explaining that what they wanted was:
(a) a clause to apply to discretionary powers to repay income to the 
settlor or his spouse;
(b) the application of the clause to any income arising while there
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was an existing or potential power, but not to income arising 
after the date of extinction of the power;
(c) an appropriate limitation on the deeming process where the power 
only extended to a fixed amount or a proportion or part of the 
income;
(d) a let-out for powers which could not be exercised within a six 
year period modelled upon the provisos to section 404(1) and (2) 
I.T.A. 1952;42 and
(e) the application of the joint settlor provisions, information 
powers, and intepretation provisions in sections 409-411 of I.T.A. 
1952.43
The draftsman expressed concern that there was an element of overlap 
between the proposed legislation and the existing rules,44 (especially 
those concerning revocable settlements and settlements where the 
settlor retained an interest), but got round this problem by confining 
the new provision to income which could not be treated as the 
settlor's under any other section.
*
After a couple of drafts and meetings to discuss them, their final 
form was agreed, but ministers still had to decide the starting date 
and the form of any transitional let-out for cases where any offending 
power was removed within a reasonable time of the passing of the 
Finance Act. The Revenue recommended, and ministers accepted, that 
the starting date should be the date of the additional resolution 
required to introduce the clause, and that the transitional let-out 
should be based upon exactly the same principles as the let-out for 
the tightening up of the revocable settlement provisions.45 in order
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to prevent any justifiable claim of retrospection it was agreed that 
the let-out was to apply for settlements made before the Government's 
intentions were made known, provided the power had not been exercised 
after that time.46
The new clause was debated in the House on July 15, 1958 with 
virtually no time for anyone outside the Government to give it any 
consideration whatever. The Solicitor-General gave a brief 
explanation of the kind of cases it was aimed at and pointed out that 
although it was drawn in very wide terms, any overlap with other 
provisions had been avoided.47 The provisions are shown in Appendix 
H3.
Although the Opposition were curious as to why anti-avoidance 
provisions were being introduced so late in the consideration of the 
Finance Billf48 n0 explanation was given. This made them anxious 
about the effectiveness of checks on tax avoidance, and gave them "the 
feeling that it is a sporadic exercise" which was "a hit and miss 
effort according to whether there is a Finance Bill in the second half 
of the year, or whether the committee stage ... lasts long enough for 
the Chancellor to be advised of additional provisions which should be 
included ...."49
SETTLEMENTS ON CHILDREN
In May 1958, Sir William Trower wrote to the Financial Secretary to 
request that a relaxation be made to the children's settlement 
provisions.The Chancellor decided to reject this request because 
the matter was not urgent and it would have needed an additional
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resolution and clause for a Finance Bill which was already long 
enough,51 That decision had not been communicated to the 
correspondent when it was realised that an additional resolution and 
clause would be required anyway to deal with settlements involving a 
discretionary power for the benefit of the settlor or his spouse.52 
The Inland Revenue therefore approached the Chancellor to suggest 
that, in view of the need for an additional resolution, a modification 
to the children*s settlement provisions should be dealt with at the 
same time.53 The Chancellor agreed and authorised a modification to 
proviso (ii) to section 399 I.T.A. 1952 so that the effect of 
paragraph (b) of that section would be confined to cases where, on the 
determination of the settlement a benefit could pass to the settlor or 
his spouse.54
The problem which was being tackled was that a settlement of capital 
would be treated as being revocable if it contained a power to appoint 
or advance capital during the lifetime of the child to persons other 
than the child and the child's spouse and issue, even though the 
settlor and the settlor's spouse were specifically debarred from any 
benefit. These deemed revocability provisions were more restrictive 
than the equivalent provisions in Chapter III of the I.T.A. 1952 
dealing with revocable settlements generally. As the 
Solicitor-General explained on introducing the amendment, there had 
been a tendency to increase the class of beneficiaries in whose favour 
the trustees might appoint capital or income, and there were 
provisions which conveyancers would like to include in settlements 
which would be caught by the existing provisions even though there was 
not the remotest possibility of either the settlor or the settlor's
wife benefiting.55
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The provisions were therefore altered so that a settlement was not 
deemed to be revocable if it could be determined in such a manner that 
no benefit could pass to the settlor or the wife or husband of the 
settlor during the life of the child.55 As a result, some settlements 
which were previously treated as revocable became irrevocable as from 
April 6, 1958, and it became possible to include a wide class of 
potential beneficiaries who could receive funds on the discretionary 
termination of a children*s settlement.
A further modification to the childrens' settlement provisions was 
made as a result of representations made to the Chancellor by Mr S 
Hammersley, an ex-M.P.5? He had been caught under the rule that 
income was treated as that of the parent "if at the commencement of 
that year the child was an infant and unmarried,"5** because a child of 
his had married before the age of 21 and he had settled income on her 
in the year of marriage. Quite correctly, the Revenue had assessed 
him on the grounds that at the commencement of the year of marriage 
the child was both an infant and unmarried. He was most upset by this 
and attended an interview at Somerset House on June 11, 1958 at which 
he suggested that the Revenue should themselves propose an amendment 
to correct the anomaly.5  ^ They refused, because in their opinion 
Parliament would not concern itself with a grievance which affected so 
few people and which was in the main of a technical character.5**
Hammersely was not satisfied. He sent a copy of his notes of the 
interview with a covering letter suggesting how "this injustice can be 
remedied" to all members of the House of Commons.5*- He also wrote to 
the Chancellor requesting an appropriate simple amendment.52
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Fortuitously, the timing of his request was almost perfect because the 
Revenue were considering the relaxation concerning revocability of 
childrens' settlements referred to above. They advised ministers that 
there was some justification for his suggestion and that it was at 
least equal in merit to the representation concerning revocability.^
The Revenue pointed out to ministers that there was another side to 
the problem. Tax was being lost because of the appreciable number of 
deeds for the year of a child's birth which escaped the settlement 
provisions in that year because the child was not even born at the 
commencement of that year. They admitted, on the other hand, that 
occasionally taxpayers' advisers did overlook the statutory provisions 
in the year in which a child attained the age of 21 or married, and 
that in such cases the settlor often had a sense of grievance.64
Although an amendment had been put down during the passage of the 
Finance Bill of 1936 to the effect that the legislation would only 
apply if the child was under 21 and unmarried at the time of payment, 
it had been rejected because of Revenue advice concerning the 
practical difficulties of apportioning the income. They were honest 
enough to acknowledge that their original view in 1936 was mistaken, 
and advised ministers that it would have been better if that amendment 
had been made.65
Given this background, it is not surprising that ministers accepted 
the proposed change. The provisions were therefore altered so that 
they only applied if the child was an infant and unmarried at the time 
of the payment. This prevented the legislation starting to
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apply too late, and going on for too long. With the anomalies arising 
out of the previous rule removed, the Revenue were relieved of the 
annoying task of making repayments for newly born children arising 
from parental settlements and of the embarrassing task of explaining 
the ridiculous manner in which the rule applied to marriage 
settlements.
Special considerations applied to cases where a settlement on a newly 
born child was made after April 5, 1958 but before the Government's 
intention became publicly known. It was thought fair that the settlor 
of such a settlement ought to be treated in the manner he expected 
when the settlement was made. Therefore, an exception was made66 so 
that the old provisions applied in respect of payments made in 1958/59 
to a child born after April 6, 1958 under a settlement made before 
July 9 of that year. The legislation is reproduced in Appendix H4.
CONCLUSION
In the twelve years to 1958, the settlements legislation stood up at 
least tolerably well, and it was only towards the end of the period 
that case law began to show up faults. The Revenue's reaction to the 
discovery of these faults was extremely fast. They immediately 
initiated the introduction of corrective legislation on all matters 
for which the political climate for change was right. Although the 
judicial criticism in the Pott's case was probably an embarrassment to 
them, the harsh way in which the legislation could be operated was to 
the Revenue's advantage, and this could explain why no attempt was 
made to have the loophole the case highlighted, blocked. However,
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generally the Revenue appear to have got pretty much the legislation 
they wanted, though not without a few battles on the way.
Once ministers agreed to go ahead and block actual loopholes it was to 
be expected that the Revenue would take the opportunity to review the 
legislation for any other weaknesses which had come to light, but they 
went further than that and actually introduced provisions to cover 
defects which had not to their knowledge been exploited. This 
resulted in various provisions being brought in as afterthoughts, and 
although it perhaps did not create a good impression in Parliament, 
they probably thought it better to carry in minor modifications on the 
coat-tails of essential changes rather than having to fight to get 
those minor alterations included in the "Budget Starters" for later 
years.
It is probably fair to say that, with the exception of the provisions 
relating to loans to settlors, the legislation on settlements after 
the 1958 amendments contained virtually everything the Revenue thought 
was necessary; or at least what they thought would be politically 
acceptable at that time. This view is supportable on the grounds that 
after 1958 there were few alterations or additions to the settlement 
legislation which were not merely the result of new policies following 
changes of Government, or changes to other parts of the tax system.
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CHAPTER 10
1958-1966: INTERACTION, EXTENSION, REVIEW AND ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 
INTRODUCTION
During the period 1958 to 1966, five Acts made modifications to or 
extended the application of the settlement provisions, but it was the 
1965 and 1966 Finance Acts which made the most significant alterations 
and these were a result of the change of Government in October 
1964.1
Up to 1965, seme of the changes were only made because the settlement 
provisions were part of a whole framework, and when any part of that 
framework underwent major change, modifications were sometimes 
necessary to the settlement provisions to make them interact with 
other parts of the Tax Acts in an effective and logical fashion.
These modifications were generally extremely easy to make.
Rather different and more difficult problems arose when alterations or 
additions were being made in some area of tax law having nothing to do 
with settlements, but parts of the settlement provisions were thought 
to be useful for anti-avoidance purposes in that other area, in such 
cases rather than designing new anti-avoidance provisions to meet the 
new problem precisely, the settlement provisions were extended to it 
and made to fit the need by a Procrustean device. Although this kept 
the volume of legislation down and avoided the difficulties of 
achieving a completely self contained and coherent system, the results 
were less than perfect. The extension of some of the settlement
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provisions to short-term capital gains illustrate this well.
The inland Revenue must have been greatly satisfied with the results 
of the thirteen cases concerning the settlement legislation which went 
before the courts in the period from April 1958 to March 1966. They 
only lost three and none of those three involved any serious loss of 
tax or brought to light any major opportunities for tax avoidance. On 
the other hand, some of the cases they won were inportant because they 
emphasised the considerable width of the definition of a settlement 
for these purposes^ and showed the formidable power of section 408 
I.T.A. 1952 to catch capital sums paid to the settlor.3 Thus the case 
law of the period indicates that there was little need for the inland 
Revenue to suggest any changes to the legislation. This view is 
supported by a memorandum they sent to the chancellor on February 15, 
19654, which, although putting forward some very radical proposals for 
policy changes, expressed little dissatisfaction with the working of 
the existing provisions and largely just reviewed the matters which 
deliberately had not been dealt with by prior Governments. The 
Chancellor decided that the only point requiring immediate action was 
the tightening up of the rules relating to covenants to individuals, 
and this was done in the Finance Act 1965. However, these provisions 
were so tightly drawn that the Government eventually accepted 
representations concerning the need for relaxations, and these were 
introduced by the Finance Act of 1966 with retrospective effect.
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INTERACTIVE CHANGES TO THE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
During the period 1958 to 1966 it was fairly common for changes in tax 
legislation outside the area of settlements to have a knock-on effect 
which required the settlement legislation to be altered so that it 
interacted with the other legislation properly.
Penalties for Failure to Provide Information
In February I960, it was decided in the case of CIR v Hinchy^ that the 
penalty chargeable on a taxpayer who had omitted a small amount of 
bank interest from his return was equal to three times the total tax 
chargeable for the year involved, and not merely three times the tax 
on the omitted income. The resulting penalty was just over thirty 
times the amount of tax on the omitted incane and was therefore 
completely out of proportion to the offence. The injustice this 
highlighted led to a complete review of all penalty provisions, 
including those concerning failure to give information.^
As regards settlements, the existing provisions of section 402 and 410 
I.T.A. 1952 specified that where there was a failure to provide 
information the penalty would be £50, plus £50 per day for every day 
that the failure continued after judgement had been given. This must 
have been considered rather too harsh and was, like many other 
penalties for failure to produce information^, reduced to £50, plus 
£10 a day for every day the failure continued after declaration by the 
court or Commissioners before whom the penalty proceedings were taken.
Information Powers Of The Revenue And Recovery Rights Of The Settlor 
The Income Tax Management Act of 1964, (ITMA 1964), removed all
jurisdiction concerning administrative functions other than appeals 
from the General and Special Commissioners to Inspectors and the Board 
of Inland Revenue.^
The information powers under the settlement provisions had, prior to 
1964, involved the General or Special Commissioners in issuing a 
written notice to any party to a settlement requiring them to provide 
such particulars as were thought necessary.9 This power was 
transferred for the purpose of charging tax at the standard rate, to 
the Inspector, and for the purposes of charging surtax, to the Board.
Under section 410 (2) I.T.A. 1952, if the General or Special 
Commissioners were not satisfied with the information provided by a 
party to a settlement, they could in certain cases make an estimate of 
the amount of income chargeable on the settlor.10 The whole of that 
section was repealed by schedule 6 of ITMA 1964, presumably on the 
grounds that it had become unnecessary on the introduction of the 
general power of the Inspector or the Board to make estimated 
assessments under section 5 ITMA 1964.
Normally the settlement legislation gave the settlor power to recover 
any additional tax payable by him as a result of settlement income 
being deemed to be his from the trustee, (and certain other persons). 
He could require the General or Special Commissioners^ to provide him 
with a certificate specifying the amount of that additional tax.^ As 
this function was not related to appeals it was transferred, in the 
case of income tax, to the Inspector, and in the case of surtax, to 
the Board.13
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Closely Controlled Companies
As the Chancellor pointed out in his 1965 Budget Statement,14 his 
proposed revisions to the corporate tax system would create a greater 
temptation to retain profits, because by doing so income tax as well 
as surtax would be avoided. It was therefore thought essential to 
extend the existing close company provisions to cover income tax as 
well as surtax and the opportunity was taken at the same time to 
tighten them up.15 . The complete recasting of the close company 
provisions by the Finance Act 1965 meant that references to the 
previous close company legislation in the settlement provisions!® had 
to be modified. ‘ This gave the Revenue the opportunity to attempt to 
widen the scope of the settlement provisions under the guise of 
changes to the close company provisions. Under*the existing 
settlement legislation any amount apportioned from a close company to 
the trustees of, or a beneficiary under, the settlement, was to be 
counted as part of the income arising and could therefore be treated 
as the settlor's,17 but this only applied to revocable and other 
settlements in which the settlor retained an interest.!® The Inland 
Revenue therefore requested the draftsman to extend the inclusion of 
apportioned income to the other provisions concerning settlements.!^ 
However, he did'not "really know what [they] were asking for"2® and 
thought that whatever it was it would involve a charge to tax and 
would fall outside the corporation tax resolution.2!
The Revenue admitted their instructions were "rather cryptic"22 but 
explained that a problem arose where income was apportioned to 
trustees of a childrens' settlement because the apportioned amount
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could not be treated as the settlor's. There were two kinds of case 
which caused them concern; settlements which were revocable under the 
tests of the childrens' settlement provisions but not under the other 
settlement provisions; and irrevocable capital settlements under which 
capital payments were made to the child. In the former case the 
apportioned income could not be treated as the settlors, while in the 
latter case the income apportioned to the trustees could not be 
counted as income available for the capital payment under S398(2) and 
(6)23
Realising that his proposals were totally unjustified, the Revenue 
official dealing with this matter advised the draftsman that achieving 
the change was more difficult than he had at first thought and that as 
"... there are very few cases, and we may have to have a frontal 
attack on [childrens settlements] next year,2  ^I would now say drop 
[it] unless it can be simply done."25 In reply the draftsman said 
that such an amendment would be "near the edge of what one can treat 
as consequential on the new code for dividends"25 and that as it was 
really a substantive amendment "it is a bit dishonest to tuck it away 
in the schedule."2  ^ The draftsman seems to have shamed the Revenue 
into dropping the matter, and as the "frontal attack" on children's 
settlements never materialised, they still retain what the Revenue see 
as being an unjustifiable, though relatively unimportant, anomaly.
The revision of the close company provisions made it necessary to 
modify the definition of a body corporate connected with a 
settlement.25 The opportunity was taken to tighten up the definition 
so that it caught corporate bodies which would have been close had
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they been resident in the U.K. rather than, as was provided in the 
original definition, merely those which would have been close had they 
been incorporated in the U.K.
Given the incidental nature of the above changes it is not surprising 
that they produced no parliamentary discussion even though various 
minor Government amendments were made to the provisions at the 
committee stage.29
EXTENSION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 
Short-Term Capital Gains
There was no parliamentary discussion of why it was thought necessary 
to apply the settlement provisions to short-term capital gains, and 
the files of Parliamentary Counsel provide no clues, though they do 
indicate that the decision to apply the provisions was an
afterthought. However, the need to deem such gains to have been made
by the settlor is fairly obvious when it is considered what avoidance
wou^d have been possible if this had not been done.30
Devising rules to enable the settlement provisions to be applied to 
short-term capital gains in a manner which was workable, logical and 
not open to avoidance, was found to be problematical. A major 
difficulty was that under the short-term gains provisions it was not 
the gain made on a particular date that was treated as income, but 
only the aggregate balance of gains and losses in the year of 
assessment.31 such aggregation would have been unacceptable for 
settlements. For instance, if a father had transferred an asset to 
his minor son who subsequently made a gain on it but who also had
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short-term losses in the same year on assets not derived from the 
parent, it was necessary to ensure that each separate gain was deemed 
to be income so that the short-term losses could not be set off, and 
so that only gains which related to settlements caught by the 
anti-avoidance provisions would be deemed to be the income of the 
settlor*32 a further difficulty arose from the need to catch cases 
where a person whose residence status made him non-chargeable made 
gains on assets which had been provided to him by a settlor who would 
have been chargeable.33
The draftsman thought that the best way to deal with these problems 
was to deem each gain not merely to be income, but to be income 
arising under a settlement, so that the settlement provisions 
themselves would be left to operate on each separate gain.34 
However,for revocable settlements and settlements in which the settlor 
retained an interest^ it was thought that there were special features 
which permitted the netting-off of gains and losses.36
The draftsman was aware that his solution did not deal with cases
where assets were transferred to trustees who used them to make gains
by a succession of transactions, but he thought that it was possible 
to argue that tracing applied so that all the gains which were derived
from the original transfer by the settlor would be caught.3*7
Furthermore, he knew that he had not resolved the special difficulties 
which would arise if the proceeds of sale of the original assets 
provided by the settlor were mingled with other property and 
subsequent gains were made.38 Another complication not dealt with was
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the manner of operation of the provisions where they applied to only a 
part of the gain so that the balance of gain was available for the 
set-off of losses of the trustees.39 The draftsman had grave doubts 
"whether we could really make these [settlement provisions] fit case 
VII at all comfortably, without having something very like a new 
code."40 it was decided however, to make do with the existing code.
The application of the settlement provisions to short-term capital 
gains was achieved by means of two separate and slightly different 
deeming provisions; one for childrens* settlements and the other for 
revocable and other settlements in which the settlor retained an 
interest.41 (see Appendix II)
Different rules applied to children*s settlements according to whether 
the property was held by trustees or had been transferred outright,42 
but in both cases gains were to be treated as profits from a trade of 
dealing in the assets and were to be segregated from the settlor's own
short-term gains.43
For property held by trustees of a children's settlement, (other than 
bare trustees),44 the net short-term gains after deduction of 
short-term losses could be deemed to be the settlor's but where the 
result was a net loss it was merely carried forward against the 
trustee's subsequent short-term gains.45 Any net gains capitalised by 
the trustees were to be brought into account in determining the amount 
of income available for distribution under section 398 (2) I.T.A. 
195245 so that they could be treated as distributed if a payment was 
made to the child, (or for his benefit), in excess of the income
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received by the trustees in the year of that payment. If the majority 
of trustees were resident and/or ordinarily resident in the U.K. and 
the trust was administered in the U.K., standard rate was charged on 
them and not on the settlor.47
By providing that profits on assets which had been gifted outright by 
a parent to his minor child were treated as the child's trading 
profits, it was ensured that any short-term gains or losses realised 
by the child on other assets were not counted as the settlor's, but it 
also meant that short-term losses realised by the child on assets 
transferred by the parent were not attributed to the parent.
The rules applying to revocable settlements and other settlements in 
which the settlor retained an interest were similar to those for 
childrens settlements, but the net gain for the year of assessment was 
deemed to be income arising, which, together with any close company 
gains apportioned to the trustees of, (or beneficiaries under), the 
settlement, could be treated as the settlor's. Net losses were not 
attributed to the settlor but merely carried forward, and the settlor 
was not permitted to set off his own losses against the trustee's
gains.48
Because section 407 I.T.A. 1952 was not applied to short-term gains, 
if the trustees distributed all annual payments received from the 
settlor but retained short-term gains as capital, the settlor's surtax 
deduction for the annual payments was not scaled down under that
section.49
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For income tax purposes, settlement income did not include income 
which would not have been chargeable on the settlor, (because of his 
residence status), if he had actually received it. In a similar 
fashion, a non-resident and non-ordinarily-resident settlor was not 
chargeable to surtax on the short-term gains of trustees resident in 
the United Kingdom. However those trustees remained liable at the 
standard rate on such short-term gains if the majority of them were 
resident and ordinarily resident in the U.K. or the trust was 
administered in the'U.K.-50.
Capital Gains of Non-Resident Trusts
At the time of introducing capital gains tax it was realised that 
because only persons resident or ordinarily resident in the U.K. were 
to be liable, it would be extremely simple to avoid tax on future 
gains merely by transferring assets to trustees resident abroad.
With such avoidance possibilities it was essential to have provisions 
to attribute gains of trustees of non-resident settlements to U.K. 
resident beneficiaries. However, it was decided that this was only to 
be done where the settlor was domiciled and either resident or 
ordinarily resident in the U.K. at the time the gain was made, or at 
the time the settlement was made. After considerable criticism^ and 
amendment, the provisions designed to achieve this purpose became 
section 42 of the Finance Act 1965, with the terms "settlement" and 
"settlor" having the same meanings as those in the income tax 
settlement provisions,52 and the term "settled property" construed in 
accordance with those definitions. Despite the considerable 
parliamentary discussion of the section,^ nobody questioned the need
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for such extremely wide definitions.
As the definition of a settlement goes much wider than merely a trust, 
it might be thought that the deeming provisions of section 42 would 
apply to outright gifts and other dispositions and arrangements not 
involving trusts. If this were the case, it would be possible for 
gains made by a non-resident person who was not a trustee to be 
attributed to a resident person. However, section 42 only applied "as 
respects chargeable gains accruing to the trustees,"54 and it is 
thought that it could therefore not have applied to dispositions, 
covenants, arrangements and agreements which did not involve trusts. 
Thus, there must have been seme other reason for including the wide 
definition of a settlement and a settlor. It is suggested that it was 
necessary for at least two reasons. Firstly, it would have prevented 
a person successfully claiming that he was not a settlor of indirect 
arrangements under which he provided funds for the purposes of a 
settlement which was apparently made by another person who was neither 
domiciled, resident or ordinarily resident in the U.K. at the time of 
making the settlement, and who was unlikely ever to acquire that 
status. Secondly, it would have caught reciprocal arrangements under 
which a person with no connection with the U.K. made a settlement on 
U.K. beneficiaries whilst at the same time a corresponding settlement 
with non-resident trustees was made by a U.K. resident in favour of 
non-resident beneficiaries.
Obviously, for the Revenue to be able to find out about the existence 
of reciprocal arrangements and indirect settlements, they needed 
considerable information powers and they were given the same powers as
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those under the income tax settlement provisions.55 Thus, any party 
to a settlement could be required to provide such particulars as the 
Inspector thought necessary for the purposes of ascertaining the 
underlying facts. However, the legislation did not specify who was 
required to give details of the trustees* chargeable gains. This must 
have created difficulties for the Revenue, but on the recasting of 
their powers by the Taxes Management Act 1970, they were given the 
right to require any person who was interested in settled property to 
which section 42 applied to provide details of chargeable gains which 
had accrued to the trustees of the settlement.55 At the same time, it 
was decided to replace the existing information powers5? with powers 
to require particulars from any person interested in the settled 
property.5**
In 1981, when the existing provisions governing capital gains of 
non-resident trusts were replaced by more equitable provisions 
designed to achieve the same purpose,5** the same wide meanings of 
settlor and settlement were not used. Although the reason for this is 
not known, it is possible that indirect settlements and reciprocal 
arrangements were entered into before the loophole was closed with 
effect from April 6, 1984,55 and it can only be assumed that the 
original omission was an oversight.
A REVIEW OF POLICY 
Background
When a Labour Government was elected in October 1964 with a mandate to 
"block up the notorious avoidance and evasion devices that have made a
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mockery of so much of our tax system,"**1 the Inland Revenue were quick 
to put forward suggestions for meeting its promises.
Many of the provisions introduced to prevent avoidance through the use 
of settlements had been compranise measures by Chancellors who, on 
political grounds, did not feel able to prevent completely the tax 
advantages accruing to certain types of arrangement. One such 
compromise was that irrevocable settlements on children by their 
parents were totally unaffected provided no income or capital was paid 
to or for the benefit of the children during their minority.
Similarly, the attack on covenants- in 1946 had not touched covenants 
in favour of individuals provided they were for a period which could 
exceed six years, were irrevocable, and were not for the benefit of a 
minor, unmarried child of the covenantor or for the benefit of the 
covenantor's agent, solicitor or servant.
Mr James Callaghan, the new Chancellor appointed in October 1964, was 
an ex-member of staff of the Inland Revenue and had been highly 
critical of avoidance through the use of settlements in the debates on 
the Finance Bill of 1946. Having the ear of a sympathetic 
Chancellor, the Revenue prepared a lengthy paper setting out all the 
areas in which the avoidance possibilities still open to taxpayers by 
using settlements could be blocked.**3 The memorandum was in two 
parts; one dealing with deeds of covenant and the other with 
settlements of capital.
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Settlements Of Income
The Revenue pointed out to the Chancellor that under a deed of 
covenant in favour of an individual, if the covenantor was liable to 
the top rate of surtax and the beneficiary*s income was kept below the 
tax threshold, the payer could provide the recipient with an income at 
a net cost of two shillings and three pence per pound of gross income 
covenanted. The existing anti-avoidance provisions relating to 
covenanted payments were explained and the Chancellor was reminded 
that they were a mere compromise adopted in 1946 and criticised by him 
at that time.65
The Revenue, though admitting they had no precise figures for the 
number of deeds in favour of individuals, estimated that there were 
160,000, about half of which were in favour of minor children by 
persons other than their parents.66 The total income transferred was 
estimated to be £40m a year and the reduction in tax liabilities £17m 
a year, of which £llm represented surtax relief and £6m the income tax
repaid to beneficiaries.67
In contrast, the figures for charitable covenants were thought to be 
accurate because their claims were handled centrally.68 The 
Chancellor was informed that in the year to September 30, 1964 there 
were one and a third million charitable deeds in force transferring a 
total income of £24m and for which income tax of just over £9m was
repaid.69
Various counter-measures were discussed in the paper. An extreme
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possibility was the withdrawal of recognition of deeds of covenant for 
tax purposes but this, the Revenue advised the Chancellor, would 
arouse considerable opposition.70 Those charities which derived 
substantial income from covenants, and those individuals, particularly 
the elderly, who benefited under covenants from their children, as 
well as those who would find that the cost of maintaining their 
relatives was increased due to the removal of tax relief would all 
complain bitterly.
A less radical proposal was the extension of the non-recognition for 
tax purposes of covenants in favour of minor children so that it 
applied to covenants by grandparents and others, as well as by 
parents. This suggestion was thought to be possible to implement but 
difficult to justify, because there would be no common law obligation 
on the covenantor to maintain the child and the income would be 
available to meet family expenditure, so that it would be more 
sensible to treat it as the parent1s.71 such aggregation of some of a 
child*s incane was thought logically to lead to the aggregation of all 
of it, but as this would have involved a considerable recasting of the 
tax system, the Revenue did not recommend either aggregation or 
non-recognition of covenants in favour of children.72
What the Revenue reconmended was a middle course, bringing all 
covenants into line with the treatment of charitable covenants so that 
no surtax relief was available to the payer.73 They thought such an 
approach was justifiable on the grounds that the relief for covenanted 
payments belonged to the system of flat rate tax that prevailed before 
the introduction of super-tax.74 The net cost to a top rate surtax
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payer would, if the Revenue's proposals were introduced, have 
increased from two shillings and threepence for each pound of incane 
covenanted, to twelve shillings and threepence. However, the benefit 
was still significant enough for the Revenue to "think that a surtax 
disallowance would [not] be a mortal blow to individual covenants."?5
A further type of covenant the Revenue believed ought to be dealt with 
was what they described as "discretionary covenants,"?6 under which 
an annual sum was paid to trustees to be applied at their discretion 
to any number of named persons or members of a defined class. Such 
covenants had been used to stretch one of the let-outs provided in the 
1946 provisions?? to a limit the Revenue found objectionable because 
they were "no more than isolated gifts of benevolence, with no 
necessary element of continuity."?6 They estimated that there were a 
few thousand such covenants under which individuals could benefit and 
that they involved income of approximately two million pounds and a 
tax loss of between three-quarters of a million and one million pounds 
per annum.?® The Radcliffe Caranittee^O had recommended that these 
covenants should no longer be recognised for tax purposes and the 
Revenue urged that the recommendation be adopted.81 what the Revenue 
really objected to was the ability to switch income year by year among 
the beneficiaries in the most tax efficient manner.
The Chancellor was warned that if a general disallowance was applied 
to discretionary covenants, there would be some solely for charitable 
purposes which would be caught.82 The Revenue also pointed out that 
the removal of income tax relief and the denial of repayments to the 
charities eventually receiving income through the discretionary
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trustees would be difficult to justify if covenants payable direct to 
charities were unaffected. They suggested to the Chancellor that he 
might propose in his Budget Speech to withdraw tax recognition from 
all discretionary covenants and then see what pressure developed for 
the exclusion of discretionary charitable covenants.83 This was 
advice which understandably the Chancellor did not take.
While dealing with covenanted payments, the Revenue could not resist 
inserting a short paragraph to describe "a small gap in the 
parent/child tax provisions which would be worth stopping up if other 
action is being taken in the field of transfers of income."84 The gap 
referred to was the treatment of payments direct to a child under a
m
court order under which the parent obtained a deduction from his 
income. Considerable tax savings were often possible because such 
payments counted as the chiId*s income. The Revenue could see no 
reason why the mere fact that a marriage had broken down enabled one 
of the parties to obtain tax relief for payments to a minor unmarried 
child,and suggested that such payments should be treated as the income 
of the parent for all tax purposes.85 Although they proposed that 
such a change should be limited to court orders entered into after the 
change in the l a w , 86 the Chancellor apparently thought the matter too 
politically sensitive to touch.87
Capital Settlements
What the Inland Revenue found distasteful about settlements of capital 
was the ability to store up income free of surtax for the eventual 
benefit of the settlor*s family or for distribution to persons who 
paid only a low rate of t a x . 88 They recommended action in three main
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areas; discretionary trusts, children*s accumulation trusts, and other 
accumulation trusts.89
Firstly, for capital settlements under which income could be applied 
at the discretion of the trustees or someone else "for the benefit of 
a mixed bag of beneficiaries,"90 the Revenue submitted that there was 
every justification for treating the income as the settlor's because 
there was no alienation of it to a particular beneficiary or 
beneficiaries for a period of years.91 They suggested such 
settlements could be dealt with in the same way as discretionary 
covenants, so that all income arising would be treated for both income 
tax and surtax purposes as the settlor*s, but their proposals met the 
same fate as those for discretionary covenants.
The second area in which the Revenue thought there was a need for 
action was accumulation settlements for the benefit of minor children 
of the settlor. Although parents who made such settlements were only 
taking advantage of an opportunity which was deliberately left open in 
1936, by 1965 there were "some very large settlements [escaping] 
surtax ... under these provisions *"92 The problem was exacerbated by 
the unit trust movement which had "recently begun to encourage less 
wealthy parents to set up settlements of units for their young 
children [with] income ... accumulated and paid over as capital when 
the children reach majority."93 it was estimated early in 1965, that 
there were ten thousand unit trust settlements and that they involved 
over three million pounds of capital. The Revenue expected the number 
of settlements and the capital involved to increase steadily as new 
settlements were created and as further units were added to existing
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settlements under regular savings schemes.94
The annual loss of surtax due to these childrens' accumulation 
settlements was estimated at eight and a half million pounds^ and a 
further one and a half million pounds of income tax was being 
reclaimed by the children under the provisions of section 228 I.T.A. 
1952 when the accumulated income was eventually paid over to them.96
The Revenue attempted to persuade the Chancellor to take action not 
only on the grounds of tax lost but also upon principle. It was 
contended that because covenanted payments by a parent in favour of a 
minor child were caught, it was unfair to taxpayers who had no capital 
resources that a parent who did could create an irrevocable capital 
settlement under which accumulated income would not suffer surtax.97 
This was exactly the opposite of the argument they had suggested to 
ministers in 1936 to help them justify to Parliament their decision 
not to bring such capital settlements within the children's settlement 
provisions.98
The Revenue's suggested solution was for accumulated income in 
parental settlements created after Budget Day to be treated as the 
parent's so long as the child was under 21 and unmarried.99 Again, 
the Chancellor apparently had no enthusiasm for their proposals and 
this class of settlement is still generally left untouched by the 
anti-avoidance provisions.
In order to deal with accumulation settlements other than those by 
parents on their children, three lines of attack were put forward by
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the Revenue, but even they thought them impracticable. The first was 
to deem the income to have been paid to potential beneficiaries and to 
charge them.l The Revenue thought this administratively unworkable, 
as the beneficiaries might be numerous, and difficult to justify, as 
their title to income might depend on various contingencies so that 
they might ultimately receive nothing.2 The second suggestion 
involved simply taxing the undistributed incane as the settlor*s. The 
Revenue warned that this would be difficult to support because it was 
completely out of line with the policy of existing legislation where 
the settlor had specifically debarred himself from any future 
benefit.3 The third possibility was to treat the accumulated income 
as subject to surtax and apply all the normal surtax rules.4 Their 
reservations on this were that it was too complicated and too easy to 
avoid without some provision for aggregating all settlements made by 
the same settlor.5
Given the Inland Revenue's lack of conviction on the need for and 
practicability of their proposals, it is not surprising that the 
Chancellor decided to leave well alone. However, with the 
introduction of a much reduced basic rate of tax in 1973, the 
opportunity was taken to apply a surcharge, (additional rate tax), to 
accumulations of income.6
The Outcome
With a delay of almost a month before getting the Chancellor's 
response, the Revenue were probably hopeful for major changes, but 
when they obtained it they must have been disappointed that he had 
agreed to take action on so little of what they had proposed.7 The
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Chancellor decided merely to extend the disallowance of surtax relief 
to those classes of covenant for which relief had not been withdrawn 
already by earlier legislation. This was only to apply to covenants 
made after April 6, 1965.
MAJOR NEW PROVISIONS IN THE FINANCE ACT 1965 
Initial Drafting
The Chancellor's decision to disallow surtax relief applied not only 
to deeds of covenant but also to "similar payments of all kinds".® As 
the existing let-outs in respect of such covenants and payments® 
operated as listed exceptions to a general prohibition,the Revenue 
suggested to the draftsman that to meet the Chancellor's objectives 
only required those exceptions to be removed. By doing so they 
believed that section 407 (1) and (2) of I.T.A. 1952 would be made 
unnecessary.^® However, they wanted to maintain the principle of 
section 407 (3) I.T.A. 1952 so that if any annual payments were 
accumulated by trustees, an equivalent restriction would be made on 
any income tax repayment should those accumulations be distributed in 
a later year.
Parliamentary Counsel duly drafted a clause and resolution which 
precisely met the instructions,!! but on seeing it the Revenue "took 
fright"!® because to achieve the equivalent of section 407 (3) I.T.A. 
1952 involved taking up "an astonishing amount of space".!® They had 
second thoughts and decided to achieve their objectives by merely 
leaving the whole of section 407 in operation, even though it would be 
overlapped almost totally by the new provisions.!4
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Examination of the first draft led the Revenue to discover a weakness 
in the existing provisions -^5 preventing surtax relief on income 
settlements. Under section 415 I.T.A. 1952 a let-out applied so that 
income would not be deemed the settlor's if it arose from property of 
which he had divested himself absolutely. However, he was not deemed 
to have so divested himself if the property, or any income from it, 
could under any circumstances became payable to him or applicable for 
his benefit. The rather obvious flaw was that the settlor's spouse 
could benefit, yet the let-out would still apply. This loophole was 
to be blocked and the draftsman introduced appropriate words for 
direct insertion into section 415.16
Clause 12 of the Finance Bill 1965 indicated that there were to be^  
changes to section 415 to ensure all forms of income settlement, 
without exception, were to be caught.17 (gee Appendix 12) Sub-section 
1 disallowed the deduction of any annual payments whatsoever in 
computing the payer's total income for surtax purposes. It also 
treated the income arising under a settlement of capital as the 
settlor's for surtax purposes unless he had, in effect, given the 
capital away completely, and sub-section 2 extended that treatment to 
settlements in which the capital or income might become payable to the 
settlor's spouse. Sub-section 3 made clear that these changes only 
applied to settlements made after April 6, 1965.
As introduced the proposed legislation contained no exceptions, and it 
was this which led to considerable criticism and the eventual 
introduction of let-outs for certain classes of deserving case. At 
first, the Chancellor, adamant that no exceptions should be provided,
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made it clear in his Budget Statement that the provisions were to 
apply "to all payments under covenant," because they resulted "in too 
much of their bounty being provided at the Exchequers expense" .18 
Although at the ways and means stage there was no comment on these 
proposals, this was compensated for at the second reading by a debate 
which although running to thirty columns of the official report, 
consisted only of emotional appeals about the hardship which would be 
created.
Committee Stage Amendments And Debates
Five amendments were put down for consideration at the committee stage 
and each of them was an attempt to obtain some relaxation.
One amendment^ was designed to ensure that only covenants to minor 
children receiving full-time instruction at a school or university 
would be caught, and that any annual payments to other individuals 
would still be eligible for surtax relief. This appears to have been 
an attempt by Conservative MPs to limit the clause to the class of 
case thought to be particularly unacceptable to the Labour Party. The 
Board cautioned ministers that although the amendment would preserve 
relief for some, such as elderly relatives, for whom sympathy might be 
felt, it would also apply even if the sole purpose was to avoid tax by 
spreading income more evenly between members of a family.2  ^ They 
therefore advised that it should be resisted.2^
During the debates the Chancellor was criticised for penalising those 
who accepted their family responsibilities and their obligations to 
"faithful retainers".22 Other examples were given22 of cases likely
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to evoke sympathy, but all these pleas were to no avail because the 
Government were "not persuaded that because there is a moral 
obligation towards old servants or elderly parents, this implies that 
such a moral obligation must be financed as to income tax and surtax 
by the State."24
A proposed exception for covenanted payments to a parent2  ^was so 
badly drafted that it would have applied to payments to anyone's 
parent, no matter who made the covenant. The clear intention was for 
it to apply only to the parent of the covenantor, but even if it were 
so limited, the Board insisted that it was nevertheless unacceptable 
because it was not invariably the case that a covenant in favour of an 
aged parent was more deserving of sympathy than a covenant for another 
relation, for example, an orphan nephew or an old poverty stricken 
aunt.26 They believed that the only practical approach was to 
disallow all such payments and ministers apparently agreed.2^
The other three amendments were similar in character and to some
*
extent overlapped.2  ^ The first was an attempt to exclude settlements 
made for valuable and sufficient consideration. The Revenue were not 
clear what the proposers of the amendment had in mind, but thought it 
likely that their concern was with:
a) payments by a husband to a divorced or separated wife;
b) payments by a professional firm to a retired partner or his
dependents ? and
c) payments made for the purchase of a business where the purchaser
could not pay the price in one sum.2^
The Law Society had made representations regarding the need for an
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exception for cases within classes (a) and (b), and other professional 
bodies had made similar representations regarding class (c).30 The 
argument they put forward for the continuance of surtax relief was 
that there was no element of bounty.
Although the Inland Revenue believed it possible to argue with some 
force that there was no reason for the Exchequer to contribute to the 
cost of buying out a retiring partner, they nevertheless told 
ministers that such cases were on a completely different footing from 
other covenants.31 Ministers were advised that there was sane doubt
about whether or not the absence of bounty in these cases would mean 
that they were not settlements and would fall outside the scope of the 
new clause.32 as there was no clear-cut authority on this, the 
Revenue suggested that if ministers were sympathetic to the principle, 
legislation would be required to put the point beyond doubt, and that 
it would not be sufficient to merely make a parliamentary statement.33
It seems that the Revenue were not averse to this amendment and may 
even have slightly favoured it and so gave ministers no grounds upon 
which it could be resisted. However, as drawn, it could not be 
accepted as it might have left the door open to avoidance "by 
disguising acts of bounty as made for some intangible
consideration."34
The Revenue were also sympathetic towards that part of the amendment 
aimed at providing an exclusion for payments by a husband to a 
divorced or separated wife.35 The rationale for their sympathy was 
that if the new rule was applied to a separation agreement, it could
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be avoided merely by obtaining a court order by consent because such 
an order would not be a settlement.33 There was obviously sense in 
having the same treatment where the substance of the transaction was 
the same but the form differed. Why such good sense did not prevail 
on the introduction of the children*s settlement provisions in 1936, 
(see chapter 5), is not known.
A second amendment in this group was intended to preserve surtax 
relief for the partners of a firm making annual payments to a retired 
partner, or the widow or widower of a retired partner.3? Its terms 
were such that relief only applied if the payments had an aggregate 
value reasonably comparable to the benefits normally provided by 
statutory superannuation schemes and the retired partner was over the 
age of 50 in 1956. The age requirement was inserted to limit the 
provision to partners who were too old to derive much advantage from 
the introduction in 1956 of tax relief for pension arrangements by the 
self-employed. The Revenue saw no objection to this amendment.33
The final amendment was aimed at retaining surtax relief for annual 
payments representing the full purchase price for a business or 
professional practice,3  ^and was subsumed under the more general 
amendment concerning valuable and sufficient consideration. The 
Revenue were supportive of some form of let-out on the grounds that 
such transactions were matters of ordinary commerce with no element of 
bounty.40
The committee stage debates were restricted to the treatment of 
annuities to retired partners. The picture was painted of young men
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entering into partnership without a capital sum available for 
investment whilst older men seeking to retire from partnership had had 
little chance of earning sufficient to provide enough for 
retirement.41 Because of this, the custom was said to have grown up 
that an incoming partner would make a personal covenant in favour of 
an outgoing partner.42 it was contended that it was perfectly fair 
that where a man had spent his life building up a practice and handed 
it over to a successor, he should be entitled to some reimbursement 
for the effort he had made.43
The Financial Secretary undertook to review the whole subject with a 
view to bringing forward more suitable amendments on report.44 He 
also advised the House that there were possible problems in connection 
with payments for the purchase of a business and payments by a husband 
to a divorced or separated wife, and he promised to review these two 
areas as well.45
Persuading The Government To Provide Exclusions
During the committee stage debates, Mr John Osborne*s offer to supply 
the Financial Secretary with further information concerning the use of 
covenants on the formation and dissolution of partnerships46 was 
gratefully accepted "to help with our study of this matter".4*7 
Osborne's information came from a wide variety of sources. His letter 
to the Financial Secretary on June 16, 1965 indicated that he had been 
approached on the subject by the Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
the Law Society48 and various individuals,49 and that he had a copy of 
correspondence between Lord Nathan and Sir Alexander Johnstone (The 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue) relating to the matter.
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Perhaps the most useful facts he had were in a letter to Mr William 
Clark, MP, from the Association of Certified Accountants.50
The Association had carried out an investigation into the proportion 
of their practising members who, in 1963, were making payments to 
former partners or their widows. The survey had indicated that ten 
per cent of firms having two or three partners made such payments, 
while the figure for those with four to nine partners was twenty per 
cent. As the survey had not covered the largest partnerships, on 
becoming aware of the proposals in the Finance Bill the Association 
made enquiries of four of the largest accountancy firms and found that 
three of them had such arrangements.51 There was therefore a clear 
correlation between the size of the firm and the payment of annuities 
to retired partners or their widows.
Various firms had written to Osborne urging some form of let-out for
commercial arrangements, and he had himself privately consulted
Thomson, McClintock & Co. who had advised him that:
"It is only the ability to pay annuities or pensions to retiring 
partners that enables a healthy movement within partnerships to 
be maintained and the average age kept at the reasonably low 
level which modern conditions appear to require."52
The Inland Revenue were apparently perfectly satisfied that there was 
a need to provide let-outs for commercial arrangements and had advised 
ministers of this in their guidance notes on the committee stage 
amendments.53 jn spite of the Revenue's recommendation that ministers 
should bring forward their own amendments on report, Government 
uncertainty appears to have held up any action until well over a month 
after the recommendations were made. Osborne's letter, reflecting as
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it did the wide variety of interests which would be adversely 
affected, eventually seems to have tipped the balance and persuaded 
ministers to act. It was backed up by a persuasive and supportive 
commentary on its contents from the Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue,54 who also reminded the Financial Secretary that a very good 
case could be made for providing a let-out for covenants by a husband 
to a divorced or separated wife.55
Drafting Of The Exclusions
Given the importance of the exclusions and the time pressures on 
drafting, it is surprising that it was not until June 30 that 
ministers gave approval for the Revenue's recommendations.56 perhaps 
the Finance Bill of 1965 had tried to do too much and ministers just 
could not cope with the large volume of detail. Whatever the cause, 
it was totally unsatisfactory for the drafting of complex amendments 
to be compressed into the six remaining days before the report stage 
on July 7.
The instructions to draft made the following points concerning the 
let-outs:
a) they were not to apply to payments which were really instalments 
of a capital sum;57
b) they were to apply to an annuity payable in part or full
consideration for the sale of an entire business, even if it did
not represent the whole value of the business where there had been
an initial lump sum payment;
c) only an annuity payable to the vendor, or if he was dead, his
widow or dependents was to be let out;
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d) only an annuity in consideration for the whole or part of the 
annuitants share of the partnership assets and payable by a 
continuing partner under the partnership deed or sane later 
instrument, was to be let-out, and only then if it was payable to 
the retired partner, or if he was dead, to his widow or 
dependents; and
e) as an assignment of an annuity would itself fall to be considered 
as a settlement, there was no need to restrict the let-outs to 
unassignable annuities.58
The day after receiving these instructions, Parliamentary Counsel sent 
a draft of the required amendments to the Inland Revenue for their 
consideration.5  ^ Within a few hours the Revenue had responded and the 
draftsman had issued a revised version58 which, although acceptable to 
the Inland Revenue, he had reservations about.
His concern was with the Revenue view of the way section 415 I.T.A. 
1952 applied to cases involving valuable and sufficient 
consideration.5^ - The Revenue had obtained a legal opinion to the 
effect that a covenant made at arm*s length for valuable and 
sufficient consideration was not a settlement, and therefore arguably 
not caught by section 415 anyway.58 it was thus possible that the 
let-outs being proposed were not necessary, but to remove any 
uncertainty the Revenue thought it best to insert them.58 They 
thought that after their introduction it would still be open to the 
taxpayer to contend that, even if the let-outs did not apply, the 
section could not operate on a covenant for valuable and sufficient 
consideration.5  ^ Although they were "not much worried by this," they
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resisted the insertion of a specific reference to valuable and 
sufficient consideration in section 415 because it might have drawn 
attention to the point.65
The draftsman doubted that the insertion of the let-outs would have no 
effect on the argument that valuable and sufficient consideration 
automatically took a covenant outside section 415.66 His reasoning 
was that if covenants made for valuable and sufficient consideration 
were already automatically outside section 415, then none of the 
let-outs would have been necessary. Therefore the insertion of the 
let-outs would imply that all such covenants must have originally been 
caught and that Parliament was now providing certain limited 
exceptions.67 The importance of this went beyond section 415, because 
it defined a settlement by reference to chapter III of part XVIII 
I.T.A. 1952, and the same implication regarding valuable and 
sufficient consideration would therefore be carried across into that 
chapter. Although the draftsman would have preferred to spell out 
that arrangements for valuable and sufficient consideration were not 
settlements at all, he accepted that it was too late to obtain 
clearance for doing so.68
Parliamentary Counsel discovered a further problem when he realised 
that section 392 I.T.A. 1952, which also applied to covenants, 
contained a specific exclusion for cases in which there was valuable 
and sufficient consideration. He believed it anomalous that a 
covenant for valuable and sufficient consideration would be outside 
section 392 and yet be caught by section 415 unless covered by the 
express exclusions which were being introduced.69 The Revenue still 
resisted the insertion of words into section 415 making clear that it 
had no
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application to arrangements for valuable and sufficient consideration, 
and this is not surprising given that this might have highlighted 
let-outs for cases which the Revenue thought not worthy of exemption.
It is interesting to note that in considering the current equivalent 
of section 415 (section 457 ICTA 1970) the House of Lords decided, in 
the case of IRC v Plummer,70 that the word "settlement" only applied 
to transactions which included an element of bounty. It would appear 
therefore that both of the draftsman's concerns were unfounded, and it 
is most unfortunate that they distracted attention from considering 
the inherent flaws in the exemptions which were being made.
The Report Stage
Despite the report stage being only six days after the drafting of the 
amendments, so that there was little time for outsiders to consider 
their implications, Mr Osborne did manage to raise sane sensible 
questions of interpretation. Because he did not understand how 
valuable and sufficient consideration could be involved in dealings 
with widows and dependants of former partners, he wanted to know 
whether covenants to meet a moral obligation to pay them an annuity 
would be caught."71 The Financial Secretary made it clear that no 
let-out would apply to annual payments made ex-gratia or for less than 
full consideration, but that payments to the widow would not be caught 
if she was provided for in the original agreement.72 However, if 
there was no stipulation at the time of retirement that the covenant 
should inure for the benefit of the widow, any annuity payable after 
the death of the retired partner would be an act of bounty and would 
not fall within the let-out.73 Though this seemed rather harsh, the 
Financial
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Secretary accepted Revenue advice that it was impossible to make a 
concession without undermining the whole clause.
Although various other questions were asked by Mr. Osborne which were 
not satisfactorily answered,?5 one of them became an important issue 
in the Finance Bill 1966. It involved the situation where partners A, 
B and C had an arrangement to pay an annuity to the widow or 
dependants of any one of them and then, through a series of changes, of 
partnership, the position was reached where partners X, Y and Z 
actually paid such an annuity. As it was unclear whether the payments 
by X, Y and Z would be caught, Osborne wanted the Financial Secretary 
to explain the position, but being quite out of his depth he asked to 
be allowed to study the matter carefully so that he could reply "with 
more accuracy than I think I could now.
It is unknown whether the Financial Secretary provided answers to Mr 
Osborne, but what is clear is that the minimal research and 
consultation and the rushed approach resulted in section 12 of the 
Finance Act 1965 being a hopelessly inadequate set of provisions which 
had to be virtually re-written in the Finance Bill of 1966. This is 
perhaps one of the best examples of how the hurried introduction of 
complex provisions without proper consultation often results in poor 
legislation. (Section 12 is reproduced in Appendix 13)
CORRECTION OF THE ANOMALIES CREATED BY THE FINANCE ACT 1965 
Though section 12 of the Finance Act 1965 created serious anomalies 
and difficulties, particularly for professional partnerships, 
representations by the Law Society and the Institute of Chartered
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Accountants?? led to retrospective adjustments to it in the Finance 
Act 1966. (The provisionsof the Bill are in Appendix 14 and the Act 
in Appendix 15.) The process leading to the amendments began with a 
meeting at which a joint deputation from the Law Society and the 
Institute of chartered Accountants?8 protested to the Revenue that the 
let-outs for maintenance payments, payments to ex-partners, and 
payments to former owners of a business in section 12(3) of the 
Finance Act 1965 were too narrow.*79 The Revenue advised the 
Chancellor that although none of these areas was by itself of major 
importance, taken together they justified making amendments because a 
valid case had been made out for each of them.80
The Law Society had also contended that surtax relief should be given 
to new partners taking over their share of voluntary annuities to 
previous partners which had been entered into prior to April 7,
1965. The Financial Secretary accepted the Revenue's view that this 
was insupportable because the whole purpose of the section was to 
disallow relief for voluntary annuities,81 and agreed that the 
amendments should be limited to maintenance payments and certain 
payments to ex-partners and former owners of business.82
Payments To Spouses in Cases Of Voluntary Separation
The let-out in section 12(3) of the Finance Act 1965 for settlements
made by one party to a marriage on the other after a divorce or
annulment or while they were separated under a court order or
separation agreement did not, according to the Law Society, cover the 
common practice of entering into a maintenance agreement without an 
agreement to separate.83 with no separation agreement, the 
maintenance payments would be caught by section 12.
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Because under the law at that time, the existence of an agreement to 
separate was a bar to desertion as a ground for divorce, there was 
frequently only an agreement to pay maintenance so that the right to a 
divorce on the grounds of desertion after a period of three years was 
preserved. Most of these maintenance agreements were for a relatively 
short time, but in cases where neither spouse bothered to obtain a 
divorce sane of them continued for a long period.84
The combined effect of the existing tax law and divorce law was to 
encourage a husband not to make provision for his wife so that she was 
forced to obtain a court order under which he obtained surtax relief. 
It was clearly unreasonable to treat cases where no formal separation 
agreement had been made on a different footing to others, but the 
Financial Secretary was concerned that any correction of the anamoly 
could be open to the accusation "of giving a tax encouragement to the 
matrimonial offence of desertion."**5 The Inland Revenue were 
therefore instructed to contact the Home Office and the Lord 
Chancellor*s Department to see whether they had any objections. When 
none were raised,5** the drafting of appropriate amendments went 
ahead.
The only alteration required was the insertion of the words "in such 
circumstances that the separation is likely to be permanent." These 
words were exactly those used in the Income Tax Act 1952 to specify 
the circumstances in which spouses were to be treated as separate 
persons for income tax purposes5?. The amendment therefore put the 
treatment of the maintenance on the same basis as the treatment of the 
individuals for incane tax. It passed through Parliament without 
comment.
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Payments To Ex-Partners For A Fixed Term Of Years 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants and The Law Society informed 
the Revenue that it was not unusual for partnership agreements to 
require covenanted payments to be made to ex-partners for a fixed term 
of years rather than for life, so that the retired partner obtained a 
"pension" for a guaranteed term without saddling the partnership with 
a liability for an indefinite period.88 if the ex-partner died before 
the fixed term expired the payments would continue, and the person to 
benefit fran them would depend upon the terms of the deceased's will. 
Where the right to the payments passed to the ex-partner's widow or 
dependants, the conditions of section 12 of the Finance Act 1965 would 
be satisfied and surtax relief would continue. But if his estate was 
left to some other person, such as a charity, a friend or distant 
relative, then no surtax relief would be due. It was thought unfair 
that surtax relief for the continuing partners depended upon the 
terms of the deceased partner's will.89
Although the Inland Revenue agreed with these contentions and 
recommended that appropriate modifications be made to meet the case,90 
the Financial Secretary asked them "to consider a ten year limit for 
fixed term payments to qualify for the surtax deduction."91 He was 
not very precise about what he wanted and although the instructions to 
Parliamentary C o u n s e l ^  refer to a ten year period running from the 
date of death of the partner, this was later altered to run from the
date of retirement.93
The first draft of the clause referred to payments made, (no matter 
when they were due), in the ten year period following the partner's
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retirement,but the Revenue quickly picked up on the point that this 
restriction could easily be avoided by making payments in advance just 
before the ten years expired.95 An amendment was made so that only 
payments falling due within the ten year period would qualify for 
surtax relief.96 The provisions became section 23(4) of the Finance 
Act 1966 without any parliamentary comment.
Other Payments To Ex-Partners And To Former Owners Of Businesses 
Under section 12 (3) of the Finance Act 1965, annual payments by a 
partner under a partnership agreement, or by any person in connection 
with his acquisition of a business or part of a business, were 
deductible for surtax purposes, provided they were incurred for full 
consideration, and that the recipient was a former member of" the 
partnership, or the former proprietor of the business, or was a widow 
or dependant of such a person. Various problems arose from these 
highly restrictive rules.
If annual payments were made to an ex-partner under a partnership 
agreement, then to obtain relief section 12 required them to be made 
"by a member of a partnership" to "a member of the partnership."^
The Institute of Chartered Accountants had taken Counsel's opinion on 
this requirement and provided a copy to the Inland Revenue.98 Counsel 
advised that where partner D joined a partnership of B and C after the 
retirement of a former partner A, then D was never a member of the 
partnership of which A was a member. Therefore, any undertaking by D 
to pay part of A's annuity could not be eligible for relief. The 
Solicitor of Inland Revenue had already advised the Board in similar 
terms,99 and they accepted that this was a shortcoming of section 12.1
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The basis of the problem was that although commercially many 
partnerships were treated as a continuing entity even though the 
partners changed over time, that treatment was not in accordance with 
partnership law because every time a partner was admitted or retired 
there was a new partnership. In the example above, the continuing 
partners B and C could obtain relief for their payments to A under the 
old partnership agreement, because payments were allowable for surtax 
purposes if they were made to a retired partner by a continuing 
partner who was a member of the partnership existing at the time of 
the retirement of the former partner.2 a person who became a partner 
after another partner's retirement, (as D did in the above example), 
would never have been a member of the same partnership as the retired 
partner, so his share of the payments to that retired partner would not 
be eligible for surtax relief.
The Revenue thought it would be possible to get round this difficulty 
by framing partnership agreements in such a way as to fix the 
liability to make the payments on those persons who had been in 
partnership with the retired partner and making appropriate 
adjustments of the division of profits to take this into account.3 
However, they advised the Chancellor that this would make the drafting 
of partnership agreements excessively complicated and would not 
provide a solution where the retired partner outlived all the members 
of the partnership at the time of his retirement.4 The Accountants 
and the Law Society had suggested to the Revenue that the appropriate 
way to deal with this problem would be to give surtax relief for 
covenanted payments to a former partner by partners who had joined the 
partnership after his retirement as well as by those who were members
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of it at the time of the retirement.5 The Revenue agreed with their 
suggestion but decided to investigate the consequences of changes of 
partnership more thoroughly.
Their investigation showed up two other flaws in section 12(3) of the 
Finance Act 1965. Firstly, there was an anomaly if a business 
previously carried on by a partnership ultimately came to be carried 
on by one surviving partner, because he would then not be a member of 
a partnership as required by the section and would not obtain relief 
for his payments to his former partners. Secondly, another anomaly 
arose where the business of a sole proprietor had been acquired by a 
partnership in consideration of an annuity and then the partners 
changed but the annuity continued, because no relief would be 
available to a person who was not a partner at the time the business 
was acquired as he would not be making the annual payments "in 
connection with the acquisition by him of the ... business."6
Both of these anomalies and the problem which had been discussed with 
the professional^bodies were put to the Chancellor,7 and as the 
Financial Secretary advised him that they were "a logical and 
reasonable extension of what we conceded last year,"8 he agreed to the 
introduction of appropriate legislation.
The drafting of the modifications caused considerable difficulty due 
to the Revenue's insistence on ensuring that they went no further than 
was absolutely necessary to remove the three defects identified.9 
However, as the drafting process continued, more and more anomalies 
were discovered and each was corrected.10
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The Budget Statement made only the most bare reference to the 
relaxations which were proposed.11 Although there were no Government 
amendments at the committee stage, the Opposition put one down 
intended to remove the requirement for full consideration if the 
covenant was merely a renewal of one which qualified for relief but 
which had expired.12 The Inland Revenue had been careful that the 
Budget resolution specifically mentioned that the relaxations were 
only to apply to payments for full consideration.13 This ensured that 
any attempt to extend the relaxations to payments containing an 
element of bounty would be out of order because it would switch the 
surtax liability to the recipient.14 Even though the Opposition 
amendment was out of order, Mrs Thatcher made a number of points on 
the Stand Part Debate which explained why it was thought to be 
necessary.^
She gave two examples of situations in which it was thought reasonable 
to give relief even though the liability was not incurred for full 
consideration. The first was where a retired partner had a right to 
an annuity from the partnership which was about to expire but which 
would be renewed. The second was where a partnership renewed an 
annuity to the widow of a retired partner under a covenant which had 
expired.1  ^ The Government's response was that such cases did not 
arise from bona fide business arrangements and were purely matters of 
bounty.1? Mrs Thatcher was quick to point out that entering into 
arrangements for bona fide business reasons was quite different from 
incurring a liability for full consideration. She submitted that 
there were good business reasons for a partnership, particularly in a 
small town, to look after former partners and widows of former
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partners, because of the possible bad reputation which a failure to do 
so would create.18 The Board had advised ministers that even though 
full consideration was difficult to define precisely, it would clearly 
exclude artificial partnerships used to obtain a surtax deduction for 
annual payments to, say, members of an individual's family.19 It was 
almost certainly concern over such possible abuses which led the 
Government to resist the withdrawal of the requirement for full 
consideration.
Another objection raised by Mrs Thatcher was that because a number of 
annuitants had commuted their right to income from the partnership in 
return for a capital sum by assigning that right to a financial 
institution, the partners were prevented from obtaining surtax 
relief. Because this was sanething beyond the payer's control, she 
believed a further relaxation should be introduced.20 The Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury promised to look at the point, but without 
any undertaking to introduce an amendment to meet it.21
The Revenue investigated the matter and found that it was the subject 
of only one representation by the professional bodies to the 
Chancellor.22 Furthermore, they were unable to find any case in which 
such a commutation had actually occurred22 and reasoned that such 
commutations would be infrequent because the financial institutions 
would be unwilling to buy annuities of uncertain duration which 
depended upon the credit-worthiness of the firm making payment and its 
continued prosperity.24 They argued that if there were such cases 
they deserved no special treatment because they were "an attempt to 
get the best of both worlds"25 as surtax relief would be available to
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the payer while the retired partner would obtain a capital sum not 
liable to tax.26 The Revenue thought that if partners wanted to 
protect themselves from any possible disallowance of their payments 
for surtax purposes, they would merely have to provide in the covenant 
that the annuity was not assignable. It was these arguments which 
appear to have persuaded ministers that no action was necessary, and 
the matter was dropped.
At the report stage, the Opposition made a further attempt to 
introduce a relaxation for bounteous covenants renewed after April 6, 
1965, but again their amendment was out of order. The only Government 
amendment involved a technical alteration to correct a minor drafting 
error which the Revenue had noticed too late for the committee 
stage.2  ^ The relevant provisions became section 23(1), (2), (3) and 
(6) of the Finance Act 1966.
Sub-section 1 effectively involved no change from the 1965 
provisions. It provided surtax relief for payments made under a 
partnership agreement and for full consideration to a former partner, 
(or if he was dead, to his widow or dependants), by someone who had 
been in partnership with him.
Sub-section 2 dealt with annual payments made in connection with the 
acquisition by an individual of a business or a part of a business. 
Paragraph (a) gave surtax relief for annual payments made by an 
individual or a member of a partnership in connection with the 
acquisition of a business. It also included the case where an annuity 
was payable for a specified share in a partnership. Paragraph (b)
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enabled incoming partners to claim surtax relief for their share of 
annuities payable for full consideration to partners who had left the 
business before they entered it. It also allowed relief for cases 
where a business originally sold by a sole trader was still being paid 
for by means of annual payments from the successors of the partnership 
which bought him out.
Sub-section 3 set a limit to the amount of surtax relief an incoming 
partner would obtain for his share of the annual payments which the 
existing partnership was already under a liability to pay. However it 
did not affect the relief where the new partner simply purchased an 
outgoing partner*s share of the business on an arm's length basis.
Sub-section 6 specified what was meant by a "preceding partnership". 
This definition was required for the purposes of sub-section (2)(b) 
because incoming partners were only entitled to surtax relief for 
annual payments to retired partners of a preceding partnership. In 
order to qualify as a preceding partnership there had to be a 
continuity of the business/ or part of it, between the current 
partnership and its predecessor. AlsO/On each change of partnership 
there had to be one or more partners who were members of both the old 
and the new partnership.
MINOR ALTERATIONS BY THE FINANCE ACT 1980 AND LATER FINANCE ACTS 
By consolidation in ICTA 1970, the 1965 and 1966 provisions were 
merged into one sec t i o n ^  to which two amendments were made by the 
Finance Act 1980. Firstly, a limited form of relief was inserted for 
additional annual payments made to a former member, or a widow or
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dependant or a deceased former member, of a partnership. Relief was 
made available for those additional payments provided they did not 
take the total of such annual payments beyond the amount of 
partnership retirement annuity which could be treated as earned 
incane.29 secondly, a new let-out was inserted which effectively 
introduced relief at higher rates for covenanted payments to charities 
up to a limit of £3,000 per annum.2° The limits on relief were
increased from £3,000 to £5,000 and then to £10,000, and eventually an 
unlimited relief was introduced by section 32 (1) of the Finance Act 
1986. That Act also introduced new sub-sections IB and 1C which were 
consequential upon the provisions designed to prevent abuse of the 
exemption of the income of charities.
CONCLUSION
Although the application of the settlement legislation to short-term 
gains was the first time it had been used to any extent outside income 
tax, all the other changes up to 1964 were relatively unimportant. 
However, with the election of a Labour Government committed to 
attacking avoidance, the Revenue would have been foolish not to have 
grasped the opportunity provided by the changed political climate to 
put forward radical proposals for extending the scope of the 
settlement provisions. It is noticeable that the suggestions all 
favoured the Revenue and that no mention was made to the Chancellor of 
the draconian provisions concerning loans to settlors and the severe • 
judicial criticism of them.21
Even the new Government, pledged to reform, would only take on board 
part of the Revenue's proposals, and in their hurry, ill thought-out
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legislation was introduced which had to be re-cast the following year.
It is fair to say that by 1966 the settlement legislation had 
virtually reached its high-watermark and that bar the provisions 
introduced in 1977 to deal with reverse annuities, virtually all the 
changes after 1966 were either incidental to new legislation in other 
areas or specific relaxations made as a matter of policy.
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CHAPTER 11
1966-1988: PARTY POLITICS, CIRCULAR SCHEMES, REVENUE SELF-INTEREST AND 
STABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Many of the alterations to the settlement provisions in the period 
fran 1966 to 1988 resulted frcm changes in tax legislation in other 
areas. Thus, aggregation of a child's income with that of the parent, 
disallowance of interest paid as a deduction for income tax purposes, 
and the introduction of capital transfer tax relief for maintenance 
funds for historic buildings, all led to modifications to the 
settlement provisions.
However, there were additions and alterations which were a direct 
result, not of changes in other areas of tax law, but of specific 
problems perceived by the inland Revenue. The reverse annuity 
provisions of the Finance Act 1977 were a response to an expectation 
by the Revenue that they would lose the case of CIR v Plummer ,1 and 
the changes to section 451 ICTA 1970 anticipated their loss of an 
important point in the case of Piratin v CIR 2.
Although the Revenue's fears about the Piratin case turned out to be 
justified, they only lost four other settlement cases during the 
period and won eleven. Two of their losses turned on narrow and 
specific points which were unlikely to recur because they were based 
upon the particular wording of the trust deeds.3 Another was Bulmer v 
CIR^ which, although it was an important case, involved a wholly
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commercial transaction with no apparent tax avoidance motive and did 
not therefore enable the Revenue to argue that corrective legislation 
was necessary. However, the principle formulated in that case was 
heavily relied upon in the highly artificial reverse annuity schemes 
under which annuities were created in consideration of a non-taxable 
capital sum and of which the Plummer case was an example. The most 
recent case lost by the Revenue was IRC v LevyS in which they 
unsuccessfully contended that interest free loans to a company in 
which 99% of the shares were owned by the lender, involved an element 
of bounty and formed part of a settlement.
AGGREGATION OF CHILDRENS INVESTMENT INCOME WITH PARENTAL INCOME
The Background to Aggregation and Its General Manner of Operation 
The legislation which required the investment income of unmarried 
infants who were not regularly working to be aggregated with the 
income of their parents was introduced by section 15 and schedule 8 of 
the Finance Act 1968, and came into operation on April 6, 1969.
Certain modifications were made by the Finance Act 1969, but they and 
the 1968 provisions were short-lived and were repealed by the Finance 
Act 1971 with effect from April 6, 1972.6
The majority of the Radcliffe Royal Commission on Taxation (reporting 
in 1954) were against aggregation,”7 but a minority recommended that 
because a family constituted a common spending unit, the child's 
income should be aggregated.8 one of the minority was Professor 
Nicholas Kaldor who, by 1968, had become an economic adviser to the 
Government and was receiving copies of policy papers concerning 
taxation.^
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In February 1965 the inland Revenue had provided a lengthy paper to 
the chancellor explaining their discontent with the tax treatment of 
non-parental covenants to minors and payments under court order for 
minor unmarried children of a divorced or separated parent. They had 
also expressed dissatisfaction that no surtax was chargeable on income 
accumulated under irrevocable settlements of capital by parents on 
their minor unmarried children.10 The aggregation provisions in the 
Finance Act 1968 neatly dealt with all these grievances except for 
accumulated income. But the chancellor promised to take action on 
that in the Finance Act 1969. H
What prompted the decision to bring in aggregation is not evident from 
Parliamentary Counsel*s files. However, the inland Revenue provided a 
memorandum to the Chancellor on December 22, 1967 setting out the then 
current system, the views expressed in the Royal commission's Report 
and the detailed provisions necessary to achieve aggregation.12 There 
was a two month delay before the chancellor gave the go-ahead. The 
legislation was to achieve the following:
a) aggregation of all investment income and capital gainsll of minor 
_unmarried children who were not in full-time employment with that
of the parent or other person having custody of the child; and
b) withdrawal of the £5 exemption for income arising from 
parent/child settlements.14
Because of the need to make enquiries about untaxed income of minor 
children in order to collect the tax on it through PAYE, the 
legislation was not to be operative until 1969/70.
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The Revenue persuaded the Chancellor that it was essential to deal 
with accumulation settlements to prevent taxpayers escaping the 
aggregation provisions by merely creating such settlements on 
children, but it was decided to defer action for a year. However, the 
Revenue thought it advisable for the Chancellor to make some statement 
of intent in his Budget Speech and suggested a suitable form of 
words^ which he used verbatim.
"The picture will not be complete, however, until we have dealt 
with certain associated questions, such as the use of 
settlements to accumulate income. I give notice now that in 
next year's Budget I will attend to these details so that the 
legislation as a whole can come into effect from 6 April,
1969."16
Although a note provided for ministers made it clear that the 
legislation would deal with all accumulation settlements for children, 
and not just those- made by parents or those created after the 1968 
Budget Statement,^ the provisions eventually introduced did not range 
so widely. (See later.)
The Application of Aggregation to Settlements
The aggregation provisions were to apply to all the child's unearned 
income. For settlements, this meant that income received from 
covenants and incane receivable from trusts (no matter who made them) 
was to be treated as the parents'.^ Furthermore, income payable to 
some other person but treated for tax purposes as income of the child, 
for example, because the child had made a revocable settlement, was 
also aggregated.^
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Any aggregated income was to be liable to both incane tax and surtax, 
or to income tax alone, or to surtax alone, according to what the 
treatment would have been had it not been aggregated.20 Usually this 
meant that both income tax and surtax would have been chargeable, but 
where a child's income under a deed of covenant was already deemed to 
be the payer's for surtax purposes, it could only be treated as the 
child's for incane tax purposes,21 and therefore only income tax would 
be charged on the parent.
A
Any parent who paid additional tax as a result of aggregation had the 
right to recover it from the child, but if all or part of that 
additional tax was attributable to undistributed trust income there 
was a right of recovery, exercisable against the trustees, out of
that income.22
Resistance to the Settlement Aspects of Aggregation 
The Royal Commission Minority that had recommended aggregation had 
suggested that a child's investment income up to £25 should be 
exempted fron aggregation, believing that this would save work.23 The 
Revenue view on this was that it would create more work by making it 
necessary to obtain details of the investment income of all children 
in order to apply the de minimus exemption2  ^where a child's 
investment income did not exceed £25. As they thought a £25 limit 
would probably encourage grandparents and others to covenant to 
children up that limit and so impose an additional burden of dealing 
with repayment claims, they strongly disfavoured the suggestion.25
It was decided on practical grounds that there should be no de 
minimus exemption for aggregation purposes^ and it followed that the
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£5 de minimus exemption for parent/child settlements would have to be 
removed. Had this not been done, the settlement provisions would have 
deemed up to £5 to be the child's, and then the aggregation provisions 
would have deemed it to be the parent's. This would have made the £5 
exemption pointless and the Revenue suggested that as there was "no 
sound reason for a de minimus exemption [and] practical considerations 
are against it" the exempt income limit for settlements should be
removed.27
Once the Bill was published a representative of the National Savings 
Committee wrote to the Chancellor asking for a £5 de minimus exemption 
on the grounds that even before aggregation had been proposed, the 
Committee had received protests concerning the way in which the tax 
treatment of income accruing on investments in children's names acted 
as a deterrent to saving by parents and others on their behalf.28 The 
Chancellor accepted that without some small exemption the provisions 
would cause irritation and have adverse repercussions out of 
proportion to the revenue involved, so that when the point was raised 
during the committee stage debate, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
promised to look into the matter "with a certain amount of
sympathy ".29
An amendment was introduced to provide an exemption where the child's 
total investment income, including income from a parental settlement, 
did not exceed £5. Thus, settlement cases previously excepted under 
the old £5 exemption limit applying to parental settlements were 
thereafter caught if the child had other investment income taking the 
total over £5.
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There were two exceptions to aggregation; one provided by the Finance 
Act 1968, the other by the Finance Act 1969.30 The 1969 amendment 
enabled the Opposition to attempt to introduce an amendment of their 
own to increase the de minimus limit to £50. In the course of debate 
various hard cases were put forward in support of such a change.31 
However, as the Revenue had advised ministers that such an amendment 
would merely encourage covenants in favour of children up to the £50 
limit and that this would cost in the region of twelve and a half 
million pounds per annum,32 the Government decided against it.33
Accumulation Trusts
The chancellor's promise in his Budget Statement of 1968 to deal with 
accumulation trusts turned out to be a damp squib. It only resulted 
in the repeal of section 228 I.T.A. 1952, under which claims to 
repayment of income tax could be made on account of personal reliefs 
once the beneficiary reached a specified age or married.
The chancellor would probably have liked to have extended the 
aggregation provisions to any income accumulated to which the infant 
was contingently entitled, but was almost certainly advised that this 
posed great difficulties, not least of which was the problem of cases 
where the beneficiary turned out not to get a vested right. The only 
feasible alteration in the law was probably the repeal of section 
228. With investment income being aggregated it would have been 
absurd not to have repealed this section, because the whole basis of 
it was to go back over the years during which the income arose and 
allow the child's unused personal reliefs against the income 
accumulated for his benefit in those years.
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The inability to find a logical and justifiable way to tax the income 
of accumulation settlements left open the tax advantages of the 
transfer of assets into an irrevocable children's accumulation trust. 
Although the children would not obtain an income tax repayment on the 
income arising, the trustees would only pay income tax on it, and the 
settlor could thereby shelter family wealth from surtax.
The Repeal of Aggregation
During the debates on the 1968 Finance Bill there were assurances from 
the conservatives that they would repeal aggregation at the earliest 
opportunity.34 The matter was considered important enough to take a 
place in the 1970 Conservative Manifesto which promised to "repeal the 
Labour changes which have imposed new penalties on children's
income."35
In the September following the formation of a conservative Government 
in June 1970, the inland Revenue briefed the chancellor on the precise 
extent of the repeal of aggregation.36 They put on record their view 
that aggregation had provided a useful restriction on tax avoidance 
involving minor children, but assumed "that you will regard yourself 
as committed to the complete repeal of these provisions."37 The 
Revenue urged that to avoid the work involved in a post-Budget 
recoding in 1971, the repeal should be made effective frcm 1972/73. 
Another possibility was for an announcement to be made in October 1970 
that the legislation would be repealed in the Finance Act of 1971 so 
that the coding for 1971/72 could be carried out on that assumption. 
The Chancellor chose the deferral of the repeal.
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Although the additional revenue arising from aggregation had been 
estimated in 1968 at between twenty and twenty-five million pounds per 
annum, the cost of repeal was estimated at between fifteen million and 
twenty million pounds per annum.38 The Revenue warned that this cost 
might well increase "as greater public attention is focused on the 
possibility of tax savings by settlements, covenants etc. for the 
benefit of children."39
In 1969, during the debates on the repeal of section 228 I.T.A. 1952, 
a Conservative spokesman had been strongly critical but the official 
Opposition amendment seeking its retention had been negatived.40 The - 
Inland Revenue therefore took an early opportunity to try to persuade 
the Chancellor that section 228 should not be reintroduced by pointing 
to its illogicality.41 Because the Revenue believed that a completely 
logical approach would require "sane pretty complicated legislation 
and might produce a lot of mainly unproductive work,"42 the chancellor 
was advised that the best practical course was to leave section 228 as 
inoperative for income arising after 1968/69.43 This advice appears 
to have been taken without any resistance.
Another problematical area for the Revenue was the reintroduction of 
the £5 per annum de minimus exemption into the children's settlement 
provisions. In the Finance Bill debates in 1968 and 1969,
Conservative Members had suggested fairly significant increases in the 
exemption limit. However, the Revenue advised the chancellor that 
they were most reluctant to recommend any increase because of its 
cost, both in terms of revenue lost and additional work on repayment 
claims.44 The available papers indicate no Government dissent from
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the Revenue's view and the £5 limit was therefore reintroduced in 
exactly the same form as before its repeal by the Finance Act of 
1968.45
REDUCTION IN THE AGE OF MAJORITY
As the Government accepted the reccmmendation of the Latey committee46 
to reduce the age of majority to 18, section 16 of the Finance Act 
1969 was introduced to make the appropriate modifications throughout 
the tax legislation. However, there was one exception. A conditional 
reduction in .the age limit was to apply to parent/child settlements so 
that income could still be deemed to be the parent's after the child 
was 18, if he or she was under 21 and was not working regularly.
Although questions of fiscal policy were outside the Latey committee's 
terms of reference, such questions were not beyond their comment, and 
they had recommended that "infancy should cease for fiscal purposes at 
18,"47 even for parent/child settlements.48 a  Conservative member 
therefore put down an amendment aimed at ensuring that the 
parent/child settlement provisions would only apply where the child 
was under 18 and unmarried. The Chancellor did not accept that such a 
change would be justified, because a person between the ages of 18 and 
21 who was not working regularly would normally be dependent upon 
their parents, and that fact was recognised by the parent's right to 
child allowance if the child was undergoing full-time education.4^
The Revenue reminded the chancellor that the basic objective of the 
settlement legislation was to stop avoidance, and cautioned him that 
the cost of the amendment would probably be very substantial because 
it would be exploited by parents with children over 18 at school or
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university through covenanted payments and capital settlements in 
their favour.50
In the committee stage debates the singling out of parent/child 
settlements was described by the Opposition as "the mean and niggling 
exception to the broad general rule ...",51 but the Government refused 
to alter its policy. When the new conservative Government of 1970 
wanted to remove the "niggling exceptions" the Revenue argued on cost 
grounds that no modification should be made. They were at first 
unable to quantify the potential loss of tax but warned that it could 
easily be substantial in view of the number of young people continuing 
their education after the age of 18.52
Neither the chief Secretary nor the Financial Secretary agreed with 
the Revenue's view that the childrens' settlement provision should not 
cease to run automatically when the child reached 18, but initially 
the Chancellor was undecided.53 jn early March of 1971, after the 
Revenue had found it necessary to remind him that a decision was 
necessary,54 he requested an estimate of its cost.55 Although the 
Revenue had to speculate on this, as there was no way of knowing how 
many parents would take advantage of the proposed change, they thought 
two factors might restrain the tax loss.56 Firstly, they assumed that 
the regulations concerning student grants would be changed so that a 
student's income fran a settlement, would also be treated as his for 
grant purposes and reduce any advantage from the change in the tax 
rules. Secondly, they believed that the reduction in the parent's 
child allowance once the child's income exceeded £115, would tend to 
limit the number and value of parental transfers.5"^ Despite the
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uncertainty the Revenue gauged that the cost would be in the order of 
one million pounds a year and that there would be twenty-five extra 
clerks required to deal with the resultant repayment claims.58 within 
a few days of receiving the Revenue's estimates the chancellor decided 
to go ahead and remove the conditions attaching to the age limit of 
18.59
The only noteworthy point in the drafting process is that it 
illustrates the need to draft tax legislation with the Scottish legal . 
system in mind. The Revenue had suggested the use of a reference to 
"an infant" rather than to a child who has not attained the age of 18, ! 
but a few weeks later there was a change of mind and the draftsman was 
advised that it would be better to refer to the age of 18 as otherwise 
"we would have to translate for Scotland in terms of minority and 
pupilarity."60 it is not uncommon for "Scottish amendments" to be 
inserted as an afterthought.
The provisions formed part of clause 10 of the Finance Act 1971 which 
also repealed aggregation. At the committee stage, the Liberal Party 
put down an amendment proposing the complete deletion of the 
clause.51 This was an almost complete reversal of its previous 
attitude, as during the 1968 debates Mr Richard Wainwright had 
supported amendments designed either to wreck or to draw the teeth of 
the aggregation provisions.52 After a long debate by a committee of 
the whole House the clause was agreed to without any modification.53
THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTIONS ON RELIEF FOR INTEREST PAID
When the Finance Act 1969 introduced severe restrictions on relief for
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interest paid,64 the inland Revenue realised that beneficiaries of a 
trust could nevertheless effectively obtain relief for surtax purposes 
on interest paid by the trustees.65 p0r example, where the gross 
income of the trust was £1,000, and interest with a gross equivalent 
of £100 was paid by the trustees, only £900 would be income of the 
life tenant. Thus, because the administrative expenses of the 
trustees were a deduction in arriving at the income attributable to 
the life tenant, the result was the loss of surtax on the gross 
equivalent of any interest paid by the trustees.66
The Revenue thought it would be unacceptably severe to impose a surtax 
charge on beneficiaries in respect of income paid out as interest, 
because they had not received it. However, they thought it acceptable 
that if the income of a settlement was treated as the settlor's then 
interest paid by the trustees ought to be treated in the same way.67 >
It was explained to the chancellor that without such a rule it would 
be open to an individual who wished to borrow to acquire investments 
to set up a trust for this purpose and thereby gain a tax
advantage.68
There was no need for special provisions for trusts in which income 
could not be treated as the settlors, and it was unnecessary to deal 
with settlements caught by those anti-avoidance provisions which 
treated income arising as the settlors, because non-qualifying 
interest paid would not be deductible in calculating the incane 
arising.69 initially, the Revenue only wanted anti-avoidance 
provisions for those sections of the settlement code which operated by 
reference to the undistributed income of the settlement,70 but later
379
decided they wanted an analogous provision to deal with children's 
settlements.71 There is nothing on the files of parliamentary Counsel 
to indicate that the Revenue met any opposition in getting what they 
wanted.
The provisions concerning interest paid by settlements in which 
undistributed income, or part of it, was treated as the settlor's, 
were introduced by paragraphs 9 and 10 of schedule 13 to the Finance 
Act 1969, whose general manner of operation was to increase the amount 
of income treated as undistributed. This was done by excluding 
interest payments from the deductions permitted in calculating 
undistributed income. If income arising in a tax year had been paid 
out, other than as interest, to a person who had to count that sum as 
his income, any interest paid by the trustees was apportioned rateably 
between income paid out and income retained, to ensure that the 
treatment of interest paid by trustees was no more disadvantageous 
than for individuals, the provisions did not apply where that interest 
qualified for tax relief.
If interest was paid by the trustees to the settlor or the wife or 
husband of the settlor, there would have been a double charge to tax; 
once on the income actually received, and again on the amount of 
interest treated as undistributed income. An exception was therefore 
provided to prevent such a double charge. However, in other cases, 
the disallowance of interest in calculating the undistributed income 
was not to affect the tax liability of the person actually receiving
that interest.72
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An interesting insight given by the drafting instructions is the 
Revenue*s request that no mention be made of the application of the 
provisions to capital sums paid to the settlor,73 even though they 
were to apply to such cases. The reason for this was that "neither 
this Bill nor its predecessor pays any attention to the scathing 
■criticisms of section 408 made by the House of Lords in CIR v 
Bates."74 it seems that the Revenue wanted to reduce the risk of 
parliamentary criticism which might have led to amendment of the rules 
governing capital payments to the settlor. As it was, there was 
virtually no .parliamentary discussion of the provisions.75
The approach in the case of children's settlements was the converse of 
that explained above, because it was not accumulated income which was 
attributed to the settlor from such settlements, but income paid out. 
It was provided therefore, that if all the income arising was paid 
out, any interest paid by the trustees was to be deemed to have been 
income paid to or for the benefit of a child of the settlor, and was, 
as a consequence, treated as the settlor's. However, where only part 
of the income arising was distributed, only a proportionate part of 
the interest paid was deemed to have been paid out for the benefit of 
the child and treated as the settlor's. The necessity for special 
rules for children's settlements appears to have been realised rather 
late by the inland Revenue, as it was April 23, 1969 before they asked 
the draftsman to put together a clause.75 The only explanation they 
gave him for needing the provisions was that "the trustees could 
distribute the whole incane for the benefit of minor children and 
increase the amounts so distributed by borrowing to buy 
securities."77 it is not at all clear what was meant by this, as it
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would be unusual for the return on an investment to exceed the 
interest payable on the loan, it is thought that the Revenue were 
probably worried that a settlor who intended to borrow to make an 
investment and who would obtain no relief for the interest payable, 
might persuade the trustees of a children's settlement, of which he 
was the settlor, to make the borrowings and receive the income from 
the investment, if the income was to be paid out anyway, and so 
treated as the settlor's, it would have been reduced by the interest 
payable, and therefore, effectively, the settlor would obtain surtax 
relief on the interest paid by the trustees. Under the anti-avoidance 
provisions, if the total income was paid out to the child, then not 
only that income, but also the interest paid by the trustees, would be 
treated as the settlor's. However, the rationale for these provisions 
is much less clear than that for undistributed income.
The drafting of the legislation followed very closely the provisions 
applying to undistributed income, and the same let-outs applied for 
interest which was eligible for tax relief and payments of interest to 
the settlor or his spouse. Similarly, the provisions were not to 
affect the liability of the person actually in receipt of the 
interest. There was little debate on these proposals in Parliament. 78
With the virtual removal of the restrictions on relief for interest 
paid in the Finance Act 1972, the corresponding provisions relating to 
interest paid by trustees became unnecessary and were repealed,*79 but 
with the reintroduction of those restrictions by the Finance Act 1974, 
they were reinstated in exactly the same form and without any
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discussion whatsoever.80
MAINTENANCE FUNDS FOR HISTORIC BUILDINGS 
Striking A Bargain - The Lib/Lab Pact
The Finance Act 1976, introduced measures which enabled the owner of a 
historic house to set up a trust fund for its maintenance without 
creating a capital transfer tax (CTT) charge either when the trust was 
set up, or subsequently.The result was that the fund was sheltered 
frcm the CTT .which would have arisen if it had been kept in the 
familyfs ownership. A capital gains roll-over relief was also 
introduced for the disposal of the assets to the maintenance fund.82 
A fundamental aspect of both these reliefs was that the fund should be 
irrevocably dedicated to the maintenance of the house, but subject to 
the possibility of an ultimate gift over for national purposes or to a 
heritage charity. The fund could therefore never revert to the 
settlor or his family.
The conditions for relief were so stringent that in the first twelve 
months of their operation, no maintenance funds were set up.83 jn an 
attempt to make them more attractive, two new clauses were put down 
for consideration during the passage of the Finance Bill 1977; one by 
Conservative back-benchers, and the other by the Liberals.
The Conservative's clause84 was designed to relax the conditions for 
relief to enable capital to pass back tax free to the settlor, or 
subject to a CTT charge, to other beneficiaries. This was based upon 
the general line being adopted by the heritage lobby and the
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Conservative's that the maintenance fund exemption would be 
insufficiently attractive unless capital could eventually pass back to 
the settlor or his descendents. The inland Revenue warned the chief 
Secretary to the Treasury that if such a concession was granted, 
maintenance funds could be used "as a money box in which the family's 
wealth can accumulate for relatively low CTT charges."85 They also 
opined that there would be nothing to stop people having no connection 
with the historic building setting up a maintenance fund "so the 
potential range of abuse is substantial."85 They made it perfectly 
clear that this new clause should be firmly resisted.8?
The Liberal's clause was designed to limit, the tax rate on income of a 
maintenance fund to the basic rate plus the investment income 
surcharge, but made no attempt to alter the conditions for 
qualification as a maintenance fund.88 calls for a similar form of 
relief had been made in the debates on the Finance Bill 1976,89 but at 
that time ministers accepted the advice of the Inland Revenue and were 
unwilling to provide any relaxation of the income tax charge.90 
However, the Lib/Lab Pact had made the political situation in 1977 
different, and although the Revenue thought that under normal 
circumstances it would be undesirable to accept the new clause, except 
where the owner or occupier of the house was not the settlor, they 
realised that the then current parliamentary situation made it 
imprudent to reject it.91 They therefore suggested that a concession 
could be granted to the Liberals "as the price of the Liberals voting 
with the Government in resisting the Capital Transfer Tax new clause 
and any other proposal for CTT relaxation in this field."92 They 
thought that the most sensible course of action would be to raise the
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matter with Mr Pardoe, the Liberal spokesman, in advance, and attached 
a draft of a letter^ which the Chief Secretary^ issued, without 
amendment, the following day.95
In the meantime, the Liberal Party had been considering an additional 
new clause, similar in effect to that of the Conservatives, to allow 
the capital to pass back to the settlor and his family.96 Because of 
this Mr Pardoe did not reply for over two weeks and indicated that he 
would have been prepared to come to sane agreement but for the changed 
situation.97 He suggested a meeting to help come to a final 
decision. A meeting was arranged and the Liberals agreed not to
pursue their CTT clause or to support the Conservative new clause in
return for the Government's promise to concede the income tax point.98
The following day the three new clauses were discussed together, and 
in accordance with their pact the Liberals did not press their CTT 
clause;99 a fact that did not go unnoticed and which was scornfully 
criticised by the conservatives.1 As the Government's side of the
bargain, the Minister of State expressed sympathy with the income tax
proposal and promised to bring forward a new clause at the report
stage. The following day the Policy Division of the inland Revenue 
wrote to Parliamentary Counsel with instructions to draft an 
appropriate clause.2
Drafting The 1977 Provisions
The Liberal's new clause was aimed at giving the trustees of a 
maintenance fund the power to elect, within two years of the end of 
the year of assessment, that the incane should only be charged at the
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basic and additional rates. The Government, though forced to agree to 
this, was advised that various technical amendments were required.5
The drafting instructions were extraordinarily complex and to assist 
the draftsman with his task the Revenue explained how the existing 
provisions operated, what had to be achieved and how they thought it 
could be done.
The income tax treatment of a maintenance fund prior to the passing of 
the Finance Act 1977 depended upon whether the owner or occupier of 
the historic building was also the settlor or the settlor*s spouse.
If so, the whole.of the income arising under the trust would, 
according to the Revenue^, be treated as the settlor's5 on the grounds 
that he had retained an interest, or that there was some discretionary 
power for his benefit, or that he had not divested himself absolutely 
of the property, and the trustees would not be liable to additional 
rate tax5. In cases where the owner or occupier was not the settlor, 
the Revenue's view? was that at least some of the payments for the 
maintenance of the house were likely to be taxable as the income of 
the owner or occupier on the principles enunciated in the case of Lady 
Miller v CIR,5 and that the trustees would be liable to additional 
rate tax.
The Revenue pointed out that because income arising to trustees of a 
discretionary trust is their income and the exercise of their 
discretion creates a new source of income, it would be necessary to 
deal separately with income arising and with distributions of that 
income. The objective of the new provisions was to set a ceiling for
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the income tax liability on the trust income at the sum of the basic 
and additional rate. To achieve this, the Revenue suggested it was 
necessary to provide that if an election was made income arising would 
be treated as that of the trustees and not of any other person, and 
that distributions of income would not be counted as income of the 
recipient.  ^ Thus, where an election was made for any particular
year, neither the income arising nor any income distributed in that 
year was to be charged on any individual.
The Revenue realised that there would’ be a difficulty with their 
proposal in years for which no election was made but distributions 
were made. Those distributions would have to be linked with the 
income of particular years and where identification was with income 
which had been subject to an election, that election would have been 
pointless if the eventual distribution caused a tax charge on the 
individual. The Revenue therefore suggested- to the draftsman that a 
distribution in a non-election year should be identified first with 
the income arising in that year and then with the income of the next 
preceding year and so on, but only insofar as that income was not 
already subject to an election or had not already been counted as 
distributed.The aim of this was to ensure that over the life of 
the trust the income of election years could never be charged as 
income of any individual, if, however, the payments exceeded the 
income available for identification, that excess was to be treated as 
paid out of capital.H The draftsman was also asked to ensure that 
where income of a settlement was treated as the settlor's it was not 
taxed again when it was distributed.
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Given the complexity of what was required, it is not surprising that 
the Revenue were not satisfied^ with the draftsman's first attempt!! 
and that considerable correspondence took place between them before an 
acceptable form of words could be found.14 m  the process, various 
other difficulties and concerns were discussed.
A difficult drafting problem involved the potential application of 
section 451 ICTA 1970 to capital payments by the trustees. If 
undistributed income^5 included income for an election year and was- 
caught by section 451 when trustees made a capital distribution,16 
this would have invalidated the effect of the election. Therefore an 
appropriate let-out was inserted to exclude the operation of section 
451 in such circumstances.
The Revenue's instructions to Parliamentary Counsel,1? show that they 
were concerned that the Opposition might succeed in introducing their 
new clause relaxing the qualifying conditions for CTT maintenance 
funds.16 They therefore asked the draftsman to ensure there was no 
possibility of obtaining income tax relief unless the stringent 
requirements of the existing conditions were met, as they were 
"particularly against ... this income tax relief being given as well 
as CTT relief."19
Initially, the Revenue suggested that any repayment supplement arising 
because of an election should be calculated as if the repayment 
related to the tax year in which the election was made.20 However, as 
the Select committee on the Ombudsman had been "taking an interest in 
repayment supplement",^1 the Revenue decided to drop their original
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proposals for fear that they might cause an embarrassing full-scale 
debate on the subject.22
The 1977 Parliamentary Debates
The long debate on these provisions consisted mainly of political 
rather than technical points.23 Matters discussed included the 
possibility of the State taking over heritage properties, the 
relationship between such properties and tourism, and the high tax 
rates which created the need for special rules. One technical point 
concerned the effect of the rule against perpetuities which specified . 
that a fund could not continue for more than eighty years.24 This, it * 
was argued, was a deterrent to the creation of a maintenance fund, 
because once the eighty years' had expired it would have to pass to a 
museum or other body for the public benefit, or to a qualifying 
charity. The Government accepted that the rule did create a problem 
and promised to look into it.25 parliamentary Counsel thought that it 
would not be possible to legislate in a Finance Bill to disapply the 
rule because the connection with taxation was too remote,26 but as, 
ultimately, it depended upon a decision of the Speaker acting on the 
advice of his officials, he offered to consult those officials if the 
Revenue wished.27 The Revenue, however, thought it "not worth 
troubling the Speaker's officials on this at the present stage and we 
very much doubt whether it ever will be."28 The matter thus seems to 
have been quietly dropped.
Further Relaxations in 198Q With Stringent Anti-Avoidance Rules 
Despite the objections of the inland Revenue to the idea of property 
in a maintenance fund being withdrawn for non-heritage purposes, once
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a conservative Government was returned to power the provisions were 
modified to permit such withdrawals.29 As a by-product the problem 
concerning the perpetuity rule was solved.
The Revenue had warned in 1977 that there would be considerable scope 
for abuse if the settlor or his family were allowed to receive capital 
from a maintenance fund. Their argument that in effect there would 
then be little difference between a maintenance fund and a normal 
discretionary trust with the settlor as a potential beneficiary2  ^
persuaded ministers that any relaxations should be guarded by 
stringent anti-avoidance rules to prevent abuse. Because of this the > 
provisions were fairly complex.21
The fundamental principle of the relaxation was that as long as there 
was no withdrawal of property for non-heritage purposes, the fund 
would continue to benefit frcm the existing income tax relief.22 But 
to prevent avoidance, if such a withdrawal took place there was to be 
an income tax charge on any income which had not been applied to 
heritage purposes. The charge therefore arose whenever income or 
capital was applied during the life of the settlement to a 
non-heritage purpose, or was passed to any person, other than an 
approved heritage beneficiary, on the termination of the 
settlement.22
An additional qualifying condition was prescribed for maintenance 
funds so that during the first six years there could be no application 
of capital or income for any non-heritage purpose.24 If trustees 
infringed that condition there was to be an occasion of charge to
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incane tax.35
If an income tax charge arose the trustees were to be charged at 30% 
on the total income, (after deduction of trustees' expenses), arising 
from the time the settlement was created, (or from the last occasion 
of charge), but only to the extent that that income had not been 
applied to maintenance or other approved heritage purposes.36 
However, any income arising in a year of assessment for which no 
election had been made under section 38 of the Finance Act 1977 was 
excluded from the charge.37
The notes for ministers indicate that the objective was to make a 
charge whenever property was withdrawn from a maintenance fund for 
non-heritage purposes, such that there would be no more and no less 
income tax payable than there would have been if that property had not 
been put into the fund in the first place.38 Therefore the only 
income which was to be charged was that which had not been applied for 
maintenance or other heritage purposes at the time of the charge. The 
Board explained that in a case where the fund was of an appropriate 
size for the property concerned, its income would normally be applied 
for heritage purposes more or less fully over the life of the fund.39
Furthermore, as the trustees would be able to control the manner and 
timing of the application of the income, and also the timing of any 
chargeable event, they would be able to arrange matters so that when a 
charge arose, all, or nearly all of the income, would have been 
applied to heritage purposes.40
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Balancing equity with administrative simplicity to arrive at an 
appropriate tax rate was a difficult matter, and various options were 
put to ministers by the Revenue. One approach was to charge tax at 
rates reflecting the differences between the settlor's personal tax 
rates and the trust's tax rates over the whole period to which the 
charge related.41 a simpler method was to assume that the income 
which had not been applied for heritage purposes was that for the most 
recent years and that the tax charge should reflect the difference 
between personal rates and trust rates of tax for those years.42 jn 
the end administrative simplicity dominated any questions of equity 
and it was decided, on the assumption that most individuals who set up 
maintenance funds would be higher rate taxpayers, that a 30% rate 
should be applied to reflect the difference between the highest 
personal tax rate of 75% and the 45% chargeable on the trust.43 no 
direct linkage was created between the maintenance fund rate and the 
personal and trust rates of income tax. Therefore whenever the 
differential between the top rate and the trust rate of income tax is 
reduced it would be reasonable to reduce the 30% rate applicable to 
maintenance funds. Such a reduction has not been made.
A further anti-avoidance aspect of the provisions was designed to 
prevent the possibility of abuse where a non-heritage beneficiary with 
a reversionary interest under the settlement sold that interest to a 
heritage charity. In such a case no tax would have been chargeable 
when the interest devolved on the heritage charity, so that in effect 
the non-heritage beneficiary would have obtained value fran the 
maintenance fund without triggering an income tax charge. A similar 
transaction could have been used to avoid the ban on the extraction of
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property other than for heritage purposes during the initial six year 
period. Section 52(5) of the Finance Act 1980 prevented such forms of 
avoidance by providing that tax would be chargeable if property 
devolved on a heritage body or charity and that body or charity had 
acquired an interest under the settlement for money or money's worth 
other than from another such body or charity.
1982 - Minor Anomalies Are Corrected
Three further changes to the income tax rules affecting maintenance 
funds were made by the Finance Act 1982. Firstly, section 61 dealt 
with the possibility of a double charge arising on the same incane in 
cases where the settlor was carrying on the trade of showing the 
property to the public but had also obtained reimbursement from the 
fund trustees of expenditure on maintenance of that property. If no 
election was made under the Finance Act 1977 provisions, the total 
income of the fund was treated as the settlor's, but as the 
reimbursement of the maintenance expenses would result in a 
disallowance of those expenses for the purposes of calculating the 
trading profit or loss, an effective double charge arose. This had 
not been foreseen, but once it was discovered it was corrected by 
ensuring that the reimbursement was excluded from the trading 
results. The second change enabled part of a settlement to benefit 
from the income tax provisions where the Treasury only approved part 
of it for heritage purposes. Each part was to be treated as if it 
were a separate settlement for the purposes of both Part XVI ICTA 1970 
and the income tax provisions applying to maintenance funds.44 The 
third modification introduced a new power under which the Treasury 
could withdraw approval from maintenance funds45 and cause an income
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tax charge to arise calculated according to the normal rules applying 
to such funds.46
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR NON-T&XABLE CONSIDERATION
The Scheme, Its Discovery By The Revenue, And Proposals To Block it 
An area of weakness in the settlement provisions was highlighted in 
1966 when the case of Bulmer v CIR47 showed their non-application to 
commercial transactions involving no element of bounty. Parliamentary 
Counsel had warned of this in the discussions relating to the drafting 
of the 1965 provisions preventing surtax relief for annual payments;to 
individuals,48 but at that time the Inland Revenue were not unduly 
concerned.49 This weakness was, however, to form the basis of a tax 
avoidance scheme which involved the Revenue in the potential loss of
many millions of pounds. I
The scheme appears to have started in the early 1970's,50 but it was 
not until the end of 1976 that the Revenue began taking steps towards 
the introduction of preventative legislation. By this time they had 
lost before the Special commissioners in Plummer v IRC^I, which 
involved the scheme, and although they were challenging all 330 cases 
which had come to their notice they had "little confidence that we 
shall succeed in all cases."52 it seems that they expected the
decisions in the courts to go against them and thought it necessary to
insure against this by obtaining legislation to frustrate the device 
for the future.
The process leading to the introduction of legislation to annul the
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scheme began with a paper by the Revenue to the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury explaining the details of what was happening and what 
counter-action was necessary.55 At that time the Revenue thought the 
scheme was only being used by individuals but, as they were later to 
find out, it had been exploited by companies too, and in one case the 
company expected to avoid a very considerable tax liability.5^
There were two main variations of the scheme? the type illustrated by 
Plummer v IRC, and the variant involving an insurance company buying 
and selling annuities. The Plummer scheme is well known and the 
details are not discussed here though the illustration provided to the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury is given in Appendix Jl. The variant 
scheme involving an insurance company was illustrated by the following 
example.
"An individual sells an annuity of (say) £15,000 net for 5 years 
to an insurance company for £65,000 and at the same time buys 
from it an annuity for £15,687 gross for 5 years for £66,500.
Using bridging finance, each instalment payable by the invidual 
is met by the sum due to him from the company. As this annuity 
contains a high capital element, the conpany deducts only a 
small amount of tax from the income element, so that the 
individual receives (say) £15,000 net. The capital element in 
the life annuity received is exempt from tax, and it is 
contended that payments to the conpany are deductible in 
conputing the annuitants liability to higher rate tax and 
investment income surcharge. The conpany too hopes to make a 
net gain at the expense of the Revenue from its purchase of the 
annuity, by claiming credit for the income tax deducted from the 
annuity it receives."55
As far as the Revenue were aware, the schemes were operated mainly by
minor insurance companies, a small number of charities and certain
investment companies.55
In December 1977 the estimated loss of tax resulting from the use of 
these schemes was two million pounds a year, but because of the
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expectation that this loss would increase sharply if the courts gave a 
decision adverse to the Revenue, it was recommended that the Finance 
Bill 1977 should contain provisions to remove the schemed tax 
advantages from both the payer and the payee.57 The Revenue suggested 
that this could be achieved by denying the payer of the annuity the 
right to deduct basic rate tax, so ensuring that the payee would not 
be able to claim repayment or credit, and by not allowing the payer a 
deduction for the annuity in computing his total incane.55
A tricky question was whether the legislation should apply only to 
future arrangements, or should be more severe and apply to all future 
payments no matter when the arrangement was made. The Revenue warned 
ministers that the latter alternative could be attacked as being 
retrospective and to expect any attack to refer to the fact that the 
1946 legislation concerning covenants to charities and the 1965 
legislation concerning covenants to individuals, only applied to such 
covenants made after Budget Day.59 The defence, the Revenue 
suggested, was that these were not valid precedents because there was 
nothing artificial about the covenants, the covenantors derived no 
personal benefit, and they did not enter into them solely to reduce 
their tax liability.50 More in point were the precedents of section 
38 of the Finance Act 1976, (involving interest payments where the 
sole or main benefit accruing was the tax relief), and section 81 of 
the conservative Government's Finance Act of 1972, (withholding future 
relief in respect of transactions involving premiums on leases already 
entered into), both of which applied to future payments irrespective 
of the date of the agreement under which the obligation arose.51
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In 1976, the anti-avoidance legislation on interest paid had been 
prefaced by an advance warning in the form of an arranged 
parliamentary question, and the legislation had been operative from 
the date of the answer to that question. This was done because the 
"legislation was concerned with very large sums and the matter had to 
be dealt with urgently."62 The Revenue believed that the tax at stake 
in the current schemes was much less, and recommended that the 
provisions should only apply to payments due after Budget Day.63 
Later discoveries of the extent of the avoidance may have led them to 
regret that recommendation.
Drafting
Two days after receiving the Revenue's briefing the Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury gave authority for them to go ahead with legislation64 
but it was not until six weeks later65 that parliamentary Counsel was 
instructed. The reason for this delay was that the Revenue found the 
subject to be "very tricky stuff"66 and Policy Division had found it 
necessary to discuss the subject fully with their technical and legal 
colleagues.
A detailed note explaining the problem was sent to Parliamentary 
Counsel, but the particular draftsman involved was already well aware 
of it, as the covering note to the drafting instructions indicates.
"You may well smile on reading these instructions. I see that 
you drafted section 12 of the Finance Act 1965 and in the course 
of the correspondence raised the questions which have now come 
home to roost."67
The Revenue thought that modification of the definition of a
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settlement so that it would encompass bona fide commercial 
transactions was not the best means of attack, believing it to be 
"better to legislate outside the scope of Part XVI and ... kill the 
particular schemes ...."68 Any changes to the definition of a 
settlement could have had totally unpredictable consequences and may 
have brought wholly commercial transactions, with no taint of tax 
avoidance, within the scope of Part XVI. Hie draftsman was therefore 
instructed to produce highly targeted provisions giving specific 
exceptions for royalties, payments within section 457(1) (a), (b) or 
(c) ICTA 1970, and for cases where a limited interest under a trust 
was given up in return for annual payments by the reversioner.
However he was to ensure that the legislation applied to transactions 
entered into by trustees and by companies who were not engaged in "a 
genuine business of granting annuities."69
The drafting instructions clearly stated that the legislation should 
apply to payments made after Budget Day, yet the recommendation 
approved by the chief Secretary to the Treasury was that it should 
only apply to payments due after Budget Day. There is no evidence 
that the Revenue obtained approval for this subtle alteration which 
clearly was advantageous to them.70
The first draft of the clause only caught an annuity if none of the 
consideration for it was required to be brought into account for 
income tax or corporation tax purposes.71 The draftsman had missed 
the rather fundamental point that it was necessary to include cases 
where only part of the consideration was not so liable, as otherwise 
purchased life annuities would escape. The appropriate insertion was
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therefore made.
The inland Revenue thought the proposed budget resolution did not make 
it clear that the provisions were to apply to payments after Budget 
Day and that consequently tax would no longer be deductible,"72 and 
were concerned in case a person making such a payment would not know 
this until the Finance Bill was published. Parliamentary Counsel was 
not unduly troubled by this point because he expected the Budget 
Statement to contain a brief description of the proposal; 
particularly as it was effective frcm Budget Day.73 Eventually, the 
Inland Revenue satisfied themselves that no action was needed because 
they realised that people making payments affected by the provisions 
would be entitled to deduct tax, (or required to deduct tax in cases 
where section 53 ICTA 1970 applied), until Royal Assent, and then the 
payer and payee would have to make the appropriate adjustments between
themselves.74
Normally the inland Revenue respond to Parliamentary Counselfs drafts 
within a matter of a few days, but in this case it was over five weeks 
before any reply was made because there were "an exceptionally large 
number of people here ... interested in this clause."75 Even after 
such lengthy consideration their suggestions involved only fairly 
minor points designed to achieve the objective of treading "a narrow 
path between on the one hand innocent transaction and on the other 
leaving gaps in the legislation."76
A Private Informant And A Public Exposure
The proposed clause was apparently finalised when the chairman of the
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Board received an anonymous letter enclosing information concerning a 
further related scheme of avoidance in sufficient detail for the 
Revenue to ascertain that the proposed legislation did not catch it.
(A copy of the letter and the details of the scheme are provided in 
Appendix J2). The lacuna in the draft clause was that it only applied 
to payments subject to the deduction of tax under section 52 (1) or 
section 53 (l)(a) of ICTA 1970 and would not therefore have caught 
payments under a group income election."77 The remedy was to modify 
the proposed legislation so that it applied to any annuity or other 
annual payment charged with tax under case III of schedule D. By this 
means, the deduction of tax at source became irrelevant.
The inland Revenue did not know which companies were involved in this 
new scheme but on May 22, 1977 the "Business News" section of the 
"Sunday Times" reported an unusual footnote to the accounts of George 
Wimpey & Co. It indicated that as a result of transactions which had 
taken place during the year ending 31st December, 1976, the directors 
hoped to obtain a reduction in the company's tax liability equivalent 
to most of the charge for taxation in that year's accountsJ 8 By the 
following week, a "Sunday Times" journalist had obtained the details 
underlying the mysterious comments in the Wimpey accounts.79 For a 
fee of £2.8 million, London Mercantile corporation, (controlled by the 
tax avoidance expert Godfrey Bradman), and Rossminster Group Holdings, 
(which was connected with Roy Tucker and Ronald Plummer), had devised 
a scheme to enable Wimpey to avoid tax of £18.2 million. The details 
of the scheme were exactly the same as those provided to the inland 
Revenue by the anonymous correspondent some two months earlier.
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At the company *s annual meeting on June 13, 1977, the chairman 
explained that the reason for entering into the scheme was to wipe out 
the exceptional tax liability that the company would have otherwise 
incurred as a result of a change of its basis of valuing stock and 
work in progress consequent upon the introduction of SSAP 9.80
Because the clause blocking the scheme was to be debated at the 
committee stage of the Finance Bill shortly after these articles were 
published, the Revenue armed the Chief Secretary to the Treasury with 
a detailed analysis of the implications of the Wimpey case which in 
the event he did not need.81 Embarrassingly, the payment had been 
made prior to Budget Day, and the new provisions would not apply, but 
the Revenue intended to examine the transactions carefully to try to 
establish grounds under the existing law for challenging the effect of 
them in the courts.82
The Revenue raised the possibility of retrospective legislation to 
deal with this case with the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, but 
advised him that this had always been offensive to both Parliament and 
to the general tenor of responsible opinion.83 Although there had 
been purely retrospective legislation in the past, it had mainly 
concerned declarations of the law, or had merely re-established a 
practice which had been upset by a decision of the court. They 
therefore suggested that it would be "quite unprecedented for the 
Government to come forward this year - out of the blue - with a 
proposal that the annuity provision ... should have effect in relation 
to payments made in say 1976",84 even though there would "be a general 
sense of outrage at the apparent enormity of what Wimpey*s (and no
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doubt others) have set out to achieve ...."85 Even though they 
thought it was "a new dimension to tax avoidance that a major public 
conpany should be prepared to embark on such a scheme,"86 they 
advised ministers that this could only be used as an aid to rebutting 
any argument that the provisions ought not to apply to arrangements 
entered into before Budget Day and not to support full scale 
retrospection.87 instead, they recommended that a minister should 
make a statement designed to scare off potential customers from those 
marketing tax avoidance schemes.88 They suggested that this problem 
was not a Party matter, because it involved a deliberate side-stepping 
of what Parliament had intended, and that therefore ministers might be 
able to say that Parliament would "find itself driven to measures 
which are themselves unpalatable, including ... retrospective 
legislation."89 Although the Chief -Secretary agreed with the 
Revenue,98 no statement of the type requested was made.91
The committee And Report Stages
On the publication of the Finance Bill, the Solicitor of Inland 
Revenue for Scotland noticed that the provisions referred to an 
interest in "settled property"; a term which has no meaning in Scots 
Law. He therefore brought this to the attention of the Lord Advocate 
who suggested the insertion of a special Scottish provision referring 
to property held in trust.92 it is surprising that such an obvious 
defect was not noticed earlier, but it seems that the usual process of 
sending draft clauses to the Board's Scottish solicitor does not seem 
to have been followed.
Besides the "Scottish amendment", there were seven others put down for
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discussion at the committee stage. The Revenue advised ministers that 
only one of them merited a promise of further consideration and that 
the rest should be rejected.93
The meritorious amendment concerned the let-out which had been 
provided for the holder of a life interest who surrendered that 
interest to the person next entitled in consideration of an annuity, 
and was designed to extend the let-out so that it would apply to a 
surrender to any person having a subsequent interest.94 The Revenue 
believed that the proposers of the amendment had in mind the kind of 
case where property was settled on A for life and then to his wife B 
for life and then to their son absolutely so that A and B could 
surrender their life interests in consideration of their son paying 
them an annuity for their joint lives and for the life of the 
survivor.95 if this was all that was involved they thought that the 
proposal was probably acceptable but "in the murky atmosphere of tax 
avoidance, [we] come across cases where the arrangements are very 
artificial, such as an interest in settled property which lasts only 
for a few days."96 m  fact the Revenue could not think of a single 
example under which the amendment could be used for avoidance purposes 
and an appropriate amendment was therefore inserted at the report 
stage.
The other six amendments were "designed to explore the dark places of 
the clause."97 They achieved their purpose by forcing the ministers 
to confirm that the provisions applied to:
(a) an annuity payable to an individual, even where that annuity 
was brought into account in computing total income;^
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(b) an annuity in consideration of the purchase of an asset;99 and
(c) annual payments to non-residents.^
They also confirmed that the legislation did not apply to payments 
under a court order or to patent royalties.2
One of the probing amendments eventually resulted in an additional 
let-out. The example used in support of the amendment was of a tenant 
for life who did not have sufficient capital to improve his 
property.2 in such a case one way he could raise capital would be to 
assign his interest in the trust, but an alternative would be to 
covenant to pay an annuity to an institution in return for a capital 
sum, with that annuity being charged upon his interest under the 
trust. The minister promised to consider this type of case,4 and the 
Inland Revenue advised him that as the provisions did not apply to the 
assignment of an interest, there was a case for providing a let-out 
where an annuity charged on that interest was created.5 The only 
reservation the inland Revenue had was that such a let-out would apply 
to annuities charged on property in reversion which was not at that 
time producing an incane.8 However, according to their information 
there was only one company which had purchased annuities charged on 
reversionary interests and it had only done so in a few cases.? in 
view of this and the fact that the exception was to be restricted to 
pre-Budget Day contracts, they were happy to provide a let-out for 
such cases, as well as those involving annuities charged on interests 
producing income.8 An appropriate amendment was drafted and inserted 
on report.
The provisions have not been altered since their introduction, and as
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there have been no reported cases this may give some indication of 
Revenue satisfaction with them.
REVISION OF SECTION 451 ICTA 1970
Section 451 had received criticism by the House of Lords on three 
occasions in the 30 years before major modifications were made by the 
Finance Act 1981.
The first criticism was in 1951 in the case of Potts' Executors v 
IRC*^ which held that payments were not paid indirectly to the settlor 
unless they were made into the hands of someone accountable to him. 
Although this showed up a loophole in the provisions, it did not seem 
to concern the House of Lords, because the section was so "capable of 
involving straight-forward transactions to such a considerable extent 
that a decision which may encourage the substitution of something 
better need not be a matter for regret."10
In the case of IRC v De vigier,11 the settlor's wife advanced money to 
the trustees to enable them to take up a rights issue in respect of 
shares forming part of the settled property. The House of Lords was 
unanimous in their decision that the section applied to this loan but 
commented that "the pit dug by the legislature [is] wide enough to 
catch the unwary innocent."12
The most detailed criticism of the section came in 1966 in IRC v 
Bates,12 where the settlor was a director of a company connected with 
the settlement and his current account with the company was overdrawn 
for' most of the year, but at the end of the company's accounting
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period it was credited with his salary and dividends to bring it into 
credit. It was nevertheless held that section 451 applied and that 
the settlor was chargeable, not only to surtax, but to income tax as 
well. It was also pointed out that income available could be counted 
more than once where the capital payment was not fully identified with 
undistributed income up to the year of payment a consequence described 
by Russell L.J. as "monstrous" and which was not, according to Lord 
Reid, applied by the inland Revenue in that manner .14 He went on to 
say that "the draftsman has chosen such a complicated method that he 
has obviously failed to realise the absurd results to which it leads 
in all but the simplest cases - and I think in almost every case where 
the trust income has to be accumulated."15
It is perhaps surprising that the inland Revenue made no effort to 
obtain legislation to close the loophole shown up by the Potts case, 
but it may well be that they were satisfied to allow the defect to 
exist provided they continued to have the advantage of such severe 
legislation. It seems they were anxious not to modify the 
legislation, because on the introduction of the provisions restricting 
relief for interest paid, the draftsman was specifically instructed to 
avoid any reference to section 451, and by this means it was hoped 
that attention would not be drawn to the section so that it would not 
attract the kind of adverse parliamentary comment which might have led 
to modifications being forced upon the Revenue by ministers.!6
As might be expected, the inland Revenue waited until it suited them 
before suggesting changes to the legislation, in January 1980, the 
case of Piratin v CIR^ came before the Special Commissioners. One
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aspect of the case concerned the application of section 451 to a 
situation where the settlor had deposited money with a body corporate 
connected with the settlement which had transferred it, at the request 
of the settlor, to another company, by drawing a cheque in favour of 
that company and handing it to the settlor. At the end of February 
1980, the Special Commissioners decided the point in favour of the 
Crown on the grounds that the Potts case could be distinguished, but 
said they thought the question was "nicely balanced". 18 within the 
Revenue this comment probably created a lack of confidence that they 
would win before the courts and may have been the stimulus to long 
overdue action.
In September 1980 a consultative paper^ was issued suggesting various 
changes aimed at dealing with the judicial criticisms of the section 
made by the House of Lords and with various other ananalies and 
difficulties which the Revenue thought worthy of correction. Although 
it was presented as being largely a series of relaxations, it did 
propose modifications to close the Potts loophole.
As it turned out, when the judgement of the High Court in the Piratin 
case was handed down on March 11 1981, the inland Revenue were 
unsuccessful on the section 451 point, but the judgement indicated 
that if the words "for the benefit of" had been included in section 
451 (1) then the relevant payments would have been caught. These 
words were therefore inserted by the Finance Act 1981.20
One minor irritation to the Revenue related to the loss in 1948 of 
the case of Howard de Walden v CIR,^ in which it had been held that
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"the flow of apportioned income along any particular channel is to be 
stopped by the appearance of a foreign corporate body in that 
channel.”22 Although it was only in rare cases that this prevented 
the Revenue from counting income as available for payment to the 
settlor, the opportunity was taken in section 44 of the Finance Act 
1981 to remove this problem, by requiring apportionment of income 
through a company which would have been close had it been resident in 
the U.K. At the same time, the definition of a body corporate 
connected with a settlement was extended so that it included any body 
controlled by a conpany which was connected with the settlement.23
Even after the process of consultation and the subsequent 
modifications by the Finance Act 1981, section 451 still contained two 
minor errors which had to be corrected by section 63 of the Finance 
Act 1982, but at last a more reasonable regime for the taxation of 
loans to settlors had been introduced.
MINOR MODIFICATIONS AND INTERACTIONS
During the period, a variety of minor modifications have had to be 
introduced to bring the settlements legislation into line with 
alterations which were being made elsewhere. The provisions 
concerning settlements, although apparently forming a self-contained 
code, do have to be made to dovetail with other parts of the tax 
legislation.24
Another consequence of having a set of anti-avoidance provisions which 
are not totally isolated from the rest of the legislation is that
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every time new anti-avoidance legislation is brought in it is 
necessary to consider the interaction between those new provisions and 
the settlement provisions. Furthermore, it is sometimes necessary to 
determine which set of provisions is to have priority.25
CONCLUSION
This period is marked by party political differences concerning tax 
policy which began to show in the settlements legislation. The 
tightening up process the Labour Government had begun in 1965 was 
continued, but the controversial aggregation of children's income and 
the restriction on relief for interest paid was removed by the 
Conservative Government of 1970-74, leaving only the permanent 
elimination of section 228 I.T.A. 1952 relief as a Labour legacy.
In 1974, when the new Labour chancellor re-introduced the interest 
paid restrictions and decided not to bring back aggregation, it looked 
like a period of stability had come to the settlement provisions, but 
for two reasons this was not to be. Firstly, the weakness of the 
Labour Government which led it into making pacts with the Liberals 
caused the relief for settlors of heritage property maintenance funds 
to be rather unwillingly thrust upon them and even more unwillingly 
upon the Revenue. Secondly, a potentially devastating tax avoidance 
scheme was discovered which the settlement provisions seemed powerless 
to stop. It became essential, therefore, to introduce immediate 
preventative legislation, but it took an anonymous tip-off for the 
Revenue to realise that their initial proposals were not widely drawn 
enough, and a tax counsel of the calibre of Peter Rees M.P. to make
409
them realise that their final proposals were unnecessarily severe.
Stability still had not come even after these changes, because 
self-interest, and apparently little else, motivated the Revenue to 
obtain major modifications to the provisions dealing with loans to 
settlors in 1981. Since then the legislation has remained virtually 
unaltered, though complexity has been compounded by complexity as new 
anti-avoidance provisions latch on to the settlement provisions and 
apply them by reference.
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CHAPTER 12
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
OVERVIEW
The following sections of this chapter summarise the study from 
different perspectives and begin by examining matters specific to 
settlements and then proceed to wider issues. conclusions are also 
drawn from the different perspectives at two different levels; those 
specific to settlements, and those which are more general in their 
scope. Before dealing with the more detailed analysis, a very broad 
review of the main findings is given.
The income tax system contained inherent flaws in having exemption for 
low incomes, personal reliefs and different treatment for income and 
capital receipts which although all very necessary, led to their 
exploitation for tax avoidance purposes through the use of 
settlements. The attractions of such avoidance were increased by the 
introduction of graduation and super-tax, and by the large and rapid 
increase in tax rates which occurred during the First World War. The 
avoidance spread from the wealthy to the less wealthy over a fairly 
long period of time and was blocked in a piecemeal fashion by 
legislation aimed at the specific areas involved (often only when the 
cost to the Exchequer became too high to let it continue). The first 
efforts at anti-avoidance legislation were a failure, largely because 
of the great flexibility of trusts. Eventually effective means of 
attack were found by the inland Revenue and were introduced with 
little parliamentary scrutiny due to lack of understanding of the 
details and complexities by the ministers and other M.P.'s involved.
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AIMS OF THE LEGISLATION AND CAUSES OF THE CHANGES TO IT
There is no single informing theme to the legislation and little of it 
has been directly influenced by political ideology. The only time 
any party has had a public stance towards tax avoidance was in 1964, 
when the Labour Party manifesto stated that they would deal with 
notorious tax avoidance schemes. But this was mere rhetoric and was 
not based on clearly thought out detailed proposals. Ministers lack 
time to go into details and the Party Research Departments cannot 
help as they are too involved with more politically sensitive areas 
and do not normally have the expertise anyway.
It has generally been left to the inland Revenue to develop the 
appropriate underlying policies of the settlement legislation and this 
seems to have been done in stages. It started with the principle 
that a settlor (or spouse) should not be able to benefit from the 
settled property, and neither should a person legally supportable by 
him. The next stage was the principle that the Exchequer should not 
contribute to the cost of employing individuals for whom no other tax 
allowance was available, (as in the Duke of Westminster case). 
Eventually the legislation was based upon little of principle but 
almost entirely upon the cost to the Exchequer if action was not 
taken, (as for charitable deeds of covenant).
The stimuli leading the Revenue to request changes to the legislation 
have been varied. in 1922 it was the extensive use of avoidance 
which a Royal commission had recommended ought to be stopped. In 
1936 and 1946 it was widespread use of particular methods of avoidance,
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(children's settlements and charitable covenants), which had become 
too costly. A further stimulus was the Revenue's loss of important 
tax cases which had shown up weaknesses in the existing system. In 
the 1920's and early 1930's nothing was done to close up such 
loopholes; thereafter reaction was extremely fast. Finally, changes 
of Government have of course been occasions for the Revenue to put 
forward more radical proposals for tightening up the rules.
Little pressure for change has come directly from the public, though 
shifts in public attitudes to avoidance, particularly during periods 
of war, have created a climate in which change became politically 
acceptable. Although there is evidence of public pressure preventing 
the introduction of legislation in 1927 to remove tax relief on 
charitable covenants, by 1946 public opinion seems to have been 
divided and there was much support for such action. The only clear 
evidence of public pressure leading to change was in 1977 when the 
heritage lobby was able to exploit the weakness of the Government to 
obtain relaxations in the application of the settlement provisions to 
maintenance funds.
Despite a disastrous start, the legislation has stood up very well in 
achieving its objectives. Few cases have been lost by the Revenue 
before the courts and little evidence was found of Revenue 
dissatisfaction with it. The study shows that the aims of this 
legislation have been very largely left to the inland Revenue to work 
out and that they have usually been successful in obtaining 
appropriate legislation and changes whenever they have thought it 
necessary.
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REASONS FOR THE COMPLEXITY OF THE LEGISLATION
Undoubtedly the complexity of this anti-avoidance legislation 
explains why some settlements are still caught and why it received so 
much adverse parliamentary comment on its introduction. But did 
these provisions need to be so complex?
Once the 1920 Royal Commission rejected the argument for broad general 
anti-avoidance legislation in favour of specific highly targeted 
rules, the approach which the 1922 provisions had to take was set.
This approach led to overt complexity and little Revenue discretion 
rather than the hidden difficulties and wide discretion applying to 
more general rules.
Experience of the failure of the 1922 provisions led the Revenue to 
take great care that the 1936 provisions did not suffer the same 
fate. By then they had discovered just how flexible trusts could be, 
and how if every bolt hole was not blocked taxpayers would make 
arrangements to squeeze into them. When in 1936 the battle was won 
on one front, the taxpayer made an attack on another, and again in 
1938 complicated legislation seems to have been the only way to fight 
back. By the time provisions were included to deal with the foreign 
element and joint settlors and to rectify the effect of the more 
important skirmishes which the Revenue had lost, the legislation was 
already intricate. But when it was altered to fit in with 
restrictions in other areas of tax law, (for example on relief for 
interest paid), and to provide concessions for certain deserving 
cases, (for example partnership annuities and maintenance funds), it 
became truly labyrinthine. Thus, when legislation is designed to
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deal with such malleable transactions, close all unintended loopholes 
and yet provide closely guarded let-outs, it is inevitable that it is 
complex. However, because the Revenue generally get their own way on 
anti-avoidance legislation, it can sometimes be excessively widely 
drawn and of uncertain scope and effect, thus condemning tax advisers 
to spend long hours grappling with the provisions, often only to 
discover that they do not apply.
We have come to the present position through what has been called 
"incrementalismj’l under which overall policy has been developed by 
building layer on layer to patch up existing provisions without any 
fundamental review. As there is overlap between some of the sections 
making up Part XVI ICTA 1970, perhaps a complete review, say by The 
Law Commission, would lead to something more logical and 
comprehensible,.but in the writer's opinion given the reasons for its 
complexity, this is doubtful it is also unlikely that such a 
proposal would find favour with the inland Revenue who are probably 
satisfied with a system which has been tried and tested and which has 
a considerable body of case law to back it up. The inevitable 
conclusion is that complexity is necessary and that any hopes for 
simplification are unrealistic.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INLAND REVENUE'S ATTITUDE TO AVOIDANCE
Prom the introduction of income tax to the present day, the inland 
Revenue have moved fran having a very relaxed attitude to income tax 
avoidance to their current aggressive stance. This study in no way
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deals with the whole subject of tax avoidance, but even the limited 
area of settlements provides considerable explanation for the 
Revenue's altered frame of mind.
The change seems to have commenced when, following the introduction of 
super-tax, professional expertise started to become more sophisticated 
and know-how on tax avoidance began to spread through the medium of 
the professional journals. As the number of taxpayers increased and 
the amount of tax they were avoiding rose, the Revenue saw that they 
had a duty to monitor the problem. Once a specialist office began 
dealing with the affairs of all the wealthiest taxpayers the basis of
an intelligence gathering system was created and the Revenue were able
/
to determine the avoidance methods used by those who had the most to 
gain and were probably the best advised.
The almost total failure of their first efforts at settlement 
anti-avoidance provisions within a few years of their introduction led 
to a realisation of the lengths to which taxpayers would go to avoid 
tax and encouraged the Revenue to adopt a more jaundiced view of the 
problem. As the use of children's settlements grew and spread widely 
through the taxpaying community and further schemes were developed 
despite the chancellor's warning of restrospective legislation, the 
Inland Revenue's attitude hardened. They found that many taxpayers 
would unashamedly exploit schemes to avoid tax and that if any 
loophole was left open it would be used. it was vital for 
legislation to cover every escape route and if any were missed it was 
essential to act swiftly to close them. Time after time their early 
experiences were reinforced by further examples of what they
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considered to be abuse, and these experiences were passed down through 
each new generation of tax officials, (through the files and by word 
of mouth), and became reflected in the Revenue’s culture. It is 
probable that the new recruit will quickly learn that wide-ranging 
anti-avoidance provisions are essential; for to believe otherwise is 
heresy.
The study shows that given the Revenue's experience of avoidance their 
attitude is understandable. Although it is an attitude which pervades 
their thinking and influences the way they interpret information and 
make decisions, it would be unjustifiable to criticise them for this, 
for it is no mere paranoia, it reflects the world as it is.
INSIGHTS INTO POLICY-MAKING AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Little material is available concerning the process by which the 
policy and detailed proposals upon which legislation will be based are 
determined, or on the relationship between ministers, civil servants 
and outside interests in this pre-drafting stage.2 in an idealised 
form the process would involve identifying the problem, determining 
alternative strategies and predicting their consequences, deciding 
which to put into effect and reviewing its operation in practice.3 
This study has thrown some light on the nature of this process in 
practice and the relationships between those involved in it, but its 
conclusions may not be of general application outside the particular 
type of legislation examined.
Identifying the problem and taking the initiative for legislation has
417
usually been left to the inland Revenue without any prompting from 
ministers. However/ the changes in 1946 and 1965 were responses by 
the administration to newly installed Labour Governments known to be 
sympathetic to more stringent anti-avoidance provisions/ but in 
neither case did ministers apparently request proposals. Recognition 
of the need to act therefore seems to lie with the Revenue officials 
and largely reflects their values and their opinions concerning tax 
avoidance.
Putting forward alternative strategies and their likely consequences 
is not something the Revenue often seem to do, though if asked, as in 
1936, they can show ministers that alternatives are available.
Internal Revenue committees, such as the Board's Tax Avoidance 
Committee, do consider alternatives and think them through fully.
Proposals put to ministers therefore reflect a considerable internal 
debate in the Revenue, and as it is unlikely that any outsiders have 
been consulted, they are probably those which are best for the inland 
Revenue. The tendency towards the "well-reasoned one possible 
solution” approach seems to have become the norm in recent years, but 
it could be argued that this is because the existing settlement 
legislation constrains the form of any new legislation so that only 
one solution is possible unless the earlier legislation is to be 
revised as well.
The decision to go ahead with legislation clearly lies with the 
minister, but there is little evidence of questioning the advice given 
unless political dangers can be foreseen in what is being proposed.
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Given how busy ministers are^, it is not surprising that they are only
presented with one proposal and that they rarely quibble over
details.5 The Revenue's briefings are generally (and probably of 
necessity) fairly long, detailed and well argued,5 thus making it 
difficult for anyone but a tax expert to dispute.
"If a minister accepts his officials' advice and he is challenged,
he at least knows he can go back and get all the supporting 
evidence he wants. But if he strikes out in a direction of his 
own choosing, he can all too easily find himself alone and lost."7
Despite the general position, there have been instances where the
Revenue's advice has been wholly or partly rejected by ministers;
most notably in 1936 when the chancellor decided to increase child
allowance to take the sting out of the Revenue's proposals and refused
to deal with accumulated income in irrevocable capital settlements on
children. The latter problem was intractable, and although it was
raised by them again in 1938 and 1965, on both occasions nothing was
done.
When an attempt is made to reject or modify the Revenue's proposals, 
they normally do not give up easily unless there would be practical 
difficulties with implementation. A particularly interesting 
phenomenon is the weakness of a new minister and the opportunity this 
gives the Revenue to put forward arguments they would not have used 
with his more experienced predecessor, and more importantly, to 
re-open matters which have already been decided upon.5 The most 
blatant example of this occurred in 1958 when, following the 
resignation of the chancellor and the Financial Secretary, the Revenue 
resurrected the minister's decision that their proposals should not 
apply to existing settlements but only to settlements made after
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publication of the Finance Bill. The original decision was reversed 
by the new Chancellor.
Once agreement has been given for legislation to be drafted it is rare 
for ministers to take any interest in the detailed rules, and it is 
this that gives the Revenue considerable influence. in exceptional 
cases, for example where there is a risk of political embarrassment, 
such as a provision with retrospective effect being passed off as a 
declaratory provision (as in 1943), ministers retain an interest in 
the detail. Where no such interest is retained, it could be argued 
that ministers examine the details later, particularly when they are 
taking the resulting clauses of the Bill through the committee stage, 
but by this time the die is cast and changes are embarrassing.
Public pressure only occasionally seems to have had any direct impact 
on the settlement legislation, as for exanple when the Chancellor 
began receiving letters complaining of the tax relief for charitable 
covenants. However, the Revenue's proposals to some extent are 
probably somewhat restrained by their perception of public 
attitudes. Because many representations are channelled through the 
Inland Revenue, they have the opportunity to comment on them and play 
down any unacceptable points before ministers get any ideas.
Once the legislation is in place there is little evidence that 
ministers are informed of or take an interest in its successes or 
failures, or in any difficulties it creates for taxpayers and their 
advisers. However, this review process is carried out by the Inland 
Revenue, and they have, since 1938, been quick to bring deficiencies
420
to the attention of the chancellor for immediate corrective action.
It can be concluded that the Inland Revenue normally identify where 
problems lie and determine the policy, the principles and the details 
for dealing with them,and it is very difficult for ministers to take 
an active part in the process. The inland Revenue therefore usually 
get the legislation they want.
There is in all this an implied criticism of the existing system of 
creating legislation on complex anti-avoidance matters, and this 
requires some suggestions for its improvement. Many suggestions 
concerning the improvement of the overall process have however already 
been thoroughly explored by others elsewhere,9 and those general 
suggestions are equally relevant to complex anti-avoidance 
provisions.
TACTICS AND STRATEGY .
It is not enough for the Revenue and the Government to have proposals; 
there must be planning to ensure they reach the statute book. There 
are two aspects to this. Firstly, the Revenue have developed methods 
which help to make certain that their proposals are accepted. The 
way in which they can exploit the inexperience of a new minister has 
already been described, but other methods have also been demonstrated 
in earlier chapters. in 1922 and 1936 they were not averse to using 
spurious arguments to back up their suggestions. Later, they wisely 
began to keep detailed statistics supporting their claims that the
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this class of avoidance had become so serious that action was 
essential. They have, however, never shied away from providing 
estimates which can have been no more than inspired (and possibly 
exaggerated) guesses when new forms of avoidance had been discovered 
and statistical information was lacking. The care with which any 
reference to section 451 ICTA. was side-stepped, because it might have 
drawn attention to judicial criticism of its drafting, is worthy of 
note. In the main however, the Revenue have been able to rely on 
their expertise and information, and the ministers' lack of it, to 
obtain acceptance of their proposals.
The second aspect is that Governments prefer to deploy tactics to
ensure a quick and smooth parliamentary passage for their proposals,
and require a strategy for presenting them in the best light, with any
warts well camouflaged. The inland Revenue assist in this task by
making appropriate suggestions and pointing out likely areas of
difficulty. The presentation of the declaratory provisions
concerning joint settlors in 1943, and the retrospective removal in
1958 of the fault in the 1952 consolidation, are two illustrations of
how true intentions and full implications can be covered up.
*
Perhaps the most insidious strategy is that referred to in the 
seemingly innocuous words of Lord Morrison of Lambeth who,in 
describing the legislative process, stated that "sometimes ministers 
may prefer to save up concessions until parliament is dealing with the 
matter".10 The settlement legislation illustrates that in practice 
this means that although the Revenue and ministers may have already 
agreed some minor let-out, the Bill as presented to parliament
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excludes it. The Government can then give in to pressure fran their 
own back-bench, or even from the Opposition when it is argued that 
some relaxation is essential. The sham of negotiation and "seeing 
reason" probably creates an atmosphere in which other, perhaps more 
contentious matters, obtain an easier passage. This strategy was 
used for the £5 exemption limit for children's settlements in 1936. 
However, it backfired because nobody raised the point in debate, and a 
Government amendment had to be introduced following late 
representations by the National Savings Committee. These plannned 
"concessions" create an illusion of power for those who have gained 
than and only go undetected because of the extreme secrecy surrounding 
the advice given to ministers.
It can be seen that not only have the Revenue covertly steered 
ministers towards the provisions the Revenue desired, but also they 
assisted them in manipulating the parliamentary process to their 
mutual advantage.
THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT
Parliament's power in matters of complex anti-avoidance provisions is 
extremely limited; it rarely produces significant changes. Richard 
Crossmanll expressed the view in his diaries that there is no 
effective parliamentary control of ministers, and stated that he (and 
others) never bothered to understand the actual clauses because "both 
sides worked off written briefs to an astonishing extent". By 
comparing those briefs with the debates one can see that this 
assertion is generally true, at least for the settlement provisions.
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Furthermore, he argued that the Opposition was usually so badly 
briefed that it could not sustain any real criticism.13 Again the 
history of the settlement legislation supports this view. Real 
mastery of the subject of debate lies with Inland Revenue officials, 
shielded by the minister from direct parliamentary scrutiny, yet 
holding a powerful grip on proceedings through the secret advice they 
give him.
The detailed examination of the parliamentary process leading to the 
settlement legislation confirms Griffiths' findings that it is rare 
for Government back-bench amendments to be accepted and even more 
unlikely for Opposition amendments to succeed.14 some amendments are 
merely attempts to discover the intentions of the legislation or the 
meaning of some particular part of it or to obtain assurances 
concerning its mode of operation, and therefore the raw figures of 
those which fail can be misleading. One must weigh the impact of 
Parliament by the importance as well as the number of amendments which 
have been accepted. Not only have the numbers been insignificant but 
they have all concerned relatively minor matters rather than important 
points of principle. This should not be interpreted as meaning that 
Parliament has had no influence on this anti-avoidance legislation; 
it has had influence , but it has been minimal. Sometimes, 
ministers, though rejecting on Revenue advice the actual wording of an 
amendment, have promised to consider the principles on which it was 
based and have inserted their own amendments at the report stage to 
meet the point. Nevertheless, most Government amendments appear to 
have little relationship to parliamentary criticism but more to fine 
tuning of the provisions following further
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consideration by the Revenue or the draftsman.
If the effectiveness of the parliamentary process is measured by the 
number and importance of the changes it causes, then as far as the 
settlement legislation is concerned, its achievements are probably far 
outweighed by the time and effort involved. Hostile parliamentary 
scrutiny of the settlement proposals was far more the case in 1922, 
1936 and 1938 than thereafter, and the impression is that it dwindled 
through lack of debating time and the increased length and complexity 
of Finance Bills. Perhaps Parliament's greatest success was in 1927 
when the proposal to remove all tax relief on charitable covenants was 
dropped, but even this was only achieved with considerable behind the 
scenes lobbying.
Parliament does however have an indirect influence. The proposals 
put before it have already been tempered to take into account expected 
parliamentary criticisms and in some cases, (notably in 1936), the 
policy of the legislation is not finalised until the reaction to a 
deliberately widely-drawn and vague Budget statement and resolution 
has been received. Given the practical difficulties of having 
consultations with interested parties concerning proposed 
anti-avoidance measures, it is perhaps not surprising that this 
"testing the water" approach has sometimes been used.
The lack of information available to M.P.'s concerning the detailed 
background to the anti-avoidance provisions contributes to the 
limitation of Parliament's influence. Ministers are provided with a 
comprehensive, persuasive, but perhaps rather one-sided argument, and
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their own lack of time and expertise makes it very difficult for them 
to understand the details, let alone dispute the Revenue's 
proposals. Non-Government amendments are treated to the same 
thorough and damaging Revenue treatment so that almost all pass to the 
minister fated to fail by the advice "resist", and supported by the 
detailed arguments to do so. Modifications are perhaps therefore 
most likely to be obtained through direct approaches to ministers. 
Individuals and pressure groups who have been able to do this have 
been very successful in bringing about changes. Those who wish to 
influence legislation must counter the Revenue's powerful position by 
ensuring that their arguments are fully thought through, capable of 
implementation and contain appropriate responses to any Revenue 
objections. Given the relatively short time in which to do this, it 
is not surprising that the Revenue have the upper hand.
THE POWER OF THE INLAND REVENUE OVER THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
«
Although some aspects of the Inland Revenue's influence are 
mentioned in other parts of the conclusion, it is desirable to bring 
the whole subject together in one place. It is stressed that 
explanation of the Revenue's power is only an incidental by-product 
of this study.
Power has been defined by Weber as "the possibility of imposing 
one's will upon the behaviour of other persons".15 The Revenue's 
power arises frcm their ability to persuade a minister to believe 
what they tell him, to-accept-their authority on the subject
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and to have confidence and trust in them. Their power is hidden 
rather than overt, but sometimes shows itself in the way ministerial 
approval is treated as a mere formality.
There have been a variety of factors conducive to the Revenue 
obtaining the settlement legislation they wanted. Perhaps the 
most important of these was the growth of specialist knowledge and 
expertise in the Department. Advice was given with the authority 
of the accumulated experience not just of present staff, but of the 
Revenue itself, as reflected in its files. The continuity through 
records of past successes, difficulties and failures, when combined 
with the inclination to look for precedents, ensured that 
departmental attitudes were passed on from one generation of 
officials to the next, and continued to evolve through experience. 
Much of the Revenue's power therefore comes from the information 
available to them. The lack of access to such information by 
anyone else enables the Revenue to put whatever gloss on the facts 
is necessary to help achieve their purposes, and even if there is no 
deliberate distortion there will be a hidden bias. Perhaps the 
position is best summed up by the statement "ministers may have the 
will, but the mandarins have the files".16 Two further 
circumstances which contribute to the Revenue's power are 
ministerial dependency and reliance on them, and the advantage 
of direct access to ministers; an advantage not easily available to 
counterveiling forces.
The above factors largely concern attributes of the Revenue but 
there are others relating to attributes of ministers which also work
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in the Revenue's favour. The lack of training in the subject and 
poor understanding of its details, when combined with the relatively 
short time normally spent in any particular post, makes it difficult 
for a minister to question official advice effectively . it is not 
even possible for him to have access to papers from the prior 
administration to help him gain a better understanding of previous 
thinking on a subject, and access to departmental files is also 
denied.17 when his other duties are combined with the wide range 
of issues he has to get to grips with in any Finance Bill and the 
limited time in which this has to be done, it is not surprising that 
the Revenue have very considerable power on matters so complex and 
politically non-controversial as most of the settlement 
anti-avoidance legislation has been. perhaps it is true that "the 
biggest pressure group comprises those administering a department".l^
The potential for the inland Revenue to develop power is a natural 
consequence of the detailed process of government and it has 
increased as anti-avoidance legislation has become more complex and 
Finance Bills more lengthy. It is assisted by limited direct 
access of outsiders to ministers and by the way the Revenue 
neutralise as far as possible any unacceptable views which do get 
through. The ability to have the last word is a useful weapon and 
it is always used.
The main limitation on the Revenue's power is that the political 
climate restricts major policy changes. For example, it was not 
until Labour Governments were elected in 1945 and 1964 that the 
Revenue put forward radical proposals for further restrictions on
the use of settlements for tax avoidance. There is therefore some 
relationship between public attitudes to avoidance, the power of the 
Inland Revenue and the anti-avoidance legislation imposed, but it is 
only slight.
Given this state of affairs, how can "outsiders", like professional 
bodies, exert an effective influence? Although they can submit 
persuasive representations concerning non-political matters such as 
practical problems arising frcm implementation, apparent omissions, 
vague terms, drafting errors and syntactic ambiguity, such 
representations cannot receive the fullest enquiry and discussion 
because of the limited time available between publication of the 
Bill and completion of its parliamentary processing. This study 
shows that at the time of the Budget statement a draft of the 
relevant clauses has almost always been prepared. Therefore, 
further time could be made available' for discussion by releasing 
copies of the draft clauses to the professional bodies directly 
concerned with taxation before publication of the Bill. Another 
weakness of the present arrangements is that the different 
professional accountancy bodies and the representative bodies of 
lawyers and tax specialists generally make their submissions to the 
Chancellor separately. Far more weight would be attached to a 
joint representation frcm all such bodies and this would require a 
cross-professional technical committee properly funded and supported 
to act as a "heavyweight" to help counterbalance the Revenue's 
powerful position.
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USEFULNESS OF THIS RESEARCH
An attempt is made here to show who could benefit from this 
research, and what disciplines, organisations and groups may find 
some value in what has been done.
Perhaps the research will be of most value to pressure groups and 
particularly to the professional bodies representing tax 
specialists. The latter make representations to the Chancellor at 
various stages in the legislative process, including pre-budget 
representations and post Finance Bill comments, as well as putting 
suggestions forward regarding the correction of anomalies discovered 
by their members. A better understanding of the legislative 
process and the influence and attitudes of the Inland Revenue may 
help in formulating more effective representations. To a 
considerable extent it is the Inland Revenue and not ministers that 
must be persuaded of the need for change and it is essential 
therefore to examine suggestions from their point of view with 
proper regard for difficulties of implementation and the possibility 
of creating opportunities for avoidance or further .anomalies. 
Possible objections must be thought through and answered so that the 
Revenue cannot easily dismiss proposals as impracticable. The 
insight given into the past behaviour and thinking of the Inland 
Revenue may help in predicting how it will react in the future.
Parts of the study will interest political scientists and political 
economists as they illustrate the policy-making process, the 
influences upon it and the weakness of parliament, and they also
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provide evidence strongly supportive of the Whitehall model of the 
constitution. Certain aspects of the research are relevant to 
those interested in public administration, the power of 
organisations in general and the civil service in particular. The
historian's focus will not only be on the above matters but also on 
the materials available for this type of research, the explanation 
for the development of the settlement legislation,and the parts 
played by the various parties to obtain it.
For those studying the detail of the settlement legislation it may 
aid understanding if its purpose is known, even though that purpose 
may not be used as.an aid to interpretation by the courts.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Though it has answered some questions, the findings of this study 
have been limited by the restriction of the subject matter to 
settlements. It would be useful to have a complete picture of the
background to all the major anti-avoidance legislation, and 
particularly to the close company provisions because they were 
originally introduced at the same time as the settlement 
legislation, usually altered at the same time, and served a parallel 
purpose in preventing avoidance through close companies.
This study only examines the culture, ideology and power of the 
Inland Revenue frcm the limited perspective of the settlement 
legislation, and does so as a secondary matter. A specific and 
wider study would lead to a better understanding of the Revenue's 
attitudes and behaviour.
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CHAPTER 1 - FOOTNOTES
1. Letter to the writer from inland Revenue Claims Branch dated July 
28, 1988. These figures do not include investigations into tax 
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partially made, but apparently do include failures to seal the 
covenant and other technical failures to comply with the general 
law.
2. Ibid.
3. Francis Bennion, Statute Law, 2nd ed. (London : Oyez Longman 
Publishing Ltd., 1973), p.101.
4. The law specifies that subject to certain minor exceptions, any 
file in the Public Record Office is not available until the 1st of 
January following the end of 30 years after the date of the last 
document on that file. The department involved has the power to 
extend the 30 year period and this power has been used by the 
Inland Revenue to a considerable extent so that many of their
. records have 50 year, 75 year and even 100 year closures. The 
Departmental Records Officer has authority, under Section 5(4) of 
• the Public Records Act, to allow access to files within the 
'* closure period. The writer therefore made a written request for 
access to relevant files or parts of files for the purposes of 
this thesis, with a promise to give a written undertaking not to 
disclose any information of a personal nature which might be so 
obtained and sent a copy of the letter to the Public Records 
Office. Although, in response to a direct request from the 
Public Records Office, the inland Revenue did review the closure 
of one class of files which had had a blanket closure of 75 years 
applied (class I.R. 40) and opened up a considerable number of 
them (approximately 1,200 out of about 3,000) access to other 
classes of files, some of which were likely to contain extremely 
relevant material, was refused.
5. Such as BEV Sabine, A History of income Tax; Mallet and George, 
British Budgets.
6. Such as BEV Sabine, Lloyd George*s Budget of 1909, British Tax 
Review 1975, No 2, pll4? BEV Sabine, The Six Budgets of Neville 
Chamberlain 1932-1937, British Tax Review 1981 No4, p223; Ian 
Ferrier, Sir Robert Horne And The Pharaohs Of Somerset House, 
British Tax Review 1982, No 6, p375.
7. Oliver Stanley, Taxology, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972)
8. Ibid, Chapter 5, "Spread It Round The Family".
9. See for example John Tiley, General Anti-Avoidance Provisions, 
Fiscal Studies, Vol 4, No.l, March 1983, p24.
10. See for example John Tiley, judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines, 
British Tax Review 1987 pl80, 220, 433, 1988 p63, 108.
11. See for example M K Robson, An Analysis of The Structure of The 
Income Taxation Of Trusts, Thesis for LLM, Faculty of Law, Glasgow 
University, October 1988. R Venables, Tax Planning Through 
Trusts, London, Butterworths 1983. R Burgess, The Settlor And 
Section 447, British Tax Review 1971, No5, p278. Potter and 
Monroe, Tax Planning with Precedents, London, Sweet & Maxwell 1987.
12. Brittan, S. Steering The Economy, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1971; 
Johnstone, D, A Tax Shall Be charged, London H.M.S.O. 1975; 
Robinson A. and Sandford c., Tax Policy-Making in The United 
Kingdom, London, Heineman 1983.
13. Tax Policy-Making In The United Kingdom, introduction p.vii.
14. Ibid. pl06.
15. (1943) 25 TC 93.
16. @.957/ 37 TC 416.
17. 1964 Labour Party Manifesto.
18. Potts' Executors v IRC, (195]) 32TC 211; IRC v De Vigier, (1964) 42 
TC 24; IRC v Bates, (1966) 44TC 225.
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CHAPTER 2 -  FOOTNOTES
1. Avoidance of the Assessed Taxes had been common - B.E.V. Sabine, A 
History of Taxation, p27 - and there is a strong likelihood that 
the propensity for avoidance was carried over to the income tax.
2. Ibid. p38.
3. Guide to the Property Tax Act, 1806, referred to in Simon's income 
Tax Vol I 1964-65 p74.
4. There is howeve,r no direct evidence of such avoidance.
5. One of the more important changes was the extension of the
exemption of charities frcm tax under Schedule A to include
exemption of income within Schedule D. For other changes see 
B.E.V. Sabine, Great Budgets III, British Tax Review 1971 No. 1 
p50.
6. All references to pence are to the currency prior to 
decimalisation.
7. The Hume committee. 1852 (354)ix.
8. When examining documents prior to the 1930's it is essential to
realise that the relatively clear distinction now made between 
evasion and avoidance was not then made and it was common for 
officials to refer to evasion when clearly they meant, what we 
would now call, avoidance. It is interesting to note that the 
officials giving evidence to the Select Committee in 1851 did use 
the term avoidance and used it in the sense which is now 
current. Subsequent documents show a blurring of the distinction 
and one wonders whether this may have been deliberate policy on 
the part of officials in order to make avoidance appear to be less 
acceptable by tainting it with the illegality of evasion.
9. The income of the wife was deemed to be that of the husband.
10. Minutes of Evidence, answer to question 1455.
11. Ibid. Question 1456.
12. Ibid. Mr E. Hyde, Mr F. Tarleton, Mr C. Levien, questions 
1457-1459.
13. Ibid. Question 1467.
14. Question 1468, Mr. Ricardo to Mr. Hyde.
15. Ibid.
16. 1852 (510).
17. Ibid. Mr. Trevor Question 4825.
18. Appendix 10 to the Minutes of Evidence of the 1852 Committee.
19. Changes in the amount of tax actually charged is a poor indicator 
of the extent of avoidance, but the tax charged for 1854/55 is 
almost exactly half that charged on the doubling of the tax rate 
in the following tax year. Similarly, the increase in tax charged 
in 1855/56 compared with that of the previous year is almost 
exactly directly proportional to the increase in the tax rate 
between those two years. This proves very little but it does give 
some evidence that tax avoidance was not taking place on a 
massively increased scale due to the increases in the tax rates.
20. The Hubbard committee, 1861 (503)vii.
21. See for example the evidence of Charles pressly at questions 
24-35. No comments were made about avoidance, it is fairly clear 
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APPENDIX A2
SUPER-TAX : RATES
Year Income Chargeable
1909-10 Exceeding £5,000 
to
1913-14
1914-15# Exceeding £3,000
1915-16 ) Exceeding £3,000
1916-17 )
1917-18 )
Rates of Super-tax
6d. for every £1 of the amount by 
which the total income exceeded 
£3,000.
In respect of the first £2,500 of 
the income
in respect of the excess over 
£2,500
For every £1 of the first £500 
of the excess (to £3,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £4,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £5,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £6,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £7,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £8,000)
For every £1 of the remainder 
of the excess (above £8,000)
In respect of the first £2,500 
of the income 
In respect of the excess over 
£2,500
For every £1 of the first £500 
of the excess (to £3,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £4,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £5,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess ('to £6,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £7,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £8,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £9,000)
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £10,000)
For every £1 of the remainder 
of the excess (above £10,000)
NIL 
s. d.
0 6 %
0 9-£ 
1 0
1 2 
1 5 
1 8
1 95
NIL 
s • d.
0 10 
1 2 
1 6 
1 10
2 2 
2 6 
2 10 
3 2
3 6
APPENDIX A2
(Continued)
1918-19
1919-20
Exceeding £2,500 In respect of the first £2,000 
of the income NIL
in respect of the excess over 
£2,000 s. d.
For every £1 of the first £500 
of the excess (to £2,500) 1 0
For every £1 of the next £500 
of the excess (to £3,000) 1 6
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £4,000) 2 0
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £5,000) 2 6
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £6,000) 3 0
For every £1 of the next £2,000 
of the excess (to £8,000) 3 6
For every £1 of the next £2,000 
of the excess (to £10,000) 4 0
For every £1 of the remainder 
of the excess (above £10,000) 4 6
1920-21
to
1923-24
Exceeding £2,000 in respect of the first £2,000 
of the income NIL
In respect of the excess over 
£2,000 s. d.
For every £1 of the first £500 
of the excess (to £2,500) 1 6
For every £1 of the next £500.
of the excess (to £3,000) 2 0
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £4,000) 2 6
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £5,000) 3 0
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £6,000) 3 6
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £7,000) 4 0
For every £1 of the next £1,000 
of the excess (to £8,000) 4 6
For every £1 of the next £12,000 
of the excess (to £20,000) 5 0
For every £1 of the next £10,000 
of the excess (to £30,000) 5 6
For every £1 of the remainder 
of the excess (above £30,000) 6 0
*The amount of Super-tax payable for 1914-15 at the rates originally fixed 
by Parliament was increased by one-third under the provisions of the Finance 
Act 1914 (Session 2). These figures accordingly represent the rates thus 
increased at which Super-tax was charged for the year in question.
Source : The 68th Inland Revenue Report.
APPENDIX A3
INCOME TAX : ESTIMATED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WITH TOTAL INCOMES 
ABOVE THE EXEMPTION LIMIT*
Number of individuals
Year
Entirely relieved 
from tax by the 
operation of 
abatements and 
allowances
Chargeable 
with tax
Total 
Number of 
Individuals
UNITED KINGDOM
1913-14
1914-15
1915-16
1916-17
1917-18
1918-19
1919-20
1920-21
1921-22
1922-23
70,000
100,000
120,000
1,080,000
1.520.000
2.200.000
3.900.000
3.150.000
2.900.000
2.735.000
1.130.000
1.140.000
1.360.000
2.184.000
2.956.000
3.547.000
3.900.000 
3,000,000
2.600.000
2,425,000
1,200,000
1.240.000
1.480.000
3.264.000
4.476.000
5.747.000
7.800.000
6.150.000
5.500.000
5.160.000
GT. BRITAIN AND N.I.
1922-23 2,700,000
1923-24 2,350,000
1924-25 2,800,000
1925-26 2,400,000
1926-27 2,100,000
1927-28 2,400,000
2.375.000
2.450.000
2.400.000
2.200.000
2.150.000
2.250.000
5.075.000
4.800.000
5.200.000
4.600.000
4.250.000
4.650.000
*The effective exemption limit was, for the years 1916-17 to 1919-20 
inclusive, £130 actual income and for the remaining years, £135 
assessable income.
Source: The 67th and 71st inland Revenue Reports.
APPENDIX A4
SUPER-TAX
Numbers Assessed, income Assessed And Tax Charged 
Year No. of Persons income (£ million) Super-Tax (£ million)
1913/14 14,008 175 3.34
1914/15 30,211 244 11.25
1915/16 29,465 233 18.41
1916/17 31,985 261 21.41
1917/18 35,286 297 25.46
1918/19 47,465 350 40.59
1919/20 54,201 406 47.52
1920/21 79,962 529 70.80
1921/22 93,273 590 74.10
1922/23 91,448 530 62.30
Note: Super-tax was charged on the income of the previous year.
Source: Derived from various Reports of the Commissioners of inland
Revenue.
APPENDIX A5
INCOME TAX AND SUPER-TAX - AMOUNT AND EFFECTIVE RATE OF TAX ON SPECIMEN INCOMES
Table I : Unmarried individual : income all investment Income
1913-14 1919-20 1920-21
1921-
and
■22
income Total Effective Total Effective Total Effective
Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate
£ £ Pence £ Pence £ Pence
130 - - - - - -
150 - - 5 7.2 2 3.6
200 2 2.8 12 14.4 10 11.7
300 8 6.5 27 21.6 25 19.8
400 14 8.4 42 25.2 46 27.5
500 20 9.8 60 28.8 76 36.4
700 37 12.6 118 40.5 136 46.5
1,000 58 14.0 188 45.0 226 54.2
1,500 88 14.0 338 54.0 376 60.1
2,000 117 14.0 525 63.0 526 63.1
2,500 146 14.0 750 72.0 713 68.4
3,000 175 14.0 963 77.0 913 73.0
4,000 233 14.0 1,363 81.8 1,338 80.3
5,000 292 14.0 1,788 85.8 1,788 85.3
7,000 508 17.4 2,713 93.0 2,763 94.7
9,000 675 18.0 3,688 98.3 3,838 102.4
12,000 925 18.5 5,238 104.8 5,488 109.8
20,000 1,592 19.1 9,438 113.2 9,888 118.7
30,000 2,425 19.4 14,688 117.5 15,638 125.1
50,000 4,092 19.6 25,188 120.9 27,638 132.7
100,000 8,258 19.8 51,438 123.4 57,638 138.3
APPENDIX A5 
(Continued)
Table II : Married individual and Three Children : Income all Earned income
1913-14 1919 -20 1920-21
1921-
and
22
Income Total Effective Total Effective Total Effect]
Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate
£ £ Pence £ Pence £ Pence
130 _ _ _ _ _ _
150 - - - - - -
200 - - - - - -
300 4 3.3 5 3.6 - -
400 8 4.7 16 9.5 7 4.1
500 12 5.8 29 14.0 20 9.7
700 24 8.1 74 25.2 61 20.8
1,000 38 9.0 144 34.6 142 34.0
1,500 56 9.0 281 45.0 277 44.3
2,000 75 9.0 450 54.0 412 49.4
2,500 125 12.0 656 63.0 599 57.5
3,000 150 12.0 963 77.0 799 63.9
4,000 233 14.0 1,363 81.8 1,224 73.4
5,000 292 14.0 1,788 85.8 1,674 80.4
7,000 508 17.4 2,713 93.0 2,649 90.8
9,000 675 18.0 3,688 98.3 3,724 99.3
12,000 925 18.5 5,238 104.8 5,374 107.5
20,000 1,592 19.1 9,438 113.2 9,774 117.3
30,000 2,425 19.4 14,688 117.5 15,524 124.2
50,000 4,092 19.6 25,188 120.9 27,524 132.1
100,000 8,258 19.8 51,438 123.4 57,524 138.1
Source : Derived from Appendices to the Report of the committee on 
National Debt and Taxation cmd 2800 pp.126-127
APPENDIX A6
QUERIES CONCERNING SETTLEMENTS IN 1 THE ACCOUNTANT1 1916-1922
February 19th, 1916
A parent held all the shares of a private limited company and also 
loaned to the company £1,000 at 5%. He now desires to give and 
transfer this £1,000 equally to his two children who are minors, pay 
the interst to their credit less tax and then as parent claim 
repayment of the tax deducted, it is asked by "Lancastrian” if the 
payment of the loan and the reinvestment will be sufficient without a 
legal deed.
Answer. The method will be sufficient so long as the gift is valid as 
against the parent and is not merely a change in form which may at any
time at the parents option be ignored and the loan become absolutely
the property of the parent. The sole point is that the income must 
actually be the income of the minors and this is a question of fact
determinable on the facts pertaining. If the loan is repaid to the
father, then he reinvests the amount in the names of the children with 
a view to both capital and income being property of the children, 
repayment should be made and moreover if the income is immediately 
vested in the children the practice allows exemption and repayment.
November 3rd 1917
A and B have minor sons, and have conceived the idea of lodging 
securities at the bank with a view to investing in canmercial and 
industrial shares in the names of the sons, so that the latter could 
claim repayment of income tax. The shares will be held in the names 
of the minors jointly, but A and B will invest the money and as 
guardians, will be at liberty to sell.
Original answer - A properly executed deed of gift is valid as far as 
transferring income to the minors, who, being absolutely entitled to 
the income could claim repayment of tax. If, however, the trust is 
created with power to the father to retake possession, at his 
discretion, of the securities, it cannot be contended that the minor 
has any interest in the income other than as a gift from the father. 
Repayment would be refused in this case. So long however, as the 
income belongs for the time being absolutely to the minors, repayment 
can be claimed.
The correspondent asked for a more definite reply to the query and 
stated that A and B proposed to lodge security at a bank and obtain a 
loan thereon. This money they propose lending to the sons, and, 
acting on behalf of the latter, to invest in shares. When A and B 
think proper they propose to reverse the process, i.e. the sons to 
sell the shares and with the proceeds to repay the loan to A and B.
The latter will then repay the loan to the bank and reclaim the 
securities. The shares held would be in the names of the children and 
the income would belong absolutely to the latter. There is no 
intention of transferring anything by a deed of gift.
APPENDIX A6
Continued
The further answer is -
The determining factors were given in the previous reply, showing what 
must be done in order to secure exemption. The position is that the 
minors must have an absolute interest in the incane, i.e. that the 
income is not that of the parents. The answer to the query is thus in 
the negative as the parents are the source of the income to be 
attributed to the children and have every control over it in the sense 
that they could at any time take the incane which therefore becomes a 
gift fron the parents of income of the parents. (Author's comment - 
this view seems to be incorrect)
12th October 1918
A person bought in the daughter's name stock to the value of £500. 
There is no deed of gift and the daughter is a minor. It is queried 
whether the daughter can claim repayment and whether the father can 
exclude the dividend from his return.
Answer:- A deed of gift is not necessary to constitute a valid 
disposal but if the giver is able at his discretion to retake 
possession of the shares there is not gift but only loan. If 
therefore there is a bona fide gift the dividends are part of the 
daughter's income and she may claim repayment so that the dividends 
can then be excluded from the father's return.
June 4th, 1921
A query was received from a widow who intends entering into a deed 
with each of her unmarried children covenanting to pay during their 
joint lives £150 per annum to each. The children would then pay her 
£3 per week for board and lodging. This would be a voluntary payment, 
or any rate not mentioned in the deeds, if the board and lodging 
payments become regular it is asked whether these should be added to 
the income although in a sense they are voluntary payments.
Answer:- The annuity becomes income of the recipient.
APPENDIX B
Finance Bill 1922 Clause 13
Finance Act 1922 Section 20
APPENDIX B1
FINANCE BILL 1922 CLAUSE 1 3 . (AS INTRODUCED)
13. (1) Any income
(a) of which any person is able, or has at any time since the 
fifth day of April, nineteen hundred and twenty-two, been 
able, without the consent of any other person not being his 
wife or her husband, by means of the exercise of any power 
of appointment, power of revocation or otherwise howsoever, 
to obtain for himself the beneficial enjoyment; or
(b) which by virtue or in consequence of any disposition made, 
directly or indirectly, by any person after the first day 
of May, nineteen hundred and twenty-two (other than a 
disposition made for valuable and sufficient 
consideration), is payable to or applicable for the benefit 
of any other person for a period which cannot exceed six 
years; or
(c) which by virtue or in consequence of any disposition made, 
directly or indirectly, by any person whether before or 
after the commencement of this Act, is payable to or 
applicable for the benefit of a child of that person for 
some period less than the life of the child;
shall, subject to the provisions of this section, but in cases 
under the above paragraph (c) only if and so long as the child 
is an infant and unmarried, be deemed for the purposes of the 
enactments relating to income tax (including super-tax) to be 
the income of the person who is or was able to obtain the 
beneficial enjoyment thereof, or by whom the disposition was 
made, as the case may be, and not to be for those purposes the 
income of any other person.
2. Where by virtue of paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of 
sub-section (1) of this section any income tax or super-tax 
becomes chargeable on and is paid by the person by whom the 
disposition was made, that person shall be entitled to recover 
from any trustee or other person to whom the income is payable 
by virtue or in consequence of the disposition the amount of 
the tax so paid, and for that purpose to require the 
Commissioners concerned to furnish to him a certificate 
specifying the amount of the income in respect of which he has
so paid tax and the amount of the tax so paid, and any
certificate so furnished shall be conclusive evidence of the 
facts appearing thereby.
3. Where any person obtains in respect of any allowance or 
relief a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount of the 
repayment to which he would but for the provisions of paragraph
(b) or paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of this section have 
been entitled, an amount equal to the excess shall be paid by 
him to the trustee or other person to whom the income is 
payable by virtue or in consequence of the disposition, or 
where there are two or more such persons shall be apportioned
among those persons as the case may require.
If any question arises as to the amount of any payment or as to 
any apportionment to be made under this sub-section, that 
question shall be decided by the General Commissioners whose 
decision thereon shall be final.
(4) Any income, which is deemed by virtue of this section to be 
the income of any person, shall be deemed to be the highest 
part of his income.
(5) In this section, unless the context otherwise requires - 
The expression 'child' includes step-child or illegitimate 
child; ( '
The expression 'disposition' includes any trust, covenant, 
agreement or arrangement.
APPENDIX 52.
FINANCE ACT 1922, SECTION 20 
  --(1) Any income
(a) of which any person is able, or has, at any time since the 
fifth day of April, nineteen hundred and twenty-two, been 
able, without the consent of any other person by means of 
the exercise of any power of appointment, power of 
revocation or otherwise howsoever by virtue or in 
consequence of a disposition made directly or indirectly by 
himself, to obtain for himself the beneficial enjoyment; or
(b) which by virtue or in consequence of any disposition made, 
directly or indirectly, by any person after the first day 
of May, nineteen hundred and twenty-two (other than a 
disposition made for valuable and sufficient 
consideration), is payable to or applicable for the benefit 
of any other person for a period which cannot exceed six 
years; or
(c) which by virtue or in consequence of any disposition made, 
directly or indirectly, by any person after the fifth day 
of April, nineteen hundred and fourteen, is payable to or 
applicable for the benefit of a child of that person for 
some period less than the life of the child;
shall, subject to the provisions of this section, but in cases 
under the above paragraph (c) only if and so long as the child 
is an infant and unmarried, be deemed for the purposes of the 
enactments relating to income tax (including super-tax) to be 
the income of the person who is or was able to obtain the 
beneficial enjoyment thereof, or of the person, if living, by 
whom the disposition was made, as the case may be, and not to 
be for those purposes the income of any other person;
Provided that in cases under the above paragaph (a) -
(i) where any such power as aforesaid can be exercised by a 
person with the consent of the wife or the husband of 
that person, the power shall, for the purposes of the 
said paragraph, be deemed to be exercisable without the 
consent of another person, except where the husband and 
wife are living apart either by agreement or under an 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction; and
(ii) where any such power as aforesaid is exercisable by the 
wife or the husband of the person who made the 
disposition, the power shall, for the purposes of the 
said paragraph, be deemed to be exercisable by the person 
who made the disposition.
Provided also that
(i) the above paragraph (c) shall not apply as regards any 
income which is derived from capital which, at the end of 
the period during which that income is payable to or 
applicable for the benefit of the child, is required by 
the disposition to be held on trust absolutely for, or to 
be transferred to, the child, or any income which is 
payable to or applicable for the benefit of a child 
during the whole period of the life of the person by whom 
the disposition was made; and
(ii) for the purposes of the said paragraph (c) income shall 
not be deemed to be payable to or applicable for the 
benefit of a child for some period less than its life by 
reason only that the disposition contains a provision for 
the payment to some other person of the income in the 
event of the bankruptcy of the child, or of an assignment 
thereof, or a charge thereon being executed by the child.
(2) Where by virtue of paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of 
sub-section (1) of this section any income tax or super-tax 
becomes chargeable on and is paid by the person by whom the 
disposition was made, that person shall be entitled to recover 
from any trustee or other person to whom the income is payable 
by virtue or in consequence of the disposition the amount of 
the tax so paid, and for that purpose to require the 
Commissioners concerned to furnish to him a certificate 
specifying the amount of the income in respect of which he has
so paid tax and the amount of the tax so paid, and any
certificate so furnished shall be conclusive evidence of the 
facts appearing thereby.
(3) Where any person obtains in respect of any allowance or 
relief a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount of the 
repayment to which he would but for the provisions of paragraph 
(b) or paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of this section have 
been entitled, an amount equal to the excess shall be paid by 
him to the trustee or other person to whom the income is 
payable by virtue or in consequence of the disposition, or 
where there are two or more such persons shall be apportioned
among those persons as the case may require.
If any question arises as to the amount of any payment or as to 
any apportionment to be made under this sub-section, that 
question shall be decided by the General Commissioners whose 
decision thereon shall be final.
(4) Any income, which is deemed by virtue of this section to 
be the income of any person, shall be deemed to be the highest 
part of his income.
(5) in this section, unless the context otherwise requires - 
The expression "child" includes step-child or illegitimate 
child;
The expression "disposition" includes any trust, covenant, 
agreement or arrangement.
APPENDIX C
Advertisements For The Use of Covenants
Total Number of New Claims Re Minors Submitted To Claims 
Branch For Years Ending 31 March 1923 to 31 March 1928
Claims Received In Respect of New Settlements On Minors By 
Their Parents And The Annual Income Transferred.
APPENDIX C l
ADVERTISEMENTS FOR THE USE OF COVENANTS
Hemel Hempstead Gazette, 14th March 1935. St. Peters Church Annual 
Parochial Meeting.
"Mr. Tyler suggested covenants and pointed out that they involved something 
for nothing."
The Times, 26th March 1935. Advertisement by British Social Hygiene 
Council.
Liverpool post and Mercury, 3rd April 1935. The King George Jubilee Trust 
inserted an advert pointing out to the philanthrope the advantages of deeds 
of covenant. The imperial Tobacco Company had given £25,000. The Oil and 
Coloured Trades journal, 29th March 1935 contains an advertisement regarding 
the Chemical Council (a charity) and indicates that contributions by 
covenant would get tax relief.
Daily Telegraph, 8th January 1936. "Why pay tax on your child's education 
and maintenance? You need notl - British Taxpayers Association Limited, 
Grand Buildings, Trafalgar Square, London.
Daily Telegraph, 21st January 1936. "By signing a deed of covenant with 
Brompton Hospital for a period of seven years, you enable the hospital to 
reclaim the income tax paid by you upon your subscription, so that your 
subscription of £5 5s is actually worth £6.15.6 to the hospital and gives 
both help and encouragement in its work of the prevention and cure of 
consumption (Enquiries to the Secretary, Brompton Hospital, SW3)". Daily 
Telegraph, 21st January 1936. "income Tax need not be paid on your child's 
education - write Taxpayers Protection Association Limited, Doland House, 
Regent Street, London SWl".
APPENDIX C2
Note:
TOTAL NUMBERS OF NEW CLAIMS RE MINORS SUBMITTED TO CLAIMS BRANCH 
FOR YEARS ENDING 31 MARCH 1923 TO 31 MARCH 1928
Year to 31 March Number of Claims
5010 
5224 
5841 
5824 
5919
1928 6777
The above figures include cases of 'out and out' dispositions of 
capital and other cases not within the intention of FA 1922 S20.
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
Source: PRO File IR40/4574
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APPENDIX D
Income Transferred By New Non-Parental Settlements on Minors 
1933/34 to 1939/40
Finance Bill 1936, Clause 19
Finance Act 1936. Settlements on Children
New Claims Arising In 1936-37 To 1939-40 In Respect of 
Settlements After 22 May 1936 By Parents On Their Minor 
Children
APPENDIX Dl
INCOME TRANSFERRED BY NEW NON-PARENTAL 
SETTLEMENTS ON MINORS 1933/34 TO 1939/40
Year to caught by Amending Deeds
31 March Irrevocable Revocable S20 FA 1922
1934 46,634 13,699 943 -
1935 51,695 16,690 1,416 -
1936 57,453 37,774 297 -
1937 61,845 58,141 1,455 -
1938 54,921 28,758 386 -
1939 61,588 33,051 1,736 16,384
1940 76,243 10,702 1,074 470
Note 1 The statistics are based upon new claims made to Claims .Branch in 
the year involved and therefore exclude existing settlements. Figures for 
cumulation settlements are excluded.
Source: Derived from PRO File IR40/6084
FINANCE B IL L , 1936 -  C lause 19
APPENDIX D2
(1) Where, by virtue or in consequence of any settlement to which 
this section applies and during the life of the settlor, any
income is paid to or for the benefit of a child of the
settlor in any year of assessment, the income shall, if at 
the commencement of that year the child was an infant and 
unmarried, be treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax 
Acts as the income of the settlor for that year and not as 
the income of any other person.
(2) Subject as hereafter provided, for the purpose of this section
(a) income which, by virtue or in consequence of a 
settlement to which this section applies, is so dealt 
with that it, or assets representing it, will or may 
become payable or applicable to or for the benefit of a
child of the settlor in the future (whether on the
fulfilment of a condition, or the happening of a 
contingency, or as the result of the exercise of a power 
or discretion conferred on any person, or otherwise) 
shall be deemed to be paid to or for the benefit of that 
child; and
(b) any income dealt with as aforesaid which is not required 
by the settlement to be allocated, at the time when it 
is so dealt with, to any particular child or children of 
the settlor shall be deemed to be paid in equal shares 
to or for the benefit of each of the children to or for 
the benefit of whom or any of whom the income or assets 
representing it will or may become payable or applicable.
(3) The following provisions of this subsection shall have effect 
as respects a settlement to which this section applies, being 
an irrevocable settlement made or entered into on or after 
the twenty-second day of April nineteen hundred and 
thirty-six, that is to say
(a) the provisions of the last foregoing subsection shall 
not apply to any income which is dealt with as therein 
mentioned by virtue or in consequence of such a 
settlement, unless and except to the extent that that 
income consists of, or represents directly or 
indirectly, sums paid by the settlor which are allowable 
as deductions in computing his total income for the 
purpose of the income Tax Acts; and
(b) where any income has been so dealt with by virtue or in 
consequence of such a settlement, any sum whatsoever 
paid by virtue or in consequence of the settlement, or 
any enactment relating thereto, to or for the benefit of 
a child of the settlor, being a child who at the 
commencement of the year of assessment in which the sum 
is paid is an infant and unmarried, shall be deemed for 
the purposes of subsection (1) of this section to be 
paid as income, unless and except to the extent that the 
sum so paid together with any other sums previously so
paid (whether to that child or to any other child who, 
at the commencement of the year of assessment in which 
that other sum was so paid, was an infant and unmarried) 
exceeds the aggregate amount of the income which has 
arisen under the settlement since it took effect.
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) of section twenty of the Finance Act 
1922, shall have effect as if references to paragraph (c) of 
subsection (1) of that section included references to the 
foregoing provisions of this section, as if references to a 
disposition included references to a settlement, and as if 
the reference to the making of a disposition included a 
reference to the making of or entering into a settlement, and 
subsection (4) of that section shall have effect as if the 
reference to that section included a reference to the said 
provisions of this section.
(5) No repayment shall be made under section twenty-five of the 
Income Tax Act, 1918, on account of tax paid in respect of 
any income which by virtue of this section has been treated 
as the income of a settlor.
(6) The General or Special commissioners may by notice in writing 
require any person to furnish them within such time as they 
may direct (not being less than twenty-eight days), with such 
particulars as they think necessary for the purpose of this 
section, and if that person without reasonable excuse fails 
to comply with the notice, he shall be liable to a penalty 
not exceeding fifty pounds, and, after judgment has been 
given for that penalty, to a further penalty of the like 
amount for every day during which the failure continues.
(7) For the purposes of this section, a settlement shall not be 
deemed to be irrevocable, if the terms thereof provide:
(a) for the payment to the settlor or the wife or husband of
the settlor for his or her benefit, or for the
application for the benefit of the settlor or the wife
or husband of the settlor, of any income or assets in 
any circumstances whatsoever during the life of any 
child of the settlor to or for the benefit of whom any 
income, or assets representing it, is or are or may be
payable or applicable by virtue or in consequence of the
settlement; or
(b) for the determination of the settlement by the act or on
the default of any person; or
(c) for the payment of any penalty by any person in the
event of his failing to comply with the provisions of 
the settlement, or for the total or partial 
indemnification or exoneration of any person in the 
event of his failing to enforce the provisions of the 
settlement.
(8) in this section
(a) the expression "child" includes a stepchild, an adopted 
child and an illegitimate child;
(b) the expression "settlement" includes any disposition, 
trust, covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of 
assets;
(c) the expression "settlor", in relation to a settlement, 
includes any person by whom the settlement was made or 
entered into directly or indirectly, and in particular 
(but without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing words of this definition) includes any person 
who has provided or undertaken to provide funds directly 
or indirectly for the purpose of the settlement, or has 
made with any other person a reciprocal arrangement for 
that other person to make or enter into the settlement;
(d) the expression "income" except where it last occurs in 
subsection (1) of this section, includes any income 
chargeable to income tax by deduction or otherwise and 
any income which would have been so chargeable if it had 
been received in the United Kingdom by a person resident 
and ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, but does 
not include income arising under a settlement in a year 
of assessment for which the settlor is not chargeable to 
income tax as a resident in the United Kingdom.
(9) This section applies to every settlement, wheresoever it was 
made or entered into, and whether it was made or entered into 
before or after the passing of this Act, except an 
irrevocable settlement made before the twenty-second day of 
April, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.
(10) Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section twenty of the
Finance Act, 1922, and any other provisions of that section 
relating to that paragraph, shall cease to have effect as 
respects any settlement to which this section applies.
APPENDIX D3
F JV; 1936. Settlements on children.
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;;^ f^ T(2}’‘"Subject: as H erealw  rpipyided, for the purpose of this 
section-— '
(a) income which, by virtue or in consequence of a settle­
ment to which this section applies, is so dealt w ith  
that it, or assets representing it, w ill or may become 
.payable or applicable to or for the benefit of a 
4 . child of the settlor, in the future (whether on the
4 . fulfilment of a condition, or the happening of a
contingency, or as the result of the exercise of a 
power or discretion conferred on any person, or 
otherwise) shall be deemed to be paid to or for the 
benefit of that ch ild ; and
(b) any income "dealt w ith as aforesaid which is not
Required by the settlement to be allocated, at the 
* time when it  is so dealt w ith, to any particular
child or children of the settlor shall be deemed to 
be paid'in equal shares to o r for the benefit of each 
of the Children to or for the benefit of whom or 
any of whom the income or assets representing it 
w ill or may become payable or applicable.
(3) Where any income is dealt with as mentioned in the 
last foregoing subsection by virtue or in consequence of a 
settlement to which this section applies, being a settlement 
which, at the time when the income is so dealt with, is an irre­
vocable settlement—
(a) the provisions of the last foregoing subsection shall
not apply to that income unless and except to the 
extent that that income consists of, or represents 
directly or indirectly, sums paid, by the settlor 
which are allowable as deductions in computing his 
total income for the purpose of the Income Tax 
'A cts; and
(b) any sum whatsoever paid thereafter by virtue or in
consequence of the settlement, or any enactment 
relating thereto, to or for the benefit of a child 
of the settlor, being a child who at the commence­
ment of the year of assessment in which the sum 
is paid is an infant and unmarried, shall be deemed
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for,the purposes of subsection (1) of ;
 ^ totf^-paid as income,^ unless and : except^  ^ e £  
e&ehfc$th£Lt the !
J othe^sums previously^*jMLid^
4;:' • ChildJc^^o any otheir c© d  y y h b ; ^ '
%   ^ year of asses^^t in w ln ^ iti^ ib th e r
i , . . v:' ;suihi^ asV:so. paid, was m  infant ahd^tinSati6i&) "
exceeds the aggregate amount of the incom&wMch 
by; virtue or in consequence of the settlement has 
beenpaid to or for the benefit of a child of the 
settlor, or dealt w ith as mentioned in subsection (2) 
of this section, since the date when the settlement 
took effect or the date when it  became irrevocable, 
whichever is the later.-
(4) Income paid* to or for the benefit7of a child of a settlor 
shall not be treated as provided in subsection (1) of this section 
for any year of assessment in which the aggregate amount of 
the income paid to or for the benefit of that child, which, but 
for this subsection, would be so treated by virtue of the foregoing 
provisions of this section, does not exceed five pounds.
. (5) Subsections (2) and (3) of section twenty of the Finance 
Act, 1922, shall have effect as if references to paragraph (c) of 
subsection (1) of that section included references to the foregoing 
provisions of this section, as if references to a disposition included 
references to a settlement, and as if the reference to the making 
of a disposition included a reference to the making of or entering 
into a settlement, and subsection (4) of that section shall have, 
effect as if the reference to that section included a reference to 
the said provisions of this section.
(6) No repayment shall be made under section twenty-five 
of the Income Tax Act, 1918, on account of tax paid in respect 
of any income which by virtue of this section has been treated 
as the income of a settlor.
(7) The General or Special Commissioners may by notice 
in writing require any party to a settlement to furnish them 
within such time as they may direct (not being less than twenty- 
eight days), with such particulars as they think necessary for 
the purpose of this section, and if that person without reasonable 
excuse fails to comply w ith the notice, he shall be liable to a 
penalty not exceeding fifty  pounds, and, after judgment has been 
given for that penalty, to a further penalty of the like amount 
for every day during which the failure continues.
(8) For the purposes of this section, a settlement shall not 
be deemed to be irrevocable, if the terms thereof provide—
(a) for the payment to the settlor or, during the life of 
the settlor, to the wife or husband of the settlor for
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his or^  her" benefit; v or for the; application fot vthe 
'the,, setQor or, thfeJ
;pr£ior-*
a n y in e ^ ^
,^r vby y to e  oni&dc^equence ofTheisefcfiement; or
,: (6) fo i the • defennittation of the -settlement by the act
or on^tlft'-defdult of any person;*;or'
(c) for the paynient oi any penalty by the settlor in the 
event of his failing to comply w ith the provisions 
of the Settlement:
. -^ Provided that -a- settlement shall not be deemed to be 
revocable by reason only— .*'
" (i) that it  contains a provision whereunder any income
or assets w ill or may become payable to or applicable 
for the benefit of the settlor, or the wife or husband 
of the settlor, on the bankruptcy of any such child 
as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection 
or in the event of an assignment of or charge oh 
, r • that income or those assets being executed, by such
. a child ; or; .. . v *
: (ii) that it  provides for the determ iriationof the settle- 
f^  V ment aLS aforesaid in such' a manner that the deter-
J VJ'r mination; w ill. not, during the lifetim e of any such
child as aforesaid, benefit any- person other than 
such a child, or the wife, husband, or issue of such 
a child; or
(iii) in the case of a settlement to which section th irty- 
three of the Trustee Act, 1925, applies, that it  
directs income to be held for the benefit of such a 
child as aforesaid on protective trusts, unless the 
trust period is a period less than the life of the 
child or the settlement specifies some event on 
the happening of which the child would, if the 
income were payable during the trust period to him  
absolutely during that period, be deprived of the 
•• right to receive the income or part thereof.
(9) In  this section—
(a) the expression “ child ” includes a ; stepchild, an 
adopted child and an illegitim ate child;
(b) the expression “ settlement ” includes any disposition, 
trust, covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer 
of assets;
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(c) the expression “ setttor”,; in  relation to a settlement,
■*; -v■’ includes^&y person^by^whom the settlement.:;vvas
- "m ade^ or indirectly,, and in  j  .
' p artic^ ® (b u t without- prejudice to f the'generality 
ofy tH e ^ l^ o in g  wnrds o f tWs definition) includes 
any pdrson who has-provided or undertaken, to 
provideTtmds directly ‘or indirectly for the purpose 
of the ‘Settlement, or has made with any other 
person a^reciprocal arrangement for that other 
person to make or enter into the settlement;
(d) the expression " income,” except in the third and
fourth places where it occurs in subsection (1) of 
this section, includes any’ income chargeable to 
income tax by deduction or otherwise and any 
income which would have been so chargeable if it  
had been. received in the United Kingdom by a 
person resident and ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom, but does not include income arising 
Under a settlement in a year of assessment for which 
the settlor is not chargeable to income tax as a 
resident in the United Kingdom.
(10) This section applies to every settlement, wheresoever 
it  was made or entered into, and whether it was made or entered 
into before or after the passing of this. Act, except a settlement 
made or entered into , before the twenty-second day of April, 
nineteen hundred and; thirty-six, which immediately before that 
date was irrevocable.
(11) Paragraph (c) of - subsection (1) of section twenty of 
the Finance Act, 1922, and any other provisions of that sub­
section relating to that paragraph, shall cease to have effect 
as respects any settlement to which this section applies.
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These claims all related to settlements of income excluded 
from S21 FA1936 by sub-section (4) i.e. income not 
exceeding £5.
The very low figures were thought by Claims Branch to 
indicate "that there has been a practical suspension of 
activity in children’s deeds" (Memo 14/8/37).
These claims were admissable on the same grounds as those 
referred to in Note 1 but also a new class or admissable 
claim was being made i.e. claims in respect of the child's 
year of birth only. Such claims were based upon the fact 
that S21(l) FA 1936 referred to the child being an infant 
and unmarried at the beginning of the year and as the 
child did not exist at that time the provisions could not 
apply.
The papers indicate that "the lull which occurred after 
the Finance Act 1936 has ended" (Memorandum from Claims 
Branch to Chief Inspector 19 August 1938).
A further class of admissable claim had started to be 
received in respect of cases where the settlor was not 
resident in U.K.
Despite the considerable increase in claims received over 
those of the previous year "they are still of extremely 
moderate proportions compared with those prior to the 
introduction of the 1936 Budget". (Memo from Claims Branch 
to Chief Inspector of Taxes 14 October 1939)
For the period from September 1939 to December 1939 
District Inspectors had discretion to deal with claims 
without submission to C.I. Claims and the figures above 
are exclusive of such cases. Even allowing for this "the 
figures illustrate clearly the continued success of Section 
21 Finance Act 1936 for the purpose for which it was 
introduced". (Memo from Claims Branch 5 August 1940). 
Irrevocable trusts for accumulation were not caught by 
Section 21 FA 1936 yet clearly they were not popular at 
this time.
Source : Derived From PRI File IR40/6084
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The Chancellor's Warning 
(Hansard 16 July 1937, Cols. 1753-4)
in clauses 12 and 13 of the Bill we have made provision to prevent 
evasion of tax. Those were evasions which had become prominent and 
which were in danger of becoming common, and we have not only 
legislated against them, but in one case at least, in view of the 
warning given by my predecessor, we have legislated retrospectively.
I think it my duty to say a little more on the subject, because I do 
not suppose^that by our present provision we have necessarily covered 
every possible evasion for the future. I am fully alive to the fact 
that there are other forms of avoidance of taxation which have been 
suggested and which may be practised, not only the field of 
income-tax, but also in the field of death duties, and, for my part, I 
think it may become necessary to deal with these matters further at an 
early date.
♦
It is utterly impossible when a chancellor of the Exchequer has 
inherited another Finance Bill, at the moment to cover every form of 
avoidance, and, of course, the process we have adopted is to deal as a 
matter of extreme urgency with the cases which we knew were the most 
dangerous, and might become most prominent. I am not going to 
specify the various methods by which avoidance may be practised. I 
do not know that I could do so. They are extremely complicated and, 
in any case, I do not wish to give them any advertisement whatever.
But I think it is desirable to refer to one method to which my 
attention has been particularly drawn. That is the method which was 
referred to by the hon. member for the Park Division of Sheffield, 
when he quoted a passage from the financial column of a newspaper.
It is the formation of cumulating trusts, under which sur-tax payers 
are able to reduce their liability by transfer of income under trusts 
which are outside the provisions of Section 20 of the Finance Act, 
1922. I believe that there are reasons for thinking that there is 
some growth in that form of avoidance, and if there is, early
legislation to deal with it is essential.
I wish now to give a clear warning to anyone who may be contemplating 
the adoption of this particular device or- any other form of avoidance 
that we shall certainly not hesitate to introduce provisions to deal 
with the subject. I should make it clear that legislation of this 
character, if it should be necessary, will be applied to the sur-tax 
payable in the year in which the legislation is introduced, because it 
is calculated on the previous year, and therefore it may affect not 
only future arrangements of this sort but also those, if any, which 
are now being made or have been made in the recent past. I feel that 
members in all quarters of the House will think that in taking that
course I have done right, and I intend to do my best to carry out what
I have suggested.
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Provisions asr respect* Settlements.
—(1) W here, in  any year o f  assessment, under Incom e 
any  se ttlem en t—  arising
under
{ a )  the s e ttlo r m ig h t, in  the even t o f  the exercise, certain
w hether by h im se lf o r any o th e r person, and settlem ents
w hether w ith  o r w ith o u t the consent o f  any  o th e r be
person, o f  any  power o f  revok ing  o r otherw ise Ha
de te rm in ing  the se ttlem ent o r any p rovis ion  uf settlor. 
thereof, have become e n tit le d  to  the beneficial 
en joym en t o f  any  incom e; o r
{ b )  the se ttlo r m ig h t, in  the even t o f  the exercise 
o f  any such power as aforesaid o r on the p a y ­
m ent o f a pena lty , have ceased to  be liab le  to  
pay any sums by v ir tu e  o r in  consequence o f 
the. s e tt le m e n t:
any incom e aris ing  under the se ttlem en t in  th a t year to  
the beneficial e n joym e n t o f w hich he m ig h t have become 
so e n title d , and any sums paid by h im  in  th a t year 
which he m ig h t have ceased to be liab le  to pay as 
aforesaid, shall be treated fo r a ll the purposes o f  the 
Incom e T ax  A cts  as the income o f  the se ttlo r fo r th a t 
year and no t as the income, o f any o th e r person.
In  th is  subsection references to a se ttlo r, except 
in the las t place where th a t word occurs, shall be con­
strued as in c lu d ing  references to  the w ife  o r husband 
o f the se ttlo r.
(2) I f  and so long as the s e ttlo r has under any se ttle ­
ment any in te res t in  any income or p ro pe rty , any incom e 
aris ing  under the se ttlem en t du ring  the  life  o f  the se ttlo r 
in any year o f assessment shall, to  the e x te n t to  w h ich  i t  
is n o t d is tr ib u te d , lie treated fo r a ll the purposes o f the 
Incom e T a x  Acts as the income o f the se ttlo r fo r th a t 
year, and not as the income o f any o the r person :
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Provided tha t -
{ a )  i f  and so long as (lie  se ttlo r has an in te res t 
ne ithe r in the whole o f the income a t  any 
tim e  aris ing  under the se ttlem en t nor in  the  
whole o f the p ro pe rty  a t any tim e  com prised 
in  the se ttlem en t, the  am ount o f incom e to  
he trea ted  as the incom e o f the s e ttlo r b y  
v ir tu e  o f  th is  subsection shall be such p a r t 
o f  the income w h ich , b u t fo r th is  proviso, 
w ould  be so treated as, in  the  op in ion  o f the  
General o r .Special Commissioners, is p ro ­
po rtiona te  to the e x te n t o f the in te res t o f  
the s e tt lo r ; and
(/>) where incom e aris ing  under the se ttlem en t 
has been treated as the income o f the se ttlo r 
fo r any year o f  assessment by v ir tu e  o f the  
last foregoing subsection, the am oun t o f 
incom e to  be treated as his fo r th a t year b y  
v ir tu e  o f th is  subsection shall n o t exceed the 
am oun t ( i f  any) by w h ich  the income w h ich , 
b u t fo r th is  p roviso, w ou ld  be so trea ted  
exceeds the incom e w hich  has been trea ted  
.as his by v ir tu e  o f the last foregoing subsection.
(3) For the purpose o f the last foregoing subsection, 
the s e ttlo r shall be deemed to  have an in te res t in  incom e 
o r p rope rty  under a se ttlem en t i f  under th a t  se ttlem en t 
any incom e or p ro pe rty  is. o r w ill o r m ay becom e,'payable 
to  o r app licab le  fo r the benefit o f  the se ttlo r o r the  w ife  o r 
husband o f the set t lo r  in  any circum stances whatsoever :
P rov ided  th a t the se ttlo r shall not be deemed to  
have an in te res t in  any income o r p ro p e rty  i f  and so long 
as tinder the settlement- that- income o r p ro p e rty  canno t 
become payable o r applicable ' as aforesaid, except in  the 
event o f •
( ( f )  the b an k ru p tcy  of some person who is o r m ay 
become benefic ia lly  en title d  to  th a t  incom e o r 
p ro p e rty ; or
(/>) any assignment o f or charge on th a t incom e or 
p ro pe rty  being made or g iven by some such 
person; or
(»•) in the case o f a m arriage se ttlem en t, the death 
of both th<» parties to the m arriage and o f  a ll 
■ >r any of the <*hi!dn*n o f the m a rriage ; o r
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( d )  the death under the age o f tw e n ty -fiv e  or some 
lower age o f some person who w ould  be bene­
fic ia lly  e n title d  to  th a t  income o r p ro pe rty  on 
a tta in in g  th a t  age.
(4) The- provis ions o f Part 1 o f the Schedule 
to  th is  Act shall have effect as respects the recovery 
by a se ttlo r o f tax w ith  w hich he becomes chargeable 
by v ir tu e  o f subsection (2) o f th is  section, and the 
recovery from  a s e ttlo r o f any a d d itio n a l re lie f to  w hich 
he becomes e n title d  by v ir tu e  o f th a t subsection, and 
in  th a t Schedule th is  section is referred to  as 11 the 
firs t re la tive  section ” .
(5) No repaym ent shall be made under section 
tw e n ty -five  o f the Incom e 'fa x  A c t, 1918 (w h ich  relates 
to  re lie f from  tax  in  respect o f incom e accum ulated under 
trus ts ) on account o f ta x  paid in  respect o f any income 
w hich by v ir tu e  o f th is  section has been treated as the 
income o f a se ttlo r.
(6) The foregoing provis ions o f th is  section shall 
a pp ly  fo r the purposes o f  assessment to  income tax  
fo r the year 1937-38 and subsequent years and shall 
app ly  in  re la tion  to  any se ttlem en t, wherever made and 
w hether made before o r a fte r the.passing o f th is  A e t :
Provided th a t -
- ( t t )  fo r the year 1937-38 no income shall be 
charged to  tax  at the s tandard  ra te  by v ir tu e  
o f the provis ions o f th is  section, bu t su rta x  
shall be assessed and charged as i f  any incom e 
w hich w ou ld , b u t fo r th is  proviso, have been 
• •barged as aforesaid had in  fac t been so 
••barged; and 
( I t )  fo r the purpose o f g ra n tin g  re lie f from  ta x  a t 
the standard  ra te  in  -respect, o f  any income 
w hich fo r the year 1937-38 is trea ted  as the 
income o f a se ttlo r by v ir tu e  o f subsection (1) 
o f th is  section b u t w ould be treated as the 
income o f some o the r person b u t fo r tha t 
subsection, th a t income shall be treated as 
the income o f  th a t o th e r person.
B.— (1) W here, by v irtu e  o r in  consequence o f any 
se ttlem ent to  which th is  section applies, the se ttlo r pays 
in any year o f assessment to  the trustees o f th e se ttle m e n t 
ar.y sums which w ou ld, but fo r th is  subsection, be 
allowable as deductions in com puting  his to ta l incom e
Disallow­
ance of 
deduction  
from total 
income of
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fo r th a t  year fo r the  purpose's o f su rtax , those sums sha ll 
n o t be so a llow able  to  the e x te n t to  w h ich  the aggregate 
a m oun t the reo f fa lls w ith in ....
( f t )  the am oun t o f  incom e a ris ing  under the se ttle ­
m en t in  th a t year w hich has n o t been d is t r i­
b u te d ; less
( b)  the am oun t o f incom e so a ris ing  in th a t  year 
w hich is trea ted  as the income o f the se ttlo r 
by v irtu e  o f  subsection (2) o f the last foregoing 
section :
P rovided that th is  subsection shall no t a p p ly  to  
any sums w h ich  have been treated as the incom e o f  the 
se ttlo r by v ir tu e  o f subsection ( I )  o f  the las t-fo rego ing  
section. -
(2) F o r the  purpose o f the last foregoing subsection, 
any sum paid in any year o f assessment by the se ttlo r 
to  any body corporate connected w ith  the se ttlem en t in 
tha t year shall be treated as i f  i t  had been paid to  the 
trustees o f  the se ttlem en t in th a t year by v irtu e  o r in  
consequence o f the se ttlem ent.
(3) No re lie f sha ll be given under any o f the p ro ­
visions o f the Incom e T a x  Acts on account o f  ta x  paid  in  
respect o f so much o f any income aris ing  under a s e ttle ­
m en t in any year o f assessment as is equal to the aggre­
gate am oun t o f any sums paid by the  se ttlo r in  th a t 
year w hich have been d isa llow ed as deductions by v ir tu e  
o f  th is  section.
(4) T h is  section shall app ly  to  any se ttlem en t 
(w herever made) made a fte r the tw e n ty -s ix th  day  o f 
A p r il.  - nineteen hundred and th ir ty -e ig h t, and where 
income aris ing  under any se ttlem en t (w herever made) 
made on o r before tha t date  is treated as the incom e o f 
the se ttlo r by v ir tu e  o f .subsection (1) o f  the last fo re ­
going section b u t ceases to  be-so treated by reason o f 
any va ria tio n  o f the term s o f the se ttlem en t made a fte r 
th a t date, o r would  have been so treated b u t lo r  such a 
va ria tio n , th is  section shall app ly  to  th a t se ttlem en t as 
from  the date  o f the va ria tion .
(5) In  th is  section references to sums paid by a 
se ttlo r shall include references to  sums paid by the 
w ife  o r husband o f the se ttlo r.
certain sum s 
paid by 
settlor.
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0. -(1) A n }7 sum paid d ire c tly  o r in d ire c tly , by w ay Sums paid 
o f loan o r repayment- o f  a loan o r o therw ise  than  as to settlor 
income, in  any re levan t year o f assessment by the trustees otherwise
%> tiiiiti its
o f a se ttlem en t to  w hich th is  section : , 'tTes to  the j l u . o i n e  
se ttlo r, sha ll —
( f t )  to  the e x te n t to  which the a m o un t o f that- sum 
fa lls w ith in  the  am oun t o f  incom e ava ilab le  up 
to the end o f th a t  year, be treated fo r a ll the  
purposes o f the incom e T a x  A cts  as the income 
o f the s e ttlo r fo r tha t y e a r ;
( b )  to  the e x te n t to  w h ich  the am oun t o f th a t sum 
exceeds the a m o un t o f income ava ilab le  up to  
the end o f th a t year but fa lls  w ith in  the am ount 
o f the income ava ilab le  up to  the end o f the 
n e x t fo llow ing  year, be treated fo r the purposes 
aforesaid as the  income o f the se ttlo r fo r the 
next fo llo w in g  y e a r;
and so on :
(2) F o r the purpose o f the last foregoing subsection, 
the am oun t o f income ava ilab le  up to  the end o f any 
year shall, in re la tion  to  any sum paid as aforesaid, be 
taken to  be the aggregate am oun t o f  income aris ing  under 
the se ttlem en t in th a t year and any previous re levan t 
year which has not been d is tr ib u te d , less
( n) I he aggregate amount of any other sums paid as 
aforesaid in any previous relevant- year or 
previously paid ax aforesaid in that year; and
(b) an amount equal to lax at the standard rate
on (he amount of income arising under the 
settlement in that year and any previous relevant 
year which has not been distributed.
( c )  any income a ris ing  under the se ttlem en t in th a t
year or'any previous relevant year which has 
not been distributed and has been treated as 
the income of tin* settlor by virtue of any of 
the provisions of the section immediately pre­
ceding the last foregoing section ; and
{»/) any sums paid by virtue or in consequence of 
I he settlement, to the extent that they have 
been disallowed, by virtue of the last forc- 
tM ling sect ion. as deductions in computing the 
settlor's income for that year or any previous 
relevant year.
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(r) an am ount equal to tax  fo r tha t year on—-
(i) the aggregate am oun t o f  incom e aris ing  
under the se ttlem ent in  th a t  year and any 
previous year which lias n o t been d is tr ib u te d , 
less
( ii)  the aggregate amount, o f  the income 
and sums referred to  in paragraphs (6), {<■) 
and (t l )  o f  th is  subsection.
(3) F o r the  purpose o f th is  subsection, any sums 
paid to  the se ttlo r in any year o f assessment by any body 
corporate  connected w ith  the se ttlem en t in  th a t year 
shall be treated as having  been paid by  the trustees o f 
the se ttlem ent in that year.
(4) W here the whole o r any p a rt o f  any sum is 
■treated by virtue ' o f  th is  sect ion .as incom e o f the  se ttlo r 
fo r any year, it shall be treated as incom e o f such an 
a m o u n ta s , a fte r deduction  o f tax  a t the  s tandard  ra te  
fo r th a t year, woidd be equal to th a t  sum o r th a t  p a r t 
thereof.
(o) 'This section applies to  any se ttlem en t w herever 
made and w hether made before o r a fte r the  commence­
m en t o f th is  A c t, and in th is  section—
(o) the expression “  cap ita l sum "  means—
(i) any sum paid by w ay o f loan o r re p ay ­
ment o f  a loan ; and
( ii)  any o th e r sum paid o therw ise  than  as 
income which is no t paid fo r va luab le  and 
suffic ien t consideration :
hut does not inc lude any sum w h ich  could  n o t 
have become payable to the s e tt lo r  except in 
one o f the events specified in the p roviso  to  
subsection (3) o f the section im m e d ia te ly  p re ­
ceding the last foregoing section ;
( b )  the expression “ re levant y e a r ”  means any 
year o f assessment a fte r the year 1937-38; and
(c) references to sums paid to  the s e tt lo r  inc lude
references to  sums paid to the w ife  o r husband 
o f the sc tt lo r .
1). ( I ) The provisions o f P art I I o f  the
Schedule to th is Act shall have* effect fo r the purpose 
• •I ca rry ing  the last three foregoing sections in to  effect
Supplem en­
tary pro­
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and otherw ise iV>r supp lem enting  the provisions o f  those 
sections, and those sections are re ferred to  in  th a t  P a rt 
o f  th a t Schedule as “  re la tive  ”  sections.
(2) Paragraph (//) o f  subsection (1) o f section tw e n ty  
o f the Finance A c t-, 11)22, shall cease to  have effect, and 
shall be de<*mcd to  have ceased to  have effect fo r the 
purpose o f assessment to  su rtax  fo r the year 1.937-38,
(3) S ub ject to  the last foregoing subsection, the 
provis ions o f th is  and the last three foregoing sections 
shall be in a d d itio n  to  and n o t in -derogation o f any 
o the r p rovis ions o f the Incom e 'fa x  Acts.
('I) f o r  the purposes o f this- am i the last three 
foregoing seel ions
( a )  the expression “  income aris ing  under a s e ttle ­
ment "  includes
(i) any income chargeable to  incom e ta x  
by deduction  o r o therw ise, and any income 
which woidd have boon so chargeable i f  i t  
had been received in the U n ited  K in g d o m  
by a person dom ic iled , resident and o rd in a r ily  
resident in the U n ited  K in g d o m ; and
(ii)  w h e r e  the amount, o f  the income o f any 
body corpora te  has been apportioned  under 
section ( w en ly-one  o f the Finance A c t, 1922, 
fo r any year o r period, o r could have been 
so apportioned  i f  the body ' co rpora te  were 
incorpora ted  in any p a rt o f the U n ited  
K ingdom , so much o f the income o f the 
la x ly  corporate  fo r th a t year o r period as is 
etpia l to  the am oun t w h ich  has been o r could  
have been so appo rtioned  to  the trustees o f 
I he set I lenient ;
bu t, where the s e ttlo r is not dom ic iled , o r no t 
resident, or no t o rd in a r ily  resident, in  the 
U n ited  K ingdom  in any year o f assessment, does 
not include income a ris ing  under the s e ttle ­
m ent in that, year in  respect o f which the se ttlo r, 
i f  he were a c tu a lly  e n tit le d  the re to , w ou ld  n o t 
la* chargeable to  incom e ta x  by deduction  o r 
otherw ise by reason o f his not being so d o m i­
ciled,-resident o r o rd in a r ily  re s id en t;
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( b )  t iie  expression “ .se ttle m e n t”  includes any d is ­
pos ition , tru s t, covenant, agreem ent o r a rrange­
m ent, and tin* expression “ s e t t lo r ”  in re la tion  
to  a se ttlem en t means any person by whom  the 
se ttlem en t was m ade;
(c) a person shall be deemed to  have made a se ttle ­
m ent i f  Ik* has rnade o r entered in to  the se ttle ­
ment d ire e tlv  o r in d ire c tly , and in  p a rtic u la r 
(b u t w ith o u t pre jud ice  to the gene ra lity  o f the 
foregoing, words o f .th is  paragraph) i f  he has 
provided o r undertaken to  p rov ide  funds d ire c t ly  
o r in d ire c tly  fo r the  purpose o f  the  se ttlem en t, 
o r has marie w ith  any o the r person a recip rocal 
a rrangem ent for tha t o the r person to make o r 
ente r in to  the s e ttle m e n t;
( d )  income aris ing  under a se ttlem en t in any  \rear
o f assessment shall be deemed no t to  have been 
d is tr ib u te d  i f  and to the ex te n t th a t i t  exceeds 
the aggregate am ount o f
(i) the sums paid in tha t year by the 
trustees o f the se ttlem en t to any persons 
(not being a body corporate  connected w ith  
the settlem ent and not being the trustees o f 
ano the r settlem ent .m ade by the se ttlo r o r 
tin* trustees o f the se ttlem en t) in such m anner 
tha t they fall to  la* treated in th a t year, 
otherw ise than by v irtu e  o f the last pre­
ceding seel ion, as the income o f those persons 
fo r the purposes o f income tax . o r w ou ld  fa ll 
to Ik* so treated i f  those persons were d o m i­
ciled. resident and o rd in a r ily  resident in the 
U n ited  K ingdom  and the sums had been 
paid to t hem I herein ; am i
(ii) any expenses o f the trustees o f  the 
settlem ent which are paid in tha t year am i 
are p roperly  chargeable to incom e; and
( ii i)  in a cast* where tin* trustees o f  a s e ttle ­
ment are trustees fo r ch a ritab le  purposes 
o n ly , the am ount o f  any incom e in respect-o f 
which exem ption  from  tax m ay be g ran ted  
under section th irty -se ven  ol the Incom e T a x  
A d .  I9 IS . or section th i r t v  o f the F inance 
A c t, 1921.
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(e)  a body corporate shall be deemed to  be 
connected w ith  a se ttlem en t in  any year o f  
assessment i f  any  o f the income the reo f fo r any 
year or period ending in th a t year o f assess­
ment -
(i) has been apportioned  to the trustees 
o f  the se ttlem en t under section tw entv-one
'o f  the Finance A ct. 1922. o r could have been 
so apportioned  i f  the body corporate  had 
been incorpora ted in the U n ited  K in g d o m ; 
or
(ii)  could have been so apportioned  i f  the  
incom e o f the body corporate  fo r th a t year 
o r period had not been d is tr ib u te d  to  the 
members thereo f am i, in the case o f a body 
corporate  incorpora ted outside  the U n ited  
K ingdom , i f  the body corporate  had been 
incorpora ted  in the U n ited  K ingdom .
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S C H E D U L E .
S i m ’p l k m e n t a r y  P r o v i s i o n s  a s  t o  S e t t l e m e n t s .
Part I.
A iuuhtments h b t w k k n t u b S ettlor a n d T rustees.
1. W hore l>v virtue of any provision of the first relative 
section any income tax heroines chargeable- on and is paid by a 
settlor, ho shall ho entitled
(it) lo recover Irmu any trustee, or other person to whom
income at isos under the settlement, the amount of the 
tax so paid: and
(/>) for that purpose to require the Commissioners concerned 
to furnish to him a certilieatc specifying the amount of
income in respect of which he has so paid tax and the
amount of tax so paid.
2. Any certificate furnished under the last, foregoing para­
graph shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
.‘h W here anv person obtains, in respect o f any allowance or 
relief, a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount o f the 
repayment to which he would, but for the provisions of subsection
(2) of the first relative section, have been entitled, an amount 
equal to the excess shall be paid by him to the trustees or other 
person to whom income arises under the settlement, or where 
there are two or more such persons shall be apportioned among 
those persons, as the case may require.
4. If any question arises as to the amount of any payment 
or as lo any apportionment to be made under the last foregoing 
paragraph, that question shall be decided by the Ceneral Com­
missioners .whose decision thereon shall be final.
Any income winch is treated by virtue of any provision 
of the relative section as income of a settlor shall be deemed for 
the purpose of this schedule to be the highest part of Jus income.
Part I I .
M iscellaneous.
1. 'fax chargeable at the stain lard rate by virtue of the first 
or third of the relative sections shall be charged under Case VI 
of Schedule D.
2. In computing the liability to income tax of a settlor 
chargeable by virtue of any of the provisions of the first relative 
section, the same deduct ions and reliefs shall be allowed as would
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have lieeii .allowed if the income treated as his by virtue of that 
provision had actually been received by him.
.'h in computing the liability to income tax of a settlor 
chargeable by virtue of the third relative section, the same 
deductions and reliefs shall be' allowed as would have been 
allowed if the amount treated as his income by virtue of that 
section had actually been received by him as income.
4. The (Jeneral or Special Commissioners may by notice in 
writing require any person, being a party to a settlement, to 
furnish them (within such time as they may direct, not being 
less than twenty-eight- days) with such particulars as they think 
necessary for the purposes of any of the provisions of the relative- 
sections, and if that person without- reasonable excuse fails to 
comply w ith the notice he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 
titty pounds and. after judgment- has been given for that penalty, 
to a further penalty of the like amount for every dav during which 
the failure continues.
Without- prejudice to the provisions of the last foregoing 
paragraph, if any party to a settlement fails to furnish any par­
ticulars required under the last foregoing paragraph, or if the 
(Jeneral or Special Commissioners are not satisfied with any 
particulars furnished under that paragraph, they may make an 
estimate of tin* amount- of income which by virtue of any of the 
provisions of the lirst or third relative sections, is to bo. treated 
as t la* income of t he set t lor. ’
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PART IV .
I n c o m e  T a x  (S e t t l e m e n t s ) .
38.-rr(l) I f  and so long as the terms of! any settlement are 
Income such that—
arising (a ) any person has or may have power, whether immedi-
certain ately or in the future, and whether with or without
settlem ents the consent of any other person, to revoke or other-
to b e  wise determine the settlement or any provision
thereof and, in the event of the exercise of the power, 
the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor will 
or may cease to be liable to make any annual 
payments payable by virtue or in consequence of 
any provision of the settlement; or 
(6) the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor may, 
whether immediately or in the future, cease, on the 
payment of a penalty, to be liable to make any 
annual payments payable by virtue or in consequence 
of any provision of the settlement; 
any sums payable by the settlor or the wife or husband of the 
settlor by virtue or in consequence of that provision of the settle­
ment in any year of assessment shall be treated as the income of 
the settlor for that year and not as the income of any other 
person:
Provided that; where any such power as is referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this subsection cannot be exercised within the 
period of six years from the time when the first of the annual 
payments so referred to becomes payable, and the like annual 
payments are payable in each year throughout that period, the 
said paragraph (a) shall not apply so long as the said power 
cannot be exercised.
(2) If  and so long as the terms of any settlement are such 
that— • . . ■
(а) any person has or may have power, whether immedi­
ately or in the future, and whether with or without 
the consent of any other person, to revoke or other­
wise determine the settlement or any provision 
thereof; and
(б) in the event of the exercise of the power, the settlor 
or the wife or husband of the settlor will or may 
become beneficially entitled to the whole or any part 
of the property then comprised in the settlement or 
of the income arising from the whole or any part 
of the property so comprised ;
any income arising under the settlement from the property 
comprised in the settlement in any year of assessment or from a 
corresponding part of that property, or a corresponding part of 
any such income, as the case may be, shall be treated as the
treated as 
income 
of settlor.
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(ii) any assignment of or charge on that income 
or property being made or given by some such 
person; or
fiii) in the case of a marriage settlement, the 
death of both the parties to the marriage and of 
all or any of the children of the marriage; or 
(iv) the death under the age of twenty-five or 
some lower age of some person who would be 
beneficially entitled to that income or property on 
attaining that . age; or
(6) if and so long as some person is alive and under the 
age of twenty-five during whose life that income or 
property cannot become payable or applicable as 
aforesaid except in the event of that person becoming 
bankrupt or assigning or charging his interest in that 
income or property.
(5) The provisions of Part I  of the Third Schedule to this 
Act shall have effect as respects the recovery by a settlor of tax 
with which he becomes chargeable, and the recovery from a 
settlor of any additional relief to which he becomes entitled, by 
virtue of this section.
(6) No repayment shall be made under section twenty-five 
of the Income Tax Act, 1918 (which relates to relief from tax in 
respect of income accumulated under trusts) on account of tax 
paid in respect of any income which by virtue of this section has 
been treated as the income of a settlor.
(7) The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply for 
the purposes of assessment to income tax for the year 1937-38 
and subsequent years and shall apply in relation to any settle­
ment, wherever made and whether made before or after the 
passing of this A c t:
Provided that—
(a) for the year 1937-38 no income shall be charged to tax
at the standard rate by virtue of this section, but 
surtax shall be assessed and charged as if any income 
which would, but for this proviso, have been charged 
as aforesaid had in fact been so charged ; and
(b) for the purpose. of granting relief from tax at the
standard rate in respect of any income which for the 
year 1937-38 is treated as the income of a settlor 
by virtue of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this 
section but would be treated as the income of some 
other person but for that subsection, that income 
shall be treated as the income of that other person ; 
and
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income of the settlor for that year and not as the income of 
any other person: * • -
Provided that, where any such power as aforesaid cannot 
he exercised within six years from the time when any particular 
property first, becomes comprised in the settlement, this sub­
section shall not apply to income arising under the settlement 
from that property, or from property representing that property, 
so long as the power cannot be exercised.
(3) I f  and so long as the settlor has an interest in any 
income arising under or property comprised in a settlement, any 
income so arising during the life of the settlor in any year of 
assessment shall, to the extent to which it is not distributed, be 
treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the 
income of the settlor for that year, and not as the income of 
any other person:
Provided that—
(a) if and so long as that interest is an interest neither in
the whole of the income arising under the settlement 
nor in the whole of the property comprised in the 
settlement, the amount of income to be treated as 
the income of the settlor by virtue of this sub­
section shall be such part of the income which, but 
for this proviso, would be so treated as is proportion­
ate to the extent of that interest; and
(b) where it is shown that any amount of the income
which is not distributed in any year of assessment 
consists of income which falls to be treated as the 
income of the settlor for that year by virtue of either 
of the last two foregoing subsections, that amount 
shall be deducted from the amount of income which, 
but for this proviso, would be treated as his for that 
year by virtue of this subsection.
(4) For the purpose of the last foregoing subsection, the 
settlor shall be deemed to have an interest in income arising under 
or property comprised in a settlement, if any income or property 
which may at any time arise under or be comprised in that 
settlement is, or will or may become, payable to or applicable 
for the benefit of the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor 
in any circumstances whatsoever :
Provided that the settlor shall not be deemed to have an 
interest in any income arising under or property comprised in a 
settlement—
(a) if and so long as that income or property cannot 
become payable or applicable as aforesaid except in 
the event of—
(i) the bankruptcy of some person who is or may 
become beneficially entitled to that income or 
property; or
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(c) the provisions of this subsection shall have effect, in 
relation to a settlement made before the twenty- 
seventh day of April nineteen hundred and thirty- 
eight, subject to the provisions of Part I I  of the 
Third Schedule to this Act, and in that Part of that 
Schedule this section is referred to as “ the relative 
section ”.
39.— (1) Where, by virtue or in consequence of any settle­
ment to which this section applies, the settlor pays directly or Disallow- 
indirectly in any year of assessment to the trustees of the settle- 
ment any sums which would, but for this subsection, be allowable fromCtotai i 
as deductions in computing his total income for that year for the income of j 
purposes of surtax, those sums shall not be so allowable to the certain j 
extent to which the aggregate amount thereof falls within the sum s paid | 
amount of income arising under the settlement in that year y se tt lo r .! 
which has not been distributed, less—
{a) so much of any income arising under the settlement 
in that year which has not been distributed as is 
shown to consist of income which has been treated 
as the income of the settlor by virtue of subsection
(1) or subsection (2) of the last foregoing section; 
and
(b) the amount of income so arising in that year which is 
treated as the income of the settlor by virtue of 
subsection (3) of the last foregoing section.
(2) For the purpose of the last foregoing subsection, any sum 
paid in any year of assessment by the settlor to any body 
corporate connected with the settlement in that year shall be 
treated as if it had been paid to the trustees of the settlement 
in that year by virtue or in consequence of the settlement.
(3) No relief shall be given under any of the provisions of 
the Income Tax Acts on account of tax paid in respect of so 
much of any income arising under a settlement in any year of 
assessment as is equal to the aggregate amount of any sums paid 
by the settlor in that year which are not allowable as deductions 
by virtue of this section.
(4) This section shall apply to any settlement (wherever
made) made after the twenty-sixth day of April nineteen hundred j
and thirty-eight, and where income arising under any settlement 
(wherever made) made on or before that date is treated as the 
income of the settlor by virtue of subsection (1) or subsection (2) 
of the last foregoing section but ceases to be so treated by reason 
of any variation of the terms of the settlement made after that
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date, or would have been so treated but for such a variation, 
this section shall apply to that settlement as from the date when 
the variation takes effect.
(5) tn this section references to sums paid by a settlor shall 
include references to sums paid by the* wife or husband of the 
settlor.
40.— (1) Any capital sum paid directly or indirectly in any 
relevant year of assessment by the trustees of a settlement to 
which this section applies to the settlor shall—
(а) to the extent to which the amount of that sum falls
within the amount of income available up to the 
end of that year, be treated for all the purposes of 
the Income Tax Acts as the income of the settlor 
for that year;
(б) to the extertt to which the amount of that sum exceeds
the amount of income available up to the end of that 
year but falls within the amount of the income 
available up to the end of the next following year, 
be treated for the purposes aforesaid as the income 
of the settlor for the next following year;
and so on.
(2) For the purpose of the last foregoing subsection, the 
amount of income available up to the end of any year shall, in 
relation to any capital sum paid as aforesaid, be taken to be the 
aggregate amount of income arising under the settlement in that 
year and any previous relevant year which has not been 
distributed, less—
(a) the amount of any other capital sums paid to the
settlor in any relevant year before that sum was 
paid; and
(b) so much of any income arising under the settlement
in that year and any previous relevant year which 
has not been distributed as is shown to consist of 
income which has been treated as income of the 
settlor by virtue of subsection (1) or subsection (2) 
of section thirty-eight of this Ac t ; and
(c) any income arising under the settlement in that year
and any previous relevant year which has been 
treated as the income of the settlor by virtue of 
subsection (3) of section thirty-eight of this A c t ; 
and
(d) any sums paid by virtue or in consequence of the
settlement, to the extent that they are not allowable, 
by virtue of the last foregoing section, as deductions 
in computing the settlor's income for that year or 
any previous relevant year ; and
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(e) an amount equal to tax at the standard rate o h -r -
(i) the aggregate amount of income arising undet 
the settlement in that year and any previous 
relevant year which has not been distributed, less
(ii) the ‘aggregate amount of the income and 
sums referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of 
this subsection.
(3) For the purpose of this section, any capital sum paid 
to the settlor in any year of assessment by any body corporate 
connected with the settlement in that year shall be treated as 
having been paid by the trustees of the settlement in that year.
(4) Where the whole or any part of any sum is treated by 
virtue of this section as income of the settlor for any year, it 
shall be treated as income of such an amount as, after deduction 
of tax at the standard rate for that year, would be equal to that 
sum or that part thereof.
(5) This section applies to any settlement wherever- made 
and whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, 
and in this section—
(а) the expression “ capital sum “ means—
(i) any sum paid by way of loan or repayment 
of a loan; and
(ii) any other sum paid otherwise than as 
income, being a sum which is not paid for full 
consideration in money or money's worth ;
but does not include any sum which could not have 
become payable to the settlor except in one of the 
events specified in the proviso to subsection (4) of 
section thirty-eight of this A c t ;
(б) the expression “ relevant year ” means any year of
assessment after the year 1937-38 ;
(c) references to sums paid to the settlor include references 
to sums paid to the wife or husband of the settlor.
41.— (1) The provisions of Part I I I  of the Third Schedule 
to this Act shall have effect for the purpose of carrying this Supplemen-
Part of this Act into effect and otherwise for supplementing the t?r7’ Proy1-r  r  u  eirtnc ac to
provisions thereof. settlem ents.
(2) Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section twenty of the 
Finance Act, 1922, shall cease to have effect, and shall be deemed 
to have ceased to have effect for the purpose of assessment to 
surtax for the year 1937-38.
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(3) Subject to the last foregoing subsection, the provisions 
of this Part of this Act shall be in addition to and not in deroga­
tion of any other provisions of the Income Tax Acts.
(4) For the purposes of this Part of this Act—
{a) the expression “ income arising under a settlement ” 
includes—
(i) any income chargeable to income tax by 
deduction or otherwise, and any income which 
would have been so chargeable if it had been 
received in the United Kingdom by a person 
domiciled, resident and ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom; and
(ii) where the amount of the income of any body 
corporate has been apportioned under section 
twenty-one of the Finance Act, 1922, for any year 
or period, or could have been so apportioned if 
the body corporate were incorporated in any part 
of the United Kingdom, so much of the income 
of the body corporate for that year or period as is 
equal to the amount which has been or could have 
been so apportioned to the trustees of or a bene­
ficiary under the settlement;
but, where the settlor is not domiciled, or not 
resident, or not ordinarily resident, in the United 
Kingdom in any year of assessment, does not include 
income arising under the settlement in that year in 
respect of which the settlor, if he were actually 
entitled thereto, would not be chargeable to income 
. tax by deduction or otherwise by reason of his not 
being so domiciled, resident or ordinarily resident;
(b) the expression “ settlement ” includes any disposition,
trust, covenant, agreement or arrangement, and the 
expression “ settlor ” in relation to a settlement 
means any person by whom the settlement was 
made;
(c) a person shall be deemed to have made a settlement if
he has made or. entered into the settlement directly 
or indirectly, and in particular (but without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing words of this 
paragraph) if he has provided or undertaken to 
provide funds directly or indirectly for the purpose 
of the settlement, or has made with any other person 
a reciprocal arrangement for that other person to 
make or enter into the settlement ;
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(d) income arising under a settlement in any year of 
assessment shall be deemed not to have been 
distributed if and to the extent that it  exceeds the 
•aggregate amount of—
(i) the sums paid in that year by the trustees of 
the settlement to any persons (not being a body 
corporate connected with the settlement and not 
being the trustees of another settlement made by 
the settlor or the trustees of the settlement) in 
such manner that they fall to be treated in that 
year, otherwise than by virtue of the last preceding 
section, as the income of those persons for the 
purposes of income tax, or would fall to be so 
treated if those persons were domiciled, resident 
and ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom 
and the sums had been paid to them therein; 
and
(ii) any expenses of the trustees of the settlement 
paid in that year which, in the absence of any 
express provision of the settlement, would be 
properly chargeable to income, in so far as such 
expenses are not included in the sums mentioned 
in the last foregoing sub-paragraph ; and
(iii) in a case where the trustees of the settle­
ment are trustees for charitable purposes, the 
amount by which any income arising under the 
settlement in that year in respect of which 
exemption from tax may be granted under section 
thirty-seven of the Income Tax Act, 1918, or 
section thirty of the Finance Act, 1921, exceeds 
the aggregate amount of any such sums or 
expenses as aforesaid paid-in that year which are 
properly chargeable to that income;
(e) a body corporate shall be deemed to be connected 
with a settlement in any year of assessment if any 
of the income thereof for any year or period ending 
in that year of assessment—
(i) has been apportioned to the trustees of or a 
beneficiary under the settlement under section 
twenty-one of the Finance Act; 1922, or could have 
been so apportioned if the body corporate had 
been incorporated in the United Kingdom ; or
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(ii) could have been so apportioned if the income 
of the body corporate for that year or period had 
not been distributed to the members thereof and, 
in the case of a body corporate incorporated 
outside the United Kingdom, if the body corporate 
had been incorporated in the United Kingdom.
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T H IR D  SCHEDULE.
Su p p l e m e n t a r y  P r o v is io n s  a s  t o  Se t t l e m e n t s .
Part I.
A d j u s t m e n t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  Se t t l o r  a n d  T r u s t e e s .
1. Where by virtue of any provision of section thirty-eight 
of this Act any income tax becomes chargeable on and is paid 
bj' a settlor, he shall be entitled—
{a) to recover, from any trustee, or other person to whom 
income arises under the settlement, the amount of 
the tax so paid; and
(6) for that purpose to require the Commissioners con­
cerned to furnish to him a certificate specifying the 
amount of income in respect of which he has so paid 
tax and the amount of tax so paid.
2. Any certificate furnished under the last foregoing para­
graph shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
3. Where any person obtains, in respect of any allowance or 
relief, a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount of 
the repayment to which he would, but for the provisions of the 
said section, have been entitled, an amount equal to the excess shall 
be paid by him to the trustees or other person to whom income 
arises under the settlement, or where there are two or more such 
persons shall be apportioned among those persons, as the case 
may require.
4. If  any question arises as to the amount of any payment 
or as to any apportionment to be made under the last foregoing 
paragraph, that question shall be decided by the General Com­
missioners whose decision thereon shall be final.
5. Any income which is treated by virtue of any provision 
of the said section as income of a settlor shall be deemed for the 
purpose of this Schedule to be the highest part of his income.
Part I I .
Special provisions as respects settlements m a d e before
2 7 th  A pril, 1938.
1. Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Schedule, in 
the case of a settlement made before the twenty-seventh day
Sections 
38 to 41.
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of April nineteen hundred and thirty-eight, subsection (1) of the 
relative section shall not, by reason only of the provisions of 
paragraph {a) thereof, apply to sums payable by the settlor by 
virtue or in consequence of any provision of the settlement in a 
year to which this Part of this Schedule applies, if—
{a) at the expiration of three months from the date of the 
passing of this Act—
(i) no person has or can have any such power as 
is referred to in the said paragraph (a) ; and
(ii) the settlor has not received and is not 
entitled to receive any consideration in respect of
. the release or disclaimer of any such power; or
(b) the like annual payments have been payable by the
settlor by virtue or in consequence of that provision 
of the settlement in each of the seven years of assess­
ment ending with a year to which this Part of this 
Schedule applies; or
(c) before the expiration of three months from the date of
the passing of this Act—
(i) the settlement, or the provision by virtue or 
in consequence whereof the annual payments are 
payable, has been revoked; and
(ii) a new settlement has been made by the 
settlor by virtue or in consequence whereof the 
settlor is liable to make the like annual payments 
and cannot, except in the event of his death, cease 
to be liable to make those payments before the 
expiration of six years from the date when the 
first of the annual payments payable by virtue or 
in consequence of the revoked settlement became 
payable:
Provided that, where any income arising under the settle­
ment in a year to which this Part of this Schedule applies has not 
been distributed, the foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall 
have effect as if there were substituted for the reference to sums 
payable by the settlor in that year a reference to the amount, if 
any, by which the sums so payable in that year exceed the 
income arising under the settlement in that year which has not 
been distributed.
2. Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Schedule, 
in the case of a settlement made before the twenty-seventh day 
of April nineteen hundred and thirty-eight, income arising 
under the settlement in any year to which this Part of this 
Schedule applies which would, but for this paragraph, be treated 
by virtue of subsection (2) of the relative section as the income 
of the settlor and not as the income of any other person, shall 
not be so treated or, in a case where any income arising under the
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settlement in that year has not been distributed, shall nob be so 
treated to the extent that it exceeds the amount of income arising 
under the settlement in that year which has not been distributed 
if, at the expiration of three months.from the date of the-passing 
of this Act—  : .
(a) no person has or can have any such power as is referred
to in the said subsection (2); and
(b) the settlor has not received and is not entitled to receive
any consideration in respect of the release or dis­
claimer of any such power.
3. The foregoing provisions of this Part of this Schedule 
shall not apply to any settlement if, in any year to which this 
Part of this Schedule applies, any capital sum within the meaning 
of section forty of this Act has been paid to the settlor directly or 
indirectly by the trustees of the settlement or any body corporate 
connected with the settlement in that year.
4. Notwithstanding that the payments payable by virtue 
or in consequence of any such new settlement as is referred to in 
sub-paragraph (c) (ii) of paragraph 1 of this Part of this Schedule 
are payable to or applicable for the benefit of another person for 
a period which cannot exceed six years from the date when the 
settlement was made, they shall not be treated as the income of 
the settlor by virtue of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 
twenty of the Finance Act, 1922.
5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Part of this Schedule shall not 
apply to any income whiclf would have been treated as the 
income of the settlor for any purpose by virtue of paragraph (a) 
of subsection (1) of section twenty of the Finance Act, 1922, but 
for the provisions of this Act relating to that paragraph.
6. In  this Part of this Schedule references to the settlor, 
except where that expression first occurs in paragraph 2, include 
references to the wife or husband of the settlor.
7. The years to which this Part of this Schedule applies are 
the year 1937-38 and the year 1938-39.
P a r t  I I I .
M is c e l l a n e o u s .
1. Tax chargeable at the standard rate by virtue of sections 
thirty-eight or forty of this Act shall be charged under Case V I 
of Schedule D.
2. In  computing the liability to income tax of a settlor 
chargeable by virtue of any of the provisions of section thirty- 
eight of this Act, the same deductions and reliefs shall be
a p p e n d i x
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allowed as would have been allowed if the income treated as his 
by virtue of that provision had been received by him.
3. In  computing the liability to income tax of a settlor 
chargeable by virtue of section forty of this Act,- the same 
deductions and reliefs shall be allowed as would have been 
allowed if the amount treated as his income by virtue of that 
section had been received by him as income.
4. The General or Special Commissioners may by notice in 
writing require any person, being a party to a settlement, to 
furnish them (within such time as they may direct, not being 
.less than twenty-eight days) with such particulars as they think 
necessary for the purposes of any of the provisions of Part IV  of 
this Act, and if that person without reasonable excuse fails to 
comply with the notice he shall be liable to a penalty not exceed­
ing fifty pounds and, after judgment has been given for that 
penalty, to a further penalty of the like amount for every day 
during which the failure continues.
5. Without prejudice to the provisions of the last foregoing 
paragraph, if any. party to a settlement fails to furnish any 
particulars required under the last foregoing paragraph, or if the 
General or Special Commissioners are not satisfied with any 
particulars furnished under that paragraph, they may make an 
estimate of the amount of income which by virtue of any of the 
provisions of sections thirty-eight or forty of this Act, is to be 
treated as the income of the settlor.
APPENDIX F I
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Extract from Cl. Claims File - B.C. Moon
Opinions In The Case Of Brig. General H. Clifton Brown, M.P. 
v. C.I.R.
Opinion In The Case of Rothman Minors
Finance Act 1943, Section 20 and Schedule 6
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INVESTIGATIONS OF SETTLEMENTS ON MINORS BY PERSONS OTHER THAN PARENTS
The cases selected for investigation were those made by grandparents and 
other relatives where the respective incomes of grandparent and parent 
indicated a probability that the settlement would not be implemented. 
(PRO IR40 6084 were dated 19 August 1938).
1st October 1937 to 30 June 1938
Cases taken up for investigation 
Claims allowed 
Claims refused
Cases still under investigation at 30 June 1938
Amount of income included in claims disallowed £17040 (note 2)
1 July 1938 to 31 March 1939
Cases b/f 40
New cases taken up 46 (note 3)
86
Claims allowed 36
Claims refused 23 (note 4)
Cases still under investigation at 31 March 1939 27
Amount of income included in claims disallowed £8743
1 April 1939 to 31 March 1940
Cases b/f 27
New cases taken up 57
84
Claims allowed 32
Claims refused 23
Cases still under investigation at 31 March 1940 29
131 (note 1) 
56 
35 
40
Amount of income included in disallowed claims £7154
fyrrcinu-L/s. r x
(Continued)
Note 1.
Note 2.
Note 3.
Note 4.
The investigation of such claims was seen by the Revenue as "a 
direct attack upon the widespread opinion among accountants 
and solicitors that the legal form of a deed or arrangement of 
deeds is in itself conclusive evidence of a transfer of 
income." (ibid).
These investigations were time consuming "but the results are 
encouraging and the amount of income tax and sur-tax saved is 
substantial" (ibid).
The reduction in the number of cases taken up did "not 
indicate any relaxation of our efforts." It was thought to 
show the extent to which the work had been successful in 
discouraging bogus claims, (memo 14 October 1939).
Several cases had been reported to the Board for consideration 
of penalty or other proceedings and details of the names of 
the taxpayers and their agents are shown on the file.
Source : Derived From PRO IR40/6084
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The deed of 19.2*34 (full copy flagged in 
Tolder M. 3092 attached) contains the following clause.
"3. THE HUSBAND and the wife in consideration 
of the premises and for the consideration afore- T 
• said respectively covenant with the Qrantor that 
for pur-pose of determining the weekly income^f 
the husband And of the wife and each of them 
during the period of Ten years secondly herein- P. 
before mentioned he the husband and also the wife,
will be .lust and faithful to the ’Grantor and at j
all times give to the Qrantor full information j 
and truthful explanations of all matters 
relating to his or-her income capital and 
finances and Inform the Qrantor as soon as may 
be of any change in the husbands weekly earnings . 
or in his or her investments or otherwise and 
should the husband and wife or either of them 
neglect or fail to give such information as 
aforesaid the Grantor shall after one calendar 
month*s notice in writing*be freed and discharged 
from all liability under this Deed of Covenant 
and all payments covenanted to be made flint 11 j 
such information shall be given."
The clause appears to amount to a •power of 
revocation in the event of a breach 6f covenant by~~ 
either of the beneficiaries and tstrictlv/to be caught 
by Section 38 (lHa) Finance .Act 1938 in accordance 
with the ruling on T.2005/105/3'38.
The case is submitted for Instructions as the 
3omewrhat similar case of H.H. Watson (T. 1686/40/39). 
submitted on 1.5.59. is apparently still under j
consideration. This case is. however, distinguishable • 
in so far as the Settlor In this case can be freed from 1 
his obligation only/for such period during which the 
beneficiaries may withhold information as to their 
incomes etc. : ^
- I
I shall be obliged if.an early decision.can be 
given as the claimant is pressing for repayment of the • 
1938/39 claim.
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Noted and papers returned herew ith .
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BRIGADIER GENERAL H^JLIFION BROWN,M.P.
✓ v. \
* COMMISSIONERS OP INLAND REVENUE.
a t 1. amount • involved in  th is  case is  tax on £297 onlv
wonth whvi apprehendedthaJ the A ppellan t might not th ink i t  
> !» £ „ !!  §rooeed w ith  h is appeal. 'Apparently, however,'
?or. ? h A ° ^ + i°  ? B°i and th£ case is  in  the p ro v is io n a l l i s tfo r  the forthcoming Revenue Paper. . v. ': ~ ^
j Before d e liv e r in g  b r ie fs  to  the A ttorney General 
and Junior Counsel (in v o lv in g  l i a b i l i t y  fo r  b r ie f  fees o f  
considerably over £100) I  th in k  i t i desirable to draw the 
Board* s a tte n tio n  to c e rta in  d i f f ic u l t ie s  which I  fe e l .
The case is  the f a m i l ia r . onsr o f ;a' ^landed p ro p rie to r  
turn ing hims e lf  into  a company fo r  tax evasion purposes, out * 
i t  has th is  fo llo w in g  super-added fe a tu r e n a m e ly tE a t f  the 
Appellant tran s ferred  h is  two estates"(and also a b lock o f i 
investments) to the company in  re tu rn  fo r  (a ) preference shares 
and (b) ordinary shares. The Appellant h im self has a l l  the i 
preference shares (except one held by h is  w i f e b u t  the j
ordinary shares he has had a llo t te d  to a. secona company (a  ; *\ 
t ru s t  company) to hold upon t ru s t  fo r  h is  3 ;daughters. Broadly, 
.speaking, the tru s t don^a^ holds rthe6ev ord inary ..shares in  trd sV  
fo r  the daughters contingently  on th e y ro r’ th e ir  issue being  
a liv e  a t the e x p ira tio n  of .20 years from":the .date of the 
settlem ent. In  the meantime a l l  the-Trustee Company is -  
en t i t le d  to receive and-apply fo r  the-daughters*, b e n e fit  is  
such ordinary dividends ( i f  any) asrmay .be "declared. In  point 
of fa c t  none have ye t been declared (o r indeed seem l ik e ly  to  
be) as on the accounts the n et p ro f its  have been s u ff ic ie n t 1 
only to  admit of payment of small preference dividends which! 
o f course go to  the Appellant h im self. The e^-dggt daughter \ 
is  of age, and her u ltim a te  share is  three the two:
ycjunger daughters are minors, and th e ir  u ltim ate  share is  one 
figunb each. 1 ; 1. .
‘ : * ' ‘A ‘ " *• ;
In these circumstances, the Crown have ccmtended, 
and the Special Commissioners h a v e jie ld . th a t two of_the  __    sp
s ta tu to ry  income of the Estate Company (namely the Schedule A, 
and the investment Income) is  "income paid to or fo r  the be n e fit  
of*these two younger daughters, w ith in  the meaning of Section 21 
o f the Finance Act 1936. The grounds of th is  c o n te n tio n a re  
th a t although n e ith e r the T rust Company nor the daughters have 
as yet e ith e r  received or become e n t it le d  to  rece ive anything  
a t  a l l ,  nevertheless, the rents and other incomings of the \ 
Company have been expended by the Company on the maintenance 
and upkeep of the Company* s es ta te s , and th is  mu61 be regarded 
as "income paid to or fo r  the b e n e fit  o f’* the daughters ( to ,  
the extent o f tw o -f if th s ) fo r  the reason th a t th is  expenditure  
enures to th e ir  b e n e f it ,  in  th a t i t  maintains and enhances | 
the value o f the estates and therefore  o f the ordinary shares, 
in  which the daughters are in te re s te d . Subsection (2 ) is  i 
also  re lie d  on, in  th a t i t  can be said th a t the expenditure  ^
of these rents e tc . on the maintenance of the Company s 
property may conduce to the payment of ordinary dividends in  
the fu tu re , in  which the daughters w i l l  be in te re s ted .
The contentions against the Crown are:
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110 dividends_have-^been-uaid on these shares. - v£?
V  V  . .
^ n ative ly ;-  * \
fannual va lue” Is  not "Income" capable o f being "paid •
I . fo r  th e b e n e fit o f11 anybody w ith in  the meaning of the : 
on* t
yen i f  i t  is .  there has not in  fa c t been anything "paid
the b e n e fit  o fw the daughters. The expenditure b y ^ fe 
ny.„.Qff, i t s, own rents e tc, on the maintenance of i t s  own  ^
es is  too remote to be regarded as paid fo r  the b e n e fit  
e daughters* i t  is  expenditure p r im a rily  fo r  the'/:-. ^
i t  o f the Company, and secondly fo r  the b e n e fit  o f ‘the' ^
Lant h im se lf, because, as matters stand a t present, he • >
the whole o f such sm all net p ro f its  as there a re , by |
>f preference dividends. • v/ 1
On the fa c ts  o f the case, I  do not fe e l much*, 
tu lty  on contention (a ) .  Contention! (b ) ra ises  a d i f f i c u l t  
of construction on the s e c tio n , but  mv chie f  d i f f ic u l t y  is  
itention  ( c ) ,  in  which (on fu rth e r  consideration) I  fe e l:  
is  much force* 1
The Board would doubtless be re lu c tan t to  abandon.a 
able decision o f the Special Conrnissioner^ w ithout an 
to defend i t  in  Court, but in  the ra th e r s p e c ia l7 i
stances I  f e e l  inc lin ed , to suggest. th a t .bevore in c u rrin g  •« i
r substantia l costs I  should ask^Mr. Stamp and Mr* H i l ls  '
ould be b rie fe d  w ith- the A ttorney.G eneral i f  the\ case .-  :
Is ) to consider the case and advise whether they "th ink i t
arguable. I f  they take an adverse view , i t  raigat be • »
? fo r  the Board to abandon the-case w ithout a c tu a lly ;; • 
ig i t  in to  Court, even though th is  would involve p l ia b i l i t y .  
i A ppellant’ s ’costs. '
I  s h a ll be glad o f the Board1 s Ins tructions r as e a rly , as
■ -v,
r •
APRIL,. 1940
APPENDIX fr'j
(C o n tin n ed )
V  '\ . 
\3.L .  11542/P .B .
BRIG-GENERAL H. CLIFTON BROTHr M.P. J./.
SUR-TAX APPEAL (ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT) 1936/37,
FINANCE Act 1956. SECTION 21. J i l l , :
I  have to report tOvthe iBoard th a t  the ahoye appeal
• : •' " 'v.
3 heard before the Specia l Commissioners ixi London on the
: February 1939. . . . .
i
Mr. F . Heyworth Talbot o f . Counsel appeared fo r  the 
ie lla n t who was also p resent, and Mr* M i l le r  o f th is  o f f ic e
resented the Crown. / '  ,
! ' '
The fa c ts  and contentions of the' p a rtie s  may be
marised as fo llo w s :--  . ■:/ A
On the 10th January 1935, am. company, C olgateiTrustees  
, was re g is te re d  w ith  a nominal share c a p ita l of L^OO shares 
51. each, o f  wliich 2 have been , issued and are heldiby- th e  
>llant .and h is  w ife . =: > :
On the 84 th  January 1955, a deed (copy annexed);was 
between Brig-Gen. H.C. Brown as s e t t lo r  and the. Colgate
u *"
tees L td . (re fe rre d  to as the Trust Company). The Deed 
tes th a t the S e tt lo r  intends to  form a p r iv a te  u n lim ited  
iny to be c a lle d  The Holmbush Estate Co. *, to* transfer., to  . 
Cstate Company a c e rta in  es ta te  in  the County o f Sussex; •
3
io cause the ordinary shares o f the E state  Company, or' 
of them, to  be issued to and reg is tered  in  the name of , 
'rust Company, such shares and the income th e re o f to be. ‘ 
upon tru s t fo r  such o f the S e tt lo r*s  three daughters as
i
be l iv in g  On the 84th January 1955; each of the ' v 
te rs  l iv in g  a t th a t date to take an e n ta ile d  in te re s t ,  
eed contains provision  fo r  the S e tt lo r  to  revoke the tru s ts  
d declare new tru s ts  in  favour of members o f the S e tt lo r*s  
j (which expression by d e f in it io n  in  clause 1 (c ) includes
.••J
; ] "  %  
\ : {
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The daughters re fe rre d  to and th e ir  shares
\
of the tru s t fund a r e : -  \
31izabeth C lif to n  Brown, horn 28th January,1914 -  Share 3/5ths
0
Katherine C lif to n  Brown •'horn 10th June, 1917 Share l /5 th
Birene Margaret C li f to n  Brown, horn March 1921. Share l /5 t h
The Holmhush Estate Co. was re g is te re d  on .the 1st
February 1935 w ith  a nominal^share c a p ita l o f 5,000 £1.
■ ' • . - ' • k
preference shares and j50,000 £1. ordinary shares. The
i-
preference shares are held  hy the Appellant and h is  w ife , and 
the issued ordinary shares (48 ,900) hy the Trust Company.
The appellant d id  in  fa c t on the 8th  February 1935 
tra n s fe r to the Holmhush Estate Company re a l property o f the 
value of £35,000 and £17,000 3^6 conversion Loan.
The accounts of the Holmhush Estate Company fo r  
the years ended 31st December 1935, 1936 and 1937 were
. iproduced and copies are annexed. These showed 1fhe fo llo w in g  
re s u lts : -
Year to 31/12/1935 . . .  . . .  . . .  Loss £28. 7*. 11.
" h " 31/12/1936 .  ....................... P r o f i t  £L64. 1 . 6 .
" " 31/12/1937 . . . .................P r o f i t  £72. p . 5.
I t  was agreed th a t fo r  the year 1936/37 ( i . e .  year 
under appeal) the Net Schedule A assessments amounted to  
£1,627 less Maintenance Claims £ 1 ,1 6 5 .1 0 .0 . and th a t the 
gross income on the £17,000 3 ^  conversion loan was £595.
I t  was fu r th e r  agreed th a t fo r  the year 1936/37 a 
Preference dividend o f £125 had been paid  hut no dividend  
tt\« VMsttn»M\v had a t any time been declared.
On behalf of the ap p e llan t I t  wea contended*—c
(1 ) That as there was a binding tru s t  created
i ;
by the deed dated 2 4 /1 /3 5 , i t  was unnecessary 
to look beyond^that document to as ce rta in
the terms o f the settlem ent. Finance 
Act 1936, Sec.21 (9 ) defines the; expression
i
"settlem ent1 as inc luding any "Trust".',
The only "income" o f the tru s t was the
/
dividends which might be declared by the 
Holmbush Estate Company as no’ dividend  
on the shares held  by the Trustee Company 
had so fa r  been declared. The Trust 
Company had received no income which could 
be paid  or applied  or accumulated fo r  the
b e n e fit  o f the b e n e fic ia r ie s .o r  any o ther
I
persons.- , „
A lte rn a t iv e ly : -
I f  the expression "settlem ent" must be 
taken to  include not only the Trust deed, 
but the form ation o f The Holmbush Estate :
i ^
Company and the Colgate Trustees! L td , T . 
then, under the provisions o f Rule 2 (a ) 
o f Sec. 21, Finance Act 1936 there must 
be an income (an ac tua l income in  fa c t)  
capable o f being paid or dt>plied to  the 
b e n e fit of the ch ild  e ith e r  presently  
or in  the fu tu re . In  the present case 
the accounts showed th a t there was no 
such income. A "no tion a l income" could 
be n e ith e r paid or applied  to or fo r ' 
the b e n e fit o f any person. (Reference 
was made to -the recent cases of
■ i
Commissioners of In lan d  Revenue v.
Sigma Trust L td , and Commissioners o f  
Inland'Revenue v. Kered L td .)
^ XL 1 t-ilv ■ •
On "behalf of the Crown I t  was contended (Cont
a l i a : -  , \
(1 ) That the expression u settlement^ included the
i '
whole arrangement entered in to  by the ap p ellan t. 
(Reference was made to Commissioners of In land  
Revenue v. Clarkson Webb, 17 T.C* 45 1 ). The 
Special Commissioners were, th e re fo re , e n t it le d  
to  review the whole of the operations to ascerta in  
the true in te n tio n  kf the s e tt lo r*
(2 ) That the meaning o f the word ” income /
a v a ila b le ” in  the Kered and Sigma cases, as
la id  down by the Court o f Appeal, had reference  
only to  ^he S p e c ia l section w ith  which the Court 
was dealing  and had no reference to the present 
case* For the purposes o f the present case,
Subsection 9 (d ) o f Section 21, Finance Act 
1936, s p e c if ic a lly  defined the expression "Income”
. \ I
as any Income "chargeable to tax  [by deduction
or otherwise” * This c le a r ly  demonstrated th a t
i t  was "income tax” income, and not "ac tu a l”
*
income th a t was Involved.
(3 ) That the income involved In  the present
case- was the income which the s e t t lo r  would have 
included in  h is own re tu rn , had no settlem ent 
been made by him, and th a t th a t income was 
represented by the Schedule A value of the „ x
properties tra n s ferred , and the gross In te re s t  /A
on the £17,000 3£/o Conversion Loan*
i
: ‘ i: l
i
* t
4.
i
-/He
At the conclusion o f the hearing the
✓
Special Commissi orders dismissed the appeal and the
a d d itio n a l assessment was confirmed in  the agreed
/
sum o f £297.
D is s a tis fa c tio n  was thereupon expressed 
on "behalf o f the ap p e llan t.
j
^  ^ February, 1939,
rti^ mNuix fh
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ROTHMAN MINORS. '
The fa c ts  o f th is  case so fa r  as i t  is  possible to !
i
ascerta in  them a t  th is  stage appear to be as fo llow s . I
I
Louis Trust L td . was reg is tered ,o n  the 84th March 1954, j
. j
the nominal c a p ita l was 80 £1 A shares and 400 l / -  B shares. I
598 B shares were issued to  Sydney Rothman fo r  cash. 2 o f the  
A shares wejre issued in  A p r il  1954 to L.tf*. Rothman and V.M. 
Rothman, both o f whom are ch ild ren  o f Sydney Rothman and 
i nfants during the years in  question. The £2 necessary to take  
up the 2 A shares were given by Mr. Sydney Rothman to h is  
ch ild re n . On the 51st May 1954 Sydney Rothman sold to the 
company 50 >000 shares in  Rothmans Ltd fo r  £120. As the shares 
paid  a dividend o f £1600. the transactio n  was fo r  a l l  p ra c t ic a l  
purposes a g i f t  by Sydney Rothman to  the company. The sale
D ire c to r a t a l l  times was Mr. Sydney Rot 
a r t ic le s  o f the company the B shares are
unan. Under the  
e n t it le d  to 5%  o f the
p ro f its  d is tr ib u te d , and carry  vo ting  c o n tro l. The A shares
are e n t it le d  to the remainder o f the p r o f its .  On a winding  
up B shares are e n t it le d  to a re tu rn  o f the paid up c a p ita l ; 
a f te r  which a l l  the assets go to  the A shares.
The Company has, up to d ate , d is t r ibuted a l l  i t s  
i ncome, which consists so le ly  o f dividends on the Rothman 
shares, to the ch ild ren  as holders o f the A shares, w ith  the ;
i
exception o f 5% paid to the B shares, and .the question th a t j 
aris es  is  whether the transaction  can be a tta c ked e ith e r  | 
under Section 21 o f the Finance Act 1956 or Section 58 o f
i
the Finance A ct, 1958. There does not seem to be any chance: 
of  success under Section 5 8 (5 )f as a f u l l  d is tr ib u tio n  has been 
made. The question th a t a rises  under Section 21 o f the Finajnc 
A ct, 1936 and Section 58(2) o f the Finance A c t, 1958 appears
s u b s ta n tia lly  the same, namely do the transactions se t
Nn m M N D i A  _b_ff
(Continp.ed)
out above c o n s titu te  a settlem ent w ith in  the meaning o f the
' ■   -   1 ■----------------------------------------------------
?respective sections and are they revocablev
Reduced to  simple terms the substance o f the transaction  
appears to  be th a t Sydney Rothman has formed a company, given  
the company 50,000 valuable shares, and given h is  ch ild ren  
shares in  the company which under the a r t ic le s  carry  the r ig h t  
to  almost a l l  the income o f the company. Is  such a transactio n  
a settlem ent w ith in  e ith e r  o f the two sections? In  my view  
t here are d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  the way o f such a contention, and 
t hey have been set out by S ir  John Shaw in  h is  repo rt o f 12th  
Ju ly  1959 on papers T. 2005 /96 /59 . A somewhat; 's im ila r  
tra n s ac tio n , however, was held  to  be a settlem ent w ith in
-------- -2TJ----------------   r------------   :
Section  in  Coneman Coleman and the S pecia l Commissioners; 
have in  two recent appeals [R ried lander T .2004/284/39 heard 
1 6 .X .39 and Lady Norman S»T.22347 heard 2 .X I.3 9 ]  held th a t
' *  I
somewhat s im ila r  arrangements are settlem ents w ith in  S ection 
38. I  consider th ere fo re  th a t there is  a t le a s t a good 
chance o f the Court holding th a t the present transactio n  
is  a settlem ent a ls o . I f  so, is  i t  revocable? I  am 
in c lin e d  to th in k  th a t i t  is  arguable th a t i t  is .  I f  a 
series  o f transactions under which the income o f c e rta in  
property ( in  the present case the Rothman shares) becomes 
payable to  A is  a se ttlem ent, and the person who c a rr ie s  out
such transactio n  is the S e tt lo r ,  i t  seems to-me th a t he is  able
i» •
to  revoke the settlem ent i f  he can carry  out another series  of;
transactions as a re s u lt  o f which the income again becomes
payable tp  h im se lf. In  the present case Sydney Rothman
could regain  almost
i ;
a l l  the income]of the Rothman shares by (
procuring the issue
■ - -  ■ .... ....  i
o f the remaining 78 nA* shares fo r  h im se lf;
and by then p u ttin g the .company in to  liq u id a t io n  oould procure
/y the shares from the l iq u id a to r .
At'r'ttNDJ.A plf- 
(Continued)
In  view o f the d i f f ic u l t ie s  set out in  S ir  John Shaw! s
report to which I  have re fe rre d  I  do not wish to be taken as
expressing the view th a t success in  an attempt to apply
Section 21 or Section 38 is  assured, and in  the two recent
cases above re fe rre d  to  the Specia l Commissioners have held
th a t there was no power to revoke. The Board have, however,*■— — -------------------------------- 1   — ---------------------------------
demanded cases, and in  view o f th a t fa c t  and o f the fa c t  th a t  
t he present scheme is  c le a r ly  one fo r  avoiding the payment o f  
S ur-tax  upon income expended upon c h ild re n 1s education, I  
t h ink there is  s u f f ic ie n t  chance o f success to  ju s t i f y  the 
Board in  a ttack in g  the scheme* L ia b i l i t y  should be claimed 
under Section 21 o f the Finance A c t, 1936 and Section 38 (2) 
o f the Finance A ct, 1938.
I  should add th a t i f  the Board wish to  challenge th is
type o f scheme the present seems a ra th e r b e tte r  one upon which
. *  ~ - - ■■■-  ...  ' . . .  ^ .     — ............
to do so than F ried lander or Lady Norman.
In  the present case there is  no body o f Trustees holding
!
»
shares who would be bound by th e ir  du ties  to take proceedings 
to re s tra in  the S e tt lo r  from obtain ing  .‘the income or assets for; 
h im se lf. I t  may, however, be held th a t Rothman as D ire c to r  
o f the Company could not issue shares to h im self w ithout 
adequate consideration and soj^shareholders, and in  th is  
connection I  should draw the a tte n tio n  o f the Board to the  
opinion o f Mr. Stamp re fe rre d  to in  my repo rt o f 23rd December 
1937 on papers T .2004/358/37 P.W. Lee.
S im ila r considerations apply to  the case o f Parker 
Minora T .1686/53 /37 . Mr. England1s opinion o f 23rd Ju ly  1937 
was o f course given w ith  reference to  Section 21 Finance 
Act 1936 only and before Copeman u&i Coleman.
APPENDIX F5
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20. For the removal o f doubts, i t  is hereby declared tha t the 
provisions of P art IV  of the Finance A ct, 1 9 3 8 , and section 
twenty-one of the Finance A ct, 1936  (which relate to the income ce£ffi“ ««tleau 
tax to be paid in  the case of certain settlements) and the provisions 
of section tw enty o f the Finance A ct, 1922  (which relates to certain oaHut ™r°oe thaa 
revocable m id other dispositions) have effect in  accordance w ith  d i s p o n e r .  
the provisions of the S ixth  Schedule to  th is A ct in  the case of e.6£!°'a‘&xEd,f 8 
my settlement or disposition where there is more than one ra&I3G<>0*3-c*X7 
settlor or more than one person who made the disposition.
Finance Act, 1943.
SIXTH SCHEDULE.
Appl ic a t io n  o f  e n a c t m e n t s  t o  s e t t l e m e n t s  a n d  d is p o s it io n s
W H E R E  T H ERE IS M O R E  T H A N  O N E  SETTLOR O R  PERSON W H O  
M A D E  T H E  DISPOSITlbN.
Part I.
A p p lic a t io n  o f  P a r t  I V  o f  the F in a n ce  A c t, 1938.
1. Subject to  the provisions o f th is Part o f th is Schedule, Part IV  
of the Finance A ct, 1938, has effect in relation to  each settlor as if he 
were the on ly  settlor.
2. References in  the said Part IV  to  the property comprised in the  
settlement include, in  relation to  any settlor, on ly property originating 
from that settlor and references in the said  Part IV  to incom e arising 
under the settlem ent include, in relation to  any settlor, on ly incom e 
originating from that settlor.
3. In considering for th e purposes o f the said Part IV , in relation  
to any settlor, whether any, and if so, how  m uch, of the incom e arising 
under the settlem ent has been distributed, any sum s paid partly out 
of income originating from that settlor and partly out of other incom e 
must (so far as n ot apportioned b y  the terms of the settlem ent) be 
apportioned evenly  over all th a t incom e.
4. The references in  subsection (1) o f section thirty-eight and in  
section thirty-nine to  sum s payable b y virtue or in  consequence of any  
provision of the settlem ent or sum s paid by virtue or in consequence 
of the settlem ent include, in relation to any settlor, on ly sum s payable 
or paid b y th a t settlor.
5.— (1) References in th is Part of th is Schedule to  property originating  
from a settlor are references to—
(a) property which th a t settlor has provided directly or indirectly  
for the purposes o f the se tt le m e n t; and  
(3) property representing th a t p rop erty ; and  
(c) so • m uch of any property which represents both  property  
provided as aforesaid and other property as, on a  just appor­
tionm ent, represents the property so provided.
(2) References in this Part of th is Schedule to  incom e originating  
from a settlor are references to—
(a) incom e from property originating from that se tt lo r ; and
(b) so m uch of an y  such incom e o f a body corporate as is m entioned
in sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of 
section forty-one of the Finance Act, 1938, as corresponds to 
property originating from the settlor which is comprised in 
the se tt le m e n t; and
(c) incom e provided directly or. indirectly b y  that settlor.
• (3) In  this paragraph—
(a) references to property or incom e which a settlor has provided  
directly or indirectly include references to  property or incom e 
which has been provided directly or indirectly b y another 
person in pursuance of reciprocal arrangements w ith that 
settlor, but do n ot include references to  property or incom e 
which th a t settlor has provided d irectly or indirectly in 
pursuance of reciprocal arrangements w ith  another p erson ;
APPENDIX F5
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(1b) references to property which represents other property include 
references to property which represents accumulated income 
from that other property.
Part II.
A p p lic a t io n  o f  F in a n c e  A c t, 1936, s. 21 .
1. Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Schedule, section 
twenty-one of the Finance Act, 1936, has effect in relation to each 
settlor as if  he were the only settlor.
2 . For the purposes of the said section twenty-one, only the following 
can be taken into account, in relation to any settlor, as income paid by 
virtue or in  consequence of the settlement to or for the benefit of a 
child of the settlor, that is to say,—
(а) income originating from that se ttlo r; and
(б) in  a case in  which paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of the said
section twenty-one applies, any sums which are under that 
paragraph to be deemed to be paid as income:
Provided that in applying the said paragraph (b) to any settlor—
(i) the references to sums paid by virtue or in  consequence of the 
settlement or any enactment relating thereto include only 
sums paid out of property originating from that settlor or 
income originating from that se ttlo r; and
; (ii) the reference to the income which by virtue or in  consequence 
of the settlement has been paid to or for the benefit of a child 
of the settlor or dealt w ith as mentioned in subsection (2) 
of the said section includes only income originating from that 
settlor.
3 . The references in this Part of this Schedule to income originating, 
and property originating, from a settlor have the meanings assigned 
to them by paragraph 5 of Part I  of this Schedule, except that para­
graph (6) of sub-paragraph (2) of the said paragraph 5 must be treated 
as omitted.
Part III.
A p p lic a t io n  o f  F in a n c e  A c t, 1922, s. 20 .
1. Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Schedule, section 
twenty of the Finance Act, 1922, has effect in relation to each person 
who has made the disposition as if  he were the only person who had 
• made it.
2 . References in the said section twenty to income payable or applic­
able by virtue or in consequence of the disposition include, in relation 
to any person making the disposition, only—
(a) income from property which that person has provided directly 
or indirectly for the purposes of the disposition ; and
(b) income from property representing that property; and
(c) income from so much of any property which represents both
property provided as aforesaid and other property as, on a 
just apportionment, represents the property so provided; and
(d) income provided directly or indirectly by that person.
3 . In  this Part of this Schedule, references to property which 
represents other property include references to property which 
represents accumulated income from that other property.
APPENDIX G
1. Section 28 Finance Act 1946
2. Charitable Deeds Of Covenant 1946 To 1954.
APPENDIX G1
Section 28 Finance Act 1946
(1) Where, during the life of the settlor, income arising under a 
settlement made on or after the tenth day of April, nineteen 
hundred and forty-six, is, under the settlement and in the 
events that occur, payable to or applicable for the benefit of 
any person other than the settlor, then, unless, under the 
settlement and in the said events, the income either:
(a) is payable to an individual for his own use; or
(b) is applicable for the benefit of an individual named in
that behalf in the settlement or of two or more
individuals named in that behalf therein; or
(c) is applicable for the benefit of a child or children of an
individual named in that behalf in the settlement; or
(d) is incane from property of which the settlor has divested 
himself absolutely by the settlement; or
(e) is incane which, by virtue of sane provision of the Income 
Tax Acts other than this section, is to be treated for the 
purposes of those Acts as income of the settlor.
the incane shall be treated for the purposes of surtax as the 
income of the settlor and not as the income of any other 
person:
Provided that the exceptions provided for by paragraphs (a), 
(b) and (c) of this subsection shall not apply where the named 
individual or individuals or, in the case of the said 
paragraph (c), either the named individual or the child or any 
of the children in question, is in the service of the settlor 
or accustomed to act as the solicitor or agent of the settlor.
(2) The settlor shall not be deemed for the purposes of this 
section to have divested himself absolutely of any property if 
that property or any income therefrom or any property directly 
or indirectly representing proceeds of, or of income from, 
that property or any income therefrom is, or will or may 
become, payable to him or applicable for his benefit in any 
circumstances whatsoever:
Provided that a settlor shall not be deemed not to have 
divested himself absolutely of any property by reason only 
that that property or incane therefrom or any such other 
property or income as aforesaid may become payable to him or 
applicable for his benefit in the event of:
(a) the bankruptcy of some person who is or may become 
beneficially entitled to any such property or income; or
(b) an assignment of or charge on any such property or income 
being made or given by some such person; or
.(c) in the case of a marriage settlement, the death of both 
the parties to the marriage and of all or any of the 
children of the marriage; or
(d) the death under the age of twenty-five or sane lower age 
of sane person who would be beneficially entitled to that 
property or income on attaining that age.
(3) In this section, the expressions "income arising under a 
settlement", "settlement" and "settlor" have the meanings 
assigned to them for the purposes of Part IV of the Finance 
Act, 1938, by subsection (4) of section forty-one of that 
Act; and Part I of the Sixth Schedule to the Finance Act,
1943 (which relates to settlements with more than one settlor) 
shall have effect in relation to this section as it has effect 
in relation to the said Part IV.
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APPENDIX H
Income Tax Act 1952 - Settlement Provisions
Finance Act 1958 Section 21
Finance Act 1958 Section 22
Finance Act 1958 Section 20
APPENDIX HI
INCOME TAX ACT 1952, SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
PART X V III
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR TAXATION OF SETTLORS, 
ETC. IN  RESPECT OF SETTLED OR TRANSFERRED 
INCOME
Chapter I
D is p o s it io n s  o f  I nco m e  fo r  Sh o r t  Pe r io d s  a n d  I rrevo cable  
D is p o s it io n s  in  F a v o u r  o f  C h il d r e n  e f fe c te d  befo re  
A p r il  22n d , 1936
392. Any income which, by virtue or in consequence of any : 
disposition made, directly or indirectly, by any person after the: 
first day of May, nineteen hundred and twenty-two (other than a 
disposition made for valuable and sufficient consideration), is pay­
able to or applicable for the benefit of any other person for a 
period which cannot exceed six years shall be deemed for all 
the purposes of this Act to be the income of the person, if living, 
by whom the disposition was made, and not to be the income 
of any other person.
393.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any income 
which, by virtue or in consequence of any disposition made, 
directly or indirectly, by any person after the fifth day of April, 
nineteen hundred and fourteen, is payable to or applicable for 
the benefit of a child of that person for some period less than 
the life of the child shall, if and so long as the child is an infant 
and unmarried, be deemed for all the purposes of this Act to 
be the income of the person, if living, by whom the disposition 
was made and not to be the income of any other person.
(2) This section shall not apply in relation to any settlement, 
as defined for the purpose of Chapter I I  of this Part of this 
Act, except a settlement made or entered into before the twenty- 
second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, which, 
immediately before that date, was an irrevocable settlement 
within the meaning of the said Chapter II.
(3) This section shall not apply as regards any income which 
is derived from capital which, at the end of the period during 
which that income is payable to or applicable for the benefit of 
the child, is required by the disposition to be held on trust 
absolutely for, or to be transferred to, the child, or any income 
which is payable to or applicable for the benefit of a child 
during the whole period of the life of the person by whom the 
disposition was made.
(4) Income shall not be deemed, for the purposes of this 
section, to be payable to or applicable for the benefit of a child
APPENDIX HI
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between 
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o f Chapter I 
to dispositions 
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is more than 
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for some period less than its life by reason only that the dis­
position contains a provision for the payment to some other 
person of the income in the event of the bankruptcy of the child, 
or of an assignment thereof, or a charge thereon, being executed 
by the child.
394.—(1) Where, by virtue of this Chapter, any income tax 
becomes chargeable on and is paid by the person by whonTa 
disposition was made, that person shall be entitled—
(a) to recover from any trustee or other person to whom the ;
income is payable by virtue or in consequence of the 
disposition the amount of the tax so paid; and
(b) for that purpose to require the Commissioners concerned
to furnish to him a certificate specifying the amount 
of the income in respect of which he has so paid tax 
and the amount of the tax so paid.
and any certificate so furnished shall be conclusive evidence of 
the facts appearing thereby.
(2) Where any person obtains in respect of any allowance or 
relief a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount of the 
repayment to which he would but for the provisions of this 
Chapter have been entitled, an amount equal to the excess shall 
be paid by him to the trustee or other person to whom the in­
come is payable by virtue or in consequence of the disposition, 
or, where there are two or more such persons, shall be 
apportioned among those persons as the case may require.
If  any question arises as to the amount of any payment or as 
to any apportionment to be made under this subsection, that 
question shall be decided by the General Commissioners whose 
decision thereon shall be final.
(3) Any income which is deemed by virtue of this Chapter to 
be the income of any person shall be deemed to be the highest 
part of his income.
395.—(1) In the case of any disposition where there is more 
than one person who made the disposition, this Chapter shall, 
subject to the provisions of this section, have effect in relation 
to each person who made the disposition as if he were the only 
person who had made it.
(2) In the case of any such disposition, references in this 
Chapter to income payable or applicable by virtue or in con­
sequence of the disposition include, in relation to any person 
making the disposition, only—■
(a) income from property which that person has provided 
directly or indirectly for the purposes of the dis­
position ; and
(b) income from property representing that property; and
(c) income from so much of any property which represents
both property provided as aforesaid and other property 
as, on a just apportionment, represents the property so 
provided; and
(d) income provided directly or indirectly by that person.
(3) In this section, references to property which represents
other property include references to property which represents 
accumulated income from that other property.
396. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires—  
“ child ” includes a stepchild or illegitimate child; and 
“ disposition ” includes any trust, covenant, agreement or 
arrangement.
Chapter I I  
Settlements on Children G enerally
•397.—(1) Where, by virtue or in consequence of any settle­
ment to which this Chapter applies and during the life of the 
settlor, any income is paid to or for the benefit of a child of 
the settlor in any year of assessment, the income shall...if.at...the. 
commencement, of that year the . .child was an infant and un­
married, be treated for all the purposes of this Act as the income 
of the settlor for that year and not as the income of any other 
person.
(2) This Chapter applies to every settlement, wheresoever it 
was made or entered into, and whether it was made or entered 
into before or after the passing of this Act, except a settlement 
made or entered into before the twenty-second day of April, 
nineteen hundred and thirty-six, which immediately before that 
date was irrevocable.
(3) Income paid to or for the benefit of a child of a settlor 
shall not be treated as provided in subsection (1) of this section 
for any year of assessment in which the aggregate amount of the 
income paid to or for the benefit of that child, which, but for 
this subsection, would be so treated by virtue of this Chapter, 
does not exceed five pounds.
(4) This Chapter shall not apply in relation to any income 
arising under a settlement in any year of assessment for which 
the settlor is not chargeable to income tax as a resident in the 
United Kingdom, and references in this Chapter to income shall 
be construed accordingly.
398.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, for the 
purposes of this Chapter—
(a) income which, by virtue or in consequence of a settle­
ment to which this Chapter applies, is so dealt with that 
it, or assets representing it, will or may become payable 
or applicable to or for the benefit of a child of the
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settlor in the future (whether on the fulfilment of a 
condition, or the happening of a contingency, or as 
the result of the exercise of a power or discretion con­
ferred on any person, or otherwise) shall be deemed 
to be paid to or for the benefit of that child ; and
(b) any income dealt with as aforesaid which is not required 
by the settlement to be allocated, at the time when it 
is so dealt with, to any particular child or children of 
the settlor shall be deemed to be paid in equal shares 
to or for the benefit of each of the children to or for 
the benefit of whom or any of whom the income or 
assets representing it will or may become payable or 
applicable.
(2) Where any income is dealt with as mentioned in subsection
(1) of this section by virtue or in consequence of a settlement 
to which this Chapter applies, being p .settlement which, at the 
time when the income is so dealt with, is an irrevocaBle settle­
ment—
(a) the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not
apply to that income unless and except to the extent 
that that income consists of, or represents directly or 
indirectly, sums paid by the settlor which are allow­
able as deductions in computing his total income; and
(b) any sum whatsoever paid thereafter by virtue or in con­
sequence of the settlement, or any enactment relating 
thereto, to or for the benefit of a child of the settlor, 
being a child who, at the commencement of the year of 
assessment in which the sum is paid is an infant and 
unmarried, shall be deemed for the purposes of the 
last preceding section to be paid as income, unless and 
except to the extent that the sum so paid together with 
any other sums previously so paid (whether to that 
child or to any other child who, at the commencement 
of the year of assessment in which that other sum was 
so paid, was an infant and unmarried) exceeds the 
aggregate amount of the income which, by virtue or 
in consequence of the settlement, has been paid to or 
for the benefit of a child of the settlor, or dealt with 
as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, since 
the date when the settlement took effect or the date 
when it became irrevocable, whichever is the later.
-399. For the purposes of this Chapter, a settlement shall not 
be deemed to be irrevocable if the terms thereof provide—
(a) for the payment to the settlor or, during the life of the 
settlor, to the wife or husband of the settlor for his or 
her benefit, or for the application for the benefit of the 
settlor or, during the life of the settlor, of the wife or 
husband of the settlor, of any income or assets in any
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circumstances whatsoever during the life of any child 
of the settlor to or for the benefit of whom any income, 
or assets representing it, is or are or may be payable or 
applicable by virtue or in consequence of the settle­
ment; or
(b) for the determination of the settlement by the act or on
the default of any person ; or
(c) for the payment of any penalty by the settlor in the
event of his failing to comply with the provisions of the 
settlement:
Provided that a settlement shall not be deemed to be revocable 
by reason only—
(i) that it contains a provision under which any income or
assets will or may become payable to or applicable for 
the benefit of the settlor, or the wife or husband of the 
settlor, on the bankruptcy of any such child as is men­
tioned in paragraph (a) of this section or in the event of 
an assignment of or charge on that income or those 
assets being executed by such a child; or
(ii) that it provides for the determination of the settlement
as aforesaid in such a manner that the determination 
will not, during the lifetime of any such child as afore­
said, benefit:*ny person other than such a child, or the 
wife, husband or issue of such a child or
(iii) in the case of a settlement to which section thirty-three 
of the Trustee Act, 1925, applies, that it directs income 
to be held for the benefit of such a child as aforesaid on 
protective trusts, unless the trust period is a period 
less than the life of the child or the settlement specifies 
some event on the happening of which the child would, 
if the income were payable during the trust period to 
him absolutely during that period, be deprived of the 
right to receive the income or part thereof.
400.—(1)'Where, by virtue of this Chapter, any income tax 
becomes chargeable on and is paid by the person by whom a 
settlement was made or entered into, that person shall be 
entitled—
(a) to recover from any trustee or other person to whom the
income is payable by virtue or in consequence o f the 
settlement the amount o f the tax so p a id ; and
(b) fo r that purpose to require the Commissioners concerned
to furnish to him  a certificate specifying the amount o f 
income in respect o f which he has so paid tax and the 
amount o f the tax so paid,
and any certificate so furnished shall be conclusive evidence o f 
the facts appearing thereby.
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(2) Where any person obtains in respect of any allowance or 
relief a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount of the 
repayment to which he would but for the provisions of this 
Chapter have been entitled, an amount equal to. the excess shall 
be paid by him to the trustee or other person to whom the 
income is payable by virtue or in consequence of the settlement, 
or, where there are two or more such persons, shall be appor­
tioned among those persons as the case may require.
If  any question arises as to the amount of any payment or as 
to any apportionment to be made under this subsection, that 
question shall be decided by the General Commissioners whose 
decision thereon shall be final.
(3) Any income which is deemed by virtue of this Chapter to 
be the income of any person shall be deemed to be the highest 
part of his income.
(4) No. repayment shall be made under section two hundred 
and twenty-eight of this Act (which provides for relief where 
income is accumulated for the benefit of a person contingently 
on his attaining some specified age or marrying) on account of 
tax paid in respect of any income which by virtue of this 
Chapter has been treated as income of a settlor.
401.—(1) In the case of any settlement where there is more 
than one settlor, this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions 
of this section, have effect in relation to each settlor as if he 
were the only settlor.
(2) In the case of any such settlement as aforesaid, only the 
following can, for the purposes of this Chapter, be taken into 
account, in relation to any settlor, as income paid by virtue 
or in consequence of the settlement to or for the benefit of a 
child of the settlor, that is to say—
(a) income originating from that settlor; and 
ib) in a case in which paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of 
section three hundred and ninety-eight of this Act 
applies, any sums which are under that paragraph to 
be deemed to be paid as income:
Provided that in applying the said paragraph \b) to any 
settlor—
(i) the references to sums paid by_ virtue or in consequence
of the settlement or any enactment relating thereto 
include only sums paid out of property originating 
from that settlor or income originating from that 
settlor; and
(ii) the reference to income which by virtue or in con­
sequence of the settlement has been paid to or for 
the benefit of a child of the settlor or dealt with as 
mentioned in subsection (1) of that section includes 
only income originating from that settlor.
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(3) References in this section to property originating from 
a settlor are references to—
(a) property which that settlor has provided directly or ;
indirectly for the purposes of the settlement; and
(b) property representing that property; and
(c) so much of any property which represents both property
provided as aforesaid and other property as, on a 
just apportionment, represents the property so 
provided.
(4) References in this section to income originating from 
a settlor are references to—
{a) income from property originating from that settlor; 
and
Kb) income provided directly or indirectly by that settlor.
(5) In subsections (3) and (4) of this section—
(a) references to property or income which a settlor has
provided directly or indirectly include references to 
property or income which has been provided directly 
or indirectly by another person in pursuance of 
reciprocal arrangements with that settlor but do not 
include references to property or income which that 
settlor has provided directly or indirectly in pursuance 
of reciprocal arrangements with another person; and
(b) references to property which represents other property 
include references to property which represents accumu­
lated income from that other property.
402. The General or Special Commissioners may by notice 
in writing require any party to a settlement to furnish them 
within such time as they may direct (not being less than twenty- 
eight days) with such particulars as they think necessary for 
the purposes of this Chapter, and if that person without reason­
able excuse fails to comply with the notice he shall be liable 
to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds and, after judgment has 
been given for that penalty, to a further penalty of the like 
amount for every day during which the failure continues.
403. In this Chapter—
“ child ” includes a stepchild, an adopted child and an 
illegitimate child;
“ settlement ” includes any disposition, trust, covenant, 
■agreement, arrangement or transfer of assets;
“ settlor in relation to a settlement, includes any person 
by whom the settlement was made or entered into 
directly or indirectly, and in particular (but without 
prejudice to the generality of the preceding words of 
this definition) includes any person who has provided
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or undertaken to.provide funds directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of the settlement, or has made with any 
other person a reciprocal arrangement for that other 
person to make or enter into the settlement;
** income ”, except in the phrase (occurring in subsection (1) 
of section three hundred and ninety-seven of this Act) 
“ be treated for all the purposes of this Act as the 
income of the settlor for that year and not as the 
income of any other person ”, includes any income 
chargeable to income tax by deduction or otherwise 
and any income which would have been so chargeable 
if it had been received in the United Kingdom by a 
person resident and ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom.
Chapter I I I
R evocable Settlements, Settlements where Settlor 
R etains an Interest, etc. '
404.— (1) If  and so long as the terms of any settlement are 
.such that—
(a) any person has or may have power, whether im­
mediately or in the future, and whether with or without 
the consent of any other person, to revoke or other­
wise determine the settlement or any provision thereof 
and, in the event of the exercise of the power, the settlor 
or the wife or husband of the settlor will or may cease 
to be liable to make any annual payments payable 
by virtue or in consequence of any provision of the 
settlement; or
(b) the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor may,
whether immediately or in the future, cease, on the 
payment of a penalty, to be liable to make any annual 
payments payable by virtue or in consequence of any 
provision of the settlement,
any sums payable by the settlor or the wife or husband of the 
settlor by virtue or in consequence of that provision of the 
settlement in any year of assessment shall be treated for all the 
purposes of this Act as the income of the settlor for that year 
and not as the income of any other person:
Provided that, where any such power as is referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this subsection cannot be exercised within the 
period of six years from the time when the first of the annual 
payments so referred to becomes payable, and the like annual 
payments are payable in each year throughout that period, the 
said paragraph (a) shall not apply so long as the said power 
cannot be exercised.
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(2) If  and so long as the terms of any settlement are such 
that—
(a) any person has or may have power, whether im -:
mediately or in the future, and whether with or with­
out the consent of any other person, to revoke or 
otherwise determine the settlement or any provision 1 
thereof; and
(b) in the event of the exercise of the power, the settlor or
the wife or husband of the settlor will or may become 
beneficially entitled to the whole or any part of the 
property then comprised in the settlement or of! 
the income arising from the whole or any part of the; 
property so comprised, 
any income arising under, the settlement from the property 
comprised in the settlement in any year of assessment or from 
a corresponding part of that property, or a corresponding part 
of any such income, as the case may be, shall be treated for all 
the purposes of this Act as the income of the settlor for that 
year and not as the income of any other person:
Provided that, where any such power as aforesaid cannot be 
exercised within six years from the time when any particular 
property first becomes comprised in the settlement, this sub­
section shall not apply to income arising under the settlement 
from that property, or from property representing that property, 
so long as the power cannot be exercised.
405.—(1) If and so long as the settlor has an interest in any 
income arising under or property comprised in a settlement, any 
income so arising during the life of the settlor in any year of 
assessment shall, to the extent to which it is not distributed, be 
treated for all the purposes of this Act as the income of the 
settlor for that year and not as the income of any other person:
Provided that—
(a) if and so long as that interest is an interest neither
in the whole of the income arising under the settlement 
nor in the whole of the property comprised in the! 
settlement, the amount of income to be treated as the! 
income of the settlor by virtue of this subsection shall! 
be such part of the income which, but for this proviso,! 
would be so treated as is proportionate to the extent! 
of that interest; and
(b) where it is shown that any amount of the income which!
is not distributed in any year of assessment consists 
of income which falls to be treated as the income of 
the settlor for that year by virtue of the last preceding 
section, that amount' shall be deducted from the amount 
of income which, but for this proviso, would be treated 
as his for that year by virtue of this subsection.
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(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, the settlor 
shall be deemed to have an interest in income arising under 
or property comprised in a settlement if any income or property 
which may jat any time arise under or be comprised in that 
settlement is, or will or may become, payable to or applicable 
for the benefit of the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor 
in any circumstances whatsoever:
Provided that the settlor shall not be deemed to have an 
interest in any income arising under or property comprised in 
a settlement—
(a) if and so long as that income or property cannot become
payable or applicable as aforesaid except in the event 
of—
(i) the bankruptcy of some person who is or may 
become beneficially entitled to that income or 
property; or
(ii) any assignment of or charge on that income 
or property being made or given by some such 
person; or
(iii) in the case of a marriage settlement, the death 
of both the parties to the marriage and of all or 
any of the children of the marriage; or
(iv) the death under the age of twenty-five or
some lower age of some person who would be
beneficially entitled to that income or property on
attaining that age; or
(b) if and so long as some person is alive and under the
age of twenty-five during whose life that income or
property cannot become payable or applicable as
aforesaid except in the event of that person becoming 
bankrupt or assigning or charging his interest in that 
income or property.
406.—(1) Tax chargeable at the standard rate by virtue of the 
preceding provisions of this Chapter shall be charged under 
Case V I of Schedule D.
(2) In computing the liability to income tax of a settlor charge­
able by virtue of any of the said preceding provisions, the same 
deductions and reliefs shall be allowed as would have been 
allowed if the income treated as his by virtue of that provision 
had been received by him.
(3) Where, by virtue of any of the said preceding provisions, 
any income tax becomes chargeable on and is paid by a settlor, 
he shall be entitled—
(a) to recover from any trustee, or other person to whom 
income arises under the settlement, the amount of the 
tax so paid; and ,
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(b) for that purpose to require the Commissioners concerned 
to furnish to him a certificate specifying the amount 
of income in respect of which he has so paid tax and 
the amount of tax so paid.
Any certificate so furnished shall be conclusive evidence of 
the facts stated therein.
(4) Where any person obtains, in respect of any allowance or 
relief, a repayment of income tax in excess of the amount of 
the repayment to which he would, but for any of the said preced­
ing provisions, have been entitled, an amount equal to the excess 
shall be paid by him to the trustee or other person to whom 
income arises under the settlement, or, where there are two or 
more such persons, shall be apportioned among those persons 
as the case may require.
If any question arises as to the amount of any payment or 
as to any apportionment to be made under this subsection, that 
question shall be decided by the General Commissioners whose 
decision thereon shall be final.
(5) Any income which is treated by virtue of any of the said 
preceding provisions as income of a settlor shall be deemed 
for the purpose of this section to be the highest part of his 
income.
.(6) No repayment shall be made under section two hundred 
and twenty-eight of this Act (which provides for relief where 
income is accumulated for the benefit of a person contingently 
on his attaining some specified age or marrying) on account 
of .tax paid in respect of any income which by virtue of any of 
the said preceding provisions has been treated as income of a 
settlor.
407.—(1) Where, by virtue or in consequence of any settle­
ment to which this section applies, the settlor pays directly
or indirectly in any year of assessment to the trustees of the
settlement any sums which would, but for this subsection; be 
allowable as deductions in computing his total income for that 
year for the purposes of surtax, those sums shall not be so 
allowable to the extent to which the aggregate amount thereof 
falls within the amount of income arising under the settlement 
in that year which has not been distributed, less—
{a) so much of any income arising under the settlement 
in that year which has not been- distributed as is 
shown to consist of income which has been treated as
the income of the settlor by virtue of section four
hundred and four of this A ct; and
(b) the amount of income so arising in that year which is 
treated as the income of the settlor by virtue of section 
four hundred and five of this Act.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, any sum 
paid in any year of assessment by the settlor to any body cor­
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porate connected with the settlement in that year shall be treated 
as if it had been paid to the trustees of the settlement in that 
year by virtue or in consequence of the settlement.
(3) No relief shall be given under any of the provisions of 
this Act on account of tax paid in respect of so much of any 
income arising under a settlement in any year of assessment 
as is equal to the aggregate amount of any sums paid by the 
settlor in that, year which are not allowable as deductions by 
virtue of this section.
(4) This section shall apply to any settlement (wherever made) 
made after the twenty-sixth day of April, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-eight, and where income arising under any settlement 
(wherever made) made on or before that date is treated as the 
income of the settlor by virtue of section four hundred and 
four of this Act but ceases to be so treated by reason of any 
variation of the terms of the settlement made, after that date, or 
would have been so treated but for such a variation, this section 
shall apply to that settlement as from the date when the varia­
tion takes effect.
(5) In this section, references to sums paid by a settlor include 
references to sums paid by the wife or husband of the settlor.
408.—(1) Any capital sum paid directly or indirectly in any 
relevant year of assessment by the trustees of a settlement to 
which this section applies to the settlor shall—
(a) to the extent to which the amount of that sum falls
within the amount of income available up to the end 
of that year, be treated for all the purposes of this Act 
as the income of the settlor for that year;
(b) to the extent to which the amount of that sum exceeds
the amount of income available up to the end of that 
year but falls within the amount of the income available 
up to the end of the next following year, be treated 
for the purposes aforesaid as the income of the settlor 
for the next following year,
and so on.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the 
amount of income available up to the end of any year shall, in 
relation to any capital sum paid as aforesaid, be taken to be the 
aggregate amount of income arising under the settlement in that 
year and any previous relevant year which has not been dis­
tributed, less—
(a) the amount of any other capital sums paid to the settlor
in any relevant year before that sum was paid; and
(b) so much of any income arising under the settlement in
that year and any previous relevant year which has 
not been distributed as is shown to consist of income
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which has been treated as income of the settlor by 
virtue of section four hundred and four of this A ct; 
and
(c) any income arising under the settlement in that year
and any previous relevant year which has been treated
as the income of the settlor by virtue of section four
hundred and five of this A ct; and
(d) any sums paid by virtue or in consequence of the settle­
ment, to the extent that they are not allowable, by 
virtue of the last preceding section, as deductions in 
computing the settlor’s income for that year or any 
previous relevant year; and
ie) an amount equal to tax at the standard rate on—
(i) the aggregate amount of income arising under 
the settlement in that year and any previous relevant 
year which has not been distributed, less
(ii) the aggregate amount of the income and sums 
referred to in paragraphs ib), (c) and id) of this 
subsection.
(3) For the purpose of this section, any capital sum paid 
to the settlor in any year of assessment by any body corporate 
connected with the settlement in that year shall be treated 
as having been paid by the trustees of the settlement in that year.
(4) Where the whole or any part of any sum is treated by virtue 
of this section as income of the settlor for any year, it shall be 
treated as income of such an amount as, after deduction of tax 
at the standard rate for that year, would be equal to that sum 
or that part thereof.
(51 Tax chargeable at the standard rate by virtue of this section 
shall be charged under Case V I of Schedule D.
(6) In computing the liability to income tax of a settlor charge­
able by virtue of this section, the same deductions and reliefs 
shall be allowed’ as would have been allowed if the amount 
treated as his income by virtue of this section had been received 
by him as income.
(7) This section applies to any settlement wherever made, and 
whether made before or after the passing of this Act, and in 
this section—
“ capital sum ” means—
(i) any sum paid by way of loan or repayment of 
a loan; and
(ii) any other sum paid otherwise than as income, 
being a sum which is not paid for full consideration 
in money or money’s worth,
but does not include any sum which could not have 
become payable to the settlor except in one of the 
events specified in the proviso to subsection (2) of sec­
tion four hundred and five of this Act; and
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“ relevant year” means any year of assessment after the 
year .1937-38; and 
references to sums paid to the settlor include references to 
sums paid to the wife or husband of the settlor.
409.—(1) In the case of any settlement where there is more 
than one settlor, this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions 
of this section, have effect in relation to each settlor as if he were 
the only settlor.
(2) References in this Chapter to the property comprised in 
a settlement include, in relation to any settlor, only property 
originating from that settlor and references in this Chapter to 
income arising under the settlement include, in relation to any 
settlor, only income originating from that settlor.
(3) In considering for the purposes of this Chapter, in relation 
to any settlor, whether any, and if so, how much, of the income 
arising under the settlement has been distributed, any sums paid 
partly out of income originating from that settlor and partly 
out of other income must (so far as not apportioned by the 
terms of the settlement) be apportioned evenly over all that 
income.
(4) References in subsection (1) of section four hundred and 
four of this Act and in section four hundred and seven of this 
Act to sums payable by virtue or in consequence of any provision 
of the settlement or sums paid by virtue or in consequence of the 
settlement include, in relation to any settlor, only sums payable 
or paid by that settlor.
(5) References in this section to property originating from a 
settlor are references to—
ia) property which that settlor has provided directly or
indirectly for the purposes of the settlement; and
ib) property representing that property ; and
(c) so much of any property which represents both property 
provided as aforesaid and other property as, on a just 
apportionment, represents the property so provided.
(6) References in this section to income originating from a 
settlor are references to—
(a) income from property originating from that settlor; and
(b) so much of any such income of a body corporate
as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of 
section four hundred and eleven of this Act as corre­
sponds to property originating from the settlor which 
is comprised in the settlement; and
(c) income provided directly or indirectly by that settlor.
(7) In subsections (5) and (6) of this section—
{a) references to property or income which a settlor has 
provided directly or indirectly include references to 
property or income which has been provided directly
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or indirectly by another person in pursuance of 
reciprocal arrangements with that settlor, but do not 
include references to property or income which that: 
settlor has provided directly or indirectly in pursuance 
of reciprocal arrangements with another person; and
(b) references to property which represents other property 
include references to property which represents 
accumulated income from that other property.
410.—(1) .The General or Special Commissioners may by 
notice in writing require any person, being a party to a settle­
ment, to furnish them within such time as they may direct (not 
being less than twenty-eight days) with such particulars as they 
think necessary for the purposes of any of the provisions of this 
Chapter, and if that person without reasonable excuse fails to 
comply with the notice, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceed­
ing fifty pounds and, after judgment has been given for that 
penalty, to a further penalty of the like amount for every day 
during which the failure continues..
(2> Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (1) of this 
section,' if any party to a settlement fails to furnish any particulars 
required under that subsection, or if the General or Special 
Commissioners are not satisfied with any particulars furnished 
under that subsection, they may make an estimate of the amount 
of income which, by virtue of any of the provisions of sections 
four hundred and four, four hundred and five and four hundred 
and eight of this Act, is to be treated as the income of the 
settlor.
411.—(1) In this Chapter, “ income arising under a settle­
ment ” includes—•
(a) any income chargeable to income tax by deduction or
otherwise, and any income which would have been so 
chargeable if it had been received in the United King­
dom by a person domiciled, resident and ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom ; and
(b) where the amount of the income of any body corporate
has been apportioned under Chapter I I I  of Part IX  of 
this Act for any year or period, or could have been so ; 
apportioned if the body corporate were incorporated 
in any part of the United Kingdom, so much of the 
income of the body corporate for that year or period as 
is equal to the amount which has been or could have 
been so apportioned to the trustees of or a beneficiary 
under the settlement,
but, where the settlor is not domiciled, or not resident, or not 
ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom in any year of assess­
ment, does not include income arising under the settlement in 
that year in respect of which the settlor, if he were actually
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PARTXVin entitled thereto, would not be chargeable to income tax by
— com. deduction or otherwise by reason of his not being so domiciled,
resident or ordinarily resident.
(2) In this Chapter, “ settlement” includes any disposition, 
trust, covenant, agreement or arrangement, and “ settlor”, in 
relation to a settlement, means any person by whom the settle­
ment was made; and a person shall be deemed for the purposes 
of this Chapter to have made a settlement if he has made or 
entered into the settlement directly or indirectly, and in particular 
(but without prejudice to the generality of the preceding words)
' if he has provided or undertaken to provide funds directly or 
indirectly for the .purpose of the settlement, or has made with any 
other person a reciprocal arrangement for that other person to 
make or enter into the settlement.
(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, income arising under 
a settlement in any year of assessment shall be deemed not 
to have been distributed if and to the extent that it exceeds the 
aggregate amount of—
(a) the sums paid in that year by the trustees of the settle­
ment to any .persons (not being a body corporate con­
nected with die settlement and not being the trustees 
of another settlement made by the settlor or the trustees 
of the settlement) in such manner that they fall to 
be treated in that year, otherwise than by virtue of 
section four hundred and eight of this Act, as the 
income of those persons for the purposes of income 
tax, or would fall to be so treated if those persons 
were domiciled, resident and ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom and the sums had been paid to them 
therein; and
(b) any expenses of the trustees of the settlement paid in 
<that year which, in the absence of any express provision 
of the settlement, would be properly chargeable to 
income, in so far as such expenses are not included 
in the sums mentioned in paragraph (a) of this sub­
section ; and
(c) in a case where the trustees of the settlement are trustees
for charitable purposes, the amount by which any 
income arising under the settlement in that year in 
respect of which exemption from tax may be granted 
under sections four hundred and forty-seven and four 
hundred and forty-eight of this Act exceeds the aggre­
gate amount of any such sums or expenses as afore­
said paid in that year which are properly chargeable to 
that income.
(4) For the purposes of this Chapter, a body corporate shall 
be deemed to be connected with a settlement in any year of
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assessment if any of the income thereof for any year or period 
ending in that year of assessment—
(a) has been apportioned to the trustees of or a beneficiary
under the settlement under Chapter I I I  of Part IX  of 
this Act. or could have been so apportioned if the body 
corporate had been incorporated in the United 
Kingdom; or
(b) could have been so apportioned if the income of the
body corporate for that year or period had not been 
distributed to the members thereof and, in the case 
of a body corporate incorporated outside the United 
Kingdom, if the body corporate had been incorporated 
in the United Kingdom.
(5) The provisions of this Chapter shall be in addition to and 
not in derogation of any other provisions of this Act.
Chapter IV
Transactions R esulting in Transfer of Income to
Persons A broad 
Chapter V
Surtax Liability of Settlors in Certain Cases not
OTHERWISE DEALT W ITH IN PART X V III
415.—(1) Where, during the life of the settlor, income arising 
under a settlement made on or after the tenth day of April, nine­
teen hundred and forty-six, is, under the settlement and in the 
events that occur, payable to or applicable for the benefit of any 
person other than the settlor, then, unless, under the settlement 
and in the said events, the income either—
(a) is payable to an individual for his own use; or
(b) is applicable for the benefit of an individual named in
that behalf in the settlement, or of two or more indivi­
duals named in that behalf therein ; or
(c) is applicable for the benefit of a child or children of an
individual named in that behalf in the settlement; or
id) is income from property of which the settlor has divested 
himself absolutely by the settlement; or
(e) is income which, by virtue of some provision of this Act 
not contained in this Chapter; is to be treated for the 
purposes of this Act as income of the settlor,
the income shall be treated for the purposes of surtax as the 
income of the settlor and not as the income of any other person:
Provided that the exceptions provided for by paragraphs (a), 
ib) and (c) of this subsection shall not apply where the named 
individual or individuals or, in the case of the said paragraph (c), 
either the named individual or the child or any of the children 
in question, is in the service of the settlor or accustomed to act 
as the solicitor or agent of the settlor.
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(2) The settlor shall not be deemed for the purposes of this 
section to have divested himself absolutely of any property if that 
property or any income therefrom or any property directly or 
indirectly representing proceeds of, or of income from, that pro­
perty or any income therefrom is, or will or may become, pay­
able to him or applicable for his benefit in any circumstances 
whatsoever:
Provided that a settlor shall not be deemed not to have 
divested himself absolutely of any property by reason only that 
that property or income therefrom or any such other property 
or income as aforesaid may become payable to him or applicable 
for his benefit in the event of—
(a) the bankruptcy of some person who is or may become
beneficially entitled to any such property or income; or
(b) an assignment of or charge on any such property or
income being made or given by some such person; or
(c) in the case of a marriage settlement, the death of both
parties to the marriage and of all or any of the children 
of the marriage; or
(id) the death under the age of twenty-five or some lower age 
of some person who would be beneficially entitled to 
that property or income on attaining that age.
(3) In  this section, “ income arising under a settlement ”, 
“ settlement ” and “ settlor ” have the meanings assigned to them 
for the purposes of Chapter I I I  of this Part of this Act by 
subsections (1) and (2) of section four hundred and eleven of this 
Act; and section four hundred and nine of this Act (which 
relates to settlements with more than one settlor) shall have effect 
in relation to this section as it has effect in relation to the said 
Chapter III.
FINANCE
Revocable 
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21.—(1) In subsection (1) of section four hundred and'four ?' 
of the Income Tax Act, 1952,—
(a) the references to a power to revoke or otherwise
determine a settlement or any provision thereof shall 
be deemed to include references to any power to 
diminish the amount of any payments which are or 
may be payable under the settlement or any provision 
thereof and to any power to diminish the amount of 
any annual payments which the settlor or the wife or 
husband of the settlor is or may be liable to make by. 
virtue or in consequence of any provision o f the 
settlement;
(b) the references to the settlor or the wife or husband o f 
the settlor ceasing to be liable to make any annual 
payments payable by virtue or in consequence of any 
provision of the settlement shall be deemed to include, 
references to a diminution of the amount of any such 
annual payments which the settlor or the wife ofA 
husband of the settlor is or may be liable to make'; *
but the sums to be treated under the said subsection (1) as the)- 
income of the settlor for any year of assessment and not as thb 
income of any other person shall, where that subsection would; 
not apply but for paragraph (b) of this subsection, be such part' 
only of the sums payable as aforesaid by the settlor or the wife 
or husband of the settlor in that year as corresponds to the 
diminution mentioned in that paragraph.
(2) In subsection (2) ‘of the said section four hundred and 
four the references to a power to revoke or otherwise determine 
a settlement or any provision thereof shall be deemed to include 
references to-—
(a) any power to diminish the property comprised in the 
settlement; and
ib) any power to diminish the amount of any payments 
which are or may be payable under the settlement or 
any provision thereof to any person other than the 
settlor and the wife or husband of the settlor.
(3) Subject to subsection (4) of this section, the foregoing 
provisions of this section shall apply for all the purposes of 
income tax for the year 1958-59 and subsequent years of assess­
ment and also for estimating an individual’s total income for 
the purposes of surtax for the year 1957-58.
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(4) Where, in the case of any settlement made before the 
sixteenth day of April, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, any 
sums payable by the settlor or by the wife or husband of the 
settlor, or any income arising under the settlement, would, by 
virtue of the foregoing provisions of this section, fall to be treated 
(whether for purposes of surtax or for all the purposes of income 
tax) as the income of the settlor and not as the income of any 
other person, but would not fall to be so treated apart from 
those provisions, the sums or income shall not be so treated if—
(a) no power by reason of which they or it would fall to
be so treated has been exercised after the fifteenth day 
of April, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, or is or 
can become exercisable after the fifth day of April, 
nineteen hundred and fifty-nine, or such later date as 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue may in any 
particular case allow; and
(b) neither the settlor nor the wife or husband of the settlor 
has received or is entitled to any consideration or 
benefit an connection with the fulfilment of the con­
dition set out .in paragraph (a) of this subsection;
or if, in the case of a settlement to which subsection (1) of the 
said section four hundred and four applies by virtue of sub­
section (1) of this section, the settlement was entered into in 
connection with any judicial separation or any agreement be­
tween spouses to live separate and apart or with the dissolution 
or annulment of a marriage.
(5) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that 
sections four hundred and four and four hundred and five of the 
Income Tax Act, 1952 (which re-enact, without amendment, the 
provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of section thirty-eight of the 
finance Act, 1938), apply and always have applied in relation to 
any settlement in relation to which the said section thirty-eight 
would have applied but for its' repeal by the said Act of 1952, 
that is to say, in relation to any settlement, wherever made.
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22.— (1) I f  and so long as the terms o f any settlement Settlements— 
• (wherever made) are such that any person has o r may have discretionary 
power, whether immediately o r in the future, and whether with or 
. without the consent o f any person—  settlor etc.
(a) to pay o r apply to or fo r -the benefit o f the settlor or
the wife o r husband o f ithe settlor -the whole o r any 
part o f the income or property which may at any time 
arise under o r be comprised in the settlement; or
(b) to secure the payment or application to or fo r the 
benefit o f the settlor o r the wife o r husband o f the 
settlor o f the whole o r any part o f that income or 
p roperty;
being a power exercisable a t his discretion, any income arising 
under the settlement in  any year o f assessment or, as the case 
may be, any income so arising from the propert> comprised 
in  the settlement or from a corresponding part o f that property, 
or a corresponding part o f any such income, shall (so far as it  is 
not so treated apart from this section) be treated fo r a ll the 
purposes o f the Income Tax Acts as the income o f the settlor 
fo r that year and not as the income o f any other person, subject 
however to the following provisions o f this section.
(2) Where the power mentioned in  subsection (1) o f this 
section cannot be exercised w ith in  six years from the time when 
any income or class of income first arises under the settlement 
o r from the time when any particular property first becomes 
comprised in the settlement, then, so long as the power cannot 
be exercised, that subsection shall not apply to any income 
arising under the settlement or, as the case may be. any income 
of that class or income from that property or property repre­
senting that property.
(3) Where, under the proviso to subsection (2) o f section four 
hundred and five of the Income Tax Act, 1952, the settlor 
is not deemed to have an interest in any income arising under 
or property comprised in the settlement, subsection (1) o f this 
section shall not apply to that income or, as the case may be, 
to income arising from that property.
(4) Subject to subsection (5) o f this section, the foregoing 
provisions of this section shall apply for all the purposes of 
income tax for the year 1958-59 and subsequent years o f assess­
ment and also for estimating an individual’s total income for the 
purposes of surtax for the year 1957-58.
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(5) Where, in the case of any settlement made before the ninth 
day of July, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, any income arising 
under the settlement would, by virtue of the foregoing provisions 
of this section, fa ll to be treated (whether fo r purposes of 
surtax or for all the purposes of income tax) as the income of 
the settlor and not as the income of any other person, but 
would not fall to be so treated apart from those provisions, it 
shall not be so treated i f—
{a) no power by reason of which it  would fa ll to be so 
treated has been exercised after the eighth day of 
July, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, or is or can 
become exercisable after the fifth  day of A pril, nineteen 
hundred and fifty-nine, or such later date as the Com­
missioners of Inland Revenue may in any particular 
case a llo w ; and
(b) neither the settlor nor the wife or husband o f the settlor 
has received or is entitled to any consideration or 
benefit in  connection w ith the 'fu lfilm ent o f the con­
dition set out in  paragraph (a) o f this subsection.
(6 ) This section shall be deemed to be included in  Chapter I I I  
of Part X V I I I  o f the Income Tax Act, 1952, and to precede 
section four hundred and six thereof, and the references in 
subsection (1) o f section four hundred and seven and sub­
section (2) o f section four hundred and eight of that A ct to 
section four hundred and four thereof shall be construed as 
including references to  this section.
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2 0 .— (1) Chapter I I  o f Part X V I I I  o f the Income Tax Act, Settlements on 
I 952 (which relates to settlements on children), shall be amended children, 
in accordance w ith the follow ing provisions o f 'this section.
(2) In  relation to  a payment to  which -this subsection applies, 
the words “  at the time of the payment ”  shall be substituted fo r 
(lie words “  at the commencement o f that year ”  in subsection (1) 
of section three hundred and ninety-seven o f that A ct (which 
relates to payments in  any year o f assessment to  o r fo r the 
benefit of a child who at the commencement o f that year was an 
infant and unmarried) and fo r the words “  at the commencement 
o f  the year o f assessment in  which the sum is paid ”  in  para­
graph (b ) of subsection (2 ) o f section three hundred and ninety- 
eight of that A c t (which makes provision supplementary to the 
j:nd section three hundred and ninety-seven).
(3) The reference in the said paragraph (b) to another sum 
previously paid to or for the benefit of a child who, at the 
commencement-of the year of assessment in which it was paid, 
was an infant and unmarried, shall be construed, in relation to a 
payment to which this subsection applies of any such sum, as 
a reference to a sum so paid to or for the benefit of a child who 
at the time of the payment was an infant and unmarried.
14) Subseotions (2) and (3) of this section apply to any pay­
ment made after the year 1957-58, except a payment made in 
the year 1958-59 to or for the benefit of a child born after the 
sixth day of April, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, and so made, 
by virtue or in consequence of a settlement made before the 
ninth day of July of that year.
(5) In paragraph (ii) o f the proviso to section three hundred 
and ninety-nine o f -the Income Tax Act, 1952 (which enables a 
settlement to be treated as irrevocable fo r the purposes o f the 
said Chapter I I  notwithstanding that i t  provides fo r its deter­
mination, i f  the determination w ill not, during the lifetime of 
such a child as is mentioned in that section, benefit any person 
'thcr than such a child, or the wife, husband or issue of such a 
child). for the words from “ any person”  to “ issue o f such a 
child ”  there shall be substituted die words “  the settlor or the 
wife or husband o f the se ttlo r” .
(6) In  relation -to a settlement which would not have been 
^revocable w ith in the meaning o f the said Chapter I I  but fo r 
subsection (5) o f this section, the reference in  paragraph (b) of 
subsection (2) o f the said section three hundred and ninety-eightp 
to the date when it became irrevocable shall be construed a* 
referring to the sixth day of A pril, nineteen hundred and fiffcvt1 
eight.
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Chapter 11 of Part XVIII 
(Settlements on children)
The definition of "incane" in section 
four hundred and three shall apply in 
relation to gains arising from the 
acquisition and disposal of chargeable 
assets as it would apply if thegains 
were profits, from a trade of dealing in 
the assets, and any such gains shall be 
treated as payable in the first 
instance to the person to whom they 
accrue; but, in the case of settled 
property within the meaning of Case 
VII, paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of 
section three hundred and ninety-eight 
of that Act shall have effect in 
relation to gains so arising from the 
settled property only in so far as they 
exceed losses so arising therefrom.
Chapter III of Part XVIII, 
including the Finance Act 
1958, section 22 (Revocable 
settlements etc.)
In the definition in section four 
hundred and eleven of "income arising 
under a settlement" references to income 
shall include the amount of any gains 
arising from the acquisition and 
disposal of chargeable assets subject 
to the like deduction for losses so 
arising as would be made under Case 
VII? but that amount shall be left out 
of account under section four hundred 
and seven.
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Finance Bill 1965
(1) In subsection (1) of section 415 of the Income Tax Act 1952 
(under which income arising under a settlement is treated for 
the purposes of surtax as the income of the settlor unless 
the income falls into one of the paragraphs of that 
subsection) paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) (which relate to 
income payable to or applicable for the benefit of 
individuals) shall cease to have effect.
(2) In subsection (2) of the said section 415 (which has the 
effect that income arising under a settlement is treated for 
the purposes of surtax as the income of the settlor if it is 
income from property and that property, or any property or 
incane derived from it, is, or will or may become payable to 
or applicable for the benefit of the settlor) references to 
any property or* income becoming payable to or applicable for 
the benefit of the settlor shall include references to 
property or incane payable to or applicable for the benefit 
of the wife or husband of the settlor.
(3) This section applies to settlements made on or after 7th 
April 1965.
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Surtax on 12.— (1) In  subsection (1) o f section 415 of the Income Tax'
income under J9 5 2  (under which income arising under a settlement is
wttlements. treated fo r the purposes o f surtax as the income of the settlor
1952 c. 10. unless the income falls into one o f the paragraphs of that sub­
section) paragraphs (a), (b ) and (c) (which relate to income 
payable to or applicable fo r the benefit o f individuals) shall cease 
to have effect
(2) In  subsection (2) of the said section 415 (which has the 
effect that income arising under a settlement is treated fo r the 
purposes of surtax as the income of the settlor i f  i t  is income 
from property and that property, or any property o r income 
derived from  it, is, or w ill o r may become payable to h im  or 
applicable fo r his benefit) fo r the words “ payable to  him or 
applicable fo r his benefit” , where they first occur, there shall 
be substituted the words “ payable to or applicable fo r the 
benefit o f die setdor or the wife or husband o f the se ttlo r” , 
and, .where they next occur, there shall be substituted the words 
“ payable or applicable as aforesaid” .
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, subsection
(1) o f the said section 415 shall not apply to income consisting 
o f annual payments made—
(a) under a partnership agreement, by a member o f a
partnership to or fo r the benefit o f a person, or, i f  
he is dead, the widow or dependants of a person, 
who has ceased to be a member o f the partnership 
by retirement or death; or
(b ) by any person, in  connection w ith  the acquisition by
him o f the whole or part o f a business, to or fo r the 
benefit o f the person from  whom it  is acquired or, i f  
he is dead, his widow or dependants,
being, in  either case, payments made under a liab ility  incurred 
fo r fu ll consideration; or to income arising under a settlement 
made by one party to a marriage by way o f provision for the 
other after the dissolution or annulment o f the marriage or 
while they are separated under an order o f a court or under 
a separation agreement, being income payable to or applicable 
for the benefit o f that other party.
(4) This section applies to settlements made on or after 7th 
A p ril 1965.
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21. (1) Notwithstanding section 12(1) of the Finance Act Surtax on
1065 (which extends section 415(1) o f the Income Tax Act income under 
1952 so as to treat certain income arising under a settlement ^ { ^ ents: 
us being fo r surtax purposes the income o f the settlor) the said exceptions to 
section ^415(1) shall not apply to income consisting o f annual s. 415(1) of 
puyments made under a partnership agreement to or for the Act of 1952. 
benefit of a former member, or the widow or dependants o f a 1965 c. 25. 
deceased former member, o f the partnership, being payments 1952 c. 10. 
made under a liab ility  incurred fo r fu ll consideration.
(2) Notwithstanding the said section 12(1), the said section 
■115(1) shall not apply to income consisting of annual payments 
made by an individual, in connection with the acquisition by him 
of the whole or part of a business—
(a) to or fo r the benefit of the individual from whom i t  is
acquired or, if he is dead, to or for the benefit of his 
widow or dependants, or
(b) if the acquisition was from a partnership, to or for the
benefit of a former member, or the widow or depen­
dants o f a deceased former member, o f that or any 
preceding partnership, or to or fo r the benefit o f an 
individual from whom the business or part was acquired 
by that or any preceding partnership or, i f  he is dead, 
to or fo r the benefit of the widow or dependants of such 
an individual,
being payments made under a liab ility  incurred fo r fu ll 
consideration.
(3) Payments made in respect of any individual under a 
liability incurred in connection w ith an acquisition from a 
partnership shall not be excluded from the operation of the said 
section 415(1) bv virtue of paragraph (b ) of the last fore2o in | 
subsection unless they are made in. substitution, wholly or iq: 
part, for other payments which, if  they had been made, would? 
themselves have been excluded from its operation.
(4) Where the right of a former member of a partnership to! 
payments falling due not more than ten years after he ceased t<3 
be a member of that partnership has devolved on his death, sub| 
sections (I) and (2) above shall apply to the payments as they! 
would apply if  he had not died. 1
fr
(5) Notwithstanding the said section 12(1), the said section!
415(1) shall not apply to income arising under a settlement made* 
by one party to a marriage by way of provision fo r the other afteri 
the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, or while they are  ^
separated under an order of a court or under a separations 
agreement, or in such circumstances that the separation is likely^ 
to be permanent, being income payable to or applicable for thef 
benefit o f that other party. 4
(6 ) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “  former member ” , in relation to a partnership, means'l
an individual who has ceased to be a member of thata 
partnership on retirement or death, '
(b ) a partnership becomes a “ preceding partnership”  of I
another if  it transfers its business or part of its business! 
to another and one or more individuals are members of;- 
both, and any preceding partnership of the transferor;: 
by reference to any part of the business transferred . 
shall also become a preceding partnership of the?- 
transferee. '§
(7) This section shall be in substitution for section 12(3) o f the 
Finance Act 1965. and shall have effect for the year 1965-66 
as well as for later years of assessment.
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23. Surtax on income under certain settlements: exceptions to s. 
415 (1) of Act of 1952.— (1) Notwithstanding section 12 (1) of the Finance Act 
1965 (which extends section 415 (1) of the Income Tax Act 1952 so as to treat 
certain income arising under a settlement as being for surtax purposes the income 
of the settlor) the said section 415 (1) Shall not apply to income consisting of annual 
payments made under a partnership agreement to or for the benefit of a former 
member1, or the widow or dependants of a deceased former member, of the partner­
ship, being payments made under a liability incurred for full consideration.
(2) Notwithstanding the said section 12 (1), the said section 415 (1) shall not 
apply to income consisting of annual payments made by an individual, in connection 
with the acquisition by him of the whole or part of a business—
(a) to or for the benefit of the individual from whom it is acquired or, if he is
dead, to or for the benefit of his widow or dependants, or
(b) if the acquisition was from a partnership, to or for the benefit of a former
member, or the widow or dependants of a deceased former member, of 
that or any preceding partnership1, or to or for the benefit of an individual 
from whom the business or part was acquired by that or any preceding 
partnership or, if he is dead, to or for the benefit of the widow or dependants 
of such an individual,
being payments made under a liability incurred for full consideration. 1
(3) Payments made in respect of any individual under a liability incurred in 
connection with an acquisition from a partnership shall only be excluded from the 
operation of the said section 415 (1) by virtue of paragraph (b) of the last foregoing 
subsection if, and to the extent that, they are made in substitution for, or matched 
by reductions in, other payments which would themselves be excluded from its 
operation.
(4) Where the right of a former member of a partnership to payments falling 
due not more than ten years after he ceased to be a member of that partnership has 
devolved on his death, subsections (1) and (2) above shall apply to the payments 
as they would apply if he had not died.
(5) Notwithstanding the said section 12 (1), the said section 415 (1) shall not 
apply to income arising under a settlement made by one party to a marriage by 
way of provision for the other after the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, 
or while they are separated under an order of a court or under a separation agree­
ment or in such circumstances that the separation is likely to be permanent, being 
income payable to or applicable for the benefit of that other party.
(6) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “former member”, in relation to a partnership, means an individual who
has ceased to be a member of that partnership on retirement or death,
(b) a partnership becomes a “preceding partnership” of another if it transfers
its business or part of its business to another and one or more individuals 
are members of both, and any preceding partnership of the transferor 
by reference to any part of the business transferred shall also become a 
preceding partnership of the transferee.
(7) This section shall be in substitution for section 12 (3) of the Finance Act 
1965, and shall have effect for the year 1965-661 as well as for later years of 
assessment1.
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Text Of An Anonymous Letter Sent To The Chairman Of The Board 
Of Inland Revenue
APPENDIX J1
THE EXAMPLE OF THE CHARITY FORM OF AVOIDANCE PROVIDED TO THE 
CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY - DECEMBER 15, 1976
A charity which was specially formed for the purpose borrowed money 
fran a finance house and used it to buy annuities from high rate 
taxpayers. Suppose one taxpayer, A, undertook to pay £10,000 net for 
five years or for his life, in return for (say) £49,000. A is 
required to use this money, and £1,000 of his own, to purchase 
promissory notes for £50,000 from a subsidiary of the finance house. 
(Thus the money has moved round from the finance house to one of its 
subsidiaries.) The promissory notes are lodged with the charity who 
in turn use them as security for their loan. With the.aid of bridging 
finance, each instalment of the annuity is effectively paid from the 
proceeds of part of the promissory notes and goes to reduce the 
charity's loan. (With each payment, therefore, the money moves again 
in a circle in the opposite direction.) It is is contended that the 
annuity is sold for an open market price and that consequently A is 
entitled to a deduction of £15,384 (£10,000 net grossed up at 35 per 
cent) in computing his liability to higher rate tax and investment 
income surcharge for each year in which the annuity is payable; basic 
rate income tax deducted frcm each instalment of the annuity, in 
figures, the position would be thus:
A pays each year to the charity £10,000
Higher rate tax saving expected:
£15,384 at say 48 per cent (83 - 35 per cent) £ 7,384
Net annual cost £ 2,616
Cost over five years £13,080
Received from the charity £49,000
Profit to A £35,920
Charity receives each year from A £10,000
Basic rate tax reclaimed £ 5,384
£15,384
Receipts for five years £76,920
Payment to A £49,000
Profit to charity £27,920
It is the intention that the Revenue should lose 5 x £7,384 + £5,384 
= £63,840.
A and the charity gain £35,920 + £27,920 = £63,840, all at the 
expense of the Revenue.
APPENDIX J2
ANONYMOUS LETTER SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF INLAND REVENUE
20th March 1977
Sir William Pile KCB MBE 
The Boardroom 
Somerset House
Dear Sir William 
REPREHENSIBLE TAX AVOIDANCE
I do not think you have dealt with the scheme currently being peddled 
round the City.
I wonder if you appreciate that your failure to take more effective 
long term measures ("artificial transactions of which the main purpose 
is the avoidance of tax shall be void for tax purposes") against these 
schemes leads to intolerable pressure on corporate tax advisers whose 
Boards are inclined to favour avoidance of any kind? in this context 
you will perhaps understand why this letter is not signed.
I enclose, I trust for your early attention, brief details of the 
latest scheme-to exploit S 248.
If this letter becomes the basis on which you kill this scheme I would 
very much appreciate an acknowledgement - you might think an insertion 
in the personal column of The Times on 27th March would be appropriate.
TAX SCHEME
P acquires an investment company, Q, with £1,000 share capital and 
they make a Section 256 (2) election.
P enters into an annuity, tied to the death of a named individual, but 
for 7 years minimum, for (say) £1,000,000 per annum in favour of Q.
Q pays P £6,000,000, being the actuarial value of the covenant.
Q borrows the £6,000,000.
P pays the first instalment of £1,000,000 under a Section 256 (2) 
election.
Q converts its share capital so that all the voting rights are passed 
into 100 shares. R acquires 75% control of Q frcm P (75% for group 
relief purposes).
P pays a non-resident company £5,000,000 in consideration for the 
non-resident company taking over the residual liability under the 
covenant. P sells its remaining share in Q to R.
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